



"This book presents the state of the art of the central issues that mark the formation of Rio de Janeiro as city-metropolis, bringing together selected texts translated into the English language. This is a special collection of seventeen articles, already published, which are representative of the production of the Observatório das Metr6poles, whose focus is the dynamics of the Cariocan city. We aim to submit to foreign audiences some of the reflections on the Brazilian metropolitan question, and, more specifically, on the urban space of Rio de Janeiro, which were developed by our network and which present various theoretical and methodological models. The variety of themes and subjects dealt with reflects the multidisciplinary capacity of a team that thinks and perceives the Urban in a plural and complementary way, and that aims to consolidate its own theoretical-conceptual framework consistent with the reality of the country".



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# THE METROPOLIS OF RIO DE JANEIRO A SPACE IN TRANSITION

**BRAZIL IS NOT ONLY URBAN**, it is also an increasingly metropolitan country. Today, the Brazilian urban network comprises 13 cities with over one million inhabitants, megacities (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), 52 metropolitan areas and 9 urban-regional agglomerations.

Monitoring trends of reconfiguration of urban agglomerates, understanding their role in the territorial coordination on global, national and regional scales, as well as the differences between them, has been the contribution that the INCT Observatório das Metrôpoles has given to the country in recent years.

The institute, originated in the 1990s, when analyzing the transformations of the needs and social inequalities in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ), joined the Millennium Institutes Program (CNPq) in 2005 and the group of the National Institutes of Science and Technology (INCT) in 2009, under the coordination of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) in partnership with the Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation of Rio de Janeiro State (FAPERJ). Over the past five years – 2009-2013 – the National Network INCT Observatório das Metrôpoles has been recognized as an innovative scientific experiment by conducting research in a collaborative and creative way, overcoming not only inter- and intra-universities and disciplinary borders, but also borders of sectorial and regional policies, and producing expertise in different fronts, especially in the development of methodologies and tools for the research of the metropolitan question.

The innovations of the INCT Observatório das Metrôpoles are expressed in various formats, such as the search for new models of public policies, the provision of strategic data for the intervention of various societal actors – governmental, third sector, private sector, and civil society in general – related to the metropolitan theme, as well as the set of outreach activities aimed at strengthening their capacity to intervene in a number of arenas and forums.

Now, with this release – The Metropolis of Rio de Janeiro: a space in transition – the institute directs its efforts at the international dissemination of the Brazilian metropolitan reality. In the case of this selection of articles in English, the object of investigation is the formation of Rio de Janeiro as a city-metropolis. From its cycle of decay and crisis, started in the late 1970s and deepened in the 1980s, to the period of recovery from the second half of the 2000s with the so-called "Carioca miracle", through several topics such as the evolution of slum populations, housing, labor market, urban inequality, until approaching the process of commodification of the city in the context of the mega sporting events.

In this moment that the city of Rio de Janeiro is about to celebrate the 450 years of its foundation, I congratulate all the researchers of the *INCT Observatório das Metrôpoles*, coordinated by Professor Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro, for the beautiful and timely work being made available.

**Ruy Garcia Marques**

President of the Carlos Chagas Filho  
Research Support Foundation  
of Rio de Janeiro State – FAPERJ

**THE METROPOLIS OF RIO DE JANEIRO**  
A SPACE IN TRANSITION



LUIZ CESAR DE QUEIROZ RIBEIRO  
(Editor)

**THE METROPOLIS OF RIO DE**  
**A SPACE IN TRANSITION JANEIRO**



Observatório  
das Metrôpoles  
Instituto Nacional de  
Ciência e Tecnologia

LETRAPITAL

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EDITOR - João Baptista Pinto  
COORDINATION - Iaci d'Assunção Santos  
BOOK COVER - Flávia de Sousa Araújo  
GRAPHIC DESIGN/LAYOUT - Francisco Macedo  
REVISION - By the Authors  
MAPS AND IMAGES EDITION - Gustavo Henrique Pinto Costa, Raquel de  
Lucena Oliveira, João Luis Nery Junior e  
Isabella Franca Magalhães Ferretti Maciel

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OBSERVATÓRIO DAS METRÓPOLES - IPPUR/UFRJ  
General Coordination: Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro  
Av. Pedro Calmon, 550, sala 537, 5o andar - Ilha do Fundão  
Cep 21.941-901 - Rio de Janeiro, RJ - Brasil  
Tel/ Fax 55-21-2598-1950  
[www.observatoriodasmetropoles.net](http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.net)

LETRA CAPITAL EDITORA  
Tels: 21. 3553-2236 | 2215-3781  
[www.letracapital.com.br](http://www.letracapital.com.br)

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## PRESENTATION

### **Rio de Janeiro: transition and permanence**

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

The city of Rio de Janeiro experiences an important moment of transformation and departs from the period of the long crisis which started in the late 1970s and worsened in the early 1980s. The city was then living the impacts of the cycle of the national economic crisis in the form of a spiral of unemployment, labor informalization, poverty, growth of favelas, urban decay and violence. The test of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s maintained and intensified in many aspects the framework of this crisis in the city. The evidence of its decline can be synthesized in a few figures: between 1989 and 1997, 22% of industrial companies moved to other regions in the country; in 1970, out of the 50 largest Brazilian banks nine had headquarters in the city, but in 1991 there were only five; Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange, the oldest in Brazil, moved to São Paulo, joining BOVESPA; in the 1980s and 1990s, the population living in favelas grew at rates of 2.6% and 2.5% per year, while the population living in the city grew just 1.8% and 0.6% per year. It was, therefore, a long cycle of nearly 25 years of a spiral of economic and urban decay, in addition to the corrosion of the social fabric of the city. Fear and uncertainty have become remarkable features of its everyday life. The representation of the “Marvelous City” almost disappears as metonymy of the collective pride of its inhabitants. In this period, Rio de Janeiro becomes a trend in the academic world emerging as an exemplary specimen of a gigantic inner city of 6 million inhabitants.

A sort of “Cariocan miracle” has been going on from the second half of the 2000s. Since 2005, indeed, a spectacular cycle of urban regeneration

governed by the following four factors has been taking place: (i) the victories of Brazil to host the 2014 Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympics Games, (ii) the return of the national economic growth under the impact of the China effect on dynamizing the international market, (iii) the resumption of the State catalyst role, and (iv) the consequent expansion of public spending. The scenario in the city changes and an urban coalition comes into view whose aim is a regeneration project for the city. This urban coalition involves different levels of governments – till then in positions of permanent conflict - and the traditional and new actors in the economy of the city and it puts into practice a new model of entrepreneurial governance and designs a strategy for the transformation of the inner city into a global city, aiming its insertion into the international division of consumption and its transformation into an attractive business locale. From a symbol of the structural question regarding the development of Brazilian capitalism and its crisis, the City transforms itself into the image of a Brazil in takes-off and it starts experiencing a cycle of economic expansion that combines growth with employment formalization, actual increase in income from work, decrease in inequality and poverty. Large public works trigger the expansion and upgrading of urban infrastructure with the construction of new subway lines, new forms of urban mobility (BRT, LRV) and the renovation of the road system. Central areas previously degraded due to a long neglect by the public power are objects of extensive urban renewal projects. It is a time for the regeneration of self-esteem, business, quality of life and the City seems to resume its historical vocation of the “Marvelous City.” The “Cariocan miracle” puts Rio de Janeiro back in the current academic fashion, praising its success as a successful experiment of a model of entrepreneurial governance and urban policies driven by goals such as the promotion of quality of life as a force of attraction for the business city.

However, such success takes place in the shadow of a huge inner city conformed by the metropolitan periphery of Rio de Janeiro, comprising 19 cities that concentrate other forgotten 5.5 million inhabitants. Rio de Janeiro is in fact a city-metropolis, containing a densely urban territory that is strongly unified by economic and social relations, cut by municipal borders inherited from the Brazilian federative organization which no longer express the commotion of the city. Among the 12 metropolises in the country, Rio de Janeiro is the one that presents the highest degree of internal integration, according to the results of studies conducted by the

Observatório das Metrôpoles. The City shows a regeneration which also takes place in the shadow of historic social inequalities and urban and housing precariousness that shall be taken into consideration since they are important features which will be crucial for the proper assessment of the impact of mega-events – the World Cup and the Olympic Games – on its present and future.

The ongoing urban transformations have been attracting great interest from the international academic community, which is the reason why the Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia Observatório das Metrôpoles decided to publish this book in English. Over the course of 17 years, our Researchers have contributed to the study of the Brazilian metropolitan reality, focusing on its main issues and peculiarities. Many of these Researchers are also Professors at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) who have the city of Rio de Janeiro as the starting point of their studies in their academic career. This collection also comprises articles by Researchers at post-doctoral level and postgraduate students (Master and Doctorate courses) of the Institute of Research and Urban and Regional Planning of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPPUR/UFRJ), where the National Coordination of the Observatório is located.

This book presents the state of the art of the central issues that mark the formation of Rio de Janeiro as city-metropolis, bringing together selected texts translated into the English language. This is a special collection of seventeen articles, already published, which are representative of the production of the Observatório, whose focus is the dynamics of the Cariocan city. We aim to submit to foreign audiences some of the reflections on the Brazilian metropolitan question, and, more specifically, on the urban space of Rio de Janeiro, which were developed by our network and which present various theoretical and methodological models. The variety of themes and subjects dealt with reflects the multidisciplinary capacity of a team that thinks and perceives the Urban in a plural and complementary way, and that aims to consolidate its own theoretical-conceptual framework consistent with the reality of the country.

In the first of the series of articles presented, “The *favela* in the *city-commodity*: deconstruction of a social question”, Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro and Marianna Olinger depart from the analysis of the various situations in which the *favela* enters the public debate to show that if in the past the territory of the popular strata was seen as a social question – a

debate in the political field and, therefore, on the conflict -, it now becomes a market good in the current context, a good still connected to the city, but transformed into commodity.

Continuing the debate on favelas and their importance for the urban dynamics of Rio de Janeiro and its society, the second article, “The *favela* (formal) neighborhood contrast in the social space of Rio de Janeiro”, by Luciana Corrêa do Lago and Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro, throws light on the evolution of the population resident in favelas in the period from 1940 to 1996 and analyzes the main socio-demographic features of the population resident in the favelas and in the districts of the city, in addition to the assessment of the social distance between favela residents and district residents, according to income.

In the article “Work and housing in the periphery of a large metropolis: for an economically-oriented urban policy”, Luciana Corrêa do Lago examines the connections between changes in the working world and the quality of urban life in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, seeking to extend the meanings of the concept of precarious work used in structural analyses of statistical nature. The territorial dimension, understood as places and distances in the city, is incorporated as determinant of social welfare and as an expression and instrument of economic and symbolic power.

The article “The social imaginary of homeownership and its effects: reflections about real estate in Brazil”, by Adauto Lucio Cardoso, Flávia de Sousa Araújo and Samuel Thomas Jaenisch, deepens the debate on the topic of housing by questioning what actually means to be the owner of a property in the current Brazilian urban context, mostly when the individual is inserted in the category of low-income people. The authors address this issue taking into consideration housing market informality, unsatisfactory housing conditions, high unemployment and limited access to social welfare policies.

Another perspective on the theme of “Inequalities and Territory” is presented here by the text “The colors of the urban borders: residential segregation and ‘racial’ inequalities in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro”. In this article, Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro and Filipe Souza Corrêa assess the relationship between the social context of residence and the color of the population in the explanation of social inequalities arising from residential segregation in the aforementioned region.

The article “Territory and employment: urban segregation, urban segmentation and occupational opportunities in the Metropolitan Region

of Rio de Janeiro”, by Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro, Juciano Martins Rodrigues and Filipe Souza Correa, examines the relations between the processes of social division of the metropolitan territory and the conditions governing the access to opportunities in the labor market.

The debate on favelas is resumed by Matthew Richmond in “Resident perceptions of urbanization and elite encroachment in a Jacarepaguá *favela*” from a perspective different from those of previous articles. His article focuses on the way residents of a favela, caught up in these processes, perceive the changes going on around them. In his analysis, Richmond draws two broad conclusions. First, residents see the intensified market activity inside and around the favela as offering new opportunities for income and employment, but also as a potentially destabilization of long-established patterns of community relations and collective action. Second, state intervention has improved the quality of the life of residents in important ways, but it inspires suspicion among many who see the State as a defender of elite interests, and fear that its increased presence will ultimately result in the favela’s removal.

Completing this first part of the book, two articles aligned the discussion involving “Inequalities and Territory” from the perspective of education. The first article, “Urban frontiers and educational opportunities: the case of Rio de Janeiro” by Mariane Koslinski and Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro, shows a brief review of the mechanisms related to the social contexts of the territory that seem most relevant to understanding the educational outcomes of children and adolescents. The authors present a discussion on the model of residential segregation of the city of Rio de Janeiro and its possible impact on educational inequalities at the macroscale – center-periphery relationship -, as well as at the microscale, arising from the presence of favelas in the wealthiest areas of the city. Another contribution to this discussion is offered by the article “Residential segregation, school quasi-market and school segmentation in the context of Rio de Janeiro” by Mariane C. Koslinski, Marcio da Costa, Fátima Alves and Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro. In it, the authors illustrate the trends of school segmentation in the city of Rio de Janeiro and the role of residential segregation on the different possibilities of access for students at a prestigious school.

The second part of the book comprises five articles dealing with the impact of mega-events on urban dynamics. The first article, “Mega sporting events in Brazil: transformation and commodification of the cities”, by Luiz



Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro and Orlando Alves dos Santos Junior, reflects on the economic and political changes in progress in Brazilian cities and on the ways they are deepening their mercantilization as they create new conditions for capital circulation and reproduction by the transformation of prices and market institutions into a nucleus of organization dynamics and urban territory appropriation.

Orlando Alves dos Santos Junior and Mauro Rego Monteiro dos Santos in “The right to housing, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics: reflections on the case of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil” discuss the impacts of mega-events from another perspective. Their article presents as hypothesis the emergence of a new pattern of urban governance and the formation of a new politico-social coalition – expressing an alliance of specific classes - that sustains this governance, in which large projects and mega-events have a central importance.

Juciano Martins Rodrigues, in the article “Urban mobility in the ‘Olympic City’: a transportation revolution in Rio de Janeiro?”, discusses the issue of mobility in Brazil. He focuses particularly the actual situation in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro where slated investments for the coming years will likely provoke profound impacts both on the urban dynamics and on aspects of the socio-spatial configuration of the city which will be one of the sites of the World Cup, in addition to being the site of the Olympic Games in the next few years.

In “From Culture to Spectacle, the new logics of Brazilian football”, Christopher Gaffney notes that the radical changes to the Brazilian sporting landscape have been conditioned by shifts in the political economy of sport that have, in turn, shaped modes and cultures of spectatorship.

Erick Omena, in “Changes and continuities on Brazilian urban governance: the impacts of mega sporting events”, aims to contribute to the analysis of the contradictions and conflicts involved in the convergence of two trends in the Brazilian urban government which were attested over the course of the last decades: the increase of institutionalized participation in the construction of public policies by civil society, and the hegemonic growth of urban entrepreneurship, particularly through the adoption of mega sporting events whose principal characteristic has been the repetition of anti-democratic practices.

Concluding the second part of the book, Jean Legroux, in “From discourse to reality: impacts of Rio’s “*transportation revolution*” on

socio-spatial justice”, attempts to evaluate the impacts of Rio’s main transportation projects, by analyzing and comparing discourses and opinions from interviews resulting from his field research.

The third part of the book comprises two articles focusing on the theme of “Politics and Government” from the metropolitan perspective. In “Political culture, citizenship and representation of the *urbs* without *civitas*: the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro” Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro and Filipe Souza Corrêa propose, from theoretical and empirical elements, a reflection on political culture as a condition for the exercise of active citizenship in a metropolitan context marked by a historical dynamics of socio-spatial segregation. Finally, the article titled “Local democracy and metropolitan governance: the case of Rio de Janeiro”, by Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro and Ana Lucia Britto, completes this collection. In it they highlight that the major challenge in the fight against the political atrophy of the metropolis is the adaptation of the Nation States political regimes and political geography to the new territoriality shaped by the rising economic importance of these spaces at national and global levels.

We thank all those who have collaborated in the publication of this book which, besides contributing to the dissemination of the investigation carried out by the Observatório das Metrôpoles, places once again on the agenda the necessary debate on the urban reality of Brazil.



PART I  
**INEQUALITIES AND TERRITORY**



# 1

## **The *favela* in the *city-commodity*: deconstruction of a social question<sup>1</sup>**

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

*Marianna Olinger*

The emergence, consolidation and expansion of the *favelas*<sup>2</sup> in Rio de Janeiro, and the related debate about the virtues and vices of their existence in the city's social space, synthesize, in an eloquent manner, the various stages of metamorphosis of the Brazilian social question<sup>3</sup>. Each of them begins with the appearance of new propositions for the model of action regarding such territory, justified by the construction of social representations that defend and/or condemn the existence of *favelas*. For such, cognitive, normative, political, more or less erudite, arguments are mobilized, in different institutional ambits. Therefore, as a social question, the *favela* presupposes a discursive field and action open to passion and reason, centered around a set of aporias sustained by arguments with which

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<sup>1</sup> This article was originally published in Portuguese in the book titled *Favelas cariocas: ontem e hoje*; edited by Marco Antonio da Silva Mello... [et al.], published by Garamond Press in Rio de Janeiro in 2012.

<sup>2</sup> In Brazil, the definition of *favela* is a little controversial. For census purposes, according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), *favelas* are “subnormal agglomerations” constituted of shacks/huts and houses, occupying or, until recently, occupied, land belonging to others, whether public or private, generally featuring a dense, disorderly layout, the majority lacking essential public services. <http://www.ssrede.pro.br/ibge%20estatisticas.pdf> accessed 8th March 2009.

<sup>3</sup> In this text, we assume the following concept of the social question: “a challenge that interrogates, brings into question, the capacity of a society to exist as a whole linked by relations of interdependence” (CASTEL, 2009: 30).

they simultaneously intend to become acquainted, judge and propose, or, to be coherent with what has been enunciated above, propose, judge and become acquainted.

This is the starting point for this article. The understanding of the various conjunctures in which the *favela* enters the public debate must seek to elucidate the relations inherent between the explanation/assessment of its existence and its problems with the propositions of action. Here, however, we do not aim to reconstruct these conjunctures. It would be impossible to do so in this brief approach that only develops the oral communication presented in the seminar from which a book resulted. We center our reflection on the present conjuncture, which we consider as a hypothesis, constituting the final stage of the *favela* as a social question and the deconstruction of the aporia formerly established by the imposition of a set of instrumental and pragmatic justifications – which withdraw the debate from the political field, and thus from the conflict, and insert it into the domain of market logic. Expressed more simply, our argument is: if, before, the debate about the *favela* used to involve taking a position by means of value judgments that did not differentiate explanation, evaluation and action, in the current conjuncture the *favela* is conceived by the model of action that seeks to ensure the conditions of its valuation as a mercantile asset which, if well connected to the city, is transformed into a commodity. Therefore, in course, there is disimpassionment of the understanding/judgment/action of the *favela*, its place in social space and in the collective imaginary of the Cariocas (Rio de Janeiro citizens), whose main consequence is the displacement of the historic dualities of the *favela* as a social question, such as that regarding urbanization versus removal, for example. This process of deconstruction has been carried out by the utilization of practices that Pierre Bourdieu called symbolic violence, practiced by the mobilization by diverse actors of cognitive-normative arguments that remove from the debate about *favelas* the misunderstanding as a discursive-practical possibility.

Due to this hypothesis, despite the modest objectives of this article, we are obliged to begin with a brief reconstruction of the trajectory of the *favela* as a social question. Next, we propose to identify the moments in which there occurred conjunctures of disimpassionment of the debate about the *favela* and the dissemination of social representations that reinterpreted it as a problem or prevented its incorporation into the status of merchandise with great potential value.

## The *favela* as a social question: theoretical tension and the practice of duality

As of the second half of the 20th century, the *favela* imposed itself as a social question in the Rio de Janeiro context when it became one of the central axes of public debate, as much in the political ambit as in the academic. From a re-reading of the history of this period, since that time until nowadays, it is possible to perceive the role of the State, the human and social sciences, the means of communication, to cite some of the actors involved in the construction and “metamorphosis”<sup>4</sup> of this question. In becoming the center of an intense political and academic debate, the *favela* came to represent one of the main symbols of threat to social cohesion in the Brazilian urban context<sup>5</sup>, which, since then, has attempted to counter the risk of its fracture, as a challenge that puts into check the capacity of the society to exist as a whole linked by relations of interdependence. The vision of an atomized society – of efficient producers and rational consumers – in the face of the apparent disorder of the *favela*, used to provoke disquiet, that the representations of society as an organism would have to be overcome<sup>6</sup>. The focus of the debate used to take place much more in the urgency to assuage its very presence, to the point of making the question invisible, crystallizing it in the periphery of the social structure, even though it would not cease to question the integrity of society.

In the Rio de Janeiro context, the *favela* social question and the problems that it presents for the city, whether they be real or imaginary, enunciated by discourses almost always constructed inwards from the outside, end up evincing frontiers of a social formation that returns to its center – in other words, the conditions for those that lie at the margins, in this case the *favela*, always depend on the condition of those that are at the center<sup>7</sup>. The definition of the State by means of practices of exception

<sup>4</sup> In *Metamorphoses of the social question*, Castel made a re-reading of the historical transformations from the 18th century to today, highlighting what is new and, at the same time, permanent, borne by its principal crystallizations, that is, present the metamorphosis regarding the previous question, which was to find out how a subordinate, dependent social actor become a fully social subject.

<sup>5</sup> Although the debate is firmly founded in the Cariocan (Rio) context, the political status of the city as the capital of the Republic.

<sup>6</sup> Topalov (1996) discusses this process in the European context.

<sup>7</sup> Understood here as the decision center.



(OLIVEIRA, 2003; AGAMBEN, 2004) and the maintenance of margins as a necessary component for the existence of the center (DAS, POOLE, 2004) seem to be echoed in the Brazilian context, where the integrated and the marginal belong to the same whole, whose unity is problematic. In this panorama, the conditions for the establishment and maintenance of this unity – the integration (or not) of the *favela* to the rest of the city – constitute the duality between removing or integrating<sup>8</sup>, which, at different moments, and by means of distinct arguments, legitimized the policies for the *favelas*.

The tension encountered in the theme of social housing in Rio de Janeiro was already central in the life of the city at the end of the 19th century, when *cortiços*<sup>9</sup> were presented as the principal threats to, on the one hand, public health, and, on the other, the capitalist project, with the need for matching the workforce to the new model of industrial production, which engendered an increase in worker productivity, and, therefore, implied reorganization of their way of life (ABREU, 2008). The existence of the *cortiços* was considered an obstacle to urban reform, which, as of the 20th century, became firmly founded on the discourse that preached the perils of the *cortiços* versus the need for changes in lower class habits to meet the needs of industry. With the closure of the *cortiços* (1891), allied to the abolition of slavery and the growth in migration between the countryside and the city, as of the end of the 19th century, the problem of social housing changed from the form – the *cortiço* (with emphasis on the conditions of hygiene and health) – to the place, with the occupation of the hills, Providência and Santo Antônio. If, formerly, the obstacle was the *cortiços*, at this point the *favelas* imposed themselves as the center of the difficulty.

The reforms that permeated the first half of the 20th century, accompanied by intensification of the removals, also gave rise to the first resistance movements, with discourses that defended the urbanization of the *favelas* as opposed to removal as an option, marking the clear theoretical tension and practical duality in confronting the question (SANTOS, 1979; VAZ, 2002; VALLADARES, 2005; ABREU, 2008). With the onset of the military dictatorship in 1964, the thesis of urbanization lost force, returning

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<sup>8</sup> Integration of the *favela* to zones without *favelas*, understood as urbanistic intervention processes that sought to broaden access of these territories to the predominant urban infrastructure in the latter.

<sup>9</sup> Collective rented housing (tenements), traditionally occupied by the poorer social strata in urban centres until the end of the 19th century.

to a position of centrality in the dispute only after the 1980s, when the *favela* began to be the object of interest in political life, which was renewed at the end of the dictatorial era (VALLADARES, 2005; BURGOS, 2004; ABREU, 2008). At the beginning of the 1990s, the thesis of urbanization became hegemonic, without, however, eliminating other positions that disputed the field where the old theories of marginality (PERLMAN, 1977; KOWARICK, 1974) remained in this scenario by means of successive re-appropriations by the academic, journalistic and political spheres.

## Forces of the construction of the urbanization thesis

The period of transition from dictatorship to democracy – at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s – was marked by major political disputes, where the land tenure question – urban and rural – was central in the formation of coalitions that determined the treatment of the subject in the 1988 Constitution. In the preparation for the return to democracy, the *favela* became a valuable political territory. The creation of the Programa Promorar (1979) (Housing Program) by President João Figueiredo, followed by the election of Leonel Brizola as Rio de Janeiro State governor (1982), and the municipal administration of Saturnino Braga (1986-1988), inaugurated a period of negation of the removal discourse, replaced by a new form of public authority relation with the *favelas*. With the 1988 Constitution, the emergence of the social function of land as a legal figure opened the way to a new period in the question of the *favela*, when the discourse of urbanization would become hegemonic. In 1992, the Plano Diretor da Cidade [City Master Plan] already incorporated the instruments brought by the Constitution, consolidating the idea of a global program of integration of the *favelas* to the city (BURGOS, 2004).

If, on the one hand, the new Constitution opened the way to renewed discussion of land occupation, privileging the social function of land, which legitimized the discourse focused on urbanization, land tenure regularization and improvements in the *favelas*, on the other, the same period was marked by the recrudescence of violence in these spaces (MISSE, 1999 and 2003), lacking the duality in discourse and in practice. In this scenario, no longer there were discussions about the need for urbanization and integration, although discriminatory security policies justified the *cidade partida* (divided city) discourse, once again putting

the integration of Rio de Janeiro society in check (VENTURA, 1994). On the one hand, society was divided between *favela* dwellers and non-*favela* dwellers; on the other, social movements, strengthened in the wake of the movement that approved the 1988 Constitution, sought democratic, integrating solutions for Brazilian social questions, among which was the *favela*. The social urban movements of the 1980s in Rio de Janeiro played a crucial role in the legitimization of the discourse that would lead to the hegemony of the urbanization in the city for another two decades<sup>10</sup>. The election of Cesar Maia (1992) consolidated the period begun in the 1980s, and the urbanization of *favelas* was presented as a possible solution to the *favela* social question. Not without contradictions, if we analyze the other urban policies in the same period<sup>11</sup>, the proposal to integrate the *favelas* into the middle/upper class districts was presented as a solution to the city's problems, making the urbanization thesis in the political field preponderant.

Just as the urban social movements of the 1980s were crucial for the construction and consolidation of the political discourse that legitimized urbanization as a policy for the *favelas*, academic forces also performed an important role in this construction. In the second half of the 1970s, influenced to a great extent by the work of Padre Lebet and research by the Sociedade de Análises Gráficas e Mecanográficas Aplicadas aos Complexos Sociais (SAGMACS) in Rio de Janeiro, various researchers dealt with the theme *favela*, as a social question. In the first works by Padre Lebet in the city, we can clearly perceive that there is an attempt to

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<sup>10</sup> The movements for urbanization and legalization of clandestine and irregularly occupied land, the experience of the Núcleo de Legalização dos Loteamentos da Promotoria Pública (Land Legalization Nucleus of the Public Prosecution Dept.), and the constitution of the Cadastro de Loteamento e Favelas da Prefeitura (City Hall Register of Land Division and *Favelas*), as the first administrative act of recognition of these territories, were determinants in the legitimization of the urbanization discourse.

<sup>11</sup> Despite the discourse strongly supported by the “integrating” housing policy and “urban order”, the new mayor ignored the Master Plan, approved in 1992, and created a Strategic Plan, with a focus on the attraction of foreign capital to the city, promoting mega projects – such as the construction of the Yellow Line highway, the Rio City Project, the Interlinked Operations, the candidature of the city to host the Pan American Games, besides the strong resistance to utilization of City Statute instruments (CARDOSO, 2007). In this aspect, if, on the one hand, the Cesar Maia government, once and for all, consolidated the discourse that defends the permanence of the *favelas* and their improvement by local state programs, this government also inaugurated a period in which the city would become the object of major capital through the possibility of holding great events.

rupture the hegemonic discourse of removal in existence since the 1950s. With his humanist conception, he had a strong influence on the training of progressive urbanists, and on the decomposition and recomposition of the representations, initiating at the academia a new field of studies, based on the social sciences, exclusively dedicated to the *favela* question. The theses developed by researchers in that period, before which the majority had been constructed by catering to the needs of an industrial order established in the first half of the century, opened the way to a new area of studies (SANTOS, 1979; BLANK, 1979; VALLADARES, 1979; PERLMAN, 1977), fundamental for the change in the representation of the urban question – of the *favela* as a social question in Rio de Janeiro.

### The Deconstruction: the *favela* as a business

In the second half of the 2000s, with changes in the political game in Rio de Janeiro city and state, we observed the gradual deconstruction of the discourse that had dominated the previous two decades. The removals, denied in the previous period, returned to the scenario. If, previously, public health and beautification of the city sustained the thesis of removals, now public security<sup>12</sup> and the environment sustained the old/new thesis. The new period was marked by the articulation of two apparently contradictory discourses: on the one hand, removal, on the other, integration of the spaces where removal was not viable, no longer sustained in the right or the threat of disintegration of the social tissue, but in the creation of a new consumer market. The integration previously sustained by the political and academic discourses now gained strength by means of the markets, inaugurating a phase where the *favela* became the object of major projects.

In this new phase of metamorphosis discussed here, a series of symbolic violence is activated in order to reconstruct legitimate representations of the world, and base new practices on redefinition of categories in the discourses about the *favela*. If the holding of the Pan American Games in the city in 2007 was the starting point to legitimize a series of truculent

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<sup>12</sup> Although the violence in Rio de Janeiro assumed alarming proportions since the end of the 1980s, the housing and security policies were implemented independently in 2007, the year the Pan American Games were held in the city. On the one hand, the municipal government treated the issue as one of integration, facing the problem through *cortiço* upgrading programs. On the other, the state government remained responsible for security policies independently of other urban interventions.

policies against *favelas*, the announcement of the hosting of the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 consolidated a new phase in the debate, placing new actors at the center of the question.

Considering that the *favela* – its way of life, or its permanence in certain areas of the city – is the main cause of social ills, an idea is created that the populations of these spaces can do nothing more to adapt themselves to the determinations of the center, progressively excluding sectors directly impacted by the interventions, which are defined in progressively less evident decision-taking spaces. Thus, a residue appears that legitimizes the permanence of truly disciplinary and organizing devices necessary to rationalize the question and incorporate the *favela* into a possible whole, ideal for the *development* of the city. Although one can consider these features *archaisms* or *resistance* of the dominant groups to a certain *modernization*, is perceived as an articulated multiplicity in social systems, and apparently originating from different historical periods, that coexist. The permanence of these features has a close relation with the spatial inequalities of the accumulation of capital, of the transformations of the productive and urban forms, and, therefore, also of the power structure (HARVEY, 2006, 2008).

The preparation of the city to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics intensifies the contradictions between discourse and practice. A new city project has emerged<sup>13</sup>, in which part of the *favelas* must be removed (whether due to environmental or human risk, or the need to use spaces for preparation of the city for the Games – a redefinition of the property occupation in some areas) and another part must be urbanized, which necessarily includes some rate of removal, so as to facilitate the maintenance of security and execution of works. In the new discourse, urbanization and removal coexist, as seen in the 60s and 70s, now dressed up differently. The context is different, and the arguments that legitimized the discourses too.

In the construction process of the new discourses and practices, at each step, new problems arise associated to the *favela* to be tackled, and

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<sup>13</sup> In 2008, the international financial crisis of December 2007 made the Federal Government announce it would strengthen the Accelerated Growth Plan, with the allocation of investment funds to *favela* urbanization on a scale never seen before in the city. The “new” city project seemed to be being designed: while the federal and state governments invested massively in large urbanistic projects in *favelas* near the high value areas of the city, and for the areas that must appreciate in value due to the holding of the mega events, the municipal government is undertaking city “clean-up” and “organization” projects.

thus, new actors and new modalities of intervention emerge. Every step, in turn, produces transformations in the discursive field itself, delimiting, *a priori*, what is legitimate/illegitimate for debate. The central thesis here is that the *favela* has its representation based in the field of social action relative to the values until the first half of the 2000s, which began to change due to the preparation of the city for the mega events and possibility of large-scale investments, forming the basis of representation in the field of rational instrumental action, simultaneously causing disenchantment and depoliticization of the *favela* debate.

### Symbolic Violence: the *favela* against the environment and urban peace

The new coalition of interests, marked by the alliance between the federal, state and municipal governments, through the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Accelerated Growth Program), which, on the one hand, articulates a strategy of continuity of investment in improvements for the *favelas* and, on the other, legitimizes an aggressive strategy to exercise control over violence in the city<sup>14</sup>. As if the physical or psychological violence - whether committed by criminal groups or public forces - suffered by *favela* dwellers were not enough, symbolic violence (BOURDIEU, 1998) comes into play, and it is strengthened. In this context, the combat of violence and degradation of the environment justifies the emergence of the old removal practices<sup>15</sup>, in parallel to the discourse of

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<sup>14</sup> In May 2007, little more than a month from the holding of the Pan American Games, the state and national security forces conducted an operation in one of the largest *favelas* in the city, resulting in 19 fatal victims in just one night. From that point on, the security forces spent months on guard at one particular *favela* (schools in the area were closed for the three months), making a demonstration of force, almost exemplary, with the aim of containing any action that could adversely affect the Games. At that moment, the focus went well beyond that event, given that the city was a candidate to host the 2014 World Cup and also the 2016 Olympics, thus justifying any type of violence against these communities, once again, seen as “a threat to integration”.

<sup>15</sup> In January 2009, in his first month in government, the mayor, Eduardo Paes, had already published four decrees aimed at containing the expansion of *favelas*. These decrees accompanied the new program launched by the City Hall to bring “order” to the city. The program soon gained public sympathy, which gave rise to a major campaign for “control” over the expansion of the *favelas*, as well as removal of some or parts of some, established for a long time, with emphasis on the South and West Zones – the latter had already been the focus of removalist proposals since 2007, when works were underway for the Pan

the valuation of the *favela* territories as mercantile assets, in a city itself transformed into a commodity.

Leite (2008), in discussing risk and violent sociability, by means of the vision of Rio de Janeiro *favela* dwellers, highlights the existence of a widely diffused perception in the city, where the *favelas* are the territory of violence, and the population is to some degree connivent with the primary agents of this violence: the drug traffickers. The insecurity and fear thus end up marking the social perception of the *favela* dwellers, leading to their criminalization and growing socio-spatial segmentation of the city (MELLO, 2001; LEITE, 2008), in addition to the redefinition of public policies and social projects aimed at such populations and territories, favoring a security policy based on direct confrontation of the drug traffickers, a fact symbolized in a “war” against *favelas* and their residents (CANO, 1997; DOWDNEY, 2002; RAMOS & LEMGRUBER, 2004).

On the other hand, climatic incidents, such as rain, flooding and landslides are also enlisted to justify the new wave of removals. When invited by the press to provide explanations, the public authorities invariably justify the tragedies as the consequences of extraordinary climatic events, outside the foreseeable patterns, but also, and above all, as a result of the supposed irrationality of the behavior of the poor, who “invade” areas subject to evident environmental risks, “choosing” to inhabit these spaces. The supposed choice of these people and their habits (such as disposing of their rubbish on the slopes) is largely responsible for aggravating the risks to which they are exposed. In the face of the threats of devaluation of their electoral capital, the authorities launch emergency operations. Engineers, firemen, police and other technical emergency corps are mobilized, in an exceptional manner, by the public authorities to decrease the damage and, in some way, calm the population’s natural sentiment of abandonment. However, such operations only strengthen the discourse of culpability of the victims, and, in the face of public opinion, legitimize the need to remove these populations from the so-called “risk areas”. The new “removalist” discourse, which had already been maturing since the holding of the Pan American Games, gained strength with the landslides that have occurred in various Rio de Janeiro *favelas*, which left dozens of fatalities, besides hundreds of homeless, in the heavy rain at the beginning of 2010. With consternation, the

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American Games (*O Globo* newspaper headlines: “Mayor issues decrees to contain *favela* expansion” [1/12/2009] and “Mayor will impose new eco-limits on *favelas*” [1/16/2009]).

authorities addressed the public to announce that there was no alternative but to remove the people, despite a range of dissonant discourses questioning removal as the sole alternative to the vulnerability in certain areas.

It is, in effect, no novelty to anybody that the urban space was and continues to be appropriated in ways totally contrary to public regulation, master plans, laws about the use and occupation of urban land, building codes and postures. A veritable *laissez-faire* reigns in our cities, producing not only territories with poverty, but also ones inhabited by high-income social segments. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, 69.7% of the areas in the municipality occupied above the 100 m contour – totaling 11.7 million m<sup>2</sup> – are in the hands of the middle and upper classes, according to data from the Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP), the City Hall’s planning and information body, and only 30% of this vast territory unsuitable for residential purposes is occupied by *favelas*. In compensation, 73.5% of the *favela* residents inhabit areas above the 100m contour, exposing a dramatic inequality in territory, also expressed in the social distribution of the risks arising from urban precariousness.

Therefore, if it is true that the catastrophes are generated by freak climatic incidents, their effects result from a very usual management pattern in our cities, where the planning, regulation and routine actions are replaced by a standard of operations by exception, making public administrative organs fragile. In this picture of urban management, the foreseeable problems caused by the equally foreseeable climatic events can only be responded with emergency action, which decisively contributed to the reproduction of precariousness of our improvised cities. However, what remains after the tragedies is a strengthening of the discourse that has legitimized a new wave of removal policies. Serving as protection for exactly what, or for whom, is perhaps one of the great questions to be elucidated.

If, on the one hand, the existing interventions have made it seem increasingly necessary to negotiate with the *favela* populations about those to be performed in the future, in practice, interventions decided in advance – beyond the reach of the spaces for participative democratic decision, so that such interventions are completely associated with interests of capital – symbolically deny the asymmetries of the relation established between the State intervener and the beneficiary communities. In this context, the economic capital, represented by State investments in urbanistic interventions in *favelas*, does not act, unless in the euphemized



form of symbolic capital. And such reconversion of the capital, which is the condition of its efficacy, is in no way automatic, requiring work and incessant care, indispensable to establishing and maintaining the relations of domination.

The entry on to the scene of new economic interests in the urban capital accumulation, linked to the recent business opportunities the mega events propitiate and possibly to the world economic crisis begun in 2007, which constrained the growth of a good part of the capital from developed countries, will directly impact Rio de Janeiro city's policies. Thus, the present programs of urbanization and removal of *favelas* concomitantly gained prominence in the dispute over the new "city project".

On the one hand, there appears to be reconversion of the city's political model as a machine for growth (MOLOTCH, 1976) for the city into a machine for entertainment (CLARCK & FERGUSON, 1983); on the other, the limits of the already developed markets place the *favela* as an unprecedented space for exploration by markets in constant need of expansion. This new city project appears to be the materialization of the disputes for control over what is going to be destroyed and integrated to the city, in such a way that capital continues to grow permanently (HARVEY, 2004). If the city has always been as much a force for viability as an expression of the capitalist dynamic, now, once again it has to recreate itself, or be recreated, to render the continuity of the capitalist project viable. The fundamental difference is that in the previous context, the city was taken over by coalitions of classical political and economic interests which designed urban policies oriented by their own interests whose effects on employment and income generation legitimized the coalition. Now the political and economic interests seem to be merged. The actors of the policies come from the market itself and are legitimized by the mobilization of traditional political resources (party, clientelism, etc), but also by the strategies of use of the city as political marketing. The expression of this double path of construction of the consensus that legitimizes the current political power over the city is the Cabral-Paes alliance. It masterfully articulates the two forms, maintaining almost symbiotic relations between the market and the party. It is no longer possible to know who is at the service of whom. On the plane of the modalities of public policy, another expression is the marvelous, harmonious coexistence of philanthropic

clientelism of the social organizations of local councilors and deputies and the market policy, translated in the public-private partnership in order to make urban investments. The first feeds the political-electoral market, and the second, the market of accumulation in urban space. The two forms of political action are united by the mercantile utilization of public funds. As a consequence, the urban policy ceases to be a fragile, unstable combination among the aims of the public provision of services, the public regulation of the use and occupation of land, and the private accumulation in the city, and becomes the direct generator of the conditions for private accumulation of wealth and power. The private interests become direct protagonists of the policy, a fact present in the interventions based on the public-private partnership, in the models for financing urban projects based on the “sale of shares” in the future profits of the projects.

However, for this model to become viable, important guarantees are necessary due to the massive amounts of fixed capital for long periods. In this context emerges the need for a set of guarantees, in part provided by macroeconomic policies (such as inflation control and exchange rate policy), in other words, the guarantee of an adjustment policy already in existence in Brazil since 2003, allied to a set of local urban policies, which minimize the threats of devaluation arising in the territory. In Harvey’s (2006) analysis of the transformation of urban governance in the late capitalism, he describes how the concepts of innovation and entrepreneurship were appropriated by local governments as of the 1980s, as an alternative to confronting the difficulties faced by the capitalist economies after the 1973 crisis.

In this process, entrepreneurship mostly focused on investment and economic development by means of speculative construction instead of improvements of conditions in the specific territory, symbolized in the transformation of the city into a business linked to the entertainment circuit, also made the transformation of the *favela* question imperative. However, the transformation of the *favela* in such a perspective brought the need for construction of new representations for these spaces, where the deconstruction of the discourse of the *favela* as an enigma of social cohesion, by means of allusion to the themes of violence and environment, was the basis for construction of the discourse of the *favela* as a commodity, marked by *disimpassionment* and *depoliticization* of the matter.

## *Favela* in the Urban Businesses

The *favela social question* in Rio de Janeiro has undergone a metamorphosis throughout the last few years. At times, the *favela* had to be removed, at others, urbanized; at times, a problem, at others, a possibility, the *favela* was, and still is, subject to and the object of interventions of every kind, regardless of the agency of its inhabitants. What we see today in the city of Rio de Janeiro is that in the places where citizenship has been affirmed and universalized, the egalitarian standard in the procedures for the provision of services and regulation practices of the use and occupation of urban land became necessary for the constitution of a technical bureaucracy to exercise the important role of rationalization of the policy; in places where this does not happen, other grammars<sup>16</sup> prevail, whose common denominator is the predominance of the particular immediate interests in the functioning of the public apparatus (NUNES, 1997).

The existence of universalism of procedures implies institutionalization of the political action field and introduction of general interest engendered by a bureaucracy as a mediator in the game of private interests. In other words, the existence of this bureaucracy is fundamental to the adoption of universalism of procedures that allows the administration to function with little influence of the immediate, particularistic political game. As various analysts of the relations between the State and society in Brazil have already shown, the constitution of bureaucracies with these characteristics occurred only in the areas of interests of fractions of modernizing capitalist classes as a way of protecting the pieces of the State that ensure the general conditions of capital accumulation. In the other sectors of State action, as a rule in those whose function it is to meet the needs of social reproduction, the grammars of the particularistic interests prevail. In the current organization of the so-called Federative Pact, the city and town halls assumed these latter functions. For such, since the beginning of the 1980s, significant portions of the fiscal resources manipulated by the Brazilian State have been decentralized. In practice, in the absence of vigorous political

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<sup>16</sup> Here, the term, 'grammars' refers to the work carried out by Edson Nunes (published in English under the title *Bureaucratic insulation and clientelism in contemporary Brazil: uneven state-building and the taming of modernity*), in which he identifies four institutionalized patterns of relations that structure the ties between the society and the State in Brazil (denominated 'political grammars'), articulated in a fluid, combined manner: clientelism, corporativism, bureaucratic insulation and universalism of procedures."

institutions capable of constituting citizenship, the decentralization feeds different particularistic political logics – whether founded on clientelism, patrimonialism, corporativism or entrepreneurship – that coexist in the organization and functioning of the urban administration, blocking the adoption of instruments for public planning and management of currents of affirmation of the logic of universalism of procedures.

In the context of dismemberment of the public machine by the coexistence of diverse political logics, articulated by coalitions controlling decision centers that function according to interests that command each one of them, the *disimpassionment* and *depoliticization* of the discourse further limits the political space as the arena for claims on the part of those who have no participation, a space not accessed by the majority in a system of dominant rights (OLIVEIRA, 2006). As the debate is depoliticized, constructing the idea that this is not a political discussion, but rather a “rational/instrumental” one, and that, therefore, it must be decided on the basis of purely technical analyses, the political debate is emptied, becoming politically irrelevant for the dominant classes and inaccessible to the dominated. Irrelevant to the point of view that these large questions, the major decisions are taken outside the representative system and not within reach of the institutions that the democracy created to channel the claim on the part of those who have no stake at all. The reduction of the political power to economic power, annulling the separation between the fields of the two powers, is what the liberalism itself elevated as a fundamental principle. In view of this scenario, it remains for us to question who commands the interventions in Rio’s *favelas* today. After all, whose territory is the *favela*?

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## 2

### The *favela*/(formal) neighborhood contrast in the social space of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1</sup>

Luciana Corrêa do Lago

Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro

*“The ‘favelas’<sup>2</sup> – a genuine Cariocan<sup>3</sup> creation not to be found in any other cities, even in Brazil – are not purely a ruthless crime against aesthetics. They are a particularly serious and permanent threat to public tranquility and health. Built in opposition to all precepts of hygiene (no water, no sewage, not the least bit of cleanliness, no garbage removal) they are like large filthy latrines covered with excrement and other waste of the human existence, heaps of dirt and rotteness that feed clouds of flies and attract all kinds of diseases and impurities into the city streets. Devoid of any type of policing, freely built out of cans and scrap in lands of the National Patrimony, freed from the need to pay any taxes, alien to all fiscal actions, they are an excellent stimulus to indolence, an attractive appeal to tramps, a stronghold of loafers, a nest of thieves bringing insecurity and restlessness to all corners of the city by multiplying robbery and larceny.”*

(Quoted from the speech “To remodel Rio de Janeiro,” delivered by the physician Mattos Pimenta, one of the inventors of the “favela problem”, at the Rotary Club in October 1926).

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was developed at the Observatory of Urban Policies and Municipal Management – IPPUR/UFRJ – FASE. The Researchers Peterson Leal Pacheco, Cynthia Campos Rangel, Carlos Eduardo Sartor, Giovanna Altomare Catão and Paulo Azevedo participated in the study.

<sup>2</sup> Favelas are residences erected on land seized by squatters who therefore live on usurped terrain. The main differences between a favela and a neighborhood (Portuguese *bairro*) is that in the latter, people either bought the land on which they built their houses (however ramshackle) or pay rent. In a favela the residences are constructed on illegally obtained land, and residents are considered as defying the classification of citizens as they do not pay city taxes, do not have an official address, and are not property owners. (CALDEIRA, 2000, p. 78)

<sup>3</sup> Cariocan is the native of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.



*“The only solution to recover a territory that is under enemy power is to start a war action. The idea is to put war tactics into practice, with ostensive and powerful occupation of the entire territory to be conquered.*

*Once the area conquered back has been militarily occupied, the dwellers should be helped to leave the place, so the recovered territory can be freed from the presence of crime. It will be reforested, if it is the case. Or else it can become a school, a health care center or a police station. In short, it will acquire a public and social destination.*

*When resettling the dwellers in their new homes, the public power must make sure they have the same quality of life of any Cariocan citizen from then on, free from criminal gangs and their heads.”*

(Quoted from an article published by Sandra Cavalcanti in: *Jornal do Brasil* newspaper, November 4th, 1996, “Behind the Bullets.”)

These two quotations illustrate the longevity of the so-called “favela problem” in Rio de Janeiro. They also depict briefly the route of the main division of the Cariocan society to separate the favela from the city. In fact, since early in the twentieth century, favelas have been portrayed as if they belonged to another social and cultural world, as if they were “a city apart,” as Olavo Bilac, the Brazilian poet, used to write. The geographic proximity to the “upper middle class neighborhoods” that enjoy urban planning, infrastructure, and services, has produced a marked social contrast which demonstrates the existence of the two separate cities.

In the 70’s, the criticism of the so-called “theory of urban marginality” attempted to prove that the dualistic discourses made by institutions, governments, and the academy on favelas were wrong. How? By demonstrating that there were similarities between favelas and popular environments, in terms of structure and social practices. The belief that there were only migrants<sup>4</sup> from the countryside residing in favelas and that the folk culture survived in them was disproved. Favelas started to be seen as “a cohesive complex, extremely strong at all levels: family, voluntary association, and community.” (BOSCHI, 1970). Others have demonstrated that life in favelas is characterized “by friendship, spirit of cooperation, and relative freedom from crime and violence.” (PERLMAN, 1976:136). A diversified social structure was detected in favelas, and even a diversified social space including sectors identified with the “*burguesia*

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<sup>4</sup> Migrants are understood as those who live in a city other than Rio de Janeiro until 1991.

*favelada* (bourgeoisie of the favela).” It was also found that favelas involve politics, much like other social environments (SILVA, 1967). The existence of sociability relationships between the “informal” world of the favela and the “formal” world of the city’s “neighborhoods”<sup>5</sup> was also detected, especially through the introduction of *favelados*<sup>6</sup>, favela dwellers, into the labor market.

These dualistic representations of favelas are currently returning to the public debate on the urban Cariocan society. This development is due first of all to the effects caused in the academic field by the absorption of the theoretical notions and concepts with which the international debate on social and spatial impacts of economic changes on cities is structured today. Terms such as ghetto, social exclusion, and new marginality have become expressions of intellectual prestige in analyses on the favela issue. It is assumed as an axiom that on-going changes in labor are destroying the relationships for the integration of the favelas into the city. The inclusion of drug traffic and urban violence into the academy agenda reinforces the legitimacy of the dualistic conception, since a state of lawlessness is replacing the organized life in favelas. We can often find references associating Cariocan favelas and black American ghettos.

On the one hand, the frequent use that the media makes of metaphors such as “divided city” and “urban disorganization,” among others, has granted social legitimacy to the dualistic conception of favelas. On the other hand, we see the appearance of the need that governments and institutions linked to the public management of poverty have for new discourses on favelas related to subsidizing the policy of “integration of favelas into the official realm of the city.”

In short, today we see an intense production of images, ideas and practices that reedit the ancient myth of favelas as another social world apart from the city, a different world, identified by neediness and disorganization.

In this paper, we propose to submit this (di)vision of the city of Rio de Janeiro to a critical reflection, starting from an empirical appraisal of demographic and social differences between the social world of the favela and that of the city. The text is divided as follows: in the first part we examine the evolution of *favelados*, favela dwellers, in the period from 1940–1996. In the second part, we analyze the key social and demographic

<sup>5</sup> *Bairro* in Portuguese.

<sup>6</sup> In this article we will use the word *favelados* which in Portuguese means favela dwellers.

traits of the people living in favelas and in the city districts. Finally, we assess the social distance between favela dwellers and city dwellers according to their income.

## Conceptual and methodological questions

The concepts of social space and social distance have been classically used in sociology to reveal the mechanisms that govern human interaction processes in social forms of collective life. They are present in works of authors such as Simmel (1971), Sorokin (1973) and Park (1924), among others. However, we can distinguish two distinct conceptions of these concepts: a psychosocial conception that sees social distance as the result of attitudes of certain groups towards others (BOGARDUS, 1959), and another truly sociological conception (SOROKIN, 1973; BOURDIEU, 1979), in which the social distance among individuals results from the relationships between social positions in which they are inserted. In this second trend, the individuals' subjectivity is important, but as a result of their insertion into the social world. As Sorokin puts it: "Similitudes in the individuals' social position generally lead to similar ways of thinking, since they imply habits, interests, costumes, values and traditions, inculcated in people by the similar social groups to which these people belong." (SOROKIN, p. 227).

However, it is in Bourdieu's sociology (1979; 1993) that the concept of social distance assumes analytical significance. In his spatial vision of society, Bourdieu understands the social space as being formed by relationships of proximity and separation that are, above all, hierarchical relationships. On the other hand, places in the social space are defined by the positions generated by uneven distribution of capital volume and composition (economic, social and symbolic), which express relationships of domination in society among social classes.

*The idea of difference, of separation, is the foundation of the notion of space itself, a set of distinct but coexistent positions, external to each other, defined one in contrast to the others by their mutual exteriority, and by relationships of proximity, of neighborhood or distancing, and also by relationships of order, such as above, below, and between. Several characteristics of the members of the petite bourgeoisie, for instance, can be deduced from the fact that they occupy an intermediate position*

*between the two extreme positions, without being objectively identifiable, and subjectively identified one by the other.* (BOURDIEU, 1993:18).

By understanding the city as the “objectivation” of the social space, the analysis of social proximities and distances between the favela and the rest of the city means evaluating its position in the (di)vision of the Cariocan social world. This analysis, however, is not trivial, since it means overcoming two trends present in the hegemonic forms of representations of the social distinction, which often appear as self-evident realities. Therefore, they are unquestionable by scientific discourse. It deals with the trends to naturalization and substantiation of the social order in which spatial metaphors have an enormous importance. In fact, they give us the illusion that social properties of a practice or the attributes of a group can be explained by the group itself, without taking into consideration that the reality in society is always relational, and as such, is socially built.

*The structure of the social space manifests itself in the most different contexts, under the form of spatial oppositions, the space dwelt (or appropriated) working as a kind of spontaneous symbolization of the social space. There are no spaces in a hierarchic society that are not hierarchized, and that do not express social hierarchies and distances under a (more or less) deformed form, and most of all, masked by the effect of naturalization which implies the durable inscription of social realities into the natural world: the differences produced by the historic logic can therefore seem that they come from the nature of things (it is enough to think of the idea of ‘natural borderline’).* (BOURDIEU, 1993:160)

The critical appraisal of the separation between the favela and the city must, therefore, start by the criticism of the common sense that sustains this social distinction, and then rebuild it scientifically as an object of knowledge. Following the analytical path proposed by Wacquant (2000) to analyze the place of ghettos in the social space of the American society, our task would comprise the following items:

- Identify the categories of common sense with which more or less erudite discourses on favelas and their congeners (shacks, etc.) are produced.
- Rebuild the history of these categories, trying to identify what their roles are in the “system of classification of the Brazilian society,” i. e., in

the hegemonic ways through which social divisions and inequalities are represented. These might be isolation, separation and work force reserve.

- Analyze the hierarchy of the social space, making the required analytical distinction between the social condition of the favela, i. e., its social, demographic, urban and environmental conditions, and its position in the social and spatial hierarchy of Rio de Janeiro. Most analyses limit themselves to evaluate the social condition of the favela in an attempt to describe the characteristics and attributes that would explain the position of isolation or separation and inferiority.
- Analyze the demand for public discourse on marginality. There is an intellectual influence to formulate the discourse on marginality that is not disconnected from the needs for social management of poverty via public intervention. Often the appearance of problems to preserve the social and symbolic order of the city generates new demands by those institutions in charge of the social management of poverty and of public discourses on the poor and their ways of living and dwelling.

Our analysis does not intend to follow all of those steps. We only propose to identify the social situation of favelas from the empirical evaluation of social and demographic differences which either distance them or bring them closer to the city. To do so, we will use different sources of information including different periods – the 1991 Census and the 1996 Population Count. At the end of the text we outline a reflection on the pertinence of the separation between favelas and the city in understanding the principles of construction and reproduction of the social space of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

## Evolution of favela residents

Census data from 1950 to 1991 show that the annual growth rate of the favela population in Rio de Janeiro started to diminish in the 1960's, with a sharp fall in the 1970's due to three factors (Table 1). First of all, the reduced population growth rate did not relate only to *favelados* but also to the Cariocan population as a whole. Between 1950 and 1960, the population grew approximately 3 % a year, and *favelados* grew at a rate of 7 % a year. In the 1970's these percentages fell to 1.8 % and 2.5 % respectively. At that

time, the migration towards the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro was starting to lose the impetus seen in the 1940's and 1950's, and the capital, the key area of attraction of these flows, suffered the impact of this change. It must be noted, however, that the rate of *favelados* compared to the total population continued to grow, even between 1970 and 1980, when the growth rate of *favelados* reached its lowest level (Table 1). In other words, the growth rate of *favelados* continued well above that of the other dwellers.

**Table 1: Growth of the total population and *favelados* in the city of Rio de Janeiro – 1950/1991.**

Years	RJ Population	Favela Population	RJ Population Growth p.a.	Favela Population Growth p.a.	Favela Population/ RJ Population
1950	2,375,280	169,305	-	-	7.13%
1960	3,300,431	335,063	3.34%	7.06%	10.15%
1970	4,251,918	565,135	2.57%	5.37%	13.29%
1980	5,090,723	722,424	1.82%	2.49%	14.19%
1991	5,480,768	962,793	0.67%	2.65%	17.57%

Source: Demographic Censuses, FIBGE; IPLANRIO, 1991.

The second factor related to the fall in the *favelados*' growth rate between the 1960's and the 1970's was the "opening" of the metropolitan periphery to poor workers through extensive production of urban pieces of land, which started in the 1950's and expanded until the 1970's. In this period, the division of the peripheral area into plots of land with low investments in infrastructure and marketed with long-term payments became the key means of access for poor people to acquire their own houses. In fact, inter- and intraregional migrations shifted direction towards these "new" areas, particularly coming from Rio de Janeiro, which reduced the number of people migrating to the capital.

Last, we must mention the impact of the favela-elimination policy in the 1960's and 1970's. According to Santos (1977), 175,800 people had been removed from favelas until 1968. But it was between 1968 and 1973 that the program was more systematic and intense. It is worth mentioning

the selective character of this policy, considering that 70% of the favela houses removed were located in the South Zone, Tijuca and Méier. The result was the loss in representativeness of South Zone favelas: in 1950, 25.4% of the favela population lived in the South Zone, whereas in 1970 only 9.6% of them still lived in the area (Castro, 1979).

This set of factors stimulated the idea spread in the 1970's that favelas tended to disappear from the Cariocan urban scene. However, favelas started to grow again in the 1980's: the old favelas became denser and new ones appeared.

Why are favelas in Rio de Janeiro starting to grow again, right when a marked reduction occurred in the demographic growth of the city? First of all, because the growth dynamics has changed in Rio de Janeiro. In fact, the extensive peripheral growth, which allowed opportunities to purchase a house to vast social segments, started to collapse, as land became too expensive and workers, in general, lost their purchasing power, among other reasons. This affected the less skilled workers unprotected by labor laws. Add to this the changes in the Cariocan policy from 1982 on, when the local public power (state and city governments) started to adopt policies recognizing favelas and illegal clandestine plots of land as the solution to the dwelling problems of poor people. When these policies proposed legalizing land possession and urbanizing favelas, they reduced uncertainties as to maintaining dwellers in the usurped land, and created expectations of improved living conditions, the result of which was reducing barriers to new usurpations.

In the 1990's the growth in the favela population (1.6% a year) remained well above the non-favela population (0% a year). The result was an increased weight of *favelados* relative to the total Cariocan population, which went up from 16% to 17% in five years. Nevertheless, these trends have varied significantly in different regions of the city. The two expanding zones of the city – the elite area of Barra/Jacarepaguá and the popular area of the West Zone – had the greatest rates of increase, both in *favelados* (3.9% and 3.4% a year, respectively) and in the non-favela population (1.6% and 1.3% a year). In the three zones consolidated, all of them with negative growth of the non-favela population, the South Zone stands out with a growth rate in *favelados* of 2.4% a year. The weight of these residents against the total population of the region rose from 14.9% in 1991 to 17% in 1996. The North Zone was the only region with an absolute loss of *favelados*.

**Table 2: Population living inside and outside favelas  
in the city of Rio de Janeiro – 1991/1996**

Large Zones	Absolute Growth		Annual Growth		% Favela Pop./ Total Pop. 91	% Favela Pop./ Total Pop. 96
	Favela	Non-Favela	Favela	Non-Favela		
<b>Downtown/South Zone</b>	16,110	-27,035	2.4%	-0.8%	14.9%	17.0%
<b>Barra/Jacarepaguá</b>	13,523	29,364	3.9%	1.6%	15.0%	16.6%
<b>North Zone</b>	-2,636	-23,123	-1.1%	-1.4%	12.6%	12.7%
<b>Suburbs</b>	21,367	-57,672	0.8%	-0.6%	20.6%	21.8%
<b>West Zone</b>	22,725	79,308	3.4%	1.3%	9.6%	10.5%
<b>Total RJ</b>			1.6%	0.0%	16.1%	17.2%
<b>Neighborhoods</b>	71,089	842				

Source: 1991 Demographic Census and 1996 Count.

How do favelas grow? Classically, the reason for the demographic growth of favelas is attributed to migration, particularly from the northeast of the country. However, the census data show that migration accounts increasingly less for the accelerated favela-settling process under way in the city. For example, between 1991 and 1996 the North Zone had the greatest absolute increase in favela population (approximately 22,000 people). In the 1990's, only 2,600 *favelados* were migrants. We can deduce that the emergence and expansion of new favelas (mostly located in the West Zone) have occurred via spatial mobility inside the city itself, either from non-favela areas to the favela, or from consolidated favelas into new ones. The avoidance of paying rent both in the formal and informal markets and the reduced supply of houses or popular plots of land, explain this mobility towards favelas. It is worth noticing that today the rent of a house in the South and North Zone favelas can be the same as that of an apartment in Copacabana or downtown.

The intra-city mobility is less explicative when we observe the population growth in already consolidated favelas in the South Zone and the suburban area. In the South Zone of the city, about 40% of the increase in favela population in the first five years of the 1990's was composed of migrants from outside the city, most of them from the northeast (*nordestinos*). In this sense, the possible “expulsão branca” (white expulsion) of the poorer



residents in downtown favelas caused by the valuation of real estate must be seen as relative, especially considering the possibility of “entrance” in these spaces of a migrating population with an average social profile lower than that of those who already lived in the favelas. In Table 3, we can see the higher social and occupational profile of the working population living in the South and North Zone favelas compared to the profile of *nordestinos* who migrated to these areas in the 1980’s. Family networks work as an important mechanism for newly arrived migrants to access housing and get inserted into the urban economy. Also, the fact that these favelas are located in areas with a great demand for unskilled work in the service and building sectors is a core factor to insert these migrants.

**Table 3: Social and occupational profile of the working population and the northeastern working migrants living in the South and North Zone favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro; 1991**

South and North Zones						
Favelas	Socio-occupational Categories					
	Elite	S. Bourg.	Middle Class	Worker	Outsourced Prolet.	Sub-prolet.
Resid. Pop.	1.3%	3.4%	17.0%	20.9%	37.3%	19.8%
NE Migrant	0.4%	0.7%	6.4%	15.7%	59.7%	16.9%

Source: 1991 Demographic Census.

**Note:**

- Elite: entrepreneurs and executives of the public and private sectors and higher-level professionals;
- Small bourgeoisie: services and commerce small employers;
- Middle class: employees in routine occupations, supervision, security, basic education, and technicians.
- Workers: workers in the industry and construction sectors;
- Proletarians in the tertiary sector: service providers and commerce workers;
- Sub-proletarians: domestic workers, street vendors and odd-jobs workers.

## The favela/(formal) neighborhood division in the unequal space of the city

The population living in Rio de Janeiro favelas is significantly younger than those who live in non-favela areas, which confirms an age profile that is, generally speaking, typical of popular areas. In this sense, it is in the West Zone of the city, a popular peripheral area, where the smallest difference found is the age profile in the favelas and official areas: while in the favelas about 51% of the dwellers are under 24 years of age, in the formal districts this percentage is 45% (Table 4). The closer we get to downtown, the greater the difference in profile and the older the population.

**Table 4: Population per age range according to the location of the home inside or outside the favela, in the major zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro; 1996**

Large Zones	Age Range						
	CHILD	ADOL	YOUNG	ADULT	MATURE	OLD	TOT
<b>Downtown/South Zone - Favela</b>	21.0%	7.1%	19.6%	34.0%	13.8%	4.5%	100%
<b>Downtown/South Zone - Non-Favela</b>	9.8%	4.5%	14.5%	31.5%	24.1%	15.6%	100%
<b>Barra/Jacarep. – Favela</b>	23.3%	7.6%	20.7%	34.6%	11.3%	2.6%	100%
<b>Barra/Jacarep. – Non-Favela</b>	15.7%	6.7%	17.5%	33.8%	19.6%	6.7%	100%
<b>North Zone – Favela</b>	2.6%	8.3%	19.5%	30.8%	13.5%	5.2%	100%
<b>North Zone – Non-Favela</b>	11.0%	5.4%	14.6%	30.4%	23.5%	15.2%	100%
<b>Suburb – Favela</b>	23.0%	8.1%	19.6%	31.6%	13.4%	4.2%	100%
<b>Suburb – Non-Favela</b>	15.0%	6.5%	16.4%	31.9%	20.8%	9.5%	100%
<b>West Zone – Favela</b>	23.7%	8.7%	19.5%	31.1%	13.1%	3.9%	100%
<b>West Zone – Non-Favela</b>	19.1%	7.6%	18.4%	32.0%	16.9%	6.0%	100%
<b>Total RJ – Favela</b>	22.8%	8.0%	19.7%	32.1%	13.3%	4.1%	100%
<b>Total RJ – Non-Favela</b>	15.1%	6.4%	16.6%	31.9%	20.3%	9.6%	100%

Source: 1996 Count; FIBGE.

The age profile of *favelados* does not vary too much in the five zones of the city. The percentage of the population in the 0–24-age range varies from 47.6% in the South Zone favelas to 51.9% in the West Zone favelas.

Note the relatively smaller weight of the population above 45 in the favelas of Barra and Jacarepaguá: while in these zones the percentage is 13.9%, in the others it ranges from 17% to 18.7%. This younger profile of Barra and Jacarepaguá favelas follows the profile of the non-favela areas, which also have a smaller relative weight for the age range above 45, and greater weight for the age ranges between 15 and 24, and between 25 and 44. As an expansion area for the middle social segments, this zone attracts a population that is starting a career and is in the first phase of the family cycle (couples with no children, or couples with small children). As the area with the greatest concentration of real-estate production, it attracts workers for civil construction, with a relatively young age profile and whose alternative for a nearby dwelling are the favelas in the region.

As to differentiation by gender, it is worth noticing the only slightly greater proportion of women in the official areas as compared to the favelas, particularly in the Center/South Zone and Barra/Jacarepaguá.

**Table 5: Population by gender and color according to the location of the home inside or outside the favela, in the major zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro; 1996.**

Large Zones	Gender		Color	
	Male	Female	White	Non-White
Downtown/South Zone - Favela	48.4%	51.6%	44.4%	55.6%
Downtown/South Zone - Non-Favela	43.7%	56.3%	84.0%	16.0%
Barra/Jacarep. – Favela	48.2%	51.8%	34.6%	65.4%
Barra/Jacarep. – Non-Favela	44.2%	55.8%	87.1%	12.9%
North Zone – Favela	49.3%	50.7%	37.4%	62.6%
North Zone – Non-Favela	48.4%	51.6%	47.9%	52.1%
Suburb – Favela	49.4%	50.6%	36.4%	63.6%
Suburb – Non-Favela	47.4%	52.6%	65.8%	34.2%
West Zone – Favela	48.7%	51.3%	37.3%	62.7%
West Zone – Non-Favela	46.7%	53.3%	62.9%	37.1%
Total RJ – Favela	48.8%	51.2%	38.0%	62.0%
Total RJ – Non-Favela	46.6%	53.4%	64.3%	35.7%

Source: 1991 Demographic Census; FIBGE.

The color indicator shows the predominance of a white population in official city districts – around 64% – and of a nonwhite population in favelas – around 62% (Table 5). These percentages vary significantly according to the different areas. While in the Center/South Zone and Barra/Jacarepaguá over 80% of the dwellers are Whites, in the North Zone this percentage is only 48%. Among *favelados*, the variation according to the geographical location is smaller: the favelas in the Center/South Zone are those that have the smallest proportion of non-Whites (about 55%); in the others this percentage ranges between 62% and 65%.

The schooling data on the population above 23 years of age in Rio de Janeiro (Table 6) shows a great difference in profile between favela dwellers and city dwellers, both in the downtown area and in the city suburbs, although the difference is relatively smaller in the suburbs. The first finding is the high weight of the population with up to 7 years of schooling in the favelas: above 70% in all the zones! Among city dwellers, the greatest percentage of this range was 19% in the North Zone, and the highest was 52% in the West Zone. In other words, the schooling level in favelas is still lower than the one seen in the formal but working class neighborhoods of the city periphery.

A second piece of evidence is the small difference between the five zones in the schooling profiles of favela dwellers. The most significant differences are the relatively greater percentages (i) of those with up to 3 years of schooling in the favelas of Barra/Jacarepaguá (36.6%) and the North Zone (35.6%), and (ii) those with a university degree in the favelas of the Center/South Zone (1.3 %). It is interesting to note that the schooling profile of dwellers of more recently built favelas located in the periphery is not lower than that of dwellers of the consolidated downtown favelas. The smaller weight of migrants, particularly those who came from farther away, in the outskirts favelas, can account for this equivalence in schooling level.

An analysis of the social and occupational profile of the working population in the favelas and formal areas shows (as well as in the education profile) a great difference between the two universes of the analysis (Table 7). However, these differences vary significantly among the five zones of the city.

**Table 6: Population above 23 years of age by ranges of years of schooling according to the location of the home inside or outside the favela, in the major zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro; 1996**

Large Zones	Schooling Years				
	No Schooling	1-4	5-8	9-11	over 12
Downtown/South Zone - Favela	33.7%	40.1%	16.9%	8.0%	1.3%
Downtown/South Zone - Non-Favela	7.2%	14.4%	11.4%	28.0%	38.9%
Barra/Jacarep. – Favela	36.6%	38.4%	15.4%	9.0%	0.7%
Barra/Jacarep. – Non-Favela	12.0%	20.3%	13.4%	27.1%	27.2%
North Zone – Favela	35.6%	39.9%	16.2%	7.6%	0.7%
North Zone – Non-Favela	5.3%	13.7%	11.1%	30.4%	39.5%
Suburb – Favela	33.8%	40.4%	16.6%	8.7%	0.6%
Suburb – Non-Favela	11.2%	27.7%	19.0%	29.8%	13.0%
West Zone – Favela	31.6%	41.8%	16.6%	9.3%	0.7%
West Zone – Non-Favela	18.0%	34.0%	20.9%	21.8%	5.2%
Total RJ – Favela	33.8%	40.4%	16.5%	8.6%	0.7%
Total RJ – Non-Favela	11.8%	25.0%	17.1%	27.4%	18.7%

Source: 1996 Count; FIBGE.

The first evidence is the favela/non-favela cut relating to the weight of the elite, which is rather marked only in the zones of the Center/South Zone, Barra/Jacarepaguá and the North Zone. The greatest difference, in this case, is in the North Zone, where the elite represent 28.5% of the city dwellers and 0.9% of *favelados*. In the West Zone, on the other hand, the elite are less represented, both in the formal areas and in the favelas: 3.6% and 0.6%, respectively. As to the middle class, the favela/non-favela cut is less marked: in the Center/South Zone favelas, 19.2% of the dwellers have average occupations, while in the districts this percentage is 32.6%. Even in the Barra/Jacarepaguá favelas, where dwellers have a relatively more proletarian social and occupational profile than the one found in other zones, the percentage of the middle class is 10.8%.

The second evidence is the weight of the subproletarians that is not much differentiated in the favelas and in the districts of the Center/South

**Table 7: Working population by social and occupational categories according to the location of the home inside or outside the favela, in the major zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro; 1991**

Large Zones	Socio-occupational Categories					
	Elite	Small Bourg.	Mid. Class	Worker	Outs. Prolet.	Sub-prolet.
Downtown/South Zone - Favela	1.8%	5.5%	19.2%	16.0%	40.1%	17.4%
Downtown/South Zone - Non-Favela	26.6%	8.3%	32.6%	3.2%	18.3%	11.0%
Barra/Jacarep. – Favela	0.7%	5.1%	10.8%	27.0%	36.6%	19.8%
Barra/Jacarep. – Non-Favela	16.8%	8.5%	29.5%	12.1%	22.8%	10.4%
North Zone – Favela	0.9%	4.9%	15.7%	21.9%	35.5%	21.1%
North Zone – Non-Favela	28.5%	9.1%	37.3%	3.4%	14.3%	4%
Suburb – Favela	0.6%	5.5%	15.0%	30.6%	31.8%	16.4%
Suburb – Non-Favela	8.8%	8.2%	39.2%	12.9%	23.7%	7.1%
West Zone – Favela	0.6%	6.5%	13.9%	30.5%	31.5%	17.0%
West Zone – Non-Favela	3.6%	6.7%	28.3%	21.9%	28.6%	11.0%
Total RJ – Favela	0.8%	5.6%	15.2%	27.8%	33.5%	17.1%
Total RJ – Non-Favela	13.0%	8.0%	34.5%	12.4%	23.1%	9.0%

Source: 1991 Demographic Census; FIBGE.

**Note:**

- Elite: entrepreneurs and executives of the public and private sectors and higher-level professionals;
- Small bourgeoisie: services and commerce small employers;
- Middle class: employees in routine occupations, supervision, security, basic education, and technicians.
- Workers: workers in the industry and construction sectors;
- Proletarians in the tertiary sector: service providers and commerce workers;
- Sub-proletarians: domestic workers, street vendors and odd-jobs workers.

Zone and West Zone: approximately 17% in the favelas of both zones, and 11% in the formal districts. It is surprising that about 11% of the dwellers in the most valued districts of the city – Center/South Zone and Barra/Jacarepaguá – are subproletarians, a category comprising domestic workers mostly. This represents evidence that, in these areas, there still are mechanisms that ensure access to housing to these workers via the market.

Finally, we must point out the significant differentiation among favelas in the social and occupational profiles, according to the area in which they are located. The favelas in the suburbs and in the West Zone have a more working-class profile – around 30% of the working people – than what is seen in the favelas of the other zones, where the predominance of tertiary workers is greater.

### Favela/(formal) neighborhood distance

In this part of the text, we evaluate the social distance between the favelas and the non-favela areas as to income.

Table 8 shows the ratio between the means in total income of favela dwellers and city dwellers, according to social and demographic variables recognized in the specialized literature as income-determinants: insertion into the occupational structure, schooling, age, color and gender. The inequalities caused by these differences can express mechanisms of segregation and/or discrimination by certain social segments in the labor market when used as selection criteria in the distribution of occupational opportunities or a salary differentiator. As the differences in income between white workers and nonwhite workers are known in the Brazilian urban work market, and as in the favelas the non-Whites have an expressive presence, we take this dichotomy as a reference point to appraise the distance between the favela and the non-favela areas.

We have remarked a relationship between the occupational hierarchy and social distance between *favelados* and city dwellers. In the lower positions (maids, street vendors, odd-jobs), we see proximity between the favela and the city dwellers, since income differentiators are very small. As we go up in hierarchy, distances increase, and reach the maximum in middle-level non-manual occupations, in which *favelados* have 56% of the income of city dwellers. We find the same similarity in examining income differentials between Whites and non-Whites, although the

distance between these two segments is smaller than the one seen between the favela areas and the non-favela areas. On the other hand, the distance between *favelados* is significantly smaller, which suggests the existence of a strong social homogeneity.

We see a similar situation in the analysis by schooling level, i. e. a greater social distance corresponds to more schooling among favela dwellers and city dwellers. The same occurs with the distance between Whites and non-Whites.

However, we notice a nuance. The relative disadvantaged position of favela dwellers and non-Whites seems to be the same up to the schooling range corresponding to elementary school (eight years). The differentials increase more strongly in the favela/non-favela cut in the other ranges, and reach 44% among those with over 12 years of schooling. In other words, *favelados* have more trouble transforming their schooling into income than the whole of the non-Whites. Among “uneducated” workers, i. e., those who are in the most unfavorable labor market position and amount approximately to 70% of the *favelados*, as we have seen, we note a surprising difference in income: favela dwellers receive 85% of what city dwellers receive.

The examination of age and gender differentials shows us that the favela/non-favela social distance is similar to the one that exists between Whites and non-Whites.

Do differences in income derive from discrimination mechanisms in the work market for favela dwellers? Then, would this be the configuration of the phenomenon of “ghettoization” of favela dwellers?

## Are favelas ghettos?

The analysis of the situation in favelas against formal neighborhoods suggests the existence of an important division in the social space of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The favela/non-favela division seems to be the spatial expression of the notorious inequality present in the Brazilian society, since it concentrates the social segments that have the biggest disadvantages to access opportunities: the youngest, the non-Whites, and those with poor schooling. However, the results of our analysis indicate that favelas are the dwelling place for those with the greatest disadvantage among the fortunate of the city, since the income differentials increase



among the groups with the greatest chances of equaling the inhabitants in non-favela areas. At the same time, the income differentials are not to be ignored among the most unfortunate of the city.

**Table 8: Ratio between the mean income of favela, non-favela, and city dwellers; 1991**

	Neighborhood (*)	Favela	City	
<b>OCCUPATION</b>	Non-Whites/ Whites	Non-Whites/ Whites	Fav/Neighb	Non-Whites/ Whites
Sub-Proletariat	0.86	0.91	0.93	0.87
Working class	0.73	0.93	0.84	0.74
Services and Commerce	0.63	0.87	0.68	0.64
Non-manual High School Level	0.63	0.85	0.56	0.63
<b>YEARS OF SCHOOLING</b>				
No schooling	0.90	0.81	0.85	0.88
1-4 years	0.75	0.92	0.77	0.74
5-8 years	0.76	0.99	0.75	0.75
9-11 years	0.72	0.89	0.61	0.71
Over 12 years	0.67	0.84	0.44	0.67
<b>AGE</b>				
Young	0.77	0.87	0.78	0.74
Adult	0.47	0.82	0.46	0.47
Mature	0.44	0.90	0.37	0.44
Old	0.41	0.87	0.30	0.40
<b>GENDER</b>				
Male	0.43	0.77	0.35	0.42
Female	0.45	0.93	0.66	0.44

**Source: 1991 Demographic Census, FIBGE**

**(\*) Favela dwellers were excluded.**

These findings seem to strengthen the dualistic conception of the favela. However, we would like to complete our work with some short comments which, from our viewpoint, are necessary to avoid reductionism. In fact, as we stated in the beginning, this analysis is not sufficient to identify the position of favelas in the social space of the city. It is critical to move from the analysis of the favela/non-favela division into the interpretation of the (di)vision of this social and spatial dichotomy, i. e. to evaluate whether the differences observed are legitimately represented in the Cariocan society as separation and/or inferiority.

The reflection on the social distance in terms of income gives us the opportunity to explore some paths. The differences that we noticed suggest two explanations about the symbolization of the favela/city division, and its insertion into the social practices that govern the relationship between work and housing. According to the first explanation, the favela would be considered as a dependent variable. It would be the consequence of discriminatory practices in the labor market against *favelados*. In other words, living in favelas would be a negative attribute, out of which discriminatory practices result as to income determination. The situation of *favelados* would be similar to the situation of women in the labor market, which has already been widely described in the sociological and economic literature. Social legitimacy for this discrimination would be obtained by transforming the poor dwelling place of *favelados* into a *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1979), through which the naturalization of the discrimination would be produced, and the consequent willingness of *favelados* to accept lower salaries. This argument approximates the position of the favela in the social space of Rio de Janeiro to the one of the African American ghettos, according to the analyses of Wilson (1987) and Wacquant (2000), in which the social inferiority of their dwellers reproduces itself in a perverse circle.

In the second explanation, the favela would be an independent variable. There are two explicative variants in this case. In the first one, the favela would be the result of low and uncertain income of workers who have positions beneath their potential due to the segmented labor market, the consequence being lower income. The illustration of this variant would be the strong presence of civil construction workers in favelas, because in this productive sector schooling is not so important to determine the workers' income, considering the nature of the work process and the prevalence of autonomous work. The uncertain low income earned would

only allow access to the housing submarket of the favela as a strategy to reduce housing and transportation costs. In the second variant, the favela would result from the possibility to access the source of income provided by the residential location of certain segments of workers who have uncertain temporary occupations dependent on a personal contract between the offer and the demand. The illustration of this variant would be the strong presence of providers of personal services in favelas located in the more central areas of the city. This hypothesis would be coherent with the verification of the relationship between the gradient of the mean of the *favelados* throughout the large areas and the city social map, in which we notice that the closer to the centers of spatial concentration of upper layers, the greater the relative income, as we can see in the table below.

**Table 9: Ratio between mean income of favela dwellers per major areas and that of the totality of favela dwellers; 1991**

Large Areas	Ratio
South Zone/Downtown	1.12
Barra/Jacarepaguá	0.94
North Zone	1.05
West Zone	0.90
Suburb	0.94
Total	1.00

In short, in both variants of the second hypothesis, the separation between favela and non-favela areas would express the segmentation of the access to resources unequally located in the city, either relating to housing or to opportunities for work and income. To us, this seems to be the most plausible hypothetical explanation for the differences in income between favela dwellers and regular city dwellers. The income and its amount explain the selection between favela dwellers and city dwellers. Those who manage to overcome the barriers in the labor market and increase their income, or who have access to more stable occupations, tend to leave the favela. This is what studies on residential mobility (Lago, 2000) between the central favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro and the metropolitan periphery show us.

Our last comment is about the need to take into account the differences between favelas as to their position in the social space of the city. The favela may represent both a moment of the upward mobility of certain social segments and the opposite, a place of refuge for those who are in the process of social marginalization. The entrance into the favelas located in the South Zone of migrants from other cities of the State of Rio de Janeiro and the Northeast of Brazil, all of them with a social and occupational status lower than those of the dwellers, seems to indicate the situation in which the growth of the favela can be associated with the dynamics of upward social mobility. In contrast, the growth of the West Zone favelas might express a downward social movement, particularly in the case of the South Zone favela dwellers who, for some reason, are forced to abandon the greater access to sources of income and occupation. Are these favelas changing into a ghetto situation, since their growth seems to be associated with a process of social isolation?

It is not possible to answer this question in this text. We would only like to remind the reader that work is not the sole explanation for the social exclusion produced by the ghettoization of poor African Americans, according to the analyses of Wacquant and Wilson. The ghetto is also produced by the stigmatization of the territories where the economically weak segments are centered, by the reduction in the organizational density of these territories, and by the little presence of the State. Most of all, the ghettoization takes place when the dwellers of these territories are deprived of the capacity to control their social representation in the collective forms of classification of the divisions of society and, therefore, their identity as a group. It is this dispossession that makes it possible to transform unequal people into social outcasts and, as such, leads them to live in disorder or in another social order legitimately considered as unacceptable.

This point takes us back to the beginning of our paper, back to reflection on the importance of theoretical conceptions, of images and practices present in the current public debate on the divided city. What negative symbolic effects would be produced by the increasingly more frequent associations between favelas and violence, and by the increasing legitimacy of the public discourse on urban disorder as the reason for the evils of the city? Is there anything in disorder? Would it be the favela dwellers or the discourses about them?

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### 3

## Work and housing in the periphery of a large metropolis: for an economically-oriented urban policy<sup>1</sup>

*Luciana Corrêa do Lago*

*I have already worked for the clothing industry with labor card signed. Last year I worked at APA, a factory of suits here in Caxias. Before I started working at home I worked in a factory in Vilar dos Teles. In the factory I didn't feel very well because we get really stuck, we earn little and nobody cares. I didn't like it much and tried to flee, and it was at that time that I thought 'Oh, I'm going to buy the machines and work at home.'<sup>2</sup>*

### Introduction

I chose the quote above as epigraph because in it we find two central ideas that guide this article: the urban labor market as a field of possibilities for the manual worker and the house in the periphery, a space of family reproduction, as a productive space. With these ideas, I will seek to put some light on the comings and goings between the precarious work and the stable work in a major Brazilian metropolis – Rio de Janeiro - focusing on the connections between different forms of work and the quality of life in the city. I understand that the changes in the working world modify the conditions of ownership of collective and individual consumer goods, and that such conditions modify the ways of working as well. I understand that to reflect on the good life in the city we need to overcome the Republican social welfare paradigm, supported by the tripod formed by steady

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<sup>1</sup> This article was originally published in Portuguese in volume 24 of the Journal *Em Pauta*, by Faculdade de Serviço Social of UERJ in 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Interview conducted in 2008 with the seamstress V., aged 29 years, a self-employed worker, who performs her profession in her own home in Caxias.

job, income security and universalization of access to basic services, introducing in the analysis about the urban life the potentialities and the limits of political organization of the “unstable” work, the conditions for the extension of the nonworking time and the various possibilities of use of that time. The proposed reading of the metropolitan reality of Rio de Janeiro in this perspective of combining forms of work and living conditions is intended to give subsidies for the formulation of urban policies that seek to break the border that divides the fields of economic production and social reproduction. In this sense, three assumptions give meaning to the analytical path here proposed. The first two relate to the size of the territory, i.e. the place of people, equipment and activities in the city, the way they concentrate or disperse in the space of the city and, therefore, the distances and times traversed daily by workers and their families. As first assumption, I believe that the reduction of these distances and times of circulation is determinant of social welfare, of increase in access to resources and services and of the nonworking time. Home-work journeys are perceived as working hours, and the reduction of distances as a gain for the worker. For David Harvey (1980), any public investment, when it earns its place in the city, generates necessarily unequal situations of accessibility to work among the residents. Therefore, the competition for public resources towards reducing social inequalities is also a dispute over location in the city.

In the field of urban studies in Latin America, the first idea that the term ‘periphery’ brings us is the idea of “distance”, a place integrated into the urban accumulation process, however, a place where urbanity has not been achieved due to the very logic of this process<sup>3</sup>. As additional categories, “core” and “periphery” opened the prospect of thinking the metropolis as a whole profoundly unequal. In this sense, periphery comprises a sum of “distances”: geographical, cultural, social and economic. The concentration of employment, of housing of the middle and upper classes, of urban equipment and services in the downtown areas of large cities and,

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<sup>3</sup> This is the concept of “periphery” built in the 70s in the framework of Marxist urban sociology and next incorporated into the common sense. It qualifies a certain territory in the metropolis by the shortcomings observed there and not found elsewhere: lack of basic public services, urbanization of public areas, ownership of the property and proximity to the labor market, among others (KOWARICK, 1983). The notion of “dormitory city” emerged as synthesis of these needs and of the enormous distances to be traveled daily between the place of residence and work.

consequently, the enormous shortcomings that mark the peripheral spaces, supported this dual vision of socio-territorial inequalities in Brazilian metropolises until the 90s. Recent studies have started to explore, on the basis of changes in the working world, analytical limits of the concept of periphery as an expression of urban life in popular spaces (Telles, 2006; Lago, 2007). The present article follows this direction, examining the quantity, the quality and the spatiality of what we call precarious work.

The second assumption is an unfolding of the first, and refers to the fact that the social and territorial inequalities mentioned above have been used by the ruling class as a mechanism of (re) production of its economic and symbolic power. That is, in a class society, places and distances in the city are, at the same time, expression of power relations and instrument of power. The concentration of a given social category in a given residential area is not just the result of economic inequalities and power between social classes in the contest for the appropriation of resources distributed in the urban space, but it may work as a (re)production or a reduction factor of such inequalities. In this sense, the most exclusive districts of higher categories or areas typically of workers may harbor a level of class cohesion that allows strategies for action and specific urban living conditions among those who live there.

This combination between place of residence and class action was evidenced by Christian Topalov (1996) when analyzing the genesis of urban reform and of the welfare state as a new system of power in Europe, at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th century. The reformers understood that for a radical change in the workers' customs, which were already organized politically at this point, it would be necessary, among other actions, to break the bonds of solidarity consolidated in the daily life of the workers' districts. And thus, the ideal of decent housing for the worker was conceived: homeownership, wholesome and suburban, far from downtown. Pierre Bourdieu (1997) also tells us of the "effect of place" on relations of domination in a class society. For the author, the dominants use the territory, or better, the demarcation of their own territory and the territory of the dominated as a mechanism for reaffirming domination through monetary gains with real estate appreciation and symbolic gains of distinction.

Following this direction, we can think that areas with high concentration of precarious or unemployed workers, far from the experience of class and with reduced power struggle in the city, can function as a reduction



factor of job opportunities and access to public resources for those residing there (Kaztman, 2001). So, districts with greater social diversity, housing workers with differentiated labor insertions with extra-local connections which are also differentiated, would produce a positive effect on the power struggle of those residents around the redistribution of public resources. This hypothesis contains the political meaning of the reading we propose here on the forms of work in the metropolitan periphery of Rio de Janeiro. The investigation of the changes in the working world, in particular what is called precarious work, and its effects on the social profile of peripheral residential districts aims to understand the possibilities of new forms of work organization besides the factory, from which is expected greater power of appropriation of public resources by workers.

The third assumption refers to simplification, in the field of politics and urban studies, of the working world categories such as “precarious” and “Informality”, which shall signify a wide variety of work situations. According to Vera Telles (2006), it is necessary to construct new reference plans, new descriptions outside the prevailing categorizations – informality, precariousness, vulnerability, among others - as a condition for the formulation of new issues, and I further add here, for the investigation of the potentialities of the self-employed work and the role of the district as productive space. Therefore, the work that is not regulated by socially imposed rules within a legal framework should not be understood *a priori* as damage or as leverage for the worker. The argument of Eduardo Noronha summarizes such view.

*We argue that only when we have identified the various types or groups of “atypical contracts” (a concept that might be preferable to “Informality”), provided or not by the laws, we can define the possible inconveniences in the absence of a single contractual standard and, especially, identify the reasons for the existence of contracts that are atypical and illegal or not provided for by the law and which are socially illegitimate. (NORONHA, 2003, p. 111)*

This analytical path widens the field of vision of labor activities in metropolitan peripheral areas by enabling the apprehension of the complexity of the popular world, especially of local productive bonds that transcend the formal/informal dichotomy. My intention is to extend the meanings of what is classified today as precarious or informal work in

structural analyses, statistical in nature, to the changes in labor relations over the past three decades. Such analyses have served as the legitimizing basis of social inclusion policies in which predominate the programs, territorially focused, of employment and income generation, of incentive to entrepreneurship and of re-qualification of workers for insertion into a new market. I will seek, as a method, to combine a structural reading of the labor market in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, privileging the peripheral municipalities and manual workers, with the apprehension of some work experience in the sector of manufacture of clothing in certain typical workers' areas in the same metropolis.

## A structural reading on the place of work and its forms in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro

The main trends of the metropolitan labor market of Rio de Janeiro<sup>4</sup> coincide with the results already shown by numerous studies on Brazilian and Latin American cities. By the end of the 70s, we experienced the expansion of employment with Labor Card signed<sup>5</sup> in all sectors of the economy and, consequently, the belief in full employment in the near future. From the 80s, the productive restructuring proliferated in the Western world led to the reversal of that expansion and to rising rates of unemployment and precarious employment not only in Latin America (SABÓIA, 2005), but also in the advanced capitalist countries (MÉSZÁROS, 2006).

Analyzing the metropolitan labor market of Rio de Janeiro on the basis of the behavior of three major occupational groups – upper, medium and popular categories<sup>6</sup> – we can say that the changes in the 90s were not

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<sup>4</sup> Today, the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro comprises 20 municipalities: Rio de Janeiro, Belford Roxo, Duque de Caxias, Guapimirim, Itaboraí, Magé, Japeri, Nilópolis, Niterói, Paracambi, Queimados, Nova Iguaçu, São Gonçalo, São João de Meriti, Seropédica, Mesquita, Tanguá, Maricá, Itaguaí and Mangaratiba. In 2000, this set of municipalities housed about eleven million residents from which four million were employed.

<sup>5</sup> An employment with Labor Card signed means that the employee is officially registered and is a contributor to the social security welfare system.

<sup>6</sup> These three broad categories synthesize the socio-occupational structure (a proxy of class structure) built under the scope of the Observatório das Metrôpoles/IPPUR/UFRJ and which results from the assumption that (still) labor is the factor that positions socially the individual in society. The structure is formed by 25 socio-occupational categories (aggregated into eight broad categories), built through the social hierarchy of occupations defined in the demographic censuses of 1991 and 2000. *Top categories*: 1.

structural. Popular occupations, which aggregate manual workers (industry workers, commerce workers, service providers, domestic workers and street vendors), suffered a small relative increase from 57.5% to 59.3% of the total workers, as well as the upper categories (leaders and professionals) that increased from 8.4% to 10%. The participation of medium-sized categories dropped from 30.4% to 27.8%. However, the complexity of the labor market in Brazil, and particularly in the metropolises, points to a variety of trends within each of the three major socio-occupational groups<sup>7</sup>. Among manual workers, specialized services providers<sup>8</sup> were the main responsible for the aforementioned increase, followed by workers of the auxiliary services industry<sup>9</sup>, construction workers, street vendors and commerce workers. As a counterpart, we detected a relative strong drop of workers in the industry – from 13% to 8% - and, to a lesser extent, of non-specialized services providers (doorkeepers and watchmen, for example) — from 6.2% to 5.3%. Domestic workers have maintained the same percentage during the period: around 8.7%. Such changes have occurred both in the metropolitan core (municipality of Rio de Janeiro) and in the peripheral municipalities, varying only the intensity of the changes.

The relative stability of the occupational structure, however, was crossed by a clear “precariousness” of labor relations in all occupational categories (Table 1), which have already been pointed in other analyses on the same universe (OLIVEIRA, 2004). The precarious work, here, was quantified by the sum of two forms of work defined by the IBGE, “employment without labor card signed” and “self-employment”, in contrast to “employment with labor card signed”. We found the largest relative increase in precarious works among domestic workers, which rose

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Leaders (large employers and leaders of the public and private sectors); 2. High-level professionals (employed, self-employed, statutory and teachers) and 3. Small employers. *Medium categories* (employed in routine occupations, supervision, security, basic and technical education). *Popular categories*: 5. Workers in the secondary sector (workers of modern industry, traditional industry, those from auxiliary services to industry and construction); 6. Workers in the tertiary sector (service providers and commerce workers); 7. Tertiary non-specialist workers (doorkeepers and watchmen, domestic workers, street vendors and odd-job workers) and 8. Farmers.

<sup>7</sup> Source: 1991 and 2000 demographic censuses.

<sup>8</sup> Occupations with the largest weight within this category are: waiters, security guards, cooks and drivers in the service sector.

<sup>9</sup> The sectors of transportation, distribution of water, electricity and gas are those with the largest weight in the category.

from 45% in 1991, to 66% in 2000. Non-specialized services providers (doorkeepers and watchmen, mostly) also showed strong growth: from 12% to 19%. Among the workers of the industrial sector, both categories linked to the processing industry, which lost relative position in the social structure, as those related to construction, which won it, showed significant increase in the percentage of “workers without labor card signed” and “self-employed workers”. Among construction workers, this percentage, which in 1991 reached 66%, reached 74% in 2000. In traditional industry, it rose from 45.4% to 55.1%, and in modern industry, from 36.4% to 45.9%.

**Table 1: Employment and average income relationship according to some socio-occupational categories, in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro: 1991 and 2000.**

Socio-occupational categories	% self-employed + employee without labor card		Income average of the main occupation in Minimum Wage	
	1991	2000	1991	2000
<b>Leaders</b>	1.8%	6.4%	22.48	32.11
<b>High-level Professionals</b>	21%	35%	10.0	12.6
<b>Mid-Level Occupations</b>	15%	26%	4.1	6.0
<b>Manual Occupations</b>				
<b>Commerce Workers</b>	40%	43%	2.6	3.4
<b>Specialized Service Providers</b>	32%	46%	2.1	2.9
<b>Modern Industry Workers</b>	36%	46%	2.5	3.5
<b>Traditional Industry Workers</b>	45%	55%	2.0	2.6
<b>Auxiliary Services Workers</b>	42%	48%	4.0	4.4
<b>Construction Workers</b>	66%	74%	2.0	2.9
<b>Non-Specialized Services Providers</b>	12%	19%	1.7	2.1
<b>Domestic Workers</b>	45%	66%	1.1	1.7
<b>Street Vendors</b>	97%	95%	2.5	2.6
<b>Total</b>	31%	43%	3.8	5.3

Source: 1991 and 2000 Demographic Censuses; FIBGE.

The retraction of employment with labor card signed is associated with an increase in instability of income from work, however, in Table 1, we can see that this instability was somewhat compensated by the increase in the average monthly income in all occupational categories, even in the most precarious such as street vendors. A higher income but which is not guaranteed monthly allows, at the same time, an expansion of the power of short-term consumption and a reduction in the ability of long-term indebtedness on the part of workers. Such trends change significantly the field of possibilities that those workers have to integrate themselves into the city: house rent, long-term installments for purchase of a real estate property, water and electricity rates and transportation fare are permanent or long-term costs that instability in income prevents, periodically, to get paid. We can add to this contingent of precarious workers the one regarding the unemployed workers, which does not enter the universe here analyzed. In 2000, 18% of the economically active population (EAP) resident in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro was looking for work<sup>10</sup>.

Now we will see the effects that these general trends in the labor market have on the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro.

Despite the fact that the present metropolitan space, in 2000, showed a clear social segmentation, the municipalities and their inner areas<sup>11</sup> guarded a significant degree of social heterogeneity, even in the most valued areas<sup>12</sup> where high homogeneity was expected. The average profile of these areas consisted of 42% of leaders and professionals, 33% of workers in medium occupations and 24.5% of manual workers. At the other end of the spatial hierarchy, the average profile of popular areas, located in slums and in the periphery, was formed by 24.5% of workers in high and medium occupations. Changes in the labor market in the 90s had effects throughout the territory, that is, we saw that as much in the central areas as in the intermediate areas of the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro and in

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<sup>10</sup> Source: 2000 Demographic Census; FIBGE.

<sup>11</sup> For analyses on a smaller territorial scale than the municipality, we used as basis the 443 areas designed by FIBGE as a minimum unit of analysis of the 1991 and 2000 Demographic Census sample data. The number of residents in each area, in 2000, varied from 10,000 to 70,000 people. These territorial units were the result of the aggregation of small districts or of the division of more populous districts. We will deal with these areas as a proxy of the districts.

<sup>12</sup> The most valued areas encompass the South Zone, Barra da Tijuca and part of the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro, districts in the coastline of Niterói and the downtown area of Nova Iguaçu.

the popular peripheral areas there was a relative increase in the amount of high-level professionals and specialized tertiary workers, and a relative drop in medium categories (in particular, office occupations) and in the amount of processing industry workers.

It is important to highlight that the professionals were able to expand their location strategies in the metropolis through two processes made possible by large real estate enterprises. On the one hand, the most valued areas of the metropolis have become more exclusive of occupational categories, feeding the growing appreciation of these spaces. On the other hand, these categories were less concentrated in these areas, increasing their presence in popular areas of lower-income professionals who remained in their neighborhoods of origin or moved in the direction of the new frontiers of expansion of the real estate capital in peripheral areas.

We found two relevant changes within the universe of 222 areas<sup>13</sup> that comprise the peripheral municipalities: (i) increase in social diversity among residents in 60% of the areas through greater presence, in relative terms, of professionals and/or workers in medium occupations and (ii) drop in the social profile in 40% of the areas, with relative increase in manual workers only. Therefore, the transformations in the labor market, throughout the 90s, did not homogeneously have an impact on the peripheral space, which can be explained in large part by political pacts and by the economic dynamics specific to each municipality. The rise of the social profile in certain areas, for example, can be related both to the expansion of the more qualified local labor market and to the expansion of the real estate industry business regarding medium sectors which were neither socially nor economically integrated to their place of residence. The “place of work” variable, as we will see, will give some indications to such issue.

In Baixada Fluminense<sup>14</sup>, the municipalities of Duque de Caxias, Nova Iguaçu and Belford Roxo stand out due to the higher proportion of areas prone to raising the social profile. However, this trend was due to different

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<sup>13</sup> The set of these areas housed, in 2000, about one million six hundred thousand residents employed.

<sup>14</sup> The region, with a population of three million one hundred and eighty thousand people in 2000, was the main axis of industrial expansion in the metropolis between the 50s and the 70s, harboring consolidated municipalities (São João de Meriti, Nilópolis, with annual growth rates in the 90s close to 0%) and the others with areas still in expansion. Since the 90s, five municipalities were emancipated (Japeri, Queimados, Belford Roxo and Mesquita were emancipated from Nova Iguaçu and Guapimirim from Magé).

local economic dynamics. The formal economy of Duque de Caxias was the one that showed the greater dynamism in the last half of the 90s with significant growth in all sectors of activities, while in Nova Iguaçu the trade sector was the sector responsible for the expansion of formal enterprises, and in Belford Roxo both the trade sector and the services sector grew<sup>15</sup>. In Caxias and Nova Iguaçu, as much the areas of medium profile as the areas of popular profile, the latter with high amount of industry workers, evidenced a trend towards greater social diversity. However, the two municipalities, despite their economic dynamism, showed a considerable number of popular areas with increasing participation of construction workers, domestic workers and specialized services providers.

In Baixada Fluminense, São João de Meriti, an industrial municipality in the 60s and 70s, and Japeri, a municipality located in the metropolitan border, were the ones with the strongest falling tendency in the social profile: half of their areas became more proletarian, i.e. with greater participation of manual workers' services. In both municipalities it was the trade sector that boosted the formal economy, although in absolute terms the level of Japeri<sup>16</sup> was well below that of São João de Meriti. São Gonçalo, across the Bay of Guanabara, presented an even larger percentage (70%) of areas with this trend towards proletarianization. The crisis in the shipbuilding industry had great impact on the municipality labor market, and can be one of the causes of this trend.

The greater dynamism of the formal economy in some municipalities, as Caxias and Nova Iguaçu, secured a lesser proportion of workers in precarious situation, especially in the industry sector, compared with more stagnant municipalities. Analyzing the percentage of workers without labor card signed and self-employed workers in Caxias, São João de Meriti and Japeri in 2000, we see that in relation to traditional industry workers,

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<sup>15</sup> The downtown areas of Nova Iguaçu and Caxias function as poles of trade and services in Baixada Fluminense. After the industrial crisis in the 80s, Caxias, headquarters of Refinaria Duque de Caxias (Duque de Caxias Refinery), is retaking its place as an industrial pole since the end of the 90s, but with greater intensity in this decade: between 1996 and 2005 there were 10,000 new jobs in formal enterprises of the industrial sector. The data base used was the Register of Enterprises (CEMPRE) produced by IBGE and available at the website of the institution: <http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bdapesquisas/centpre>.

<sup>16</sup> Japeri is one of the municipalities with the lowest tax collections for the State of Rio de Janeiro. The growth of 125% of employees in formal trade between 1996 and 2000 was equal to over 472 workers (CEMPRE/FIBGE).

for example, “precarious” workers reached 47% in Caxias, 52% in São João de Meriti, and 53% in Japeri<sup>17</sup>. In the sector of modern industry, the percentage in Caxias was 39% while in São João de Meriti it was 45%. Among services providers, percentages were very similar.

Observing the set of Brazilian peripheral areas which are more typically of workers, i.e. areas with the highest concentration of workers in the manufacturing industry, it calls our attention the striking difference between Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre, the metropolis with the highest amount of workers in the country. In 1991, the areas with most workers in Rio de Janeiro had, on average, only 17% of their residents working in the industry. In 2000, this percentage dropped to 10%. In Porto Alegre, these percentages reached 52% in 1991, and 44% in 2000<sup>18</sup>. This is an important evidence to consider the role of the territory in the collective actions of workers. If the house location is a relevant dimension in the organizational skills of workers, the high diversity of employment situations in most popular districts of Rio de Janeiro reveals the limits for a collective action that articulate such situations in the working world with the urban conditions of social reproduction.

Let us examine, now, to what extent the changes in the profile of the residents in peripheral areas are related to the new economic functions of these territories. That is, to what extent the periphery can be thought of as “place of work”, breaking with one of the features that define it as such, i.e. as “dormitory”. This issue will be the basis for considering the distances and time spent in the workers’ daily practices. I will use the census variable called “municipality of work” to establish the relationship between place of residence and place of work of the population employed which resides in peripheral municipalities.

The main change observed between 1980<sup>19</sup> and 2000 was the significant increase in the percentage and the amount of people who would not come out of their own municipality of residence in the periphery to work: 63% of employees worked, in 2000, in the municipality where they lived, which

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<sup>17</sup> We will see later that in the specific sector of manufacture of clothes in Caxias and São João, this difference between the two municipalities still remains.

<sup>18</sup> In the metropolis of São Paulo, the districts with more workers showed 28% of industry workers in 1991, and 20% in 2000 in their average profile.

<sup>19</sup> Here, we used the 1980 Demographic Census due to the absence of the “place where one works or studies” variable in the 1991 Census.



represented about a million people, while in 1980 this percentage was only 48%, equivalent to about 590 thousand people<sup>20</sup>. In summary, there has been a reduction of the home-long distance work mobility for the residents of the periphery, which led to the belief that the labor market not only expanded itself in these areas, but absorbed part of the local workforce as well.

A first explanation for this phenomenon is that the increase in the space immobility of the workers would be related mainly to the expansion of the informal low-skill labor market in peripheral areas. Thus, the gain with the proximity of the workplace would be associated with precarious employment. A second explanation, which does not exclude the first, would be the largest economic dynamism in peripheral sub-centers following the expansion of the local labor market, especially for the medium sectors. Such dynamism would further generate an economy, both formal and informal, of medium and low-skill services directed to these sectors. The analysis of some data confirms the two explanations.

The municipalities which were the most consolidated and most directly affected by the crisis of the industrial sector in the 80s<sup>21</sup> were the ones that most expanded the ability to retain the local workforce. The interesting point is that this process occurred with the same intensity in the most economically dynamic municipalities and in those that were stagnant. We saw that all peripheral municipalities had, in 2000, high absorption of their residents of higher professional qualifications in the local labor market. In the overall municipalities, the percentage of employers, leaders and professionals working in the very municipality of residence was over 50%. In contrast, technicians and mid-level supervisors and office workers were more prone to their daily journey to other municipalities, in particular, to the municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

As regards the manual occupational categories, the domestic worker was, in mostly of the peripheral municipalities (except in Caxias, Nova Iguaçu and São Gonçalo), the only occupation with fewer than 50% of employed workers in the local market. Most of the street vendors, on the other hand, exercised their activities in their own municipality<sup>22</sup>. In

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<sup>20</sup> This increase occurred significantly in the overall peripheral municipalities, with the exception of Itaboraí and Maricá.

<sup>21</sup> These are: Caxias, Nova Iguaçu, São João de Meriti, Nilópolis and São Gonçalo.

<sup>22</sup> On average, about 80% of street vendors worked in their own municipality. Even in stagnant municipalities like Japeri, 73% were in this situation.

this case, the spatial immobility of these workers would be related to the decentralization of a popular economy marked by the precariousness of working conditions. Construction workers also were predominantly absorbed by the local real estate dynamics. The real estate sector in the most dynamic municipalities contains different forms and scales of production, from self-construction to large incorporations by leading companies. The overall forms have high rate of work informality, however, the economic circuits and the income volume are different. Finally, the workers of the manufacturing industry showed different territorial dynamics between those of the modern sector and those of the traditional sector. This last sector, where the clothing and food industries stand out and the level of precariousness, as we have seen, is larger, proved to be more rooted in the local space since it used a larger proportion of local workers, compared to the sector of the modern industry<sup>23</sup>.

We can say, from the description above, that some distances, traveled daily by workers residing in the metropolitan periphery of Rio de Janeiro, decreased due to the decentralization of the real estate capital, services and commerce. The labor market in these areas is characterized by diversity, expanding the field of possibilities of labor insertion for local residents.

Next, I will seek to qualify the manual work carried out in the periphery through the reading of some work experience in the sector of the clothing industry in Caxias and São João de Meriti. It is a productive sector with high absorption of local labor and with high level of precariousness in employment relationships, if we consider precarious the job not regulated by legal contract.

## The clothing industry, the peripheral district and the meaning of precarious work

The period of economic recession in the 80s represented a sharp decline in the number of industrial units in Baixada Fluminense, reversing the scenario of the previous decade which was characterized by a high industrial expansion<sup>24</sup>. The only municipality in the region that showed continuity

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<sup>23</sup> In Caxias, 67% of workers of the modern sector and 71% of the traditional sector worked in their own municipality; in São João, they reached 44% and 60%, respectively.

<sup>24</sup> In Caxias, for example, the number of formal industries increased from 530, in 1970, to 901, in 1980 (Economic Censuses of 1970 and 1980; FIBGE).

in this expansion, although in smaller pace, was São João de Meriti. The explanation for this growth is found in the clothing industry which went from 31 units to 114 between 1980 and 1985, turning the sector into the main generator of jobs in formal industries in the municipality. The local trade also accompanied this expansion, generating in the district of Vilar dos Teles the so-called “Pole of Jeans”, a commercial area that, during this period, attracted resellers and buyers from different regions of the State<sup>25</sup>. In Collor’s Era<sup>26</sup>, the opening of the Brazilian market to imported products directly affected the clothing industry market in the region, especially the production and commercialization of jeans, which declined.

For the year 2000, the IBGE data on the formal companies show an interesting scenario: São João de Meriti housed a larger number of companies of “Manufacture of Articles of Clothing and Accessories” than Caxias, however, the total number of employees in companies in Caxias was twice the number shown by São João<sup>27</sup>. Namely, the clothing industries in Caxias were larger sized, with an average of 15 workers per factory, while in São João there were only six workers per factory. There are two unions of employees in the industry working in the region: the “Sindicato dos oficiais alfaiates, costureiras e trabalhadores nas indústrias de confecções de roupas e de chapéus de senhoras” (“Union of the official tailors, dressmakers and workers in industries of clothing and hats of ladies”), with headquarters in Caxias and the “Sindicato das costureiras da Baixada Fluminense” (“Union of dressmakers of Baixada Fluminense”), in São João de Meriti. Both do not have a working base organized and, according to two dressmakers unionized, they are inefficient in their assistance functions.

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<sup>25</sup> The Pole of Jeans did not provide enough dynamism to compensate, at least in São João de Meriti, the crisis in production and mainly in industrial employment in the 80s: according to the demographic censuses, in this municipality, resided 24,700 manual workers of the processing industry in 1980, which was equivalent to 18% of the total number of residents employed; in 1991, there were 18,900, equivalent to 12.5%. In Caxias, the fall was similar in the same period.

<sup>26</sup> Government of President Fernando Collor de Mello (from 1990 to 1992).

<sup>27</sup> Caxias housed, in 2000, 136 formal companies in the sector of clothing and accessories which employed 2,079 workers. In São João do Meriti, there were 202 companies with 1,194 workers. CEMPRE/FIBGE data.

*We are unionized, the union is in Duque de Caxias, but the union won't help at all, the union is purchased by the employers. The union does not provide a clinic or health insurance. (E., employee with labor card signed in Zarkos factory, Caxias).*

The dressmakers unionized, or even those employed with labor card signed, are the minority among the professionals residing in the two municipalities studied. At the time of the 2000 Census, Caxias housed approximately 7,500 dressmakers<sup>28</sup>, and of these, around 3,200 (42%) were only formally hired as employees. In São João de Meriti, we found a similar situation: there were about 5,100 female workers, and around 1,900 (39%) were officially registered<sup>29</sup>. We could classify this profession as presenting a high level of “precariousness”. Now, I will deepen the meaning of precariousness, starting with the role of the territory in working conditions.

The dressmakers of Caxias and São João de Meriti are heavily circumscribed to a local labor market: about 70% worked in their own municipality in 2000. Among the self-employed professionals, this percentage reached 91% in both municipalities, and among those with labor card signed it did not reach 48%. Hence, in the clothing sector, the proximity between the residence and the work in the periphery appears more strongly related to precariousness in employment, if compared to the work carried out far from the residence.

Descending further down the territorial scale, we note that the district plays a key role in the possibilities of access to the labor market, especially to dressmakers who are entering the profession, whether through movement of word-of-mouth information about “vacancies”, whether through informal learning of the profession with a neighbor or through personhood in local economic relations.

I learned to sew with this girl here on Feira de Santana Street. I started there with her, finishing up the seams, cutting thread, gradually she was putting me on the machine and I was learning to sew. Nowadays

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<sup>28</sup> The statistical data concerning the dressmakers were taken from the 2000 Census, where such occupation is named “sewing machine operators of clothes”. In the original version of this paper in Portuguese I used the term of the female profession, that is, *costureira*, since the vast majority of these professionals are female: 96%, for the total of the metropolis.

<sup>29</sup> In 2000, in both municipalities, dressmakers amounted to approximately 3% of the total number of residents employed.

I sew on all machines. I started there with 13, 14 years of age, there I learned to sew. (...)

*I have a client who has a shop here in São João and I have two clients that sell at the fair. So, they cut, bring the material here, then I sew. And I also make my clothing and sell. I make them and I sell to people here close to home. I manufacture and sell my clothes and sell dresses, things like these ... (V., 29 years, self-employed, works at home, São João de Meriti).*

By examining the dressmakers' areas of residence in São João do Meriti, it is clear that there is a concentration in the districts of Jardim Meriti and Vilar dos Teles, site of the now extinct " Pole of Jeans": they were 1,650 dressmakers living in this region, with 1,290 working in their own municipality<sup>30</sup>. In Caxias, the district of Parque Duque concentrated 740 dressmakers in 2000. The "neighborhood dressmaker", who makes small adjustments and manufactures clothes in her domicile for the local businesses and for the neighborhood, is a common phenomenon in Baixada Fluminense. In this case, there is a skill acquired along the employment trajectory which facilitates the concrete work in the production of an outfit. This skill can be acquired in the family, in small domestic firms through neighbourly relations or in the very factory of Fordist production.

*I learned at Demillus, aged 14 years when I started. There they teach. (M., 30 years, employed with labor card signed at Cristilux factory in Caxias)*

*Here they teach, when I arrived here I learned to do everything. The girls come in here without skills. (D., 40 years, employed with labor card signed in Zarkos factory, Caxias.)*

The entry into the profession, the initial learning period, occurs most frequently through the factory and the wage earning. The two tables below show that younger dressmakers, under 25 years of age, are mostly employed with labor card signed, therefore more "stable", while those with older age are mostly self-employed, therefore more "precarious".

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<sup>30</sup> Data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

**Table 2: Dressmakers residing in Caxias, according to age groups and work relationships in 2000**

<b>Work Relationship</b>	<i>under 25 years of age</i>	<i>aged 25-34 years</i>	<i>aged 35-44 years</i>	<i>aged 45 and more</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>With Labor Card</b>	24%	26%	38%	39%	43%	3225
<b>Without Labor Card</b>	31%	31%	31%	29%	20%	1495
<b>Self-employed</b>	45%	42%	30%	32%	38%	2859
<b>Total Dressmakers</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	7579

Source: 2000 Demographic Census; FIBGE.

**Table 3: Dressmakers residing in Caxias, according to age groups and work relationships in 2000**

<b>Work Relationship</b>	<i>under 25 years of age</i>	<i>aged 25-34 years</i>	<i>aged 35-44 years</i>	<i>aged 45 and more</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>With Labor Card</b>	60%	51%	32%	22%	39%	1972
<b>Without Labor Card</b>	30%	23%	26%	16%	23%	1174
<b>Self-employed</b>	10%	26%	42%	62%	38%	1931
<b>Total Dressmakers</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	5077

Source: 2000 Demographic Census; FIBGE.

The important thing here is to look for the meaning of this growing “self-employment” of the dressmakers as age advances. In the statement of the self-employed dressmaker V., introduced earlier, we find two different work situations: the abstract work of assembling the pieces of an outfit and the concrete work of creation and manufacture of an outfit. In the first case, the concept of “self-employment” approaches the unregulated wage, being, in many cases, the form of payment for the work – wage or remuneration for each piece produced - the only distinction. The statement

below exposes the subordination of the “self-employed” dressmaker to a single enterprise of manufacturing of clothing.

*I've been self-employed, but the firm where I worked started to outsource and stopped sending service then I decided to work with labor card signed. (S., aged 44 years, employed with labor card signed in Zarkos factory, Caxias.)*

The wage labor with labor card signed appears, in different statements, linked to the idea of the devaluation of the profession of a dressmaker, where the value of the wage is the main evaluation criterion, but not the only one. The lack of prospect of professional growth is linked to the low salary. The stability of income is the only rationale for staying in the factory.

*They say that in past days the dressmaker made the same amount of money a bus driver did, she had the same importance. Nowadays, the driver is already earning, I think, 1000 reais<sup>31</sup> and the dressmaker not even reaches 500. It's a little ungrateful, very little. At home you have at least 1, 2, 3 clients and then we can work hard and get a nice little money. (...)*

*Also in this factory of suits where I worked last year, they don't give us any opportunity, the dressmaker is never in charge of anything, she doesn't become anything. There are people aged 30 years in the job and are still a dressmaker, it is always the same thing. A bit ungrateful, each place has its own standard. (V., aged 29 years, self-employed, works at home, São João de Meriti).*

*The only positive point is that the factory is very correct in the payment. Sometimes the salary is paid in advance, when you have a holiday for example. They do not delay wages. (E., employee with labor card signed in Zarkos factory, Caxias.)*

The self-employed dressmaker would then have two advantages vis-à-vis the factory employee: higher income<sup>32</sup> and greater control over the time and the work process. A condition for the self-employment work

<sup>31</sup> *Real* is the currency in Brazil.

<sup>32</sup> The average income of self-employed dressmakers in Caxias and São João was above that of employees with and without labor card signed, with the exception of professionals over 45 years, according to the 2000 Demographic Census. In São João, the average income of self-employed workers aged 25-44 years was 2.5 minimum wages, while the average income of those with labor card signed was 1.8 minimum wage.

to produce an income higher than the average wage is the accumulated knowledge in the production and creation of “the whole piece”, or in other words, in the performance of the concrete work. This knowledge extends employment opportunities – production for shops, fairs and neighbors, in the case here studied – in addition to the abstract work conducted at home assembling fragments of a product, organized by formal and informal enterprises that outsource production.

Self-employment, quantified by statistics, contains distinct meanings. It can be understood as actual self-employment, where the worker exerts control over the production process of the goods produced, or as abstract work subordinated to an industrial production process, but performed outside the factory and disconnected from the wage relationship. In this second case, the precariousness is evident; in the first case, not so much. The expansion of the field of possibilities of work reduces the risk of instability of income and entry in the precariousness of life itself<sup>33</sup>.

I conclude that the territorial concentration of the clothing industry and the accumulated knowledge by the workers are two elements necessary for the emergence or extension of collective actions that compete for and redirect public resources for the strengthening of self-management experiences of work and for the reproduction of the worker and his family.

## Conclusion

As mentioned at the beginning of this work, the intention of the analysis here performed is to generate subsidies for the formulation of urban policies that seek to break the border that divides the fields of economic production and social reproduction. I understand that this border imposes limits on the effectiveness of an urban policy that creates conditions for overcoming the barriers, material and symbolic, to the access to the city, i.e. a full urban life, nourished by the principle of redistribution and cooperation.

In the reading of the urban issue marked by the disconnection between the spheres of labor and of social reproduction (access to goods and services), inequalities are assessed regardless of social relations which

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<sup>33</sup> For the advancement of this discussion it would be important to work with the sphere of domestic unit as basic economic unit. As income and its stability are defining criteria in the choice of work, then such a choice is largely familiar. In the dressmakers' statements it was clear that the income earned had a complementary function in the household budget.



produce and reproduce power hierarchy in our society, although labor is the activity that locates socially individuals in this hierarchy.

Sociologists and economists have accumulated a relevant reflection and an extensive research on the crisis of work and its impact on social inequalities. Urban planners and geographers favor the impact of these inequalities on the territory, highlighting new standards of urban segregation. At the same time, the materiality of the city, the location of things and of people within the territory, therefore distances and proximities, barriers and openings modify the conditions of access to the city. The urban goods and services, public policy objects, should not be thought of only as a condition for a dignified life, but also as productive and monetary resources, which are likely to become suitable for workers in emancipatory practices. In Brazil, the economic activity at home in popular areas is growing, whether in the clothing manufacturing, in food production or in provision of services varied. In these cases, access to drinking water, electricity and telephony and the low price of these services are conditions for the formation of local productive networks that promote the overcoming of the precariousness of life in those places.

A final challenge is to seek to capture the metropolitan dynamics through the daily practices of its residents. An urban policy that aims to break away from the socio-spatial barriers that segment the metropolis will have to incorporate the dimension of the daily journeys, whether between home and work, work and leisure and home and school, regarding the articulation between city planning, which focuses on only some dimensions of the residents' daily life, and the metropolitan life. The labor market, the real estate market, water, sewage and transportation services, and numerous cultural and commercial equipment such as malls, are metropolitan. However, territorial regulation and planning of these activities are under the responsibility of the municipal public power that is not much interested in reducing its autonomy in the allocation of investments and in control of its territory.

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## 4

### The social imaginary of homeownership and its effects: reflections about real estate in Brazil<sup>1</sup>

*Adauto Lucio Cardoso*

*Flávia de Sousa Araújo*

*Samuel Thomas Jaenisch<sup>2</sup>*

The meaning of home ownership in the context of urban Brazil: constructing a research question

In the context of formulating strategies to confront the international economic crisis of 2009, the Brazilian government unveiled an ambitious housing program called *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (My House, My Life) aiming to finance the production of – and underwrite access to – one million new homes destined primarily for low-income segments of the population<sup>3</sup>. The program entered its second phase in 2011, and by 2014, projections suggest the completion of a total of 3.5 million new units, making *Minha Casa Minha Vida* one of the largest housing programs ever undertaken in Brazil's history.

*Minha Casa Minha Vida* operates by offering financing and fiscal incentives to incorporated businesses in order to make new housing developments economically viable, and by providing subsidies and easing

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<sup>1</sup> This article was presented at the RC43 Conference 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Translated by Raphael Soifer.

<sup>3</sup> On the importance of the program in confronting the economic crisis, see Cardoso & Leal (2010).

access to real estate credit among its target population, composed of lower- and lower-middle-class segments of the population. This makes clear the central role that both the Brazilian federal government gave to the private sector on the program's conception and implementation.

It is worth emphasizing here that *Minha Casa Minha Vida* shares a characteristic that has been constant in the vast majority of previous housing programs developed by the Brazilian government: namely, the access to housing by the promotion of homeownership<sup>4</sup>. In this sense, the program creates conditions for a significant quantity of individuals to assume ownership of residential real estate, offering real possibilities for these individuals to realize the “dream of home ownership” which is very present in the imaginary of the population living in Brazil's big cities, but which remains under-examined in academic literature.

Due to that, it is worth inquiring: what does it mean to be a property owner in the current context of urban Brazil? Why is the desire for private property so widely disseminated among the urban population – especially low- and middle-income groups – to an extent that, throughout the history of the country's housing programs, alternatives such as rental housing (a possibility adopted in various European countries during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) were never adopted as strategies to confront existing housing needs? Obviously, various political and economic interests in sectors connected the real estate industry are at play, but our central objective is not to discuss this issue based on a study of the agents who elaborated this policy model. Instead, we are interested in understanding the subjectivities<sup>5</sup> involved in the acquisition of property: in other words, we want to discuss property acquisition based on the agents on the other side of this process (i.e., those who stand to acquire property).

Certain particularities that mark the process of urbanization in Brazil offer pertinent indications for the discussion of this question. In the first place, it is worth noting that since the end of the nineteenth century –

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<sup>4</sup> On the history of housing policy in Brazil, see: Bonduki (1988), Azevedo (1988), Pasternak (1998), among others.

<sup>5</sup> According to Guattari, subjectivity refers to a human being's psychic, emotional and cognitive reality, which manifests itself simultaneously in individual and collective environments, and is closely linked with the intellectual appropriation of external objects. Subjectivity is a polyphonic and plural reality that is not aware of any dominant, determining instance that guides other instances according to a single causality. In addition, because of its collective character, subjectivity should be understood in the sense of multiplicity which develops together with the *socius*, which is to say, beyond the individual (Guattari 1992, 11).

when the process of urbanization began to develop in Brazil in a more intense form<sup>6</sup> - neither the formal real estate market nor the actions of the state managed to satisfy completely the demands for housing generated by population growth in the country's big cities. As a result, part of the population was always obligated to develop solutions for housing needs by voluntarily occupying devalued urban areas or spaces that could not be exploited by the real estate market (such as the slopes hills, areas threatened by flooding, river banks, and public lands); in other words, spaces generally characterized by the absence of land subdivisions; a lack of infrastructure and public services; the precarious construction of living space; and the inexistence of legal rights to property (Cardoso, 2007)<sup>7</sup>.

These residential nuclei – usually known as favelas – were consolidated throughout the twentieth century as the principal alternative housing option for low-income populations<sup>8</sup> (Cardoso, 2007). However, they also were spaces that faced the immediate or latent possibility of forced removal. These evictions (or threats of eviction) came through the actions of the state, which maintained a certain control over these settlements, impeding the improvement of housing and keeping them without possibilities of access to basic services such as water supplies, sewage treatment, and trash collection. Evictions also took place through judicial actions of repossession, or else because of natural disasters, especially the mudslides and flooding that occurred in periods of significant rainfall. In synthesis, these occupations offered little to no guarantee of stability to their residents. However, this situation began to change during the 1980s, with urban housing policies that recognized the importance of maintaining favela residents in the local where they already had living spaces. The new Constitution of 1988 recognized this

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<sup>6</sup> During the first half of the twentieth century, the population of Brazil still lived mostly in rural areas. Only 32% of the population lived in urban areas in 1940, a percentage that climbed to 37% during the 1970s, and to 49% during the 1960s. From this moment, the rate of Brazil's urbanization began to rise significantly: it grew to 56% in 1970; 68% in 1980; 81% in 1990; and 85% in 2000. In parallel, the population rate also grew significantly: in 1940 there were close to 41,000,000 residents in the country, a number that grew to 93,000,000 in 1970, and to 190,000,000 in 2010.

<sup>7</sup> This process is not exclusive to Brazil; it tends to occur in other Latin American countries as well. On this point, see also: Gilbert & Gugler (1982), Turner (1972), Turner (1976).

<sup>8</sup> Beyond the favelas, low-income groups have secured access to housing through allotments of land in peripheral areas (in which they have extended the practice of self-constructing housing units seen in the favelas), as well as through the public housing units produced in large scale in Brazilian cities, especially during the 1970s.

right through the institution of a legal principle known as the “social function of property”. With these changes, the favelas consolidated their presence in the urban space of big cities, receiving investments in infrastructure and recognition as legitimate sites for occupation, and beginning a process of legal regularization of the right to land ownership, as well of the amplification and improvement of individual housing units. In spite of these changes, however, favelas continued to exist at the margins of legality, principally because of the exponential growth of drug traffic, which used the favelas as points of distribution and was “tolerated” by state power. In this sense, favelas continued to be characterized by the state and by high-income groups – with special vehemence in specific moments – as spaces of insalubrity, promiscuity, criminality, or social animosity<sup>9</sup>, and therefore as threats that ought to be eliminated in the interest of guaranteeing a supposedly desirable urban order. More recently, with the transformations seen in Brazilian cities in anticipation of sporting mega-events – such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics – the occurrence (and threat) of eviction have grown, increasing the sensation of insecurity of ownership among local residents<sup>10</sup>.

Considering this context, we begin from the hypothesis that the act of formally acquiring one’s own home – especially among low-income populations – may be understood as a crucial element in the possibility of creating a process of social mobility. In this sense, we propose that access to home ownership may allow individuals – objectively or symbolically – to put forward a series of improvements in their living and social conditions, such as: greater access to infrastructural networks and public services; the possibility of acquiring new consumer goods; the security of not needing to abandon one’s home involuntarily; as well as more readily available access to social and civil rights. This argument is reinforced when we consider that Brazil’s big cities were always marked by an unequal distribution of infrastructure, public services, and equipment. The process of expansion in Brazilian cities did not manage to guarantee the same pattern of urbanization, services, infrastructure, or social rights to all of the population, conferring only limited or partial access to low-income groups.

<sup>9</sup> See Machado da Silva (2008)

<sup>10</sup> See the United Nations. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Raquel Rolnik, A/HRC/13/20, 2009. Available online at: [http://direitoamoradia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/G0917613\\_Megaeventos2.pdf](http://direitoamoradia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/G0917613_Megaeventos2.pdf) (accessed 10 June, 2013)

Therefore, the strength of the “dream of home ownership” resides in the will to surpass a living condition seen as unsatisfactory, to access a more complete experience of citizenship (especially in the sense of occupying and producing the city), and to inhabit permanently the urban fabric (even at its margins, in spite of the potential problems that this localization presents). This willfulness serves as a form of continued access to the benefits that the city offers. This same strength, therefore, stimulates both the act of buying real estate as well as of remaining in a given property even in the face of problems connected to said acquisition, whether by the high costs generated in the process of purchasing or by the effects of the new socio-spatial relationships (localization, neighbors, building norms, the provision of services, etc.). This willfulness allows individuals to surpass all of these difficulties in the interest of realizing their dreams.

### Hierarchies, distinctions, and living conditions: elements for a theoretical approach

Here, we will problematize the presence of the “dream of home ownership” in the imaginary of the Brazilian urban population through certain concepts developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Initially, it is worth showing that Bourdieu refuses to undertake any essentialist approach that considers social practices as inherent to a specific social group, segment, or class. If it is possible to verify empirically a series of elements that characterize forms of thinking and acting among individuals belonging to different social classes, these elements must not be understood as properties intrinsic to each particular class, but rather as phenomena that constituted relational forms within a specific social structure. From this perspective, for example, the sense given to home ownership or to private property among favela residents can only be understood through a comprehension of the relationships established between this and other social groups.

For Bourdieu, analyzing different forms of action, thought, and being in the world implies understanding the position that each agent occupies within the social space (Bourdieu, 2008). He uses the idea of “space” to express relations of coexistence and distinction between different positions:



This idea of difference, or a gap, is at the basis of the very notion of [social] *space*, that is, a set of distinct and coexisting positions which are exterior from one other and which are defined in relation to one another through their *mutual exteriority* and their relations of proximity, vicinity, or distance, as well as through relations of order, such as *above*, *below*, and *between*. (Bourdieu 1998, 6)

In speaking of relations of order (above, below, and between), Bourdieu signals that social space involves a hierarchical distribution of different positions, which in turn implies qualitative differences between these positions, as well as relations of power that define who is above and who is below a given social position, in addition to disputes around these positions. In this sense, Bourdieu emphasizes that in order to situate each social segment, group, or class within a determined social structure, one must also consider the functional weight that each exercises in the constitution and maintenance of said structure (Bourdieu, 2007). Some groups may be considered hegemonic because their position confers the power to define the distinctive traits that differentiate in a hierarchical way the positions within their specific social structure. This hegemony, then, refers to relations of material and symbolic power:

a class cannot be defined simply by a situation and by its position in the social structure, that is, by the relations that it maintains objectively with other social classes. Innumerable properties of a given social class derive from the fact that its members are deliberately or objectively involved in symbolic relations with individuals from other classes. With this, they express differences of situation and position according to a systematic logic, which they tend to express in *signifying distinctions*. (Bourdieu, 2007:14)

These distinctive traits may derive from diverse orders (such as clothing, language, living conditions, consumer habits, and leisure activities, among others), and are characterized by their capacity to mark symbolically the differences of position within a specific social structure. However, Bourdieu points to living condition as a central element in this process (Bourdieu, 2002). The house as a durable good, central to the organization of daily family life, has the power to express significantly the position that an individual occupies within his or her social space. The same may be said for the living place,

particularly in the case of the big Brazilian cities which have historically been marked by processes of social segregation and the hierarchization.

In the case of Rio de Janeiro, for example, residing in the neighborhoods of the city's South Zone (the touristic area) or in the Barra da Tijuca region is constituted as a distinctive trait capable of marking an individual as belonging to a hierarchically distinct economic elite. The same may be said of private property. Big cities in Brazil have always been marked by limited access to the formal real estate market – especially in areas with good infrastructure and urban services – which has made a significant part of the population obligated to create housing solutions that are instable from a juridical point of view, in addition to being permanently susceptible to processes of eviction. In this way, being a homeowner may be understood as a distinctive trait that marks hierarchically the difference between those agents who are inserted in a world seen as legitimate and complete with social guarantees, and those who continue at the margins of this world. Here, we emphasize that the definition of this legitimate world is the result of processes of symbolic domination exercised by those agents at the top of the hierarchy, who therefore retain the power to define what is legitimate and what is not.

Here, we will also put forth the hypothesis that the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program reifies the importance of this distinctive trait in the context of urban, contemporary Brazil by creating real possibilities for the low-income population to access private property, and therefore give rise to a change in position within the social space. What is interesting about this perspective, as formulated by Pierre Bourdieu, is that it allows one to relativize the monetary value of a given property or of locations within a city. What defines “value” are subjectivities involved in the actions of social agents in dispute within a specific social context; in other words, the valorization of a property of determined areas of the city depends on their association with determined markers of social distinction recognized as such.

An interesting indicative for analyzing this process is the action of agents within the real estate market, because their residential developments allow them to turn material a series of symbolic elements that mark existing hierarchies in the social space. One example of this process was the occupation of the Barra da Tijuca region in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In the 1980s, this region was the principal front for the expansion of the city's real estate market through a pattern of urbanization based on the constructed of gated communities aimed at the middle and upper classes.

In this case, the individuals who moved to the neighborhood acquired not only a property, but also access to a new contemporary and cosmopolitan lifestyle associated with the real estate developments of that specific region (Ribeiro, 1996), as well as the possibility of differentiating themselves from the “other Rio de Janeiro” seen as violent, polluted filled with favelas, and chaotic (Shapira, 1999).

The same may be said about the residential developments financed by the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program. In the model adopted by this housing policy, the real estate sector is responsible for producing housing developments, and later, for putting them on the market so as to be acquired by interested parties through a system of bank-supported financing linked to state subsidies. This guarantees easier access for low-income individuals to new places of living, as well as to a “new city”. In both cases, the construction of meaning of this property effected by each social agent involved – both those who go to Barra da Tijuca and those who enter into the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program – shows itself in relation to a complex alterity toward which these individuals constantly aim to both distance themselves and to bring themselves closer. They bring themselves closer to those distinctive traits recognized hegemonically as elements that can mark an improved position within the social space, and they distance themselves from those traits that identify them as subaltern or marginal within a social hierarchy. Through empirical studies already realized (Cardoso *et al*, 2013), it has been possible to verify that, in many cases, the individuals who use the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program acquire properties in neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro very far removed from their previous living places, and with very restricted access to urban infrastructure and resources. This makes evident that determined material and objective conditions of quality of life may become secondary when faced with an individual’s desire to become a property owner.

It is worth reinforcing that these distinctive traits are not simply reflexes of an objective structure that relapses towards these individuals; rather, they are mechanisms that structure these differences of position, considering that the construction (and maintenance) of these structures takes places through the action of agents in the social world. In this sense, disputes of position are constant within each field, and may even transform these structures. Social agents who occupy close positions have significant possibilities of sharing a series of dispositions that result in similar takings

of position, because, according to Bourdieu, for each class of positions – whether of university professors, factory workers, artists, executives, merchants, or any other class – there exists a specific corresponding habitus (Bourdieu, 2008). Based on this concept, it is possible to suppose that low-income populations conceive of the importance of home ownership in a different form from middle-class professionals. For Bourdieu, habitus is a unifying principal that translates the characteristics of a determined social position in a single conjuncture of choices of goods and practices on the part of the agents. It is, in other words, a conjuncture of pre-reflected dispositions that orient the action of the individual in the world.

From the individual's point of view, habitus may be understood as a sort of filter, or else as a socially defined outline that delimits one's choices of forms of action. From the point of view of social structure, however, habitus operates by effecting mechanisms of distinction between the social groups that compose a given structure. However, this division only has heuristic value: for Pierre Bourdieu, habitus is both structured and structuring; in other words, it breaks with the dichotomy between structure and action. The social agent incorporates a series of dispositions and categories of perception of the social world that derive from his or her position within a defined social structure at the same time as he or she establishes this structure based on his or her practical actions in the world. In these terms, it is also worth noting that different forms of habitus are at once differentiated as well as differentiating; in Bourdieu's words, "are generating principles of distinct and distinctive practices (...) But habitus are also classificatory schemes, principles of classification." (Bourdieu 1998, 8)


## On the fieldwork

This possibility of interpreting the meaning of the "dream of home ownership" is based on the results of an empirical research project carried out in the city of Rio de Janeiro during the year 2012. Between July 2009 and December 2012, the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program contracted 220 residential developments in the city, for a total of 57,017 living units. Close to 30% of these units are concentrated in the neighborhoods of Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, both located in the extreme west of the city, an area that features a few historically consolidated urban centers but is generally characterized as an area of Rio's expansive urbanized area.

The development chosen as the focus of our research was Málaga Garden Condominium, located on the margins of the Avenida Brasil highway in the Campo Grande neighborhood, approximately 50 kilometers from the center of Rio de Janeiro. The condominium was constructed according to the “gated community” model: it is surrounded by walls, and features private internal roads, 121 parking places, as well as leisure areas for residents. It consists of 299 living units (all identical and consisting of 44 square meters) distributed in 77 housing blocks. The area surrounding the condominium is characterized by large empty urban areas and by other housing developments, with few commercial offerings or urban services (Cardoso *et al*, 2013). We chose this housing development as an object of research because it is one of the first delivered by the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program in Rio de Janeiro, and because its commercialization was effected directly through the city’s real estate market.

Our research had a qualitative character. After an initial quantitative inquiry, carried out through the distribution of a questionnaire with the objective of identifying the socioeconomic profile of residents and their degree of satisfaction in relation to the housing development, we selected six families to interview. The central objective of the interviews was to explore the motivations that led these individuals to buy property in the condominium in question. We were interested in understanding what led each family to leave their previous residential location for their “own home,” even if, in the majority of cases, this change had entailed drastic changes in their daily life. Our selection of families took into consideration factors such as: family configuration; location of previous residence; and socio-economic profile. Of the six interview subjects, only two had already been property owners, and five had left areas with majority low-income populations.

**Image 1 – Map of the city of Rio de Janeiro with the location of the case study**



Source: Self-produced, 2012

**Images 2 & 3 – Málaga Garden condominium: External and internal views**



Source: Fieldwork, 2012

We analyzed the data obtained in our interviews based on the concept of residence pathway – inspired by the concept of “residence career” (*carreira habitacional*) described by Brandstetter and Heineck (2005) – which aims to understand changes of location and/or living condition of families based on specific events in their trajectories which have influenced these changes. These events may be related in a direct way to family cycles (job changes, the birth of children, retirement, professional development, divorce) or in an indirect way (natural disasters, increase of urban violence, or new state programs for financing housing). Here, it is important to note that we do not understand these events as motives that spur a change of residence, but rather as objective facts capable of activating subjectivities that effectively operate as motivation for these changes. According to our proposed hypothesis, the creation of the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program may be considered as an event that allowed a specific family to acquire a new residence, but our intent here is to comprehend which flows of desires<sup>11</sup>, anxieties, motivations, and meanings were activated by this specific event. We remind our readers that this hermeneutic posture must not fail to bear in mind the position that agents occupy within the social space and social relations in question.

### The will to leave and the hope to stay: change of residence as a possibility of improvement

One element that interview subjects mentioned to justify moving to Málaga Garden Condominium was the search for a less violent living space. This theme is most evident among families that previously resided in areas of the city that in the past decade had been marked by the presence of groups linked to drug traffic, to violent police actions, and – more recently – to the

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<sup>11</sup>From the order of desire, which does not refer directly to need, lack, or reaction, but rather to desire as a creation, as a will do create and to become, because Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 27). We may affirm that capitalist society, as a producer of desire and of fluxes, produces itself out of desiring machines, in which everything functions concomitantly, but amid hiatuses and ruptures, breakdowns and failures, stalling and short circuits, distances and fragmentations, within a sum that never succeeds in bringing its various parts together so as to form a whole. (*ibid*, 45).



domination of armed militias.<sup>12</sup> This is the case of families that had lived in the Maré complex of favelas, the neighborhood of Padre Miguel, or the Vila Aliança allotment of land. All three areas are identified as violent both by official state discourses (generally through statistical interpretations such as rates of homicide or drug arrests, etc.) and by discourses produced by the press and by other opinion-forming institutions. This discourse serves as a construction that operates in a symbolic environment, instituting those spaces as areas in which residents understand their daily experiences as susceptible to diverse forms violent actions.

What makes evident the force of the discursive construction is the fact that none of the subjects interviewed related any explicit violent incidents (that either they themselves or persons close to them had suffered) as factors that motivated their move to a new residence. The theme of violence was always qualified in the environment of impediments and of latent possibilities of danger. Subjects made reference to the impossibility of circulating in parts of these areas, or during certain times of day owing to the control exerted by groups of drug traffickers, to the risk of being hit by stray bullets during confrontations between rival gangs or between a specific gang and the police, or the threat posed by crack cocaine users.

Another form that subjects interviewed used to qualify violence was that of the imminent risk of involvement in the world of crime. This was most evident among subjects with children (or even with younger siblings or nieces and nephews), who understood their previous living spaces as areas where the possibility of their children being co-opted by criminal groups posed a real threat. Because of this, the fact that the Málaga Garden Condominium had been built according to the typology of a “gated community” was, for them, a positive fact, inasmuch as it served to restrict the circulation of children or adolescents inside the walls of the condominium. Beyond this, subjects mentioned in a diffuse form the possibility of self-segregation in relation to the surroundings offered by this typology. In spite of the fact that these contiguous areas presented the same socioeconomic profile as the subjects’ original areas, and had been related to the occurrence of certain crimes in the surrounding area (primarily muggings), subjects always qualified their new living space as a safe place.

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<sup>12</sup> Armed militias are organized groups that control commerce and informal services (such as street vendors, transportation, distribution of gas for cooking, etc.) inside favelas and peripheral areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

In general, subjects qualified their move to a new address as an improvement in their families' quality of life, in spite of the various problems that they identified inside the condominium and in relation to its surroundings. They saw many of the services announced in the development companies' publicity – such as soccer fields, party rooms, barbeque areas, leisure space for children, and a pool – as insufficient relative to demand within the condominium, or else they noted that these areas presented some kind of defect that made their use impossible. Another frequent criticism was a lack of parking spaces for all residents, and the constant conflicts that the demand for parking generated. These perceptions were marked by dissatisfaction in relation to what residents found after buying a house. However, at the same time, they were accompanied by a series of positive qualifications in relation to the new place. Aside from the sense of security cited above, they mentioned calm, the possibilities of leisure space for children made possible by the “gated community” typology, the existence of sanitation networks, or their legal recognition as property owners.

Subjects also mentioned relations with the area surrounding Málaga Garden Condominium as problematic in some aspects and positive in others. They recognized the existence of commerce, services, schools, and transport services which attend to the basic daily needs of residents in the areas immediately surrounding the development. However, when they need a specialized service (such as banks, cinemas, large supermarkets, shopping malls, or medical clinics, among others), residents were forced to go to the center of the Campo Grande neighborhood, a journey made possible only by private car or by precarious public transportation options. Another difficulty that residents of this housing development faced is that of the considerable time necessary to make the trajectory from home to work and back. Although one group of interview subjects work in nearby neighborhoods (with an average travel time of 20-40 minutes), the majority of residents commute to the city center (nearly and hour-and-a-half away) to work or study. Here, we must note that all families included in the study had previously lived in areas with much more ample commerce and services, and with greater accessibility to the city center. Subjects also pointed to the distance in relation to their former living spaces as a negative aspect of their new residence, because they recognized that the new localization diminished their contact with neighbors, friends, or parents who lived close to their old houses.

Yet in spite of these difficulties, none of the interview subjects expressed regret with his or her purchase of a new home, and none planned to return to his or her former residence. All qualified moving as a positive course of action. This suggests to us that the interview subjects' comprehension of the meaning of changing residences was not limited to an objective improvement in living conditions. All families interviewed identified some sort of loss – whether in terms of commute time to work, in the decreased size of their living space, or in the decrease in the offer of commerce in their immediate surroundings – but they also reinforced the importance of having managed to acquire their own homes, and they glimpsed progressive future improvements in their quality of life.

### Legality, formality, and adaptation: life in a gated community, and its restrictions

One discursive element that subjects used to express this qualitative change in their life condition is the question of formalities that life in a condominium demands. This was especially evident for those who had left favela areas. When buying their property, all residents took on debt to secure financing for their new living spaces, and to pay fees like monthly condominium payments and taxes like the Property Tax (IPTU). Although subjects recognized that their new situation generated a certain onus, they saw this as a necessary cost in maintaining new living conditions associated with formality and legality.

Subjects activated these elements of formality and legality in order to mark overcoming previous living conditions in which these types of regulations did not exist. The same may be said about new norms of conduct that established by condominium rules. Norms within the condominium establish certain times of day when noise is forbidden, regulate the use of collective equipment, prohibit alterations in the façades or structures of houses, or establish limits to the use of common areas. In spite of the fact that all interview subjects had accepted these norms as inherent to their new living situation, and necessary for maintaining a healthy relationship between neighbors, they also recognized in them the potential to generate conflict. Here, it is important to emphasize that living spaces of low-income populations in Rio de Janeiro (from which

a significant part of the residents of the new housing development in this study had moved) are characterized by an extensive use of public spaces, of processes of expanding and subdividing living space, and by a tenuous boundary between what residents understand as public vs. private space.<sup>13</sup>

The living dynamic of Rio de Janeiro's lower classes involves continuous family arrangements that alter the composition of the nuclear family that resides in a given living space, of networks of sociability, and of reciprocal relationships involving relatives, neighbors, and friends, as well as a series of social practices that have the street (understood as an extension of the house) as the locus of their reproduction. However, the type of housing development financed by the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program (as well as by previous housing programs) takes as its model the house as an independent domestic unit associated with the nuclear family. Yet this model has never become widespread among Brazil's lower classes (Lima, 2008); as seen in the case of the Málaga Garden condominium, it generates conflicts between those who want to follow the norms imposed by the condominium, and others who prefer to reproduce the social dynamics that characterized their previous residences.

None of the subjects interviewed pointed to a desire to overcome any of these social dynamics as a motive for leaving their former living spaces. However, they referred constantly to the conflicts involving the norms and to the "desired" pattern of collective conduct in the Málaga Garden Condominium as a necessary process of adaptation for those who had chosen this sort of housing development as their living space. Some subjects emphasized that they were advancing toward a new stage of life, which in turn demanded an adaptation that they qualified as positive. In this sense, they qualified the practices of other residents who insisted in disrespecting this adaptation or reproducing determined social practices not in keeping with the agreement demanded by "condominium life" (such as using plastic swimming pools in front of their houses; listening to loud music; hanging clothes and flags from their windows; storing bicycles or chairs outside of their houses; or altering the property's signature façades) as presenting a risk of imminent "favelization" in the Málaga Garden Condominium. Here, we emphasize that interview subjects' understanding of their current living situation constitutes itself as a relationship of double alterity: in the contrast between a model associated with a pattern of

<sup>13</sup> See Varela *et al* (2012)

urbanization from which subjects strive to distance themselves (the favela), but to which they remain connected through daily practices and habits, and of another pattern that residents as desirable (the gated community), but which imposes restrictions on behaviors and practices of sociability that characterized their lives for a long time and that, to a certain extent, they maintain even if it puts them at odds with the condominium's norms.

### Considerations on residential mobility, desires, and hierarchies

The interviews referenced here indicate that acquiring property in the Málaga Garden Condominium involved a series of elements that qualify the process of coming to a new living space as a qualitative change in family's life conditions. In this sense, we return to our initial hypothesis that conceives of the force of the "dream of home ownership" – especially among low- and middle-income classes in urban Brazil – as social upward mobility, and as a possible means of overcoming an existence seen as unsatisfactory. We have already mentioned that big Brazilian cities present significant inequalities in access to services, infrastructure, and quality of life, but this reflects on a characteristic that marks Brazilian society in a more extensive sense: it is not only unequal, but also hierarchical.

The thesis has been discussed in social science literature since the 1970s, especially in the works of Roberto Da Matta. For Da Matta, there is a generalized comprehension in Brazilian society that conceives of individuals as naturally unequal and holding different levels of social relevance. This inequality shows itself in everyday situations of sociability, in which individuals constantly bring into action elements that affirm their positions of superiority, revealing the strength of hierarchy as an "organizing rule both in social perceptions as well as in social relations."(Soares, 1999, 226).

Soares (1999) complexifies this formulation in pointing to Brazilian society as one in which a system structured by hierarchical relations coexists with another marked by the advance of an egalitarian individualist worldview. The advance of a capitalist economy and the strengthening of democratic political institutions also serve to consolidate worldviews in Brazil that understand all individuals as equal and as inherently possessing

the same rights and responsibilities conferred by citizenship. The author treats the hybridization between these two systems as a potentially dangerous phenomenon for the country's lower classes because of the form in which the concepts tend to be articulated in the face of a social context marked by extreme disparities.

We will take the case of the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program as an example. Since the creation of the program, it has become possible for low-income families to gain access to the formal real estate market and to the property deeds that this market confers, as is the right of any citizen. This phenomenon is reinforced by the media and by official discourses that promote home ownership as the result of work and as an expression of personal victory, accessible to all who show themselves to be sufficiently dedicated. Yet parallel to the development of this concept based in equality and individual capacity, the families that access the program remain forced to utilize a precarious public transportation system, live with restricted access to basic public services, move to areas of the city with little infrastructure, or else to constantly reaffirm their condition as former favela residents. In their daily lives, in other words, these families cannot escape from elements that reinforce their subaltern positions within the greater social structure.

The majority of subjects interviewed affirmed that they only managed to buy their own homes after the implementation of *Minha Casa Minha Vida*. In this context, the program may be considered an important element in the consolidation of the "dream of home ownership" inasmuch as it creates the possibility for low-income families to gain access to a sign of hegemonically legitimated distinction. However, we must question whether this policy has the effective force to diminish existing inequalities in Brazilian cities, or whether it simply reinforces certain processes of social distinction that continue to reify certain spaces, practices, or forms of sociability within the city as less legitimate. It is worth remembering that throughout the process of urbanization in Brazil, hegemonic classes have always directly associated urban problems with lower-income spaces or social practices in the city (Ribeiro, 2004). Is the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program, then, reinforcing this type of perspective in allowing families to leave these spaces?

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## 5

# The colors of the urban borders: residential segregation and “racial” inequalities in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1</sup>

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

*Filipe Souza Corrêa*

This work aims to evaluate the relationship between the social context of residence and the color of the population to explain social inequalities arising from residential segregation in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (MRRJ). We seek to contribute to the reflection on the issue of Brazilian “racial” inequalities described by other researchers.

In more precise terms, our interest is to investigate whether a Black or a Brown individual holds an unequal social status in terms of opportunities and access to certain elements of social welfare regardless of his position in the social division of the MRRJ territory or, on the contrary, whether the social context formed by the residential segregation processes represents the filter through which opportunities and urban social welfare are distributed unevenly among groups of color.

### Positioning the problem: residential segregation and the Brazilian racial issue

The previous question is relevant, on the one hand, to the extent that the literature on the impacts of economic transformations on large cities highlights the growing role of residential segregation in explaining the

<sup>1</sup> This article was originally published in Portuguese in the book titled *Olhares sobre a Metrópole do Rio de Janeiro – economia sociedade e território*, published by Letra Capital Editora in Rio de Janeiro in 2010.

reproduction of social inequalities. This occurs on account of the articulation between the macro social mechanisms – labor market restructuring, family universe weakening, welfare social system privatization–, and the micromechanisms related to the social and territorial isolation of the groups most vulnerable to these changes. Various authors from different theoretical currents have sought to describe such reproductive articulation of inequalities using concepts such as *neighborhood effect* (Katzman, 2001), *territory effect* (Bidou-Zachariassen, 1996) or *place effect* (Bourdieu, 1997).

On the other hand, this article is part of the debate on the so-called *racial issue* in Brazil which has suffered significant changes since the consensus in the 1930s about the existence of a “racial democracy” in the country. Indeed, since the second half of the 1970s, according to the empirical work of Hasenbalg (1979) and Silva (1978), the perception of the existence of reproductive mechanisms of racial inequality has been gaining legitimacy in the academic field and in society, despite the expansion of a competitive order in Brazil. For a wide range of authors<sup>2</sup>, it became evident that inequalities of social conditions and positions between Whites, Blacks and Browns<sup>3</sup> cannot be assigned to survival—in a class society conformed by industrialization, urbanization and modernization—to the effects of the statutory order of our slave past as postulated in 1950s and 1960s by Bastide and Fernandes (1955) and Fernandes (1965). Currently, there is strong consensus about the existence of a *racism without racialism* in Brazil (Guimarães, 1999), that is, of discriminatory practices in interpersonal interactions between Whites, Blacks and Browns and structural mechanisms of discrimination in the access to resources that generate both social welfare and social opportunities, which, however, do not rely on an ideology founded on the existence of biological races and their natural differences.

The absence of such ideological component would have made racism invisible among us, especially if we consider that skin color as a criterion for racial classification and discrimination has been replaced by “social tropes” that relate to the marginalized condition and position held by Blacks and Browns in Brazilian society. Guimarães (1999) proposes to investigate how

<sup>2</sup> Due to the impossibility of presenting a complete review of reinterpretation of the theme of racism, we cite the systematization works designed by Antônio Sérgio Guimarães. See Guimarães (1999) and Guimarães and Huntley (2000).

<sup>3</sup> Brown people in Brazil are called *Pardos*, a term that has been used by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística/IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) since 1940 to comprise multiracial Brazilians.

in each moment of our history and in each corner of the Brazilian social space these “social tropes” are constructed, reconstructed and used to maintain and reproduce racial inequalities. The results of this investigation would be crucial for the proper understanding of the paradox present in Brazilian society that legitimizes practices and mechanisms of racialization of a social hierarchy formed by the market and the social classes. In other words, this investigation would be on how other classificatory categories would appear as “symbolic substitutes to ‘Blacks’, as are, in Southeastern Brazil, the epithets of ‘*Baianos*’<sup>4</sup>, ‘*Paraíba*’<sup>5</sup> and ‘*Nordestinos*’<sup>6</sup>” (ibid., p. 123).

Guimarães also proposes the investigation of three mechanisms that reproduce racial inequalities in an invincible way (Ibid., p. 201). The first refers to socialization at school and in the community (neighborly relations) where are concentrated individuals with certain somatic and cultural characteristics socially devalued, transforming these values in individual attributes and contributing to the maintenance of a low self-esteem. The second mechanism acts in everyday life and is materialized in interpersonal relationships in which discriminatory or exclusion practices, although in the polished and discreet way that characterizes our culture of cordiality, keep at a distance the groups of Blacks and Browns or their “social tropes”. This mechanism certainly reinforces the first as it extends, to a social space wider than the space of socializing institutions, the experience of sociability that confirms social inferiority and devaluation. The third mechanism concerns institutionalized discriminatory practices that function in an impersonal way, based on bureaucratized actions that occur in the market such as prices of goods and services, the formal or tacit qualifications required, personal characteristics, diplomas, appearance, among others.

The city, the principles that organize its social space, the classification system that displays this space as a hierarchy, the sense of interactions between individuals in everyday life, the relations with the city institutions – police, bureaucracy, land market etc. –, the functioning of the socializing institutions such as family, school, neighborhood and community life of the district may function according to these three mechanisms. They can

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<sup>4</sup> *Baiano* is the person born in the State of Bahia.

<sup>5</sup> *Paraíba* is a Brazilian state. As general terms and used pejoratively, both *Baiano* and *Paraíba* are applied to people from the Northeastern part of Brazil.

<sup>6</sup> *Nordestino* is a general term for people born in the Northeastern (*Nordeste*) part of Brazil, one of its poor regions.

create “social tropes” linked to the territories of groups of individuals in accordance with the somatic and cultural attributes that are object of discriminatory practices. At the same time, the city may be the product and producer of institutionalized discriminatory practices; it can generate spaces of socialization that build the legitimacy of inferiority and of social devaluation; and it can also generate practices of sociability that confirm the inferiority and social devaluation of individuals based on their somatic and cultural attributes.

However, in Brazil, there are few works that seek to relate the theme of residential segregation with the theme of racial inequalities. This conjunction of themes is called *racial segregation*. For the purpose of systematization, we will consider three works. In this argumentative line, one of the pioneering works in Brazil is the book of L.A. Costa Pinto titled *O Negro no Rio de Janeiro* that was published in 1953. In it, Costa Pinto highlights the coercive force of costume as the mechanism from which racial segregation was practiced in Rio de Janeiro, which was the Federal District at that time, in opposition to the mechanism of legal force as in the United States of America (USA). In this case, the residential segregation of Blacks in the city of Rio de Janeiro would be the result of an economic incapacity of a parcel of the population to choose their place of residence, a choice that would be the prerogative of a dominant group. This perception of racial segregation in Rio de Janeiro – away from the referential of extreme racial segregation in the USA – is based on the non-random difference of percentage of Blacks in the various areas of the city and, especially, in the overrepresentation of Blacks residing in slums and in the city periphery in comparison to the percentage of Blacks in the overall population.

Lately, Telles (2003) resumes the thesis of the existence of a “Brazilian way of racism”, reinforcing the hypothesis of a “racism without racialism” (id., 1993). He applies the techniques of the segregation indices disseminated since the seminal work of Duncan and Duncan (1955) and compares the patterns of the territorial distribution of Blacks and Whites in Brazilian and American metropolises. He comes to the conclusion that among us there is a “moderate segregation” (Telles, 2003, p. 180) and that social distances between the “middle class” and the rest of the social strata, taking into account groups of colors, decrease as income increases, but in a different gradation when it comes to Whites, Browns and Blacks. The latter tend to remain isolated from wealthy Whites, a fact that for Telles can produce impacts on the social composition of the territory:

[...] (they have) less access to resources, such as good professionals, better networking, better urban infrastructure, which in turn would generate social capital and better quality of life. The non-Whites and especially Blacks are more likely to have worse odds of life simply because they are farther from the middle class and live in concentrations of poverty. (Ibid., p. 180)

Another recent attempt to address the issue of racial segregation was made by Garcia (2009), whose analysis compared the situation of Blacks in two capitals – Rio de Janeiro and Salvador – to demonstrate that social inequalities expressed in the territory are in fact racial inequalities. In other words, according to Garcia's perspective, social inequalities would not end up in the exploitation of classes and there is actually an imbrication between social structure and the naturalization of racial inequalities, which resulted in the so-called social-racial-economic stratification of individuals. In this sense, the overall empirical effort is concentrated on showing how the structuring of the metropolitan territory, seen through territorial inequalities in terms of housing condition, possession of urban goods (washing machine, telephone, automobile and microcomputer) and distribution of collective consumption services, is correlated with the social-racial-economic stratification of individuals.

From these hypotheses, we propose to evaluate in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro the differentiated effects of the social contexts of residence which are conformed by the social division of the metropolitan territory in the relationship between groups of color and social inequalities. This task becomes more complex if we consider that the social morphology of the main city shows, as a unique feature, the presence of slums in areas where are concentrated social segments that occupy the upper positions in the social structure.

## The social context of the place of residence

To identify the social context in which individuals are inserted we considered as geographic units the weighting areas<sup>7</sup> (WA) of the

<sup>7</sup> This territorial division was created by IBGE for disclosing the sample data and it follows statistical criteria. Each of these geographical units is "formed by a group of mutually exclusive census sectors created to implement procedures for estimate calibration using information known by the overall population" (IBGE, 2002).


2000 Demographic Census. Despite not forming neighborhood units in themselves – since their limits are defined by technical criteria used for the Census data collection –, the boundaries of the MRRJ weighting areas largely coincide with the geographical boundaries of the districts, a fact that allows us to speak of a *social context of the place of residence*.

In order to classify these areas, we created a typology that uses the variable of the *school climate of the domicile* built on the average years of schooling of individuals older than 24 years of age living at home<sup>8</sup>. The choice of school climate as a variable for typology construction is justified by the possibility of description of residential segregation in terms of the concentration of people living in households and neighborhoods in situations of greater or lesser chance of access to schooling – a scarce opportunity in Brazilian society – as an enhanced resource of their placement in the social structure, which influences their chances of access to social welfare and opportunities (Kaztman, 2001; Kaztman and Retamoso, 2005; Ribeiro, 2007).

The composition of the types of social contexts according to the school climate of the domicile can be seen in Chart 1. The first type is characterized by a high presence of domiciles with low school climate in which 36.2% of individuals show up to 4 years of schooling and 42.9% in the range of over 4 years and up to 8 years of schooling. This type comprises 49.3% of the individuals residing in the MRRJ. The second type shows a predominance of middle school climate with 33.9% of individuals in the range of 4 to 8 years of schooling and 29.8% in the range of 8 to 11 years of schooling, thus comprising 42.7% of the population residing in the MRRJ. The third type consists of areas of high school climate as it presents a high concentration of domiciles in the range of individuals with over 11 years of schooling (63.5%) in which resides 8.0% of the MRRJ population. Based on this composition, we called the first type “low-status social context”, the second, “middle-status social context”, and the last, “high-status social context”.

<sup>8</sup> This typology was built as follows: first, the domiciles were classified according to four levels of school climate: “up to 4 years of schooling”; “over 4 and up to 8 years of schooling”; “over 8 and up to 11 years of schooling”; and “over 11 years of schooling”. Then, we applied on this distribution a Binary Correspondence Factor Analysis (Fenelon, 1981) from which we extracted two factors with the cut-off criterion value of 80% of the variance of the data explained by the factors. After saving the factorials loads obtained by this procedure, we conducted a Hierarchical Ascending Classification (ibid.), which resulted in three groupings with an intra-groups variance of 32.6% and an intergroup variance of 67.4%.

**Chart 1: Percentage composition of ranges of the school climate of the domicile according to the social context of the place of residence in the MRRJ – 2000**




Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 002).

The spatial distribution of the social contexts classified according to the school climate of the domicile is shown in Map 1. Based on this map, we realized that high-status contexts largely coincide with the areas of the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Niterói considered noble; middle-status contexts coincide with the suburban areas of the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Niterói and the central areas of some municipalities in the metropolitan region; and low-status contexts correspond to areas of the MRRJ periphery.

In the next topic we will explore the situation of color segments (Whites, Blacks and Browns) for each of the social contexts of the place of residence in order to examine possible differences between them as regards two types of inequalities. The first type is related to the opportunities offered to them, expressed in the different chances of groups of color to reproduce the situation of their parents' poverty by way of education and labor. This will be done through the use of indicators of young people and children's vulnerability situation; delay and school evasion, and unemployment. The second type is related to well-being, assessed by differences in housing conditions.



**Map 1: Social context typology of the place of residence in the MRRJ – 2000**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

The colors of the social contexts in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro: can we talk about racial division of the MRRJ territory?

The color variable or the race variable of the 2000 Demographic Census is obtained based on the informant’s statement and subsequent insertion in the categories defined by the Census research plan. Thus, the MRRJ population presents itself as mostly White with a percentage of 53.1%. The individuals who declared themselves Blacks comprise a minor group of color which corresponds to only 10.5% of the population. Those who declared themselves Browns correspond to 35.2% of the population. The other categories of color correspond to 1.3% of the MRRJ total population; therefore, in our analyses we will focus on the white, black and brown color categories (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Population composition according to color in the MRRJ – 2000**

<b>Color</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
White	53.1
Black	10.5
Brown	35.2
Other	0.5
Unknown	0.8
Total	100.0

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

Previously, we saw how the different social contexts according to the school climate of the domicile are distributed in the MRRJ space. It now remains for us to know how the groups of color considered in this paper (Whites, Blacks and Browns) are distributed in these contexts. To this end, Maps 2, 3 and 4 present the distribution of groups of color according to four proportional ranges of concentration in the territory.

Map 2 presents the distribution of Whites according to the concentration ranges in the MRRJ. Table 1 shows that Whites comprise the largest group of color, corresponding to 53.1% of the metropolitan population; according to Map 2, most areas show percentages that revolve around this value. However, it calls our attention the high concentration of Whites in areas that form the center of the MRRJ social space: the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, Barra da Tijuca, Great Tijuca, the Downtown area, and the oceanic region of Niterói.


Map 3 shows the distribution of the black color population according to the four concentration ranges. The low concentration of individuals declared Black is much clear in areas where the concentration of individuals declared White is higher than that observed in the overall MRRJ. We note that the range of 10 to 15% of Black people is distributed predominantly in the areas of Baixada Fluminense<sup>9</sup> and the concentration range over 15% tends to be located in the central regions of the municipalities of Baixada Fluminense and regions near the city of Rio de Janeiro.

The Brown population, as we can see in Map 4, presents a spatial distribution close to that of the Black population: areas with large concentrations of Whites correspond to areas of low concentration of Browns. However, due to the heterogeneity of the Brown group of color in this work, we considered separately Browns and Blacks and the category of white color as reference for comparative purposes.

To verify the relationship between the different social contexts of residence and the distribution of the groups of color we resorted to Table 2 that shows the composition of each context by color. As expected, we realized that social contexts have significant differences in composition in terms of two opposing social contexts: low and high. In high-status spaces 88% of the population is White, while in low-status spaces the highest concentration is of Blacks and Browns. Even in the low-status context the color white ceases to be predominant and shows a percentage equal to that of Browns. In the middle-status context, despite the fact that the white color shows a percentage lower than the observed in the high-status context, the percentages of Blacks and Browns remain below the MRRJ average as a whole.


<sup>9</sup> Baixada Fluminense is located in the periphery of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro and comprises eight municipalities: Nova Iguaçu, Duque de Caxias, São João de Meriti, Nilópolis, Belford Roxo, Queimados, Mesquita and Japeri. With a population around three million people, its urban and social problems show a strong inequality compared to Rio de Janeiro, the main city of the metropolis.

**Map 2: Spatial distribution of the white color population in the MRRJ – 2000**




Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

**Map 3: Spatial distribution of the black color population in the MRRJ – 2000**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

Map 4: Spatial distribution of the Brown color population in the MRRJ - 2000



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

**Table 2: Color percentage according to social context – MRRJ – 2000**

Color	Social context of the domicile			Total
	Low	Middle	High	
White	43.6	59.3	88.0	53.8
Black	12.5	9.8	2.9	10.6
Brown	43.8	30.9	9.0	35.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

However, when we analyze the distribution of each group of color among the social contexts, the relationship between racial segregation and residential segregation is clearer, especially if we consider the high-status context in relation to middle- and low-status contexts, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3: Percentage of individuals in each social context according to color – MRRJ – 2000**

Color	Social context of the domicile			Total
	Low	Middle	High	
White	40.4	46.8	12.8	100.0
Black	58.6	39.2	2.2	100.0
Brown	61.2	36.8	2.0	100.0
Total	49.7	42.4	7.8	100.0

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

In addition, we cannot disregard the fact that the spatial structure of the city of Rio de Janeiro is characterized by a considerable presence of slums embedded in its noble areas. But despite spatial proximity, it expresses a large social distance which is the hallmark of the *Carioca*'s<sup>10</sup> residential segregation (Ribeiro, 2005; Ribeiro & Lago, 2001); in other words, we can say that, especially in the case of the slums located in the noble areas

<sup>10</sup> *Carioca* as an adjective is related to the city of Rio de Janeiro; as a noun it relates to the person born in it.

of the city, the scheme of interaction with its surroundings is still strongly hierarchical based on perceptions deeply rooted in two separate and distinct social worlds. Based on this idea, Ribeiro and Koslinski (2009) stated that despite social proximity, the boundaries between the “asphalt” and the “slum”<sup>11</sup> located in wealthy areas of the city are more pronounced than in the rest of the city. The strong contrasts resulting from the territorial proximity of these spaces strengthen and institutionalize the collective representations of two distant and separated social worlds<sup>12</sup>.

Table 4 shows the percentage of individuals residing in slums in each of the social contexts. We applied the *subnormal agglomerate* variable of the 2000 Demographic Census to identify those individuals<sup>13</sup>.

**Table 4: Composition of the social context according to the slum and non-slum classification – MRRJ – 2000**

	Social context			Total
	Low	Middle	High	
Non-Slum	86.2	89.9	96.5	88.6
Slum	13.8	10.1	3.5	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(\*) Census sectors classified as subnormal by the IBGE.

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

In Table 5, considering only the non-slum area, we find that the difference in concentration of the color segments remains the same as evidenced in Table 2 when we compared the social contexts of residence. However, when we observe only the slum areas, the color composition of the high-status contexts changes; in this case, the percentage of Whites

<sup>11</sup> In Portuguese, slum is *favela* and slumdog is *favelado*, the individual that resides in a *favela*.

<sup>12</sup> We estimate that within a 3-km radius from the most elite neighborhood of the city of Rio de Janeiro nearly over 33% of the resident population lives in areas regarded as slums.

<sup>13</sup> This variable indicates that the domicile of the individual is located in a census sector that matches a “set (slums and the like) consisting of housing units (shacks, houses etc.), occupying, or having occupied until recently, land of foreign property (public or private) arranged generally in a disorderly and dense way, and needy mostly of essential public services” (IBGE, 2002).



(31.8%) is smaller than in areas not classified as slums; and the percentage of Blacks (21.1%) and Browns (47.1%) is much higher than in non-slum areas (2.3% and 7.7% respectively).

**Table 5: Color percentage in the areas according to the social context and the slum\* or non-slum classification – MRRJ – 2000**

	Color	Social context			Total
		Low	Middle	High	
Non-Slum	White	43.9	61.5	90.1	55.4
	Black	12.4	9.0	2.3	10.1
	Brown	43.8	29.4	7.7	34.5
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Slum	White	42.2	39.0	31.8	40.8
	Black	13.4	16.9	21.1	14.9
	Brown	44.4	44.1	47.1	44.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(\*) Census sectors classified as subnormal by the IBGE.

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

First of all, we can say that there is a color of the spaces occupying the lower positions in the socio-spatial hierarchy. Both slums and low-status social contexts show a larger concentration of Blacks than the other social contexts. Here stands out the interesting fact that the population residing in slums has a larger concentration of Blacks and Browns in high-status spaces than in low-status spaces. We can say, on the other hand, that there is a social proximity between spaces of low-status social context and slums; namely, in spaces of low-status social context there is social proximity between slum and non-slum areas.

In Table 6, in which the reference population is the overall MRRJ population located in each of the social contexts of residence, the percentages of Whites, Blacks and Browns residing in slums in low-status contexts do not differ significantly from the average; conversely, in the middle-status context, the percentage of Blacks living in slums increases

to 17.2%, while the percentage of Whites in the same situation decreases to 6.6%; and, in the high-status context, only 1.3% of Whites reside in slums, a percentage that increases to 25% in the case of Blacks. Namely, these results show that the perception of the slum as a predominantly “Black” space results from the effects on the social representations of the social morphology of high-status spaces: the strong contrast between spaces that concentrate heavily the white segments of the population holding the top positions of the social structure and slum spaces. The same does not occur in slums located in low-status areas since there are no significant differences in the composition of color between slum and non-slum spaces.

**Table 6: Percentage of the population residing in slum\*, according to color and social context in relation to the overall MRRJ – 2000**

	Color	Social context			Total
		Low	Middle	High	
Slum	White	13.3	6.6	1.3	8.6
	Black	14.8	17.2	25.3	16.0
	Brown	14.0	14.3	18.3	14.2
	Total	13.8	10.1	3.5	11.4

(\*) Census sectors classified as subnormal by IBGE.

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

We did not find “racialization” signs of the social hierarchy of the residence contexts. In a way, we can say that the distribution of color segments by the socio-spatial hierarchy of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro is more a phenomenon of the territorial concentration of Whites of greater social status, therefore, of greater prestige and economic power, than a phenomenon of compulsory removal of “Blacks” from that space. That is, at the same time that Blacks and Whites are not separated in the low-status social contexts, we see that there is a relative “whitening” of the highest status positions. However, the difference in the color composition between slum areas and non-slum areas in high-status social contexts is clear.

In the current work, we have no conditions to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of the territorial insertion of slums in high-status social contexts for relationships between the color segments of the population.

Nonetheless, from the data available it is possible to investigate whether this territorial proximity generates some advantages for the Brown and Black groups since the location in the city is associated with a smaller or larger control of resources that increase opportunities and access to social welfare. Thus, the main objective now is to answer the following questions: is this difference in the distribution of color segments in the metropolis followed by inequality in the levels of urban welfare and opportunities? Is this inequality more influenced by the color of the individual or by the social context in which he lives? To what extent?

We seek to answer these questions by analyzing inequalities between Whites, Blacks and Browns in relation to housing conditions that determine the level of urban social welfare and opportunities for social inclusion. With regard to the first aspect, inequalities result from the action of the State in the distribution of collective services which complement the function of the household in social reproduction and the function of the residential real estate market which, through the filter of prices, distributes people in the territory and regulates access to conditions of housing comfort. With regard to the second aspect, that is, social inequalities, they result from inequities in the structure of opportunities and are analyzed taking into account four scenarios: (i) school delay of children in the 8-15 age range; (ii) school evasion of children in the 8-15 age range; (iii) *institutional disaffiliation*<sup>14</sup> of men in the 14-24 age range; and (iv) maternity of young women without spouse in the 14-19 age range. The observation of these segments may reveal evidence of reproduction of social inequalities since labor market and school are mechanisms for access to opportunities which affect the future trajectory of children and young people with regard to social mobility.

As for sanitation services, we found that inequalities are markedly cut in the socio-spatial hierarchy, although it is possible to say that Black and Brown residents in high-status spaces show neediness rate higher than Whites in the same context; however, the difference is larger among Blacks and Browns of high-status contexts in relation to Black and Brown residents in low-status spaces (see Table 7). Blacks, Browns and Whites residing in these spaces show neediness rates remarkably higher than those found in high-status contexts. The government seems to “discriminate” by place of residence and not by color, generating or tolerating extreme inequalities

<sup>14</sup> We will define this concept later.

of housing conditions and, therefore, different levels of urban welfare. We can think of two explanations for the greater advantage of Blacks and Browns residing in high-status contexts: the first is based on sanitation which, since it is a collective service, is distributed and made accessible via the location of social groups in the territory allowing housing proximity to benefit indistinctly White and non-White individuals; the second is based on the investments made in the last 20 years in the slums of Rio de Janeiro, followed by the relative abandonment of metropolitan peripheries where is located a large part of low-status contexts.

**Table 7: Indicators of housing inequalities according to social context – MRRJ – 2000**

Indicators of inequalities	Color	Social context			Total
		Low	Middle	High	
Extreme housing density *	White	18.2	8.6	2.4	11.7
	Black	26.5	18.7	10.7	23.1
	Brown	24.6	16.5	10.0	21.3
	Total	22.1	12.0	3.3	16.3
Lack of sanitation facilities	White	14.7	2.9	0.6	7.3
	Black	18.8	6.2	1.7	13.5
	Brown	17.5	5.3	1.7	12.7
	Total	16.5	3.9	0.7	9.9

(\*) Domiciles with over two people per dormitory.

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

The evaluation of the indicator of housing density leads us in the same direction (see Table 7). At the upper top of the socio-spatial hierarchy there are sharp inequalities because the percentage of Blacks and Browns living in high-density housing conditions (10.7% and 10%, respectively) is larger than that of Whites (2.4%). But, at the same time, we can say that housing conditions become worse equally for Whites and Blacks as we go down the socio-spatial hierarchy scale. In relative terms, the Whites of low-status spaces are in a worse situation than that of Blacks and Browns

living in high-status contexts. It seems correct to conclude that, in this respect also, the place of residence is more decisive in determining urban social welfare than color.

Now we come to the evaluation of inequalities of opportunities. As already mentioned, we chose some indicators that could translate mechanisms of production/reproduction of inequalities related to social contexts. They reveal circumstances in which children and young people may be in situations of social risk due to obstacles, in terms of family and neighborhood, in their opportunities of accumulation of resources which in the future would ensure them greater social welfare and higher social positions. Such opportunities are related to access to educational assets resulting from schooling and from the accumulation of experiences in the labor market.

First of all, we noted the significant differences between Whites and non-Whites in school delay of a year or more of children in the 8-14 age range, as shown in Table 8. In high-status context, in relative terms, the incidence of school delay of Blacks and Browns (59.9% and 47.8%, respectively) doubles that of Whites (23.7%). In this perspective, inequalities between Whites and Blacks seem to impose themselves to inequalities arising from the housing location. However, when we examine the situation of each segment, we find that Black individuals residing in high-status contexts enjoy advantages in school performance in relation to individuals residing in low-status contexts in the socio-spatial hierarchy where the school delay of Blacks is 70.9%, of Browns is 62.7%, and of Whites is 51.8%. As for school evasion, we find the same relationship, that is, despite the disparity between Whites and Blacks in high-status contexts, the incidence of school evasion in low-status contexts is considerably larger (Table 8).

Early maternity also involves decreasing the chances of social mobility to the extent that the adolescent is obliged – in most cases – to withdraw from studies, thus limiting her present and future employment possibilities. Early maternity is today one of the main causes of school evasion, because, according to Unesco, 25% of pregnant young women in the 15-17 age range stop studying. Early maternity is strongly linked to family<sup>15</sup> and social contexts in which different mechanisms act and

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<sup>15</sup> Data processed by Itaborá (2003, p. 179) indicate that 22.5% of teenage mothers in the 15-19 age range are socialized in rather poor environments as they live in domiciles with income up to two minimum wages (MW).

**Table 8: Indicators of inequalities of opportunities according to social context – MRRJ – 2000**

Indicators of inequalities	Color	Social context			Total
		Low	Middle	High	
Children with school delay greater than one year	White	51.8	35.8	23.7	42.3
	Black	70.9	60.2	59.9	66.9
	Brown	62.7	52.8	47.8	59.2
	Total	59.1	44.0	27.4	51.6
Out-of-school children	White	24.0	12.9	6.1	17.6
	Black	40.6	29.2	28.0	36.3
	Brown	32.4	22.9	19.7	29.1
	Total	29.8	17.9	8.2	24.1
Single adolescent mothers	White	5.7	4.1	0.9	4.4
	Black	11.2	9.8	8.4	10.7
	Brown	7.6	7.0	4.4	7.3
	Total	7.2	5.6	1.5	6.2
Young people in institutional disaffiliation	White	8.0	6.0	4.5	6.7
	Black	10.7	8.8	11.8	10.0
	Brown	8.7	7.4	5.1	8.2
	Total	8.7	6.7	4.8	7.6

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

influence the adolescent's behavior: lack of information on contraceptive practices; lack of access to the public health system; limits of socialization; exposure to traditional social roles. We observed, based on Table 8, that the incidence of early maternity in low-status contexts is higher than this incidence in contexts occupying the top position in the social hierarchy, as much for the overall population as for the White and non-White segments. What draws attention in this case is that the location of the residence appears to have little influence on the behavior of non-White teens. Conversely, the incidence of White teens' early maternity rises from 0.9% in high-status contexts to 5.7% in low-status contexts. As an explanatory hypothesis, we assume that, for adolescents without spouse, differences in context (family

and social contexts) favor more Whites than non-Whites. In other words, the fact of living in low-status social contexts influence negatively more Whites, while for the non-Whites the risk of early pregnancy remains higher in all socio-spatial contexts.

The situation of the young male who does not study, does not work, and does not seek employment approaches the social condition Williamson (1997) called zero status and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2002) called *institutional disaffiliation*, since this youth is removed simultaneously from two possible social roles – worker and student – in this stage of the life cycle. Indeed, the fact of being in a disaffiliation situation may indicate the exclusion from social conditions in which this young individual acquires important assets for access to higher social positions, whether they stem from schooling or from the accumulation of occupational experience. In a limit situation, it may indicate a juvenile behavior no longer guided by moral normativity required by the dominant values and aspirations<sup>16</sup>.

Data analysis shows again important differences between both ends of the socio-spatial hierarchy, i.e. the rates of the young people of *zero status* or in a situation of *institutional disaffiliation* living in low-status spaces are higher than those of the young people living in high-status contexts. This difference is mostly noticeable in the segment of young Whites, which indicates that social contexts can have some influence on reducing their chances of disaffiliation. The same is not true with young Blacks, because the rates of those who are in high-status contexts are slightly lower than those in low-status contexts. In relation to this indicator, we can also state that place of residence has greater role in the access to opportunities than color, though this situation shows more influence on Whites than Blacks and Browns. However, the most striking result is that the incidence of disaffiliation among young Blacks is slightly smaller in middle-status contexts (8.8%) than in high-status contexts (11.8%). In this case, we can state that the slum located in high-status contexts is responsible for the high incidence of disaffiliation of young Blacks.

In order to test the effects of residential segregation *vis-à-vis* the effect of color on access to opportunities, we built a logistic regression

<sup>16</sup> It is important to consider the social contexts in the search for the sociological significance of the young individual who dropped out of school or work. As Saravi points out (2004), in Latin America *zero status* has been understood as a condition of vulnerability and risk since it stands for the possibility of decreased future opportunity of social welfare and of association with illicit activities.

model with dependent variables from each of the situations mentioned above. We chose the multivariate analysis because the indicators of inequality of opportunities set variables known in statistics as dummy, namely, categorical data for each individual in which value “1” identifies the individual who finds himself in one of the situations of inequality of opportunities, and value “0” in the opposite case. As control variables of the model, we considered the *per capita* family income in minimum wages and the school climate of the domicile. This procedure is important to control the relations we wanted to highlight such as inequality of opportunities x color, and inequality of opportunities x social and residential context.

In short, our aim is to submit the results of the descriptive analysis to the statistical test and verify whether or not and to what degree the division by color (White x Black and White x Brown) explains more the inequalities of opportunities than the social contexts, taking into consideration family (poverty x non-poverty), domicile (low school climate x high school climate) and dwelling place (high status x low status). The estimated coefficients of the regression model, when they are higher than 01, express the relative risk of the individuals who are in one of the situations of inequality of opportunities set out above, that is, in relation to their reference groups. Each of the variables considered in the model has a value that represents the risk (or relative chance) of being in one of the situations of inequality of opportunities. We applied this model for the entire population of the metropolitan region and, at the same time, for each of the color segments. For the color variable, we considered the color white as reference and we estimated the risk for Browns and Blacks. For the social context variable, we considered the high-status social context as a reference and we estimated the effects of low-status and middle-status contexts. In the case of the *per capita* family income, we estimated the effect on individuals who are members of family groups which earn up to ½ minimum wage and from ½ to 01 minimum wage, taking as reference the group that earns 01 minimum wage or more. For the home context variable, we estimated the risk of individuals belonging to a domicile with school climate up to 4 years of schooling (low) and from 4 to 8 years of schooling (middle), with reference to individuals residing in domiciles with a school climate from 9 or more years of schooling (high).

In Table 9 we presented the results of the logistic regression model for the school delay variable of a year or more for children in the 8-14 age range.



In the overall metropolis, division by color has greater importance than the place of residence in explaining inequalities of educational opportunities. It reaches more heavily Black children than Browns in relation to Whites, which could lead us to accept the hypothesis of the existence of effects of discriminatory practices with racial background. Nevertheless, a much more important explanatory weight relies on the social conditions in which the child is socialized, which comprises family, domicile location with an emphasis on the school climate of the domicile, and poverty.

When we examined the results of the application of the model for the groups of color, we observed that these contextual conditions reach more White children than Black and Brown children, while for the latter the place of residence has little or no influence on the risk of school delay.

**Table 9: Estimate of the effect of the social context and color on the school delay of 01 year or more, considering children in the 8-14 age range –MRRJ – 2000**

	Relative risk			
	MRRJ	Whites	Blacks	Browns
Black	1.54	-	-	-
Brown	1.27	-	-	-
<i>Per capita</i> family income up to ½ MW	1.63	1.65	1.38	1.48
<i>Per capita</i> family income from ½ to 01 MW	1.34	1.38	1.22	1.25
School climate of the domicile up to 4 years	2.31	2.41	1.68	1.89
School climate of the domicile from 4 to 8 years	1.66	1.71	1.34	1.48
Low-status social context	1.26	1.30	1.10	1.03*
Middle-status social context	1.13	1.15	0.99*	0.95

(\*) Non-significant for  $\alpha = 0.05$ .

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

In Table 10, we present the results of the school evasion variable. The color brown represents a virtually null risk of school exclusion in comparison to the white color, but this risk is high for the Black child (1.36). As well as in the situation of school delay, the risk of school evasion suffers greater effect from social contexts in terms of family and domicile – represented here by the school climate and the *per-capita* family income – than by the color of the children. In addition, when we observed the effects of the place of residence, we found that the risk for children who live in a low-status context is 1.22 time higher than the estimated risk for those who live in a high-status context, which is a high value and not far from the value estimated for the black color (1.36). Noting the results of the application of the model separately for the color segments, we realized that White children suffer major disadvantages arising from the effects of living in unfavorable social contexts in terms of family, domicile and place of residence. What calls attention is the fact that White (1.48) and Black children (1.42) living in contexts marked by the low schooling of adults are exposed to high risks of school evasion in similar magnitudes for both groups of color. What appears as a novelty in this case, unlike what was observed with regard to school delay, is that Black children living in low-status contexts show a higher risk of school evasion than Black children living in high-status contexts. To Brown children, this effect of the place of residence is not significantly different among the different social contexts.

In the coefficients analysis, what draws our attention is the higher risk of school evasion for Black children from poor families (up to  $\frac{1}{2}$  minimum wage), when compared with those who live in domiciles with low school climate (up to 4 years of schooling). In the first case, the risk amounts to 2.20, and, in the second, to 1.34. This result indicates the strong relationship between poverty and school evasion for Black children, probably as a result of the need to complement the family income through child labor.

In Table 11, we present the results of the model that estimates the risk of pregnancy in single young women in the 14-19 age range. In the overall MRRJ, the range of up to  $\frac{1}{2}$  minimum wage (MW) of the *per capita* family income presents a risk of 5.45 times the estimated risk for the *per capita* family income of 01 minimum wage or more, whereas the risk for the range from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 01 minimum wage represents 2.24 times the risk estimated for the same reference range which is well above the estimated values for

**Table 10: Estimate of the effect of social context and color on school evasion of children in the 8-14 age range – MRRJ – 2000**

	Relative risk			
	MRRJ	Whites	Blacks	Browns
Black	1.36	-	-	-
Brown	1.07	-	-	-
<i>Per capita</i> family income up to ½ MW	1.98	1.85	2.20	1.98
<i>Per capita</i> family income from ½ MW to 1 MW	1.31	1.19	1.34	1.41
School climate of the domicile up to 4 years	2.34	2.53	1.58	2.29
School climate of the domicile from 4 to 8 years	1.28	1.38	0.95*	1.22
Low-status social context	1.22	1.48	1.42	0.9*
Middle-status social context	0.92	1.06*	1.01*	0.71

(\*) Non-significant for  $\alpha = 0.05$ .

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

the black and brown colors. This indicates that the risk of early pregnancy is strongly related to the social context created by the extreme poverty of the family to which the young woman belongs. Living in spaces that concentrate heavily adults with little schooling represents a higher risk for Blacks. However, when we observe the results of the model for each color segment, we realize that for the White young women the effects of the low and middle-status contexts increase to 2.30 and 2.62 times, respectively, the estimated risk in the high-status context, while for Black and Brown young women the effect of context has no significance. Thus, data show that the effects of different contexts are smaller for Black and Brown young women and, at the same time, high for Whites. In addition, we note that the color variable has a large absolute weight in the constitution of the risk of early pregnancy in adolescents.

**Table 11: Estimate of the effect of social context and color on unmarried mothers from 14 to 19 years of age – MRRJ – 2000**

	Relative risk			
	MRRJ	Whites	Blacks	Browns
Black	1.71	-	-	-
Brown	1.21	-	-	-
<i>Per capita</i> family income up to 1/2 1/2 MW	5.45	6.09	4.27	4.73
<i>Per capita</i> family income from 1/2 MW to 1 MW	2.24	2.27	1.81	2.24
School climate of domicile up to 4 years	1.37	1.51	1.16	1.26
School climate of domicile from 4 to 8 years	1.23	1.44	1.05*	1.06
Low-status social context	1.80	2.30	0.97*	0.94*
Middle-status social context	2.09	2.62	1.06*	1.12*

(\*) Non-significant for  $\alpha = 0.05$ .

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

In Table 12, we present the results of applying the model to the institutional disaffiliation variable of young people in the 14-24 age range. The results show that this type of risk is little influenced by the social context of the place of residence because it only presents significant effect for Brown young women, being 1.13% for low-social context and 1.16% for middle-social context. For White young women, the effect of the social context was not significant, while for Black young women the effect was of protection for risk in case they reside in low- or middle-social contexts in relation to high-social context, i.e. Black young women residing in high-social context have a higher risk of being in a situation of institutional disaffiliation. Reflecting on this result, it is important to remember that the weighting areas defined by the IBGE do not discriminate slum areas and that there is a strong incidence of this type of dwelling in the MRRJ in contexts

defined herein as of high status. That is, in the process of the slumization of Rio de Janeiro the large number of *favelas* encrusted in noble areas of the city stands out, mainly by the occupation of hills and slopes.

As we saw in the descriptive part of this article, 25% of the Black population resides in *favelas*/slums located in high-status contexts, and Blacks account for 20% of the population in those slums. Such a strong presence of slums in those areas of the city affects the estimates for areas classified as high-status areas because, despite slums do not express the kind of total separation observed in American ghettos, social segregation between the slum area and its wealthy surroundings expresses the existence of social worlds with strong differences in their living conditions (income, education, housing comfort, etc.), of patterns of social organization (family type, size and composition, for example), and other conditions related to a complex and secretive system of interactions based on social stigma which are so deeply rooted that the everyday language has incorporated the term “*favelado*”<sup>17</sup> as a category of the game of social distinctions founded on estate hierarchy, and such a term has been used legitimately by the media and public authorities in the current sociability.

It would be impossible, within the framework of this article, to develop arguments explaining the reasons for the fact that the territorial proximity of these social worlds juxtaposed does not create advantages for those who are at the bottom of the social structure, thus encouraging young people to search for social inclusion via school and/or work. In other words, the co-presence in the space of those social groups does not seem to arouse fully positive dimensions of the sociological phenomenon known as “pair effect”.

Subsequent studies may show how the presence of slums in noble areas of the city affects the institutional disaffiliation of Black young people, a situation that does not happen to Browns. However, we assume that we are facing unexpected effects of changes in the young people expectations about their place in society arising, as much from exposure to the mass media and the increase in the level of education, as from the socialization process resulting from the interaction with young people residing outside the space of slums and occupying higher social positions. These are two mechanisms that generate incongruities between the social status expected by young Blacks residing in slums and the social status

<sup>17</sup> As we mentioned earlier, *favelado* is slumdog in English.

effectively carried out through the structure of existing opportunities (Lensky, 1954). Young people refuse the occupation they can have access to since it is usually an occupation related to manual and informal labor and to personal or household services. This occurs because they see this occupation as socially devalued after having achieved levels of education higher than those of the adults of their reference group. Besides, they are not encouraged to continue their schooling because public schooling is socially devalued and because they do not acknowledge this via as being able to allow them to achieve their expectations of social ascension<sup>18</sup>.

**Table 12: Estimate of the effect of the social context and of color on the disaffiliation of young people in the 14-24 age range – MRRJ – 2000**

	Relative risk			
	MRRJ	Whites	Blacks	Browns
Black	1.15	-	-	-
Brown	0.98	-	-	-
<i>Per capita</i> family income up to ½ MW	3.12	3.08	2.78	3.17
<i>Per capita</i> family income from ½ MW to 1 MW	1.51	1.44	1.47	1.55
School climate of the domicile up to 4 years	1.32	1.47	1.12	1.25
School climate of the domicile from 4 to 8 years	1.15	1.24	0.94	1.12
Low-status social context	1.02*	1.03*	0.73	1.13
Middle-status social context	1.02*	1.02*	0.69	1.16

(\*) Non-significant for  $\alpha = 0.05$ .

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE, 2002).

<sup>18</sup> Sansone (2003) explored the hypothesis that the behavior of the young people from the popular strata facing the institutions of society, especially the behavior of the so-called Blacks, is guided by the effects of status incongruity.

## Conclusions: do urban frontiers have colors?

The primary motivation of this study was to generate some empirical evidence that would reflect the hypothesis of the “racialization” of the structure of inequality expressed in the territory through residential segregation taking the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro as a case study. We sought to conduct our reflection on this hypothesis in two debates present in the Brazilian academic world: on the one hand, the debate that is guided by hypotheses disseminated by the international literature on contemporary trends of increasing connections between the macro mechanisms of reproduction of social inequalities and the micro-mechanisms of residential segregation in large cities, and, on the other hand, a national debate about the “racial” dimension of social inequalities.

We do not want that the analysis undertaken here might be seen as a demonstration of the lack of relevance of “race” in the processes of production and reproduction of social inequalities through the mechanisms which organize socially the territory, distributing people, resources and opportunities from the social structure and its historic “racialization”. We want, first of all, that our findings point to the complexity of the issue. In this sense, in accordance with the results described, we reached conclusions which we now present and which dialogue with the inquiries exposed at the beginning of the article.

Firstly, the self-declared color of individuals has strong influence on the risks of the social disadvantages examined in our analysis and that are related to the access to urban social welfare and to the structure of opportunities, reaching mostly the Black segments. Nevertheless, we noted that color does not fully explain the reproduction of inequalities. The empirical results of our work point to the strong relevance of contexts in which children and young people are socialized and acquire tangible and intangible resources necessary to the access, present and future, to the city resources. In this scenario, we can highlight results from the prior acquisition of parcels of the economic and school capital by family groups comprising children and young people. We also noted that such access is conditioned to the social context conformed by place of residence despite the fact that we deal with social facts (school delay, school evasion, early pregnancy and institutional disaffiliation) that are highly dependent on more immediate contexts (family and home). Besides, we found no evident signs

of similarity between the inequalities produced by stratification according to color and the inequalities resulting from the social organization of the territory in terms of the spatial distribution of individuals and the chances of access to urban welfare and opportunities. Whites, Blacks and Browns, living in contexts with large concentration of adults with low schooling, face urban conditions of life that are worse than those experienced by Blacks and Browns from higher status contexts.

These comments allow us to call into question the hypothesis present in the literature about the existence of the phenomenon of “racial” segregation in the city (Pinto, 1998; Telles, 2003; Garcia, 2009). But, in spite of not finding signs of the “racialization” of the inequalities generated by the effects of the social organization of the territory, we found differences in the constraints imposed on Whites, Browns and Blacks in their chances of accessing opportunities. This fact results from the observation that Whites are more negatively affected in their chances of taking advantage of opportunities due to family, domicile and urban contexts which are less unfavorable than the contexts of Browns and, particularly, of Blacks. The latter, in turn, would be less affected since their color already is disadvantageous from the starting point and the fact of living in more favorable contexts does not seem to change this situation. Moreover, this fact may mean that the historic social inequalities between groups of color in Brazilian society can be articulated with those arising from the formation of urban social environments not much favorable to use of opportunity structures. Accordingly, in future research, it would be interesting and useful to consider the mechanisms of discrimination described by Guimarães (1999) which, acting on the socialization of individuals, everyday life and functioning of institutions, naturalize “racial inequities” while transforming them in their “social tropes”.

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## 6

# **Territory and employment: urban segregation, urban segmentation and occupational opportunities in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1</sup>**

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

*Juciano Martins Rodrigues*

*Filipe Souza Correa*

### Introduction

The Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro has been losing importance in the national economy. This process has been occurring in the context of deconcentration of productive activities that depart from the traditional areas of economic polarization in the Southeastern area and head for the inland areas of the country. However, it is not a recent trend. It is inscribed in the long movement of the ongoing loss of the metropolis centrality since the city lost its status as federal government headquarters to Brasilia in the 1960s. In this regard, there was a crisis in the developmental model initiated in the 1980s whose distinctive trait was a succession of short periods of crisis and an economic expansion, which, in the 1990s, jointly with the effects of the policies of structural adjustment and insertion into globalization, produced specific effects on the metropolitan economy of Rio de Janeiro.

It is estimated that the GDP of the metropolitan region has been stagnated for 25 years. Several analyses on the reconfiguration of the national economy (Diniz, 1993) have pointed to signs of its marginalized

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<sup>1</sup> This article was presented at the XVI Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais, held in Caxambu-MG – Brazil, from September 29 to October 03, 2008.

situation when compared to the dynamic territory that is being built in the southeast of the country. A recent work conducted by the Observatório das Metrôpoles (Observatory of the Metropolises) on the productive structures of the metropolitan regions facing the new trends of the territorial deconcentration of national economy highlights that Rio de Janeiro, although occupying the second position in the urban-metropolitan hierarchy of the country in economic and demographic terms, shows clear signs of marginalization in the territorial restructuring of national economy. Moreover, it shows some disparity between its potential productive capacity and its transformation into an economic dynamics which promotes development. (Ruiz and Pereira, 2007)<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, we can state that the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro has been living for many years an impasse that prevents it from entering the competitive economic dynamics opened with the transformation of the development model. Many are the reasons for this situation, but the aim of this work does not include seeking an explanation for them. What matters to us is the fact that these changes and the impasse of the development of Rio de Janeiro resulted, on one side, on a tertiary economy divided between the formal and informal sectors with huge repercussions on the labor market. The labor market adjustment to these transformations has been conducted through the informality of the activities, the maintenance of high rates of unemployment and the expansion of personal and household services.

The overall objective of this work is to capture some of the reflexes created by such processes in the relationship between the conditions of access to the labor market and the territorial dynamics of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro. In other words, we intend to analyze the relationships between the processes of social division of the metropolitan territory and the conditions governing the access to opportunities in the labor market. We will seek to test to what extent the location of individuals

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<sup>2</sup> Research Report carried out as part of the project titled *Observatório das Metrôpoles: Territory, Social Cohesion and Democratic Governance* related to Metropolization, Intra-metropolitan Dynamics and National Territory. According to this study, the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (MRRJ) concentrates 6.4% of the national population, 9.7% of the aggregate income and 10% of technological capacity. Indeed, these same indicators for the metropolis of São Paulo are as follows: 10.5%, 18% and 22%, respectively. In terms of the productive capacity of the exporting and innovative enterprises the scenario is even more contrasting: while the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo owns 19% of the value of the industrial transformation of these enterprises, the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro has participated with just 5.8%.

and social groups in a socio-spatial structure characterized by tendencies to residential segregation and territorial segmentation impact on the quality of employment (occupational fragility) and on the possibilities of transforming the very job opportunity in resources from the labor market (income).

More specifically, we aim to capture the effects of the social context of the areas (residential segregation) and the difficulties of dislocation (mobility) – called spatial mismatch<sup>3</sup> in American literature – on the opportunities mentioned above. In this sense, we will use data from the 2000 Demographic Census to assess these spatial configurations as mechanisms that influence on the labor market, using the micro data and the weighting areas information as units of analysis.

The text is organized as follows. In the first section, we present the results of the test related to the hypothesis of residential segregation, and in the second are the results related to territorial segmentation. In each section the analysis is organized in two phases: first, we describe the processes adopted to identify the residential segregation and territorial segmentation trends and the ways the association with each one of them determines the access to occupations considered fragile in terms of stability when compared to the remuneration differentials of the main occupation; then, we present the application results of the regression models designed to submit the empirical evidence to the causality test, controlling the residential segregation and segmentation effects on the variables mentioned according to other attributes that determine access to the labor market at individual and household levels. In the second part of the text, we assess the empirical results obtained seeking a dialogue with some of the literature that has been pointing the phenomena of the social division of the territory of the metropolises as independent variables in relation to the reproduction mechanisms of social inequalities.

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<sup>3</sup> This concept has origins in the works of John Kain (1968, 1969) and it was designed to describe the effects on the access to employment opportunities and on the wages of African American workers resulting from the decrease in the choices of the place of residence on the grounds of racial discrimination and peripheral dispersion of jobs which were concentrated in central areas in the past.

## Residential segregation and employment

In previous works, Preteceille and Ribeiro (1999), Ribeiro (2000) and Ribeiro (2001) showed that the territory of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro is organized heavily in accordance with the system of distances and oppositions which inserts social groups in the social space. The upper classes which hold high amounts of the economic, social and symbolic capitals dominate areas called “South zone” and part of the “North zone” of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Conversely, the popular classes are strongly present in popular spaces of the metropolitan periphery, both opposed to segments of the classic middle class which dominate the suburban spaces where social configuration is, however, less defined. Thus, we came to the conclusion that the metropolitan territory features a clear projection of the division lines of the city’s society in such a way that living on one side of the city or on the other makes all the difference.

We can affirm that the social space of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro features the self-segregation of the upper layers of the social structure. We will present our conceptual understanding of the term ‘residential segregation’. As already discussed in another work (Ribeiro, 2005), this is a category of analysis that always contains two dimensions: *conceptual*, related to theoretical principles chosen to explain social organization, and *practical*, related to normative concepts of society. In this sense, according to Bourdieu’s (1997) notion of social space, we can identify two concepts: (i) segregation as difference in the location of a group in relation to another and (ii) segregation as unequal chances of access to material (services, equipment, etc.) and symbolic goods (prestige, status) and to the structure of opportunities (Kaztman, 1999).

These two sides of residential segregation are inseparable, although we can separate them for purposes of analysis. Social groups are grouped in the territory in accordance with their affinities of lifestyles and cultural model, but especially due to relations of force established with other groups and with the public power, whose object is the selective appropriation of the territory as a location advantage that allows the reproduction of segregation power. (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2000). The way we chose to operationalize our understanding of the segregation phenomenon is driven by the search for identification of the social composition of the pieces that make up the urban structure, which form distinct social contexts resulting

from the struggle for ownership of the city as a source of multiple resources. Once formed, these social contexts trigger reproduction mechanisms of the inequalities regarding the chances of appropriation of goods (material and symbolic) and opportunities.

### How to identify social contexts?

According to Ribeiro (2005), there are two methodological families of segregation quantification or measurement: one, which translates into synthetic indices, and another, which elaborates typologies. In this paper, we chose to use typology as a tool for classification and description that meets the objectives for the planning and categorization of sociological phenomena, allowing comparisons.

To express the social division of space in the MRRJ, we chose to classify the intra-urban areas. This means that we used a typological analysis having as variable the *average of home schooling of adults above 25 years of age* (School Climate) as variable. We considered that such a variable allows the description of residential segregation in terms of concentration of people living in the family and in the district in situations of greater or lesser chance of access to resources that leverage their position in the structure of opportunities offered by the labor market. Such assumption is based on previous works on the subject, such as those of Kaztman and Rematoso (2005) and Ribeiro (2007), that showed the growing relevance of school qualification as a requirement for placement in the labor market and for the transformation of this position into new resources (labor remuneration).

As spatial units of analysis, we used the weighting areas of the 2000 Demographic Census (ADE)<sup>4</sup> sample, because only the data collected in the most comprehensive questionnaire of the Census, therefore of the sample, allow us to create the variable mentioned above.

First, households were grouped into four schooling levels: a) under 4 years; over 4 and up to 8 years; b) 8-12 years; and, c) over 12 years.

Given the percentage of households in each level and in each of the 444 weighting areas, we started the construction of the typology.

The classification of areas through this typology was carried out applying the Factorial Analysis by Binary Combination technique, followed

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<sup>4</sup> In the original text it is *área de expansão demográfica* (area of demographic expansion) whose initials are AED.



by the Ascending Hierarchical Classification. In the first phase we reduced the size of the explanation of the distribution of indicators through the districts (in fact ADE's) in two dimensions (factors), having as criterion the 80% value of explanation of the factors variance). The coordinates of the factor(s) corresponding to this percentage were saved and used as a building element of district clusters. The Statlab hierarchical classification has provided three groups whose intra-classes variance was 23.2% and the inter-classes variance was 76.8%<sup>5</sup>.

The result obtained by the procedure described above has offered us the grouped areas in three types (see Map 2.1). The first type is characterized by a high presence of low schooling domiciles and comprises 54% of the people residing in the MRRJ, as we can see in Chart 2.1.

Looking at this chart, we can observe that the second type, which includes 35% of the population, shows a profile with high and medium schooling domiciles marked by the presence of domiciles with school climate between 4 and 8 years. The third type is characterized as high social context territories, because it shows a high concentration of domiciles with high schooling where 10.5% of the metropolitan population lives. Therefore, we call the first type "high social context", the second "medium social context" and the third "low social context".


It is important to note that in the territories of low social status the percentage of domiciles with school climate under 4 years of schooling is 35% higher than the school climate in areas of high social context. On the other hand, in the latter the number of domiciles with educational level above 12 years of schooling is 52% higher<sup>6</sup>.

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
<sup>5</sup> For such a procedure we used the Stalab software.

<sup>6</sup> These differentials and other indicators are in the table annexed.

Map 2.1 - Types according to the school climate of the domicile -2000



**Chart 2.1.**




Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

### Segregation effects on the risk of occupational fragility

In the MRRJ, occupational fragility<sup>7</sup> reaches 36% of employed adults aged 25-59 years. The level of fragility among people in this age group varies territorially, but in the territories of high social status it is 10% less than in the territories of medium social status. When we compare the territories of high social status and the territories of low social status this difference is even greater, exceeding 20%, because whilst the fragile occupation reaches a quarter of the people employed in the former, in the latter it is over 45% (Chart 2.3).

<sup>7</sup> For the purposes of this study, we grouped the adults aged 25-59 years on the basis of the occupations considered fragile. Therefore, we considered fragile the following occupations indicated by the Census variable “position in the main occupation”: 1) self-employed employee – not a social security contributor; 2) domestic employee with labor card signed; 3) domestic employee without labor card signed; and 4) domestic employee without labor card signed and who is not a social security contributor of the compulsory social welfare system.


**Chart 2.3.**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

In the territories of low social status, the highest level of occupational fragility is due to the high presence of self-employed people and employees without labor card signed that do not contribute to social welfare, as we can observe in the chart below which, in addition to showing the overall fragility of the territories of low social status (46), shows the fragile occupations apart. Moreover, we can note that among the domestic employees the employees with no labor card signed predominate (Chart 2.4).

**Chart 2.4**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

The data presented above indicate that the access to better conditions of employment is related to a certain association with housing location since we noticed substantial differences between spaces of high, medium and low social contexts.

In order to refine such analysis and clearly show the effect of territory on such conditions, we applied a logistic regression model to estimate this effect<sup>8</sup>. In addition to the territory variables, we controlled the effects for the following variables: a) Individual variables: years of schooling; age; color, migration and gender; b) Family context variables: *per capita* household income and school climate of the domicile; c) District context variables: the socio-spatial typology described above.

Description and hierarchy of variables are shown in Annex B.

On the first analysis we sought to capture the risks of adults aged 25-59 years in situations of occupational fragility, according to housing location. The reading of Table 2.1 highlights the fact that living in areas that concentrate heavily people in households with low school climate is a situation of risk for having a fragile occupation. As it is shown, this risk is 18.2% greater compared to situations of people living in areas that, on the contrary, concentrate households with high school climate. Living in spaces considered as belonging to the medium type increases only in 6.3% this same risk. That is, controlling the effects of all other variables through their reference levels, either individual or related to the household, which focus on the situation of occupational fragility, we were able to find a significant effect of the social contexts formed by the processes of residential segregation on the situation of fragility in the occupational position in the labor market.

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed description of the logistic model, see Annex A.

**Table 2.1.**  
**MRRJ: Estimation of the effect of the typology of residential areas according to the school climate for risk of being in situations of occupational fragility, for people aged 25 to 59 years - 2000**


	Risk Percentage	Significance
0-4 years of schooling	26,4 %	0,00
5-8 years of schooling	31,6 %	0,00
25-25 years of age	20,9 %	0,00
30-34 years of age	20,5 %	0,00
Black and Brown	20,0 %	0,00
Migrant	12,0 %	0,00
Female	0,6 %	0,00
Up to ½ minimum wage (MW)	68,8 %	0,00
From ½ to 1 MW	44,1 %	0,00
School climate up to 5 years	48,9 %	0,00
School climate from 5 to 9 years	26,9 %	0,00
Medium socio-spatial type	6,3 %	0,00
Low socio-spatial type	18,2 %	0,00

**Source: Elaborated by authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.**

### Segregation effects on income differentials

We also aimed to grasp the effects of place of residence on income differentials of employed people of 25-59 years of age. Indeed, the average remuneration in the main occupation is over 68% in the territories of high social context compared to those of medium social context. This difference is even greater when comparing high and low social contexts, contexts where the difference reaches 80%. As shown in Chart 3.5, the difference between the territories of medium and low social status is 39%. The difference of income between territories of high and low social contexts is remarkable.

**Chart 2.5**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

In Table 2.2 are shown the results of the multiple linear regression model adjusted to the explanation of the variation in income from the main occupation for the same population of 25 to 59 years of age, considering the territory divided by the three types found and controlled by other individual and household factors which focus on the variation in the main occupation income. In this case, the social context has a greater weight on the variation in the main occupation income. In territories of low social context, the main occupation income decreases by 37.92% in relation to areas of high social context and the other individual and household factors are controlled. In territories of medium social context there is a decrease of 34.56% in the main occupation income.

We noticed, therefore, that the occupational fragility and the main occupation income vary in the territory in accordance with the social context in which the household is located, but at the same time this social context is a factor that determines to some extent the chances the individuals have of achieving quality occupations and income from their work.

**Table 2.2.**  
**MRRJ: Estimation of the effect of the socio-spatial typology according to the school climate of the domicile for the main occupation income for people aged 25-59 years - 2000**

	Explanation Percentage	Significance
0-4 years of schooling	- 17.2 %	0,00
5-8 years of schooling	- 14.0 %	0,00
25-29 years of age	- 18.1 %	0,00
30-34 years of age	- 5.5 %	0,00
Black and Brown	- 8.0 %	0,00
Migrant	- 0.4 %	0,00
Female	- 22.16 %	0,00
Fragile occupation	- 16.8 %	0,00
School climate of the domicile over 5 years of schooling	- 23.3 %	0,00
School climate of the domicile 5-8 years of schooling	- 19.8 %	0,00
<i>Medium socio-spatial type</i>	- 34.6 %	0,00
<i>Low socio-spatial type</i>	- 37.9 %	0,00
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> = 47%		

**Source: Elaborated by authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.**

## Residential segmentation and employment

As already mentioned, we will seek to test the effects of territorial segmentation on the forms of insertion of people in the labor market. The territorial segmentation is understood as a situation of distance between place of residence and employment location.

Segmentation can be generated by three mechanisms relating to mismatching between supply structures of households and employment, as pointed out by Kaztman (2008). They are: (i) spatial distribution of the population in large cities, which in Latin America is characterized by a configuration where low-skill workers occupy the peripheral areas, which



can be accentuated by intra-urban migrations; (ii) relocation of sources of work caused by changes in the spatial distribution of productive structure that may reflect policies aimed at a more efficient use of land, of changes in land price or changes that aimed at locational advantages through agglomeration economies; (iii) technological changes that imply changes in the skills required by companies which change the patterns of labor recruitment that can be located next to the productive establishments.

However, we cannot just consider that the implications on the access to the best employment conditions arise only from the distance or from the mismatching between employment and housing spaces of employed people or which comprise the economically active population (EAP)<sup>9</sup> but also from the uneven distribution of conditions of accessibility generated by the transportation system.

For this reason, in this work we have adopted as an indicator of segmentation the capacity of mobility people have in the metropolitan territory. Namely, the phenomenon of spatial mismatch can also be generated as a result of changes in the provision of mobility, either due to the shortage of transport connecting the place of residence and the place of employment, or by changing the price of the dislocation.

This phenomenon is particularly important in Brazilian metropolises for two reasons. The first refers to the strong concentration of job offer in central areas at the same time we observe the growth of the population residing in the outskirts of the city, especially due to the increase in the price of housing and urban land, but also because of various forms of public intervention. The second reason results from the total public de-regulation of the transport system in Brazilian metropolises through the expansion of the so-called “alternative transport” and through the capacity of pressure exerted by the authorized contractors of this service on tariffs.

We know, for example, that the municipality of Rio de Janeiro concentrates 54% of the metropolitan EAP, while the concentration of formal job locations reaches 76%. We also know that there is a territorial concentration of job offer in the intra-urban scale in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. As regards peripheral municipalities, we found clear disparities between the resident EAP and the jobs offered. Except for Niterói, in all other municipalities of the MRRJ, EAP is larger than the number of jobs

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<sup>9</sup> In Portuguese it is *população economicamente ativa* and its initials are PEA.

offered in 2000. Nova Iguaçu, for example, which comprises 8.1% of the metropolitan EAP, participates with just 2.8% of all jobs.

These data indicate a clear mismatch – at the municipal level – between place of residence and the location of the jobs offered. It highlights, therefore, one of the configurations that characterize territory segmentation which, according to Kaztman (2008), may still involve access barriers to the opportunities offered by the labor market. The first of these implications would be the cost (time and money) in the search for jobs (or better jobs) and the daily transport to the workplace. Secondly, segmentation would constitute a barrier towards the visibility of occupational opportunities (information, contacts and personal filters).

### How to measure territorial segmentation?

As our goal is also to investigate the possible linkages between district location in the structure of Metropolitan mobility and the insertion in the labor market of people residing in that area, we used a division of the territory different from that used in segregation tests, but also the technique of socio-spatial typology construction taking as variable the mobility index of the macro-zones defined by the MRRJ Plano Diretor de Transporte Urbano/PDTU (Master Plan of Urban Transport), which in turn was developed using data from Pesquisa de Origem-Destino 2002-3003 (Origin-destination Survey 2002-3003).

This survey was conducted from October 2002 to December 2003 and comprises a useful sample of 34,000 households where we interviewed over 99,000 people. For its implementation, the Metropolitan Region was subdivided into 485 areas called traffic areas, which constitute the smallest geographic level of representation of the information obtained. According to the survey, 19.9 million dislocations are made in the MRRJ in all modes of transport being 12.5% of these modes motorized. On the other hand, the survey reveals that 45% of the trips made daily have the workplace as destination. Other 32% of the trips are motivated by study. In the dislocation to the workplace the use of collective transport is prevalent since 55% of the trips are performed through this mode.

We grouped the 17 macro-zones in three synthetic types using the mobility index as proxy, which was a procedure simpler than the typology

used to identify the division of the city according to the social context of each area. We believe, therefore, that the socio-spatial typology built as representation of the segmentation level of the MRRJ territory is a better indicator as it expresses the capacity of dislocation of people inside the metropolitan territory according to their place of residence.


We classified the macro-zones into three types according to this indicator: 1– Macro-zones with high mobility (well above average); 2 – Macro-zones with medium mobility (around the MRRJ average); and 3 – Macro-zones with low mobility (well below the MRRJ average) (Map 3.1). The chart below brings the average mobility of each type. The territories of high mobility feature an average index exceeding 2.34 trips/inhabitant/day while the territories of medium and low mobility feature 1.81 indices of trips/inhabitant/day and 1.5 trips/inhabitant/day, respectively.

This way of dividing the city for the purpose of analysis, although being less “refined” than the typology built from the school climate, also expresses the social division of the metropolitan space. We will now observe the very distribution of households according to the school climate.


We note clearly the larger presence of domiciles of high schooling (12 years of schooling and more) in the territories of high mobility.

The difference between these territories and those with medium and low mobility is striking. While in the territories of high mobility 38% of the households show high schooling, in the territories of medium and low mobility the percentage of households with over 12 years of schooling is 9.6% and 6.8%, respectively. Namely, there is a difference of people with high schooling that reaches 28% between high and medium mobility and over 30% between high and low mobility (Chart 3.2).


Map 3.1. Typology according to the degree of population mobility



**Chart 3.1.**



**Chart 3.2**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

In territories of low mobility the percentage of domiciles with school climate under 4 years of schooling is 30% higher than in areas of high status which, as we have seen, does not reach 14%. On the other hand, in territories of high mobility the percentage of households with high schooling (over 12 years) is 52% higher than in areas of low mobility where the numbers of domiciles in this condition does not reach 6.8% of the total amount (Chart 3.2).

### 3.2 Effects of segmentation on the risk of occupational fragility

We have already mentioned that the percentage of fragility is 36% in the MRRJ. However, we noted clear differences when we looked at the city in order to understand its social division from the perspective of segmentation. In territories of low mobility, 39% of employed people are in this situation, that is, as we can see in Chart 3.4, the difference between spaces of high and low mobility is 11%. It is worth noting, however, regarding fragility, there are no major differences between territories of medium and low mobility, as the difference does not reach two percentage points (Chart 3.4).


**Chart 3.4**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

As it occurs in territories of low social context, in territories of low mobility fragility is caused by the predominant presence of persons exercising self-employed occupations and employees who do not have labor card signed and who are not social security contributors, with greater weight to the latter who represent 12% of the employed people, as we can see in the chart (Chart 3.5).

**Chart 3.5**



**Source:** Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

Table 4.1 shows the results of the logistic model considering the population aged 25-29 years, with the response to situations of occupational fragility as variable and using the typology of mobility. In general, individual level variables exert more influence on the risk of occupational fragility in this age group than the variables which classify areas. The risks of low and medium mobility areas also do not differ much among themselves.

Low mobility presents a risk of 6.3% in relation to areas of high mobility and the average mobility presents a risk of 6.1% for the situation of professional fragility. Thus, we can note a significant effect of the areas classified according to the typology of mobility on professional fragility, in accordance with the hypothesis of this work, controlling the other variables of individual and household levels which also have an effect on the situation of fragility presented here.

**Table 3.1.****MRRJ: Estimate of the effect of typology of mobility for the risk of being in a situation of occupational fragility for people aged 25-59 years - 2000**

	Explanation Percentage	Significance
0-4 years of schooling	24.92 %	0,00
5-8 years of schooling	32.90 %	0,00
25-29 years of age	21.9 %	0,00
30-34 years of age	21.4 %	0,00
Black and Brown	20.7 %	0,00
Migrant	13.3 %	0,00
Female	0.4 %	0,00
<i>Per capita</i> household income up to ½ minimum wage	70.1 %	0,00
<i>Per capita</i> household income up to ½ minimum wage to 1 minimum wage	45.2 %	0,00
School climate of the domicile over 5 years of schooling	53.6 %	0,00
School climate of the domicile 5-8 years of schooling	29.0 %	0,00
Medium mobility	6.3 %	0,00
Low mobility	6.1 %	0,00
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> = 45%		


**Source: Elaborated by authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census – 2000.**

### 3.3 Effects of segmentation on income differentials

When we compare territories according to the level of mobility, it is possible to note considerable differences between the types. We note, as shown by Chart 3.6, that these differences are similar to those found when we compare territories based on social context. The difference between the average remuneration in the main occupation of adults aged 25-59 years in territories of high and medium mobility, for example, is 68.6%. We note that the average remuneration in areas of high mobility is 80% higher than the average remuneration in territories of low mobility.



**Chart 3.6**



Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census.

In Table 3.2 are the results of the multiple linear regression model adjusted to the explanation of the variation in income from the main occupation for the population aged 25-59 years, considering the typology of mobility and controlling by means of other individual and household factors.

With this analysis, we can see that the variables that indicate the type of mobility have a considerable weight in the variation in the main occupation income, as well as the variables of the school climate of the domicile. Thus, we showed that the social capital acquired at the domicile - here represented by the school climate of the domicile - and the mobility of the residential area make up the main factors that explain the variation in income from the main occupation. In areas of low mobility, the main occupation income decreases by 21.73% in relation to areas of high mobility, while the medium type of mobility decreases by 22.79% the income from the main occupation. Thus, the effects of these two areas for the variation in the main occupation does not differ much from each other, but there is a significant difference for variation in income in comparison with areas of high mobility. In this way, we clearly realize the effect of territorial segmentation, jointly operating with the social capital acquired in the domicile, on the income of individuals. That is, the more segmented a territory is, smaller are the gains from the occupation exercised.

**Table 3.2.**  
**MRRJ: Estimate of the effect of typology of mobility for the main occupation income, for people aged 25-59 years - 2000**

	Explanation Percentage	Significance
0-4 years of schooling	- 18.08 %	0,00
5-8 years of schooling	- 14.97 %	0,00
25-29 years of age	- 10.70 %	0,00
30-34 years of age	- 6.09 %	0,00
Black and Brown	- 9.63 %	0,00
Migrant	- 0.96 %	0,00
Female	- 21.8 %	0,00
Fragile occupation	- 16.76 %	0,00
School climate of the domicile over 5 years of schooling	- 27.11 %	0,00
School climate of the domicile 5-8 years of schooling	- 22.99 %	0,00
Medium mobility	- 22.79 %	0,00
Low mobility	- 21.73 %	0,00
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> = 45%		

**Source: Elaborated by authors with data from the 2000 Demographic Census – 2000.**

## Conclusion

The central objective of this study was to generate empirical evidence on the role of processes of residential segregation and territory segmentation on conditions for access to the labor market and on possibilities of transforming occupation into income, taking the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro as a case study. According to the technical and methodological strategy here adopted, the results achieved show relations of causality between the risks of access to fragile occupations and income differentials in the main occupation resulting from the social context of the place of residence and its position in the uneven structure of spatial mobility in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro. The academic relevance of this exercise, apart from its possible methodological virtues, may be the strengthening of the need to consider the

social organization of the urban space not only as a reflection of the structure of macro social inequalities, but also as an independent variable in the relationship between trends to segmentation of the labor market, residential segregation and territorial segmentation.

This is an issue which is relevant since recent literature, devoted to the analysis of the impact of economic transformations on large cities, has been increasingly highlighting the role played by the phenomena of social division of territory on the explanation of the inequality of opportunities resulting from the combination of the effects of: (i) the labor market segmentation; (ii) the re-structuring of the welfare system, which in turn results from the combination of trends to commercialization of social reproduction and from the retraction and social segmentation of the public consumption system; and (iii) of the weakening and precariousness of social structures in terms of family and community (district) in their ability to generate solidarity actions of resource mobilization for self-reproduction and utilization of the opportunities generated by social macro-structures.

The evidence presented here joins itself to a large number of other evidence resulting from other works produced by other researchers with the same purpose of investigating other metropolises. It remains open to discussion the issue on the mechanisms that connect the social organization of the territory and the access to opportunities created by the labor market, particularly relating to the phenomena of residential segregation. Indeed, if today we have good supporting evidence in the literature on the relationship of causality between the different social contexts of the district on a series of phenomena that manifest themselves in individuals, households and social groups, we have not much evidence of the its mechanisms. According to Small and Newman (2001) and Small (2004), there are neighborhood effects translated into two mechanisms: those relating to socialization and those that are instrumental. The former have to do with the existence in the social context of the district of a model of (i) social roles and (ii) normative efficiency, in addition to (iii) the presence of marginal subcultures. The socio-territorial closure of people living a long period of unemployment, or underemployment, and consequently poverty, certainly does not expose children to the situation in which the model of successful social role through work can serve as an example and incentive for schooling. We can rather expect the opposite, namely, the tendency to the formation of a subculture marked by other ethical and moral principles

that do not encourage the effort via education and work. Moreover, there is a low regulatory efficiency in social interactions. The instrumental mechanisms are those related to the social and material conditions of the district which limit or block the individual action as, for example, the free flow of people (distance, violence, etc.). Other authors, such as Bourdieu (1993) and Wacquant (2001) in turn, based on a theoretical Marxist matrix, highlighted the mechanisms related to what they called “effects of place”, expressed by socio-spatial mechanisms through which the reproduction of social domination occurs. Each district is constituted by the distribution of the amount and composition of the various forms of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic) of the social groups.

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## Annex A

### Description of the regression models used

#### 1. Logistic regression model

As we are working with a dichotomous variable (whose values are: absence (0) or presence (1) of risk) such as the “occupational fragility”, we chose to use the logistic model as regression model since it is more suitable for this type of distribution of the response variable. The logistic regression model is given by the equation  $\log\left(\frac{\pi_i}{1-\pi_i}\right) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_i$  which is commonly known as logarithm of advantages, where  $\beta$  is the vector of the estimated parameters of explanatory variables and  $\pi$  is the probability of the individual in a situation of occupational fragility.

As the logistic regression model is applicable mostly to low-impact phenomena in the population, which is not our case, we performed a correction called “relative risk” (ZHANG & YU, 1998), given by the formula  $RR = OR / ((1 - \pi_i) + (\pi_i \times OR))$ , being RR the relative risk and OR the odds ratio, given by the formula  $\pi_i / (1 - \pi_i) = \exp(\beta_i)$ .

To test the significance of the estimated parameters, we will use Wald’s statistics that is given by  $(b - \beta)'J(b - \beta)$ , which, for large samples, is distributed as  $(b - \beta)'J(b - \beta) \sim \chi_p^2$ , or  $b - \beta \sim N(0, J^{-1})$ . With this correction we prevent distorted estimates of the parameters. The results can be understood as percentage of the effect of an explanatory variable on the response variable in relation to the reference group that is given in the model, which is a contribution to risk if the sign is positive and a protection if the sign is negative.

#### 2. Multiple Linear Regression Model

For the explanation of the “income per hour worked” variable based on the selected explanatory variables, we used the multiple linear regression model since the response variable chosen has a continuous distribution.

Due to its asymmetric distribution we applied a transformation given by the logarithm. The multiple linear regression model is given by the formula  $y = X\beta + \varepsilon$ , where  $y$  is the response variable,  $X$  is the matrix with the values observed by the explanatory variables,  $\beta$  is the vector of parameters corresponding to the effect of each explanatory variable and  $\varepsilon$  is the matrix of random error (CHARNET et al.), 1999).

To test the model adequacy we used the adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted  $R^2$ ) which is obtained by the formula


$$R_a^2 = \frac{y'y - \hat{\beta}'X'y}{n - p} \bigg/ \frac{y'y - n\bar{y}^2}{n - 1},$$

where  $n$  corresponds to the number of explanatory variables and  $p$  corresponds to the number of estimated parameters. The test of significance of the parameters is given by the

expression  $T_{(n-p)} = \hat{\beta}_1 \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i^2} / \hat{\sigma}$ . The least squares estimator of the

parameters is given by  $\hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1} X'y$ . The result of the parameters estimation gives us a measure of the contribution of each explanatory variable for the distribution of the response variable. In the case of the transformation of the response variable by the logarithm we can tell of a relative contribution of each explanatory variable in relation to the variation in the response variable.

## Annex B







## 7

# Resident perceptions of urbanisation and elite encroachment in a Jacarepaguá *favela*<sup>1</sup>

*Matthew Richmond*

### Introduction

Unlike their North American counterparts, the suburban areas that expanded rapidly in the cities of Latin America during the post-War era were typically characterised not by middle-class comfort and conformity, but by extreme poverty and widespread informality. Urban scholars saw this process as a spatial expression of the extreme inequalities present in Latin America's social structure, with geographical marginality acting as both a mechanism and a metaphor for the economic and social exclusion of the urban poor (Ford 1996). In recent decades, however, changes to the physical and social characteristics of suburban zones across the region have complicated the picture. The redesign of urban road networks and the 'invention' of the gated condominium as a new housing type (Ribeiro 1995), have permitted elite expansion into peripheral areas previously considered unattractive due to their isolation or the presence of low-income populations (Caldeira 2000). As a result, suburbs have been transformed into zones of social diversity and territorial fragmentation.

The neighbouring districts of Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá in Rio de Janeiro offer an insight into how such processes have unfolded (Santos

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<sup>1</sup> This article was presented at the International RC21 Conference 2013 Session 19: "Suburbs and boundaries: the continued push for peripheral expansion".

Maia 1998; Herzog 2008). Although both have undergone dramatic processes of urbanisation since the early 1970s, they have followed very different paths. The Jacarepaguá lowlands to the north (see Maps 1 and 2) were predominantly settled by low-income populations in government housing projects, favelas or poorly served subdivisions.<sup>2</sup> By contrast the coastal strip of Barra was developed through a process of massive government and private investment into a ‘global suburb’ dominated by high-rise, gated condominiums. A broad separation between the two zones has traditionally been maintained by the natural barrier of a complex system of lakes, rivers and forests at Barra’s northern edge. However, in the last decade or so a city-wide property boom, the exhaustion of space for further development in Barra and the decision to locate the 2016 Olympic Park on the boundary between the two areas have driven an expansion of Barra-style development into Jacarepaguá.

These processes have had dramatic impacts for existing low-income residents in Jacarepaguá. One of the places they are being most strongly felt is in the favela Asa Branca, which lies just 1km north of future Olympic Park (see Map 2). In general terms there has been an intensification of both market activity and state presence in and around the favela. Specifically, three key transformations can be identified. First, an increased flow of employment opportunities in the construction and service sectors has heightened demand for housing and given rise to a vibrant rental market. Second, after decades of neglect, the presence of the state has visibly increased, partly relating to the development of the Olympic Park and related transport and infrastructure projects. Finally, previously vacant land to the south and west of Asa Branca has been developed into a large number of affluent gated communities.

This paper will look at how Asa Branca’s residents view these different processes, the risks and opportunities they perceive and their hopes and expectations for their future in the area. It draws two broad conclusions. First, residents see the intensified market activity inside and around the favela as offering new opportunities for income and employment, but also as potentially destabilising of long-established patterns of community

<sup>2</sup> Favelas are officially defined by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística as “Collections of at least 51 housing units, most of which lack essential public services, which occupy or have until recently occupied publicly or privately owned land, and are characterised by disordered and dense occupation” (own translation)  
<http://saladeimprensa.ibge.gov.br/noticias?view=noticia&id=1&busca=1&idnoticia=2051>

relations and collective action. Second, state intervention has improved the quality of life of residents in important ways, but inspires suspicion among many who see the state as a defender of elite interests and fear that its increased presence will ultimately result in the removal of favela residents.

## Favela Asa Branca

Asa Branca is a favela in the *bairro* (neighbourhood) of Jacarepaguá, at the edge of its boundary with the *bairro* of Curicica, both of which lie in the administrative region of Jacarepaguá. With a population of 3,295 residents and 1,069 dwellings, Asa Branca is considered a medium-sized favela.<sup>3</sup> It was established through a co-ordinated occupation and division of plots in 1986 and has subsequently grown through verticalisation (most houses now have three or four floors) and the annexation of an unoccupied strip of land bordering the river Pavuninha in 2002 (SABREN). As is typical in many of Rio's newer, more peripheral favelas built on flat land, Asa Branca has an orderly layout, with equally sized plots distributed along streets just wide enough to access by car (See Image 1).

Against most social indicators Asa Branca is typical of Rio's favela population.<sup>4</sup> The area is well covered by water utility services, with 100% of residents receiving running water from the general network and 91% connected to the sewerage network, compared to 96% and 85% respectively for Rio's favelas as a whole. At 83%, literacy among the population aged over 5 is just under the favela average of 84%. In terms of racial composition, 34% of Asa Branca's residents define themselves as white, 16% as black and 50% as mixed, making it almost identical to the Rio favela average.<sup>5</sup> There are slightly fewer women in Asa Branca than men, which is the reverse of the favela population as a whole.<sup>6</sup> It is important to note the considerable social variation within Asa Branca's population. While two-thirds of households have a typical per capita

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<sup>3</sup> According to the definition used by the Rio de Janeiro *Prefeitura* (or city council) of 500-2,500 dwellings (Burgos 1998, p. 49).

<sup>4</sup> Following data comes from the 2010 Census (IBGE 2010).

<sup>5</sup> The Brazilian census collects self-defined data on colour or race according to the main categories of 'branca' (white), 'preta' (black) and 'parda' (brown or mixed).

<sup>6</sup> This may be a result of the greater presence of single men living in rented accommodation – see next section.

income of between one half and two minimum salaries,<sup>7</sup> just over one quarter earn less than this, while almost 10% earn more. There is also a spatial expression of this internal diversity. One section of Asa Branca, known as ‘the condominium’, has larger houses and is seen as wealthier. Meanwhile, the most recently occupied area along the canal has a generally poorer population.

The following discussion is based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 25 residents (F = 15; M = 10) of varied ages and social circumstances, conducted between March and May 2013. Initial interviews were organised through the Asa Branca Residents Association and a local NGO, and further participants identified through snowballing techniques. It is also informed by a large number of informal discussions with community leaders and NGO workers with a good knowledge of the area.

## The arrival of the market

Abramo describes three ‘logics’ that co-ordinate individual and collective action in modern societies, and thus condition access to urban land (Abramo 2003, pp. 1-2). The first is the state, which generates and enforces (or not) the institutional and legal framework through which land is accessed, and also directly intervenes through the production of social housing. The second is the market, which allocates land and property through mechanisms of exchange and capital accumulation. These have been the dominant logics shaping the urbanisation in the rich world. However, in countries like Brazil with extreme social inequalities and financially constrained governments, a third logic – the ‘logic of necessity’ – has played an important role in urbanisation. The absolute need for shelter and the lack of formal means to acquire it has both provided the motive and shaped the process of land occupation in many places.

As in the case of every favela, the establishment of Asa Branca by settlers who lacked access to housing via the state or the market was driven by the ‘logic of necessity’. A resident who participated in the invasion of the canal-side area in 2002 provides an emblematic account:

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<sup>7</sup> Brazil’s minimum salary is readjusted annually. The level in 2013 is R\$678 (approximately \$316 USD) <http://tmagazine.ey.com/news/ibfd/brazil-new-monthly-minimum-salary-2013/>

Before the invasion we used to rent. My mother had five children. It was just her with the five of us. My father had left. So for her to work, look after the children and pay the rent the cost was very high. So we came here, built a wooden hut... and we stayed.

*Female, 21*

However, since this time the logic of the market has come to play a significant role in determining access to land and the production of space within Asa Branca. Most of the original occupiers and/or their families remain in the area, but as in many other favelas an active property market has arisen, most notably in the form of a large rental sector. A comparison of the 2000 and 2010 censuses reveal that the percentage of rented dwellings increased from 11.1% to 29.1% of the total (IBGE 2000; IBGE 2010).<sup>8</sup>

There is no detailed official data on the rental sector in informal areas that might show changes in rent levels over time or the characteristics of landlords and tenants. However, anecdotal evidence from informants can help to delineate some key features. While an informal rental market has long existed in Asa Branca it seems it has until recently primarily served existing residents of this and neighbouring communities, for example newly married couples with overcrowded family homes who could not afford to purchase a property. This appears subsequently to have transformed into a 'build-to-let' market, in which existing house-owners deliberately convert or add additional floors as purpose-built 'kitchenettes'. There are accounts of a few larger-scale landlords who have bought up several properties to let out, allowing them to move out of the favela. The tenants also appear to be coming from further afield, particularly from states in the North East of Brazil. A large proportion of these new renters are drawn by employment opportunities in the construction sector, and commonly appear to find out about renting opportunities through information chains stretching back to their place of origin.<sup>9</sup> The typical cost of a two-room kitchenette is R\$300-500 (\$140-230 USD) per month, which residents say is considerably higher than levels five years ago.

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<sup>8</sup> Interviewee testimonies suggest that it is primarily in the last three years that the number of renters in the area has noticeably risen, suggesting that this figure significantly under-represents the current level.

<sup>9</sup> Migrants' knowledge about the area and rental opportunities appears to be disseminated informally via word-of-mouth, although it is possible there are actors playing a more significant co-ordinating role

Interview questions sought to ascertain whether respondents had noticed the increase in renters, whether they felt this was changing the area and if so how. All but one of the interviewees reported having noticed the presence of a large number of new residents in recent years.<sup>10</sup> However, most did not perceive any major problems of integration of new residents. A 17 year-old male renter who had moved to the area from the state of Bahia 5 years previously said he found the first few weeks difficult, being new to the city and not knowing anyone. However, he felt he had quickly become integrated and did not perceive any divisions between long-term and newer residents. Most of the older respondents expressed a similar view.

However, some residents felt the changes had produced conflict, either because some newcomers did not act according to local behavioural norms or because their status as renters meant they did not have an investment in preserving relationships or the quality of the local environment. For example:

Respondent: “It’s changing a lot, with lots of people arriving from outside. They don’t have a commitment to the neighbourhood. Not to the place or to the community. Because it’s not theirs, how would they know? They don’t have roots here, so they don’t care. They don’t come here to contribute, but just to pass through.”

Interviewer: “(Because) they don’t stay for very long?”

Respondent: “It’s not that they don’t stay for long. The worst thing I see is that as they’re not from here they don’t have any commitment. When they become property owners then they start to change, because then they start to think, now I’m worried, now I have to look after things. But with the majority of renters, they don’t have a sense of looking after the [place].”

*Female, 43*

More typical, however, was a more diffuse sense that the presence of more unfamiliar faces had changed the ‘feel’ of the area. Residents reported being less likely to leave their doors unlocked than in the past and an increasingly felt that they no longer knew what was going on in the area. This was closely tied to discourses about violence and crime. Asa Branca’s residents invariably identify the very low crime rate as one

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<sup>10</sup> Of the 25 respondents, nine were renters and five had arrived in the area in the last five years.

of the great attractions of the area and a source of local pride. Although recorded violence does not appear to have risen in recent years, many see the changes in the area as a threat to this peace.

Interviewer: Have you noticed the presence of new residents here in recent years?

Respondent: Yes, suddenly I'm seeing lots of people I don't recognise... It's fine, it's just that you don't know who they are so you never know if it might be a criminal or something like that.

*Male, 31*

In general it seems that residential turnover has not undermined conviviality in Asa Branca, and residents still celebrate the fact that neighbours greet each other and chat in the street, newer residents included. However, there has been a weakening of the correspondence between the space of the neighbourhood and the social networks of residents (Blokland 2003). If some residents are not integrated into local social networks, or it is simply perceived that there are people present who lie outside them, it may undermine the 'collective efficacy' of the community as whole (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). One resident offered an example for how this may occur:

"You don't know if you have some kind of normal neighbourly disagreement how the guy will react, whether he might be a violent guy."

*Male, 48*

In the absence of 'closure', or a clear overlapping of local networks, norms may have become both more ambiguous and more difficult to collectively enforce.

## The arrival of the state

Sociologists have long attributed the Brazilian state a key role in the process of urbanisation (Abreu 1987). Conflict models present the state as an agent of capital, producing segregation and reproducing inequality through its uneven investments across urban space (most famously Kowarick 1970). Such theories seemed to accurately account for the



actions of Brazil's military regime during the 1960s and 70s – a time when favela populations were forcefully removed from high value areas in Rio's city centre and South Zone and re-housed in poorly built and subsequently abandoned peripheral housing projects. Meanwhile huge amounts of public money were invested in opening up Barra da Tijuca to elite development. Following democratisation, however, state expenditure in poor areas increased considerably, most notably through the Favela Bairro programme which carried out on-site upgrading works in a significant proportion of the city's favelas during the 1990s and 2000s. Evidence suggests that during this period state spending still did not come to play an actively *redistributive* role in Brazilian society and was not allocated on an equal basis among low-income areas (Haddad and Nedovic Budic 2006; Bichir 2009; Preteceille and Valladares 2000). However, neither was public money spent solely in the service of elites.

The current urban transformations associated the upcoming Olympic Games have once again raised the question of the role of the state in the urbanisation process (see Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas 2013). Several favelas have been or are due to be removed to make way for new sporting and transport infrastructure. These decisions have been made with little transparency and few official channels for communities to appeal. The removals are concentrated in Barra/Jacarepaguá, the South Zone and the city centre, which are the main sporting and tourist hubs for the Games, but also regions experiencing enormous property booms, raising suspicions about government motives. While some evicted populations have been re-housed within the same neighbourhood, others have been sent to public housing on cheaper land in the far northwest of the city, where transport and infrastructure are poor and employment opportunities limited. On the other hand, as emphasised by the Prefeitura, physical upgrading of favelas has continued apace and new infrastructure, transport and policing interventions are, at least in theory, beneficial to the public as a whole.

Although neglected for most of its history, Asa Branca has found itself profoundly affected by this new burst of state activism. In late 2012 public upgrading works were carried out under the Bairro Maravilha programme, bringing paved roads, drainage and street lighting. Given its proximity to the future Olympic Park, Asa Branca lies near the intersection of two new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lines. Unlike nearby Vila Autódromo which lies within the grounds of the Olympic Park, and a few small favelas to the

northwest which lie on the projected BRT route, Asa Branca has not been threatened with removal. However, it is likely that some houses along the Avenida Salvador Allende will be removed to make way for the BRT.<sup>11</sup> The resident interviews probed for views about the favela upgrading works, the new transport systems and more general feelings about state intervention.

Interviewees were unanimous in praising the improvements that the recent urban upgrading works had brought to the area. In a practical sense it was widely regarded as having improved quality of life. In discussing the changes, residents portrayed the upgrading as a temporal watershed in which many of the major challenges associated with favela life, such as flooding during spells of heavy rain, had become things of the past:

It's better. It's better, yes. They paved the roads and everything. God, it's great. Before when it rained and when the river flooded everything got soaked and ruined. Now that won't happen any more.

*Female, 21*

Respondent: It (the community) has got better, a lot better.

Interviewer: In what ways?

Respondent: The services have improved for the people that live here. They put in sewers, they've brought in lighting, they've paved the streets, they've put in water. So everyone's happy.

*Female, 71*

In a more symbolic sense the changes seemed to have altered the ways in which many residents see the area and themselves. Following the inauguration of the public works, a pun circulated among residents (only half jokingly) that the area was no longer a favela, but a 'neighbourhood', playing on the name of the programme under which they were implemented, *Bairro Maravilha* (or 'marvellous neighbourhood'). This indicates a desire among some favela residents for the aesthetic trappings of formality, perhaps symbolic of more substantive demands for civic inclusion and social acceptance that have traditionally been denied to them.

Despite these broadly positive perceptions of state intervention, there were also more critical voices among the interviewees. Many residents

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<sup>11</sup> The precise number is not known (Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas 2013, p. 23).

felt the investment stopped short of what was really required in the neighbourhood. Common complaints were the lack of public or community spaces like a crèche, medical centre or public leisure facilities providing activities for children and young people. None of these were available within the area, nor in the immediately surrounding communities (although private social areas were being provided in the new condominiums). Other residents complained about the quality of the schools and a shortage of job training programmes. For those who perceived a lack of willingness of the state to address these more ‘sticky’ issues, the upgrading amounted to no more than ‘maquiagem’ (make up), improving the appearance of the area with tackling its fundamental social challenges.

There were improvements here, but I think there should be a more critical attitude about the community. There needs to be a lot more done here, but it goes unnoticed. [There is a problem with] children taking drugs, but no-one sees that. I think it’s poorly done.

*Female, 20*

This limited form of state intervention feeds a sense that investments have only been made because of the rising profile of the surrounding region, and not because of the needs of the favela residents themselves:

The upgrading wasn’t to improve the community. If I’ve been here eight years, and it’s only now that they want to pave the roads! ... The priority is not an interest in our community, it’s a general interest, a general development which they want the world to see. They aren’t doing it for the community. They don’t invest for the sake of the residents.

*Female, 43*

### **Elite encroachment: Inequality, opportunity and fear of removal**

Elite development of the area north of the Lagoa de Jacarepaguá is the most dramatic symbol of urbanisation in the region. At the time of writing, in the past twelve months perhaps as many as twenty high-rise, gated condominium blocks have been built in the immediate vicinity of

Asa Branca. A short distance to the east work has begun on the Centro Metropolitano da Barra, an area of five square kilometres, which will contain dozens of new housing blocks, a Hilton Hotel and what will become one of the city's largest shopping centres. Residents were asked for their views on these changes, their perceptions of their wealthy new neighbours and about how they believed they would be perceived by them.

Like attitudes towards the favela upgrading, residents were broadly positive about the development of the surrounding area, and particularly about the job opportunities it would bring with it for residents.

There will be lots of construction so people who work in that area are going to have lots of work. For example, with the improvements they did here lots of people benefitted from working on them, didn't they. I think that's good.

*Female, 42*

The majority of interviews were in employment and all but three worked in the Barra-Jacarepaguá region. Many of the female respondents worked in domestic or other service jobs in nearby condominiums and hotels. Further development of the region would mean more job creation and less risk of unemployment. For small informal businesses, wealthy new residents would also mean new markets. One resident who ran a microenterprise barbecuing for social events saw great potential for expansion:

Take my tiny little business. If I can get just a small proportion of them [the condominium residents] interested in using my business that could be a hundred new clients.

*Male, 48*

However, the broad enthusiasm for development was tempered by widespread feelings of social distance and segregation. At the time of the interviews many of the new condominiums had not been fully occupied, while the older ones are further away from the entrances into the favela. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy (if perhaps unsurprising) that, apart from those who worked in the condominiums, respondents had had practically no interaction with their residents. In the context of this separation, most

believed that they would be perceived negatively by them, as a result of general social discrimination against favelas within Brazilian society:

People who have money always look at people like us through different eyes, you know. I'm sure they see us in a different way. [That's what it's like]... in Rio, in our society. So we know that they look at us with different eyes.

*Male, 38*

More specifically, many expected discrimination to revolve around media representations of favelas as violent places. One female, aged 18, said she saw Asa Branca as a 'community' (a term that is often used interchangeably with favela, but which has more positive connotations) rather than a 'favela' because "here they don't have gangs, they don't have drug trafficking". However, she believed that the condominium residents would see it as a "dangerous kind of favela":

I think they think this is the most dangerous place there is

*Female, 18*

In this way an important component of resident identity and social distinction vis-à-vis other favelas is overwhelmed by a more powerful and widely recognised social distinction between rich and poor, formal and informal.

In a similar way many residents favourably compared their situation with low-income or favela residents in areas with fewer employment opportunities. However, the elite encroachment into the area made many question whether they would be allowed to remain. Around one third of the respondents volunteered the view, unprompted, that they thought the community would be removed. One woman had suspended building a third floor on her home in case of an eviction. No specific reason was given for these fears, and the fact that removal hadn't been threatened and that the area had recently been upgraded did not reassure them. Instead they felt a vague sense that their surroundings were becoming inhospitable and that when the time came the government would not protect them:

Sincerely, I'm a bit scared. I can't see how the community can continue with so many buildings surrounding it... I'm scared that one day they'll decide to remove the community... and send us to Santa Cruz or Sepetiba... where there's no transport, no healthcare, no education, nothing. That's my concern.

*Female, 20*

In this conception elite encroachment and state attention are two sides of the same coin, and if low-income populations benefit it is simply because of their proximity to favoured groups. Such benefits are accompanied by a persistent fear that the arithmetic may some day change and the state's defence of elite interests will at that time entail removal of informal settlements, rather than on-site upgrading.

## Conclusion

The transformations currently occurring in and around Asa Branca are impacting profoundly on the lives of residents in two main ways. Firstly, the economic dynamism of the surrounding region fuels optimism among many about their long-term employment and financial prospects. However, by stimulating the rise of a rental sector in recent years it has also weakened the correspondence between local social networks and the space of the neighbourhood, and thus of the sense of control residents feel over what goes on in their area. This has not undermined quality of life for most residents, but some fear that it may in the future.

Secondly, increased state presence – in the last year in particular – has significantly improved the lives of residents in practical and symbolic ways. However, this sudden interest of the Prefeitura in a previously neglected region is not praised unreservedly. Many believe the changes stop short of what is required to produce transformative social change. A smaller, but still significant number attribute the state's arrival to the elite pattern of development in the surrounding area. For these residents distrust of the state and a belief that it ultimately acts in the interests of the elite prompts a lingering fear that some day, for some indefinable reason, the favela will be removed. They fear this will result in relocation to distant areas where they will lose their locational advantages and the social and cultural characteristics that they value in their neighbourhood.

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
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## Appendices

Map 1: Rio de Janeiro's planning zones (Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá occupy the area marked AP4)



Source: O'Hare and Barke (2002, p. 227)

Map 2: Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá (arrow marks location of Asa Branca)



Source: Instituto Pereira Passos



## 8

# Urban Frontiers and Educational Opportunities: the Case of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1</sup>

*Mariane C. Koslinski*

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

### Introduction

After the Second World War, in view of the dissemination of egalitarian values and growing social conflicts, various studies in the field of the Sociology of Education began to cover themes related to the capacity of education to promote mobility and greater equality (Karabel & Halsey, 1977). These studies, given the context of universalization of basic education, have sought to understand the factors and processes that lead to the permanence and reproduction of educational inequalities, as well as those capable of promoting educational effectiveness and equity.

The first generation of studies was financed by governments that intended to expand and reform their educational systems. One of the most influential was that described in the *Coleman Report* (1966), which observed that the variability within a school is greater than that between schools, and concluded that differences in results are due more to differences in the clientele of the schools than to differences in the school characteristics (resources, equipment, programs, teacher qualifications)<sup>2</sup>. The debate generated by this

<sup>1</sup> This article was presented at ISA –RC21 São Paulo Conference – Inequality, Inclusion and the Sense of Belonging. São Paulo, August 23-25th, 2009; 33 Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, October 2009, Caxambú.

<sup>2</sup> In Great Britain, the Plowden Report (1967) found similar results: school variables had less impact on the explanation of differences in school success in the primary schools when compared with factors linked to the attitudes and behavior of the parents (Forquin, 1995).

report caused reactions and criticisms in academic and government circles, due to the pessimism of its conclusions concerning the capacity of the school to reverse effects of the socioeconomic origin of families (Reynolds & Teddlie, 2000; Soares, 2002).

In response to these studies, there was a second generation of studies aimed at opening up the “black box” of the schools. Studies about ‘effective school’ and ‘school effect’ began to be oriented by the objectives of demonstrating that “school makes a difference” and that it could exert an effect on educational opportunities. Such studies concentrated their efforts on the task of determining which school factors could lead to greater or lesser school performance. It is interesting to note that these studies have a pragmatic basis, given that they aim to identify the elements that could aid educational policies in achieving greater effectiveness and equity of results.

In the last two decades, with the exacerbation of the phenomena of ghettoization in the major cities, a third generation of studies has sought to conjugate the approaches of Urban Sociology and the Sociology of Education to deal with, besides family and school, factors related to the social organization of the territory and its possible effects on educational opportunities. In the studies about the possibilities of effectiveness and equity of the school, the possible effects of the social contexts formed by neighborhood units, constituted by processes of residential aggregation and segregation, they gain significance. This theme raises the old concerns of classical sociology with regard to the contextual determinants of the trajectory of individuals in society, given the impulse of rapid, intense change that has taken place in the large cities, especially those in America, with the socioeconomic transformation driven by globalization and restructuring of industrial capitalism. The two main features of such change are the constitution of territories with heavy concentrations of the poor in economically stagnant areas, presenting evident signs of social disorganization, isolation from the rest of society, civic desertification, violent crime, reduction of normative effectiveness in social interaction, entailing enormous impacts on the social institutions located in these territories. A current line of research has emerged about the role of the neighborhood’s social context in the constitution of various mechanisms of reproduction of social inequalities<sup>3</sup>, in which those related to the functioning of basic schooling gained great significance.

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<sup>3</sup> As there is extensive literature on the theme in the USA, we return to the bibliographic reviews made by Jencks and Peterson (1991) and Dreier, O., Mollenkopf, J. and Swanstrom (2004).

This work is linked to the efforts of this third generation of studies and is intended to contribute to the reflection on the role of the phenomena of territorial segmentation and residential segregation in the reproduction of educational inequalities, taking the municipality of Rio de Janeiro as a case study.

This city presents a particular model of social organization of its territory, whose main feature is the combination of two principles of residential segregation. On the one hand, the classical Nucleus-Periphery model, characteristic of the cities organized in societies marked by extreme social inequalities, in which physical distances and low urban accessibility territorially separate the social classes and groups from each other and from the urban assets that promote social welfare. On the other hand, the strong presence of *favelas* in the wealthy districts, which, in principle, should bring groups, social classes and urban assets together in the territory, actually hierarchize the practices of interaction of such groups and filter the access to the urban assets through a series of political, institutional and symbolic mechanisms that separate them.

We are, therefore, dealing with a city about which we can apply empirical analysis about what a vast amount of literature has been calling the neighborhood-effect. Indeed, it seems pertinent in the context of the city of Rio de Janeiro to formulate the following question: will this social geography favor effective functioning or greater equity in the public education system, considering the alleged positive effects of heterogeneous social contexts on the learning of children? This question gains even greater significance if we consider that the city of Rio de Janeiro, due to its past as the nation's capital, has one of the most established public municipal systems of primary education.

This article is intended to contribute to the understanding of the socio-territorial processes in school results, based on the following questions: (a) Is the center-periphery model sufficient for understanding of more complex processes, such as the Rio (Carioca) model of residential segregation?; (b) Is the school performance of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grades (respectively 10 and 14 years) students in the public education system associated with the socio-spatial organization of the city of Rio de Janeiro?; (c) Which mechanisms can be proposed as hypotheses or seem more plausible in explaining the relation between territory and school results in this urban context?

In order to handle these questions, the first part of this article makes a brief review of the mechanisms related to the social contexts of the territory

that seem more pertinent to the understanding of the educational outcomes of children and adolescents. The second part presents a discussion of the residential segregation model of Rio de Janeiro and the possible impacts of the presence of *favelas* in wealthy areas of the city on social isolation. The third part of the article presents the results of empirical analyses conducted using hierarchical linear regression techniques with the purpose of producing evidence on the possible effects of the social contexts, generated by the principles of residential segregation mentioned above, on the educational inequalities of children attending public schools at the fundamental education level. The social contexts of the territories were identified through application of the model for construction of socio-spatial typologies developed in the Observatório das Metrópoles<sup>4</sup>, which employs the techniques of factorial analysis and construction of clusters, using socio-demographic data from the Censo 2000 (2000 Census) as indicators. In order to assess the educational inequalities, we utilized the results of Prova Brasil 2005 (nationwide examination), employing various statistical controls, related to the socioeconomic origin of the students (Prova Brasil, 2005) and the characteristics of the schools they attend (Prova Brasil, 2005; Censo Escolar [School Census], 2005), on the school results. The analytical model was devised to reveal the possible effects of the social contexts of the territories, on macro and microscales, in which phenomena of the social division of urban territory are materialized. Finally, the article points out the importance of taking the social organization of the territory into consideration as a sphere that is also capable of limiting the overall increase in school effectiveness and of its role in the democratization of access to educational opportunities.

### The neighborhood effect: impacts on the supply and demand of educational opportunities

Urban Sociology originated as a discipline under the influence of the classical works of the so-called “Chicago School”, which, examining the processes of residential segregation of ethnically and culturally homogeneous social groups, constructed conceptual and methodological references about the effects of social contexts of neighborhood on the

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<sup>4</sup> Regarding the basis for this methodology, see Ribeiro, (2004).

processes of assimilation of individuals into the competitive social order. After the long period of eclipse of the influence exerted by the works of William I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, Robert E. Park, Louis Wirth, Ernest Burgess, Everett Hughes and Robert McKenzie, with the hegemony of Talcott Parsons' sociology, the theme was resuscitated in the 1980s with the repercussion of the seminal work by Wilson (1987). His theorization about the effects that reproduce social disadvantages arising from territorial concentration of old black workers transformed into the excluded from the mainstream of the economy, resulting from the restructuring of production, exerted great influence on the carrying out of a series of studies based on the hypothesis that poverty in the neighborhood affects the opportunities of the poorest<sup>5</sup>. These studies sought to understand certain social outcomes based on a relation of causality between the individual (motivations, choices, social behavior and situation) and the social contexts in which one resides, characterized mainly by the common properties of the residents.

For example, in the field of the Sociology of Education, whereas studies that attempted to explain inequality of educational results used to concentrate on factors related to the family and the school, as of the 1990s, we have observed a proliferation of studies that have begun to consider the neighborhood as a sphere that is also capable of exerting an impact on the distribution of educational opportunities .

Two key questions guide the vast amount of literature on the neighborhood effect that followed the study by Wilson (1987): a) Do neighborhood conditions affect individual results, for example, those of school?; b) Which mechanisms explain the relation between the characteristics of the district and individual results?

Diverse bibliographical reviews have been made with respect to the mechanisms that explain the negative impact of poor neighborhoods and/or the positive impact of affluent neighborhoods (Jencks & Mayer, 1990; Ellen & Turner, 1997; Brooks-Gun et al., 1997; Sampson and Morenoff, 2002; Small and Newman, 2001). Here we do not intend to make an exhaustive review of this bibliography, but rather explain how the models described by

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<sup>5</sup> According to Wilson (1987), the conjunction of factors, such as structural changes in the economy, the growth of inequality and the selective exodus of families of the black middle and working classes to higher income neighborhoods and suburbs have led to a concentration of poverty within neighborhoods with poor minorities, and caused an atmosphere of scarcity of institutions, values, social role models that are necessary to achieve success in a post-industrial society.



these works would help us to think about a possible neighborhood-effect on educational results, as much on the side of demand as on that of the supply of educational opportunities. Thus, division of these mechanisms into three broader models seems pertinent: a) model of collective effectiveness; b) model of collective socialization; c) institutional model.

The model of collective effectiveness returns to the thesis of social disorganization<sup>6</sup>, which defends that poverty in the neighborhood produces socially disorganized communities, and, therefore, it presents higher crime rates (Small, 2004). On the one hand, children who live in communities, where norms are clear and overseen by their inhabitants, present less probability of risk behavior. The social disorganization implies a lower density of social networks in the neighborhood, less involvement in voluntary associations and collective effectiveness, that is, the degree to which the neighbors are willing to supervise children and adolescents, and intervene in social situations for the collective good (Small & Newman, 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).

More pertinent to the intended discussion are the models that are supported by the idea that the characteristics of neighborhoods influence processes of collective socialization. According to these models, the patterns and norms of behavior tend to be shaped by those with whom one has most contact and most often interacts. They are based on Wilson's (1987) argument of social isolation<sup>7</sup>, which advocates that the concentration of poverty has created a socially disadvantageous atmosphere, given that the poverty of the district disconnects persons from relations and interactions with the middle class. Thus, for the author, living in a mixed-income neighborhood is less harmful than living in a neighborhood with a high concentration of poverty.

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<sup>6</sup> The theory of social disorganization comes up against various criticisms from authors who defend that the poor urban neighborhoods are not disorganized, but present alternative forms of organization. (Small, 2004; Wacquant, 1996).

<sup>7</sup> The studies based on the thesis of social isolation also state that when poor neighborhoods exert a negative impact on the social networks of the individuals. This factor is important, as the knowledge that the individuals possess about economic opportunities depends on their networks of friends, colleagues and acquaintances who are, at least in part, geographically based. Thus, in a neighborhood with few employed families, individuals experience social isolation that excludes them from job networks. Various studies argue that this mechanism has a special impact on adults (Newman & Small, 2001; Ellen & Turner, 1997). However, we can expect that the networks also affect access of parents to information about the quality of schools and the probability of enrolling their children in one of quality.

The first mechanism of collective socialization is based on what the literature usually calls the epidemic model, which arises from the question of how peers are mutually influenced. According to this model, if adolescents in a community present little interest in school, or have already abandoned school, and, often, engage in crime and other dangerous behavior, other adolescents will have a greater propensity to see these activities and behavior as acceptable. On the other hand, this model states that children and adolescents, who live in neighborhoods where most neighbors finish middle school and reach higher education, will feel compelled to do the same. Finally, if we compare the children and adolescents of similar families, we can expect that those brought up in poor neighborhoods will more frequently present risk behavior than those in more affluent ones<sup>8</sup> (Jencks & Mayer, 1990; Ellen & Turner, 1997).

Another important mechanism of socialization is related to the social role models, which are based on the presupposition that children learn about what behavior is considered normal or acceptable from adults with whom they often interact in their neighborhoods. Thus, children that grow up in homogeneously poor or segregated neighborhoods are separated from middle class social role models, in particular models of those adults who are successful due to their schooling<sup>9</sup> (Wilson, 1987; Ellen & Turner, 1997; Newman & Small, 2001). As a consequence, we may expect that children and adolescents in these contexts will prove to have less propensity to adopt the behavior and attitudes that would lead to success at school (high educational expectations and effort) as they would not be exposed to direct evidence that these attitudes and behavior are useful and desirable (Ainsworth, 2002).

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<sup>8</sup> Jencks and Mayer (1990) criticize the epidemic model, since it is based on the presupposition that bad behavior is contagious, and that each neighborhood, or school, has a single set of dominant norms, with which the children and adolescents comply. Such a perspective ignores the possibility that the individuals are not equally susceptible to the influence, as much of the neighborhood as of the school.

<sup>9</sup> Upon analysis of the process that led to the exodus of the middle and working classes from black districts in the North American context, Wilson (1987) observes that, previously, the presence of the middle class would have provided social role models that maintained alive the perception that education was a viable alternative. With the concentration of poverty, most of the adults with whom the adolescents establish contact are not working or present precarious forms of engagement in the employment market. "The net effect is that joblessness, as a way of life, takes on a different social meaning; the relationship between schooling and post-school employment takes on a different meaning" (Wilson, 1987, p.57).

The mechanisms of socialization have special relevance to school results, as children and adolescents are more susceptible to such processes. For example, we can expect that the influence of peers, as opposed to that of the adults, grows in adolescence, when youths affirm their independence, as much in relation to the family as in relation to other adults with whom they have contact in school and in the community (Ellen & Turner, 1997; Jencks & Mayer, 1990).

Finally, the third model, called institutional or institutional socialization, is based on the presupposition that individuals can be affected by the quality of the services provided in their neighborhoods. Proponents of this model focus principally on quality, quantity and the diversity of institutions present in a given community/neighborhood, capable of providing the needs of children and adolescents, such as libraries, schools, kindergartens, medical facilities etc. Thus, the poor neighborhoods are deprived or inadequately equipped with quality institutional resources.

The institutional model, in a similar manner to the social role model, also concentrates on the way adults affect children and adolescents. However, in this model, the adults in question are not residents of the districts/neighborhoods, but work in institutions situated there.

The schools of elementary or fundamental level are of special relevance for the explanations of this model, as, at this level of education, children tend to frequent establishments located in their neighborhoods.

Various factors are mentioned to explain the difference in quality of schools located in more affluent neighborhoods from those where there is a higher concentration of poverty. The factors encompassed range from differences in terms of resources and infrastructure to the management capacity of the school administration. For example, the schools located in wealthier areas tend to receive better qualified and experienced teachers, and the poor neighborhoods are not only less capable of recruiting but also of retaining good teachers (Ainsworth, 2002; Jencks and Mayer, 1990). Besides this, the neighborhood exerts an impact on the expectations that teachers have regarding the future and the capacity of their students. According to Flores (2008, p.152) “The adults, in these institutions, use distinct criteria of functionality based on interpretation of the cultural attributes and potential of their users”.

Thus, the massive bibliography that discusses the mechanisms related to the neighborhood effect leads us to believe that the geographically defined social contexts, on the one hand, generate effects on the “demand

for schooling”, to the extent that they configure intermediate spaces of socialization between the family and the school. On the other hand, they also exert an impact on the “supply of schooling”. The social division of the urban territory produces important differentiations in the public education system through a complex interplay of the effects of physical and social distancing that incides on the actors and the school institutions, producing a social geography of the educational opportunities.

However, Jencks and Mayer (1990) warn of the difficulty in differentiating the effect exerted by these different mechanisms, given that all stem from the hypothesis that the socioeconomic status (SES) of the neighborhood exerts an impact on school results. It would be difficult to distinguish these models when looking at the schools, since the forms of measuring the socioeconomic status of the neighborhoods say little about these mechanisms<sup>10</sup>. The authors further argue that these studies tend to attribute more weight to the explanations arising from the models of collective socialization than to the effect of the institutions or different social practices configured in them in different neighborhoods. It is worth noting that the preference for explanations that return to the collective socialization model is not based on empirical judgment, but solely on a hypothetical explanation of the relationship between individual behavior and their neighborhood. As a result, they underestimate the effect of an affluent or a poor neighborhood on the institutions configured there.

### Residential segregation, *favelas* and urban frontiers in Rio de Janeiro

As seen in the previous section, there is no convergence in the pertinent literature about the socio-territorial mechanisms related to the school performance of children and adolescents. In addition, there is no consensus regarding which characteristics of the neighborhood most affect individual results, or, more specifically, school results. This is a great challenge for research on the theme: to operationalize a variable capable of taking into account the social relations that have an influence on the various individual outcomes.

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<sup>10</sup> The work of Ainsworth (2002) consists of a few studies that attempt to empirically differentiate the influence of different mediating mechanisms. The author concluded that as much the collective socialization as the institutional mechanisms exert an impact on school results, although the former exerts a more accentuated impact.

In the studies that focus on educational outcomes, we observe a great variety of forms utilized as expressions of the social relations in the district: (i) percentage of single-parent families in a neighborhood as an indicator of normative effectiveness (Ainsworth, 2002); (ii) percentage of families with high economic status, percentage of adults who work in prestigious occupations, level of schooling of the adult population (to illustrate mechanisms of socialization or of isolation of the middle class and their social role models) (Duncan, 1994; Garner & Raudenbush, 1991; Flores, 2008; Retamoso & Kaztman, 2007); (iv) indicators of residential segregation, such as the index of dissimilarity, of exposure, of local Moran, to measure the concentration of the population according to income, schooling and/or race (indicators to illustrate mechanisms of isolation from the middle class and their social role models, as well as to measure restriction of social networks) (Wilson, 2008; Flores, 2008).

Despite the evidence about the effect of the neighborhood on the school results of children and adolescents provided in the aforementioned studies, they do not reach agreement on the direction of this effect. For instance, while for some the wealthy neighborhoods exert a positive impact on school results, other studies emphasize negative effects due to the effect of relative deprivation, cultural conflict or competition for scarce resources<sup>11</sup>. Still others defend that the effect of the neighborhood is very small in comparison to the effect of the family, the closest and most influential social context, especially for younger children.

Besides this, several studies about the neighborhood-effect privilege socio-territorial configurations that denote a territorial segregation on a macroscale. For example, they use measurements that not only indicate the districts bearing similar characteristics (for example, similar socioeconomic status), but also whether these districts share geographical proximity<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> For example, with regard to relative deprivation, children and adolescents conceive their economic position comparing their standards with those of their neighbors and schoolmates. Thus, children with less socioeconomic status have worse results in schools or in districts where they interact with children of high socioeconomic status. These explanations are based on the presupposition that, when children do not achieve the desired standard or results (school success, finishing middle school and entering higher education) they create a common culture, or a deviant subculture, in order to deal with this shared failure (Jencks and Mayer, 1990).

<sup>12</sup> This is the case of the LISA index of spatial correlation, an index that measures “the extent to which area units inhabited by minority members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space” (Massey and Denton, 1988, p.293).

Studies that utilize such measurements are based on the presupposition that the presence of contiguous areas with a low socioeconomic level, which create large enclaves, have a more marked impact on the social disorganization and social isolation, and, consequently, on various individual results.

As an example, we may cite studies that observe transformations in the social morphology of the urban contexts in Latin American cities and approximate them to the explanations about the processes observed by Wilson (1987) in the North American context. These transformations imply modification of the social composition of the districts, which become progressively more socioeconomically homogeneous and configure spaces isolated from one another. This residential segregation on a large scale, or of the center-periphery type in which poor neighborhoods and irregular settlements are constructed in peripheral areas, leads to a decrease in opportunities for interaction among persons occupying different positions in the social space of the city. (Flores, 2008; Kaztman & Retamoso, 2008)

However, the analyses that privilege residential segregation only at the macro level do not seem to be capable of taking account of the more complex urban context that goes beyond a model of the center-periphery type. This is the case of the Rio's (Cariocan) model of segregation, characterized by physical proximity and social distance (Ribeiro, 2005; Ribeiro and Lago, 2001). In this specific context, we observe the presence of *favelas* throughout the territory of the Rio de Janeiro municipality, plus a heavy concentration of these in the affluent areas of the city. However, this physical proximity does not imply social interaction among social segments that occupy socially distant positions.

Reading the maps<sup>13</sup> makes the principles of social organization of

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<sup>13</sup> The map illustrates the socio-territorial division of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro based on the indicator of "educational atmosphere" resulting from a typological analysis created in the Observatório das Metrôpoles, utilizing the average schooling of the adults over 25 in households. This variable describes the residential segregation through the concentration of households with adults with a greater or lesser level of education. The tracts from the 2000 Demographic Census were utilized as spatial units of analysis. The first step in devising the indicator of educational atmosphere was the grouping of the households into four schooling ranges: a) under 4 years; b) 4 - 8 years; c) 8 - 11 years; d) 12 or more years of study. The classification of the tracts by a typology was made based on the application of techniques of factor analysis by binary combination, followed by an ascending hierarchical classification (cluster analysis). In tracts with a strong educational atmosphere, we observe a predominance of households with a strong educational atmosphere; in the tracts with a medium level of educational atmosphere, we observe a predominance of households in the category 4 - 8 years of study and 8 - 11 years of study;

the city territory evident. They show an enormous periphery, forming a continuous territory, concentrating households with a weak educational atmosphere – areas in red – as opposed to the few spaces (in blue) that concentrate the households with a strong educational atmosphere. At the same time, the dark points indicate the location of the *favela* areas (what the nomenclature calls subnormal agglomerations) scattered throughout the city, but with an intense concentration precisely in the territories that aggregate the persons living in households with a high level of schooling and that also concentrate the public urban assets of higher quality.


Attention is drawn to the fact that around 25% of the population dwelling in the elite areas lives in *favelas*. This fact is of great significance to understand the microscale of the phenomenon of the residential segregation in the city.

What are the *favelas* as a place in the social space of the city of Rio de Janeiro? Some recent studies about the *favelas* have fuelled a debate about the sociological pertinence of the *favela* vs. the city distinction in the understanding of the model of social organization of the space in Rio de Janeiro. In effect, analyzing the evident improvements in the urban living conditions in the *favelas* – especially those related to housing – some authors (Preteceille & Valladares, 2000) have pointed out the growing process of diversification of these spaces and their social approximation to the poor districts of the periphery. Such works criticize, explicitly or implicitly, the conception of the *favelas* as spaces that concentrate social segments submitted to the negative effects of residential segregation, among which are those related with the reproduction of poverty. At the limit, Preteceille and Valladares (2000) argue the inadequacy of the concept of the *favela*. The results of our works in the Observatório das Metrópoles, as well as those of other researchers, demonstrate, however, the pertinence of this distinction, to the extent that it is associated with the distinct patterns of social interaction among the *favela* residents and the institutions of the society, and even with other social groups. For example, studies about the labor market utilizing the data from the Censo 2000 (2000 Census), such as those of Ribeiro and Lago (2001), and Pero, Cardoso and Elias (2005), showed the relation between socio-territorial segmentation and differences in workers' earnings, considering those


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and, finally, in the areas of low educational atmosphere, we observe a greater presence of households in the categories up to 4 years of study and 4 - 8 years of study.

Maps 1 e 2 - Residential Segregation and Location of Shantytowns







with similar social demographic attributes. On the other hand, Andrade (2004), through a case study, provided evidence of the negative impacts on the possibilities of personal income for *favela* dwellers arising from the inherent uncertainty regarding property rights guaranteed by local informal mechanisms, that is, outside the standards of the official institutions. In the field of political relations, Burgos (2005) analyzed how the residents in *favelas* are, even today, submitted to mechanisms that weaken their citizenship by the permanence of clientelistic practices that are strongly present in the relations they maintain with public organisms and institutions. In the field of education, Alves, Franco and Ribeiro (2008) showed the disadvantages of children and youths, aged 7 – 17, in terms of greater gaps between age and school grades when they are residents in *favelas* in comparison with children similar in terms of individual and family attributes.

The results of the studies, conducted by the research group coordinated by Luis Antônio Machado (Machado, 2008), regarding the impacts of criminal violence and police violence on the sociability of the *favela* residents, reinforce the pertinence of the *favela* vs. district dichotomy to understand the dynamic of social organization in the territory of the city and its internal impacts on the social life of these territories and in the relations of its residents with the remainder of the city. The quotidian experience of this population is strongly marked by disorganization and social isolation arising from the territorial and symbolic confinement, from the mistrust of the internal social interactions and of those maintained with the social groups residing in districts in various levels of urban sociability, whose basis is the stigma arising from the criminalization of these spaces. But, one of the most important results of this research for the purposes of this article is the observation that researchers make about the change of approach of the public policies aimed at this territory. In the 1960s, it was oriented by the representation of the need to “subir o morro” [go up the hill into the *favela*] to anticipate the potential for contestation of the elite urban order. The latter was represented by the existence of the *favela* dwellers as a category conceived as being at the margin of a modernization process associated with accelerated urbanization, incapable, for various reasons, of including new city dwellers in the progress and development. At that moment, such understanding of the “problem of the *favela*” implied formulation of a diagnosis, whose solution was the extension to the marginalized territories of the “rights to the city”. The theme of “urbanization of the *favelas*” was

directly connected with the political agenda, and was included in the public debate on allying modernization with democratization. In the 1980s and 1990s, the growing presence of representation regarding urban violence, resulting from the possibilities of contamination of this population by an ethic of the organized crime by the drug dealers, began to steer the debate about shantytowns. They began to be conceived as a threat to the social order and the theme of “urbanization of the *favelas*”, led to actions of containment of the epidemiological expansion of the culture of violence.

Moreover, following the reflections generated by the aforementioned innovative research, such change of orientation of public policy – which is broadly echoed by society – produces three important consequences: it dynamizes and increases the disorganizing dynamic of social life and isolation of this population; it transforms the previously flexible organized frontiers, based on a variable geometry, into hard univocal frontiers<sup>14</sup>; and, thirdly, it creates and legitimizes a salvationist “ideology”, bearing a disciplinary project as a strategy for social control, which begins to be the distinguishing mark of the relations of the institutions of the city with these territories and their population. In other words, if the threats come from the “margins of the city” by the presence of violence and crime not regulated by the State, the policy of containment and expansion of State action seeks the recuperation of the legitimate monopoly over power, this action being combined with others originating from the “civil society” organized as salvationist devices for the innocent victims of the threats of being mobilized via the recruitment policies of these criminal organizations.

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<sup>14</sup> Leite (2008) thus describes the concentration of the *favelas* in terms of the violence of the drug traffic, firearms, and constitution of an amply shared collective representation of the *favelas* as territories with criminality. “Constituted in the social perception as a violent territory of the city, the *favelas* are inhabited by a population that needs to take into account in their quotidian, on the one hand, this designation that encompasses them and that essentially demarcates their place in the city and their possibilities of access to citizenship assets, public institutions and services. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider the different modalities of presence and activity of violent crime and of the police in their places of residence. Both dimensions construct and reconstruct the frontiers between the district and the *favela* in Rio de Janeiro, as distinct physical and moral territories of the city. What is permanently at stake, in the case of the former, is the renewal of these frontiers with the intention of discursively territorializing the violence, involving an effort undertaken by means of diverse devices to encapsulate them in the “margins” of the city. The second dimension indicates that the sociability that is woven in the *favelas* incorporates violence as empirical data with which its population has to deal with the quotidian.” (Leite, 2008, pp.119-120)

In this work, we assume, therefore, that, despite the clear tendencies towards *inter-* and *intra-favela* differentiation, besides the increase in their integration with some urban services, the *favela-city* dichotomy has not been eliminated as a distinctive feature of the Rio (Cariocan) urban order. In effect, between the *favela* and the city, a regime of strongly hierarchized social interaction is maintained, and organized on the basis of the perceptions of the existence of separate, distant social worlds. This regime of social interaction is not made real only in quotidian practices, but also in the interactions with the city's institutions, that is, those that should form the basis of its action due to the values of the rights to the city, by means of the promotion of access to fundamental public assets of a universalized citizenship, in its conception and in the procedures by which access is obtained. We are referring to the institutions that were based on the countries where there has occurred construction of an effective nation-state, organized by universal notions and rules of incorporation into the political community. The school, without doubt, was one of these institutions. As we shall attempt to make evident below, the public schools are organized as institutions and organizations that are discriminating and discriminatory, especially when they are attended by lower strata segments that today are the object of this double policy of management at the margin: containment by violent action and salvationist social policy, encompassing disciplinary and pedagogic social control. If the population of these territories struggles every day against the disorganizing effects of the social life stemming from the presence of violent crime and the policy of containment, the act of counterbalancing the tendencies towards socio-territorial isolation is more difficult as it implies interaction with institutions, whose rules of functioning this population scarcely knows. It also becomes difficult to counteract isolation when the old practices of discrimination, experienced almost exclusively in the universe of personal interaction, gain the objectivity of institutional action by the fact that the dwelling place – the *favelas* – is a bureaucratized attribute of discriminating and discriminatory treatment.

The study by Small (2004) helps us to understand social isolation, even in a model of segregation in which rich and poor districts coexist side by side. In his study of a poor district of Latin origin close to an upper middle class district in Boston, the author shows the constitution of a spatial configuration in which the frontiers are fixed and precise<sup>15</sup>. These

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<sup>15</sup> According to the author, in places where the frontiers are fluid, the residents can

fixed markers are composed of different landscapes and constructions in the poor and non-poor areas (characteristics of streets, houses, buildings, pavements, businesses and services) and by spatialization of class, race and crime (when a great proportion of the residents on each side of the boundary is of a different racial or class origin, and a certain number of practices, such as drug traffic, engagement in violent crime, occurs predominantly on one side of the frontier. This ecology ends up preventing the residents of the poor district crossing “an invisible wall” and this leads to the perception of the existence of two groups of people that are mutually exclusive, internally homogeneous and opposed. Thus, it reduced the possibilities of interaction with the middle-class neighbors. Therefore, the study by Small (2004) makes us propose that the frontiers between the “favela” and the “district” can be clearer and fixed, and the social distance among the different social groups more accentuated in the affluent areas than in the less wealthy or poorer areas of the city. In these areas, we can expect that the businesses, leisure areas and services used by these social groups will be better delimited (Ribeiro, 2008). Concerning the impact of this socio-spatial configuration on educational opportunities, we can expect that children and adolescents in *favelas* in the wealthier areas of the city to be more easily identified and stigmatized by teachers and principals who do not recognize in them the attributes that they desire for their students. Thus, we may propose the hypothesis that, in these contexts, in which the frontiers are demonstrably fixed and clear, the neighborhood-effect mechanism, named an institutional model by the literature, exerts an impact on educational opportunities. In other words, we can expect that this socio-territorial configuration, typical of the Rio (Cariocan) model of segregation, exerts an impact on educational opportunities, not only on the demand side of education, but also on the supply side. This mechanism also finds theoretical support in the conception of Bourdieu’s (1997) “effect-of-place”, and his vision of urban space as the materialization of social space, with its hierarchies, segmentations and social distinction practices.

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recognize the poor and non-poor by race or personal appearance, but these are not recognized in space. Thus, the groups cannot avoid the areas where other groups dwell, and the interaction between the groups becomes inevitable. However, when the spatial frontiers between these groups are fixed and precise, it becomes easier for the individuals of one social group to avoid the areas of another.

## Some evidence about the municipality of Rio de Janeiro

In order to answer the questions posed by the work, analyses were made utilizing the hierarchical regression models at two levels. These models are suitable for educational analysis, as they possess a hierarchical structure: students are grouped in schools.<sup>16</sup> In the analyses, we took into account the phenomenon of residential segregation, as much in its manifestation on the macroscale as on the micro.

The models presented seek to estimate the results in the mathematics tests of Prova Brasil 2005 (SAEB scale) for students of the 4th and 8th grades of public schools in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. On the one hand, they include variables at the level of the student that are recognized by the pertinent literature as factors that reflect on the school performance of the students, such as the socioeconomic status<sup>17</sup>, gender, color and the school grade repetition variable, as an indicator of the students' school trajectory<sup>18</sup>.

Besides the socioeconomic status considered at the levels of the student and one of the school, the models also contemplate the collective effect of the socioeconomic status and the color composition of the students of each school. At school level, a variable that summarizes the availability of resources of pedagogic use in the schools was also considered<sup>19</sup>.

At the second level, the models also contemplate variables that characterize the territory, or the neighborhood, in which the school is located, based on the educational atmosphere variable. This variable was obtained from a typological analysis utilizing the average schooling level in households among the adults aged over 25 (Censo IBGE, 2000). The tracts of the 2000 Demographic Census (Censo IBGE, 2000) were utilized as spatial units of analysis. The schools were located in these territorial units based on geo-processing techniques.

<sup>16</sup> Specifications of technical questions of this type of model are found in the works of Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Ferrão (2003).

<sup>17</sup> The socioeconomic status variable was created from the extractions of the first factor of a factor analysis by the method of main components, which considered the following variables: a) Possession of goods; b) Possession of educational resources; c) Maximum education of the parents.

<sup>18</sup> The variables at the level of the student were calculated from micro data from Prova Brasil 2005.

<sup>19</sup> This variable is constructed by a factor analysis with three variables related to the quantity of TV sets, overhead projectors and videocassette recorders, weighted by the number of classrooms. From this analysis the first factor was extracted.

In this case, we can think that the territory where the school is located is a proxy of the students' dwelling place<sup>20</sup>, and, therefore, we may think of an effect of the territory via the functioning of mechanisms of collective socialization. But we could also think that the schools located in territories with different characteristics also possess distinct infrastructure, organization and management.

Finally, we also include in our models the variable location of the schools up to 100 meters from a *favela*, based on the presupposition that schools located in and very close to a *favela* would be “encapsulated” by these territories, and suffer a negative effect of the territory, especially due to the mechanisms related to the supply of education.

Chart 1 presents a description of the variables used in the models and Table 1 presents statistics that describe these variables:

**CHART 1- Variables used in the models of analysis**

VARIABLES	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
<i>Dependent Variables</i>		
<b>Mathematical Proficiency 4th grade</b>	Continuous	Math scores - Prova Brasil, 4th grade, SAEB scale
<b>Mathematical Proficiency 8th grade</b>	Continuous	Math scores - Prova Brasil, 8th grade, SAEB scale
<i>Independent Variables</i>		
<b>LEVEL 1</b>		
<b>Brown</b>	Dummy	Brown (1 = yes/ 0 = other)
<b>Black</b>	Dummy	Black (1 = yes/0 = other)
<b>SES</b>	Continuous	Socioeconomic status of student
<b>Gender</b>	Dummy	(0 = Female/ 1 = Male)
<b>School Grade Repetition</b>	Dummy	Student already failed once (0=no 1= once or more times)

<sup>20</sup> The work by Alves (2008) in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro observed that 85% of the students in the first segment of primary education live up to 1,500m from the schools where they study. However, the schools with higher performance more frequently tend to receive students who live at greater distances from the school.

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**LEVEL 2**

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<b>SES_SCHOOL</b>	Continuous	Socioeconomic status of school
<b>Brown_Black_SCHOOL</b>	Continuous	Percentage of Blacks and Browns in school
<b>Equipment</b>	Continuous	School equipment of pedagogic use
<b>Weak Atmosphere</b>	Dummy	Location of the school in tracts with weak educational atmosphere (1 = yes/0 = other)
<b>Medium Level Atmosphere</b>	Dummy	Location of the school in tracts with medium level educational atmosphere (1 = yes/0 = other)
<b><i>Favela 100m</i></b>	Dummy	Schools located up to 100m from <i>favelas</i> (1 = yes/0 = other)

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**TABLE 1– Descriptive Statistics of the variables used in the models**

Variables	8 <sup>th</sup> Grade		4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Math Scores</b>	250.38	45.02	191.21	38.58
<b>Brown</b>	0.46		0.51	
<b>Black</b>	0.16		0.16	
<b>SES</b>	0.01	0.98	0.02	0.98
<b>Gender</b>	0.50		0.51	
<b>School Grade Repetition</b>	0.33		0.30	
<b>SES_School</b>	-0.04	0.32	0.00	0.31
<b>Brown_Black_School</b>	0.64	0.09	0.67	0.09
<b>Equipment</b>	-0.27	0.61	-0.07	0.85
<b>Low Atmosphere</b>	0.33		0.36	
<b>Medium Level Atmosphere</b>	0.58		0.56	
<b><i>Favela 100m</i></b>	0.11		0.17	

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For the macro analyses, all the schools and students of the Rio de Janeiro public system, for which there were data from Prova Brasil 2005, were considered. In the analyses at the micro-level, the models were applied considering only students and schools located in each of the territories characterized by the educational atmosphere variable.<sup>21</sup>

For macro analysis, considering students of the 4th grade, we obtained the following results:

**Table 2: Hierarchical Linear Models Estimating Proficiency in Mathematics – Prova Brasil 2005 - 4th grade**

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
<b>Fixed Effects</b>				
INTERCEPT: $\beta_0$	191.63 ***	205.17 ***	203.75 ***	202.70 ***
<b>Student</b>				
BROWN: $\beta_1$		-1.33 ***	-1.29 ***	-1.17 **
BLACK : $\beta_2$		-8.29 ***	-8.21 ***	-8.12 ***
SES: $\beta_3$		3.61 ***	3.62 ***	3.62 ***
GENDER: $\beta_4$		2.92 ***	2.90 ***	2.89 ***
SCHOOL GRADE REPETITION: $\beta_5$		-14.99 ***	-14.80 ***	-14.76 ***
<b>School</b>				
BROWN_BLACK_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{01}$				-18.35 ***
SES_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{02}$			17.89 ***	15.13 ***
EQUIPMENT: $\gamma_{03}$				2.78 ***
LOW ATMOSPHERE: $\gamma_{04}$		-11.60 ***	-9.61 ***	-7.87 ***
MEDIUM LEVEL ATMOSPHERE: $\gamma_{05}$		-6.52 ***	-6.63 ***	-5.86 ***
FAVELA 100M: $\gamma_{06}$		-3.75 **	0.01	-0.14
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Level 2 (School): $R_0$	153.64	125.38	98.10	90.56
Level 1 (Student): $E$	1,337.01	1,263.08	1,263.15	1,263.15

Note: +  $p \leq 0.10$ ; \*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

<sup>21</sup> See annex A with the model that served as a basis for the analyses on a macroscale.

Model 1 is the null model. It estimates the proportion of the total variance of the scores in mathematics attributable to each one of the hierarchical levels considered (school and student). As it can be observed, the greater part of the difference in the students' scores is related to the characteristics of the students, and only 10.31% of the total variance can be attributed to the school. This fact can be explained by our working only with public schools, almost all of them belonging to the municipal system.

In Model 2, the variables of Level 1 and those related to the vicinity of the school are introduced.

For the level of the student, we observed trends compatible with findings already observed in other studies about school-effect: white students have greater performance than non-white students; a higher socioeconomic status is associated with the best performances; boys have greater performance than girls, and the factor that presents a more accentuated negative impact is school grade repetition, a result that provides evidence that the student's school trajectory exerts a strong influence on his school outcomes.

In what concerns the educational atmosphere variable the strong level was used as the reference category in the models. The value of the coefficient  $\gamma_{04}$  indicates that the location of the school in a tract with a weak educational atmosphere, in comparison with the schools located in tracts with strong educational atmosphere, means an average decrease of 11.60 points in the mathematics scores of the students. This decrease is 6.52 points for the schools located in tracts with a medium educational atmosphere. On the other hand, the effect of studying in a school located in a *favela* or up to 100 meters from one, leads, on average, to a decrease of 3.75 points in the students' test scores.

In Model 3, the socioeconomic status of the school variable is introduced. As observed in various studies that take into account diverse contexts, we noted a strong effect of this variable on the school result. The addition of one point to the socioeconomic status of the school is accompanied, on average, by an addition of 17.89 points to the students' scores. With the introduction of this variable, the coefficient referring to the location in or near the *favela* ceases to be statistically significant.

Lastly, in Model 4, we observe that, when we introduced the variables related to the racial composition of the students and the presence in the school of equipment for pedagogic use, the coefficients, related to the educational atmosphere in the vicinity of the school, remain significant,

although the effects decline: the location of the school in a tract with weak educational atmosphere, leads to a decrease of 7.87 points, and in a tract with medium level educational atmosphere, to a decrease of 5.86 points in the students' mathematics scores.

In the analyses made on a microscale, the models were applied considering only students and schools located in each of the territories characterized by the variable, educational atmosphere. (See Table 3).

In Model 1, variables were introduced related to the characteristics of the students, and to the variable related to proximity to a *favela*. In the analysis presented in the first column, only students and schools located in a strong educational atmosphere tract were considered. The value of the coefficient  $\gamma_{04}$  indicates that studying in a school located in or close to a *favela* presents a negative impact. The expected decrease in proficiency in mathematics is 14.08 points. This decrease is 4.37 points when we take into consideration only students and schools in tracts with medium level educational atmosphere, and it is not significant when we consider students and schools in tracts with weak educational atmosphere.

In Model 2, the variables related to SES, to color composition and to pedagogic equipment at the school were introduced. We observe that, controlling by these variables, only in the model that considers schools located in strong educational atmosphere tracts, the coefficient of the proximity to a *favela* variable continues to be statistically significant. In other words, the proximity to a *favela* only has a negative effect on the proficiency of the students in wealthier areas of the city.

We also observe that as much in the schools located in strong educational atmosphere tracts as in those located in medium level and weak educational atmospheres tracts, the percentage of black and brown students in the school exerts a negative effect on the proficiency of the students. However, this negative effect seems more accentuated when we consider the schools located in a tract with strong educational atmosphere, that is, in the wealthier areas of the city.

**Table 3: Hierarchical Linear Models Estimating Proficiency in Mathematics – Prova Brasil 2005 - 4th grade – by educational atmosphere**

	Strong Educational Atmosphere		Medium Level Educational Atmosphere		Weak Educational Atmosphere	
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 1	MODEL 2
<b>Fixed Effects</b>						
INTERCEPT: $\beta_0$	207.30	205.32	199.23 ***	198.61 ***	192.25 ***	191.50 ***
<b>Student</b>						
BROWN: $\beta_1$	-2.34 +	-2.11	-2.27 ***	-2.12 ***	0.12	0.27
BLACK : $\beta_2$	-8.37 ***	-7.90 ***	-8.95 ***	-8.79 ***	-7.32 ***	-7.20 ***
SES: $\beta_3$	3.17 ***	3.21 ***	4.05 ***	4.07 ***	3.13 ***	3.14 ***
GENDER: $\beta_4$	3.28 **	3.26 *	3.38 ***	3.36 ***	2.24 ***	2.22 ***
SCHOOL GRADE REPETITION: $\beta_5$	-14.96 ***	-14.61 ***	-15.49 ***	-14.21 ***	-14.31 ***	-14.11 ***
<b>School</b>						
BROWN_BLACK_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{01}$		-60.08 ***		-14.21 *		-15.52 *
SES_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{02}$		20.54 ***		11.70 ***		18.86 ***
EQUIPMENT: $\gamma_{03}$		1.88		2.65 ***		3.91 ***
FAVELA 100M: $\gamma_{04}$	-14.08 ***	-8.47 *	-4.37 **	-0.91	-1.03	1.97
<b>Random Effects</b>						
Level 2 (School): $R_0$	166.75	75.75	113.14	88.41	131.90	87.55
Level 1 (Student): $E$	1,317.29	1,318.68	1,265.26	1,265.34	1,250.05	1,250.06

Note: +  $p \leq 0.10$ ; \*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

Similar trends were found through the analysis considering 8<sup>th</sup> grade students:

**Table 4: Hierarchical Linear Models Estimating Proficiency in Mathematics – Prova Brasil 2005 - 8th grade**

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>								
INTERCEPT: $\beta_0$	250.00	***	265.29	***	265.93	***	264.91	***
<b>Student</b>								
BROWN: $\beta_1$			-3.40	***	-3.33	***	-3.25	***
BLACK : $\beta_2$			-7.82	***	-7.73	***	-7.68	***
SES: $\beta_3$			4.61	***	4.63	***	4.63	***
GENDER: $\beta_4$			6.80	***	6.74	***	6.74	***
SCHOOL GRADE REPETITION: $\beta_5$			-21.22	***	-21.21	***	-21.12	***
<b>School</b>								
BROWN_BLACK_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{01}$							-13.66	+
SES_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{02}$					22.73	***	20.33	***
EQUIPMENT: $\gamma_{03}$							4.69	***
LOW ATMOSPHERE: $\gamma_{04}$			-13.26	***	-12.82	***	-11.00	***
MEDIUM LEVEL ATMOSPHERE: $\gamma_{05}$			-6.02	***	-8.42	***	-7.85	**
FAVELA 100M: $\gamma_{06}$			-7.41	*	-3.85	+	-3.18	
<b>Random Effects</b>								
Level 2 (School): $R_0$	217.49		187.34		138.53		130.08	
Level 1 (Student): $E$	1,806.35		1,663.33		1,663.36		1,663.33	

Note: +  $p \leq 0.10$ ; \*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

Once again, we observe in the null model that the major part of the variation in mathematics proficiency is explained by the difference among students in the same school. Only 10.72% of the variance is due to the variability among the schools.

In Model 2, in which variables related to the vicinity of the school are introduced, we observe that the location of the school in tracts with a weak educational atmosphere, means, on average, a decrease of 13.26 points in the students scores. This decrease is 6.02 points for those who study in a vicinity with a medium level educational atmosphere. The factor related to proximity of the school to a *favela* presents a negative impact: a decrease of 7.41 points. In Model 3, in which the SES of the school variable is introduced, the coefficients related to the educational atmosphere and proximity to a *favela* variables remain statistically significant.

In Model 4, upon introduction of the variables related to the proportion of Blacks and Browns in the schools and pedagogic equipment, we observe that the coefficients related to the educational atmosphere in the vicinity of the schools remain significant: the location of the school in tract with weak educational atmosphere implies a decrease of 11.00 points, and in a tract of medium level educational atmosphere, a decrease of 7.85 points in the students' mathematics scores. On the other hand, the coefficient  $\gamma_{06}$  referring to the proximity to a favela variable ceases to be significant when the other variables related to the school are introduced.

Finally, the following results were obtained from analyses on a microscale, considering the school results for students in the 8th grade. (See Table 5)

Again, the tendencies observed follow those observed for the models that estimate proficiency in mathematics of the 4th graders. In the model presented in the first column (Model 1 - strong educational atmosphere), the value of the coefficient  $\gamma_{04}$  indicates that studying in a school located in or close to a *favela* implies an average decrease of 14.08 points in the students' school results. This decrease is 7.37 points when we consider only schools located in tracts of medium level educational atmosphere, and it is not statistically significant when we consider schools located in tracts of weak educational atmosphere.

In Model 2, we observe that, controlling by other variables related to school, only in the model referring to the schools located in tracts with strong educational atmosphere does the coefficient of the proximity to a *favela* variable remain statistically significant. In this territorial context, the proximity to a *favela* results in an average decrease of 10.27 points. Again, we observe that the percentage of the black and brown students variable in the school has a more accentuated negative effect on the model that considers students and schools located in tracts with strong educational atmosphere.

**Table 5: Hierarchical Linear Models Estimating Proficiency in Mathematics – Prova Brasil 2005 - 8th grade – by educational atmosphere**

	Strong Educational Atmosphere		Medium Level Educational Atmosphere		Weak Educational Atmosphere	
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 1	MODEL 2
<b>Fixed Effects</b>						
INTERCEPT: $\beta_0$	264.34 ***	263.58 ***	258.90 ***	258.31 ***	252.81 ***	252.05 ***
<b>Student</b>						
BROWN: $\beta_1$	-1.43	-1.21	-3.66 ***	-3.52 ***	-3.48 ***	-3.32 ***
BLACK : $\beta_2$	-8.24 **	-7.96 ***	-8.33 ***	-8.19 ***	-7.02 ***	-6.86 ***
SES: $\beta_3$	3.86 ***	3.89 ***	4.93 ***	4.94 ***	4.30 ***	4.31 ***
GENDER: $\beta_4$	9.34 ***	9.24 *	7.70 **	7.64 ***	4.86 ***	4.81 ***
SCHOOL GRADE REPETITION: $\beta_5$	-21.74 ***	-21.53 ***	-20.87 ***	-20.75 ***	-21.66 ***	-21.63 ***
<b>School</b>						
BROWN_BLACK_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{01}$		-46.36 +		12.56		-22.58 +
SES_SCHOOL: $\gamma_{02}$		14.94 *		23.21 ***		17.46 ***
EQUIPMENT: $\gamma_{03}$		-3.14		5.52 ***		6.61 *
FAVELA 100M: $\gamma_{04}$	-13.64 ***	-10.27 *	-7.37 *	-3.84	-5.52	-1.29
<b>Random Effects</b>						
Level 2 (School): $R_0$	171.49	119.00	191.57	131.41	184.74	126.57
Level 1 (Student): $E$	1,738.52	1,738.69	1,683.08	1,683.28	1,616.34	1,616.09

Note: +  $p \leq 0.10$ ; \*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

## Conclusion

As mentioned previously, the city of Rio de Janeiro presents a particular model of social organization of its territory, combining the classical model of nucleus-periphery as well as places that present greater heterogeneity of social groups and classes, given the strong presence of *favelas* in affluent districts. The analyses made, as much on a macroscale as on a micro one, reveal the effects of this complex model of residential segregation on school outcomes.

In the analyses on the macroscale, we observe that the students who study in schools located in less privileged surroundings, which concentrate households in a weaker educational atmosphere, tend to present lower average performance. Considering that, roughly speaking, there is a greater predominance of tracts with strong educational atmosphere in Barra da Tijuca, Tijuca and the South Zone of the city, greater concentration of tracts with a medium level educational atmosphere in the North Zone, and a greater concentration of tracts with a weak educational atmosphere in the West Zone of the city, we can argue that the nucleus-periphery model is pertinent to the understanding of the neighborhood effect on educational results in the city. As in studies conducted in the context of other large cities, we propose as a hypothesis that the effects of social isolation also function as, and are exerting, a negative impact on the areas of greater concentration of poverty in the context studied.

However, the possible effect of the territory or of the neighborhood on school outcomes does not end with the center-periphery model. These analyses on the microscale showed that the location of the schools up to 100 meters from *favelas* in wealthier areas also seem to exert a negative effect on educational results. The results found reinforce the idea that the *favela*-district dichotomy may still be thought of as a distinctive feature of the Rio (Cariocan) urban order, in particular, in the areas where the frontiers of the territory present clearer markers. Even if the ecology of the affluent areas with a strong presence of *favelas* physically brings together these different social groups, this does not mean, as previous studies have already indicated, greater social interaction among these groups (Ribeiro, 2008). In other words, the physical proximity does not allow a beneficial impact of collective socialization in heterogeneous territorial contexts, as stated by much of the literature about the neighborhood-effect. Thus, the relation between the proximity of the *favela* and the school results, in the affluent



areas of the city, can be understood, as in the center-periphery model, on the basis of the mechanisms related to social isolation. On the other hand, this relation may also be understood via institutional mechanisms or by the supply side of education. We can suggest, as a hypothesis, that the schools near *favelas* are “encapsulated” by these territories; that they function and are organized in a peculiar manner, and that, for example, they present a school atmosphere that is not propitious for the students to learn.

This work is restricted to the observation of a possible neighborhood effect on educational opportunities in a city that presents a complex model of residential segregation. Given this complexity, the work proposed, on the one hand, multi-scale analyses, and, on the other, some mechanisms by which neighborhood affects education.

However, the studies on the effect of the socio-territorial organization of the cities on educational opportunities are still incipient in the researches that take into account the context of the Brazilian cities, and they present little penetration into the discussion of the sociology of education and urban sociology. Subsequent studies, as much of a quantitative nature as of a qualitative one, may contribute to the discussion of the effects of territory through more profound investigation of the mechanisms, by means of which neighborhood impacts on education.

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## Annex A

The model that served as a basis for the analyses on a macroscale is given by:

Model of Level 1:

$$\text{MATHEMATICAL PROFICIENCY}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1(\text{BROWN})_{ij} + \beta_2(\text{BLACK})_{ij} + \beta_3(\text{SES})_{ij} + \beta_4(\text{GENDER})_{ij} + \beta_5(\text{SCHOOL GRADE REPETITION})_{ij} + e_{ij}$$

Model of Level 2:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{BLACK\_BROWN\_SCHOOL})_j + \gamma_{02}(\text{SES\_SCHOOL})_j + \gamma_{03}(\text{EQUIPMENT})_j + \gamma_{04}(\text{WEAK ATMOSPHERE})_j + \gamma_{05}(\text{MEDIUM LEVEL ATMOSPHERE})_j + \gamma_{06}(\text{FAVELA 100M})_j + u_{0j}$$

On the other hand, the model that served as the basis for the analyses on a microscale is given by:

Model of Level 1:

$$\text{MATHEMATICS PROFICIENCY}_{ij} = \beta_{0ij} + \beta_1(\text{BROWN})_{ij} + \beta_2(\text{BLACK})_{ij} + \beta_3(\text{SES})_{ij} + \beta_4(\text{GENDER})_{ij} + \beta_5(\text{SCHOOL GRADE REPETITION})_{ij} + e_{ij}$$

Model of Level 2:

$$\beta_{0ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{BLACK\_BROWN\_SCHOOL})_j + \gamma_{02}(\text{SES\_SCHOOL})_j + \gamma_{03}(\text{EQUIPMENT})_j + \gamma_{04}(\text{FAVELA 100M})_j + u_{0j}$$

## Residential segregation, school quasi-market and school segmentation in the context of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1</sup>

*Mariane C. Koslinski*

*Marcio da Costa*

*Fátima Alves*

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

### Introduction

It has been observed that there is a growing discussion about the influence of educational policies that foster competitive mechanisms by means of incentives for school choice and/or accountability. Residential segregation has also been recognized as an element that influences the stratification of educational opportunities<sup>2</sup>. This article intends to contribute to this discussion and seeks to understand the mechanisms by which residential segregation and the functioning of a “hidden quasi-market” may produce impacts on educational stratification.

The city of Rio de Janeiro seems to be a fertile terrain for a study of this nature, given that the “Cariocan (Rio) model of residential segregation” (RIBEIRO, 2005, 2008; RIBEIRO & LAGO, 2001) can only partially be understood in terms of center-periphery relations. For reasons of its historical, spatial and social formation, the city presents specific characteristics, combining geographical proximity and social distance, due to the massive presence of *favelas* located in districts that concentrate segments occupying higher positions in the social structure. Residential

<sup>1</sup>This article was presented at the XVII World Congress of Sociology – International Sociological Association, July 11-17<sup>th</sup>, 2010, Goteborg, Sweden.

<sup>2</sup> See studies about the theme in various Latin America cities in Ribeiro and Kaztman (2010).

proximity of groups with very distinct standards of living should produce less residential segregation impact on school stratification. This, however, is not verified. Previous studies (Costa and Koslinski, 2009, 2011, 2012) suggest that, in Brazil, and, specifically in this city, one can understand the distribution of students among public schools by the quasi-market concept, even in the absence of educational policies that promote parental school choice and stimulate competition among schools.

Due to these processes, throughout the city, at least two principles of stratification are formed, operating in the distinction among public schools: there is regional segmentation, according to the patterns of socioeconomic inequality, and there is also segmentation within every region of the city. The distribution of students who attend the public school system seems to follow an intricate pattern that overlaps socioeconomic, residential and school performance aspects.

The current article will seek to present evidence of the processes synthesized above. It is intended to map some student flow patterns and identify factors that condition the chances of being enrolled in municipal public schools, according to the hierarchy of performance observed among these. In order to achieve the proposed objectives, use was made of the data regarding students and the municipal fundamental schools participating in the Estudo Longitudinal Geração Escolar 2005 (GERES<sup>3</sup>) [Longitudinal Study of School Generation]. This study contains information about the socio-demographic characteristics and place of residence of the students, as well as identification of the school in which the students were enrolled at the beginning of the first segment of fundamental education. It also provides information about whether the students remain in or leave these schools during the first segment of fundamental education. The results indicate that the access and permanence of students in public schools that present different performances are not random. The article concludes that the combination of residential segregation with the functioning of a hidden quasi-market structures the unequal supply of educational opportunities in the city.

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<sup>3</sup> A longitudinal study conducted in five Brazilian cities, involving students beginning the first grade of fundamental education, in 2005. The research accompanied a sample over a 4-year period, until completion of the first segment of fundamental education (then four years and compulsory).

## School stratification in Brazil


There is a marked segmentation between the public and private educational systems in Brazil. This is the main school cleavage presented by its very unequal school system, in strong association with the social inequality in general. For decades, the controversy regarding this phenomenon occupied a central space on the agenda of debates concerning the theme of school differentiation. The relevance of the question was not disregarded.

However, beyond the conflictive situation involving the “public/private” segmentation, there is great differentiation within the public basic school systems. Significant hierarchies are constituted and fostered, even when evident contrasts among, for example, basic schools under federal administration and other public schools, are put aside. In fact, few public schools, almost always the federal ones, benefit from certain conditions and present social composition and performance levels that approximate them to the private schools, perhaps even the most renowned private schools in the major urban centers. Interest is concentrated on the strong hierarchy observed within public education systems composed of “common” schools. Such schools cater for the immense majority of the Brazilian population, and concentrate the poorer segments (Costa, 2008; Costa and Koslinski, 2009, 2011).

Chart 1 expresses the difference between public and private schools in the city involved in the GERES research of 2008. It informs the relative positions of the schools in terms of the mean student socioeconomic status (SES) and performance in secondary school mathematics. It depicts a combined portrait of differences among educational systems and intra-systems, while not omitting to stress perceptible differences among schools.



Graphic 1: School's Mean Score in Portuguese – 5<sup>th</sup> year Fundamental Education – Brazil



Source: Estudo Longitudinal Geração Escolar 2005 [Longitudinal Study of School Generation], 2008

TYPE	Mean
Low Municipal SES	157.7266
High Municipal SES	161.6828
Low Private SES	177.3880
High Private SES	190.2314
Total	170.0275

In Chart 2, it is possible to observe the differences among schools of the city's public system in the Portuguese test for the 5th grade<sup>4</sup> of fundamental education.

The relation between socioeconomic level (standardized) and mean performance exists, but it is not as strong as the relation observed in Chart 1, perhaps because the variability in socioeconomic level of the public municipal schools is not so high. However, the chart suggests a strong school effect accentuating the school stratification, as verified in other studies conducted in the Brazilian context (Alves and Franco, 2008).


### Conditioning factors of the school stratification

The starting point of this article is to consider the inequality of opportunities as a sociological conditioning factor of the inequalities of proficiency and differences in school trajectories. With regard to this aspect, two dimensions of this relation were considered: that related with the distribution mechanisms of population in the territory according to the positions arising from the places they occupy in the social structure and the access conditions to public goods and services, including schools; and the dimension related with the intra-school mechanisms of ascriptive selection of the access to educational opportunities. The simultaneous consideration of the two dimensions helps to understand the mechanisms that lead to school stratification and the conditioning factors for the students' school trajectories. Such a focus has implied a broadening of the horizon of the analysis of the Sociology of Education. In effect, if until recently, the studies in this academic field attempted to explain the inequalities of educational results

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<sup>4</sup> According to the new denomination, 9th year.

**Graphic 2: Public School's Mean Score in Portuguese – 5<sup>th</sup> year Fundamental Education - Rio de Janeiro**



Source: Prova Brasil [Brazil Test], 2005

and the school stratification, concentrating the analysis on the factors related to the family and the school, as of the 1990s, new research has also begun to contemplate the role of the inequalities in the territory in the explanation of school inequalities. Such a relation has been treated theoretically through the concept of neighborhoods effects, an analytical resource also capable of providing understanding of the mechanisms that produce inequalities of educational opportunities.

The literature that relates neighborhoods to school education into two groups can be classified. The first contains studies that emphasize how the social life in segregated districts confers unequal conditions and dispositions to families, children and youths regarding appropriation of the opportunities offered by the school systems. The second highlights the effects of residential segregation on the organization and functioning of the school system, generating inequalities in terms of the distribution of school opportunities.

Analysis of the research about the first group has identified the following two mechanisms that synthesize the neighborhoods effects on the conditions and school dispositions of the families, children and youths: a) theories of collective socialization; b) institutional theory (Jencks and Mayer, 1990; Ellen and Turner, 1997; Brooks-Gun et al., 1997, Sampson and Morenoff, 2002; Small and Newman, 2001).

According to the theories of collective socialization, the standards and norms of behavior of the people tend to be shaped by those with whom they have most contact and most frequent interaction. Such theories are based on the argument of social isolation, formulated by Wilson (1987), who defends that territorial concentration of the poor creates a social environment of disadvantage, as it disconnects these people from relations and interactions with middle class role models. The literature about the neighborhood effect deals, principally, with epidemic models<sup>5</sup> (the influence of peers) and social role models<sup>6</sup>, as important mechanisms

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<sup>5</sup> According to the epidemic model, if the adolescents in a community present little interest in school, and many also having already abandoned their studies, and often engage in crime, and other risk behavior, other adolescents will be more inclined to view these activities and behavior as acceptable (Jencks & Mayer, 1990; Ellen & Turner, 1997).

<sup>6</sup> According to such models, children would learn about which behavior is considered normal and acceptable from the example of adults with whom they frequently interact in their neighborhoods. Those that grow up in homogeneously poor or segregated neighborhoods would lack models of adults who are successful through schooling (Wilson, 1987; Ellen & Turner, 1997, Newman & Small, 2001).

related to the social isolation that influence school performance, adherence to the school, and, therefore, the educational opportunities.

The second theory, called institutional or institutional socialization, is based on the presupposition that individuals can be affected by the quality of the services they are offered in their neighborhoods. This argument approximates to the idea of the geography of opportunities, which considers that the distribution of urban equipment varies – in terms of structure, quality and access – throughout the territory in urban contexts (Galster & Killen, 1995).

The second line of analysis has highlighted the impact of residential segregation on school stratification, due to the fact that its distribution in the territory of the city occurs according to the latter's social division. The schools are differentiated in terms of conditions and school dispositions of the actors in education, under the influence of the composition of their students in socioeconomic and racial terms (Van Zanten, 2001, Frankenberg and Lee, 2002; Logan, 2004). This is a point of extreme significance for the mapping of educational opportunities, given that studies about the school effect have already observed that the socioeconomic level and racial composition of the school are closely associated with the students' school results.

Thus, the two groups of works dedicated to analyzing the effects of neighborhoods indicate that the social contexts shaped by the social geography of the city, on the one hand, are reflected on the “demand for schooling”, as they are configured as intermediate spaces of socialization between family and school. On the other hand, they also exert an impact on the “school supply”. The social division of the urban territory produces important differentiations in the public school system through a complex interplay of effects of physical and social distancing that affect the actors and school institutions, producing a social geography of the educational opportunities.

Another aspect focused by this work is the impact of education policies regarding the distribution of places on school stratification. Perhaps, in this case, it is more appropriate to speak of the absence of such policies. The matter of distribution of places has been approached in the theme of the so-called quasi-market for education (Bradley et al, 2000; Costa, 2008; Costa & Koslinski 2009, 2011, 2012; Davies & Quirke, 2007; Glenn, 2009; Glennester, 1991; Le Grand, 1991; Maroy, 2006; Souza & Oliveira, 2003; West, 2006; West & Pannell, 2002; Van Zanten, 2005). Great controversy has been manifested ever since education policies were

developed, taking as a premise that competition among the agents present in the school education ambit can lead to a solution for the inefficiency of public school systems, which became emblematic in the 1988 British Educational Reform Act<sup>7</sup>.

What seems to be at the core of the quasi-market for education is the idea of school choice. According to the usual prescriptions, this quasi-market functions on the basis of the granting of opportunities of choices from a menu of schools, that would impose, on the basis of the demand (the students/clients), reactions on the part of the supply (the schools). The supply side, no longer shielded by the barrage of protection typical of welfare state systems, would have to adjust, seeking to attract students by the quality and type of their merchandise – education – they had on offer. From the signaling issued by centralized systems of external educational assessment, the supply would tend to raise its quality via the aggregated effect of the competition for clients<sup>8</sup>. Clearly there is the notion of a self-organizing quasi-market, albeit with important dissimilarities in relation to a typical market.

However, one can observe controversies about the results of these policies. More optimistic defenders of these measures argue that the introduction of market mechanisms would enable parents to choose quality schools, and this fact would have an impact, especially for marginalized students and those with low school performance. Some studies (Ball, 1997; Ball & Gewirtz, 1996; Reay & Ball, 1997), however, show that the introduction of market mechanisms has been accompanied by more freedom for schools which have begun to impose criteria for the selection of their students, as well as capacities for choice would present important differences, according to social class. These measures would make the schools become more socially segregated or lead to a process called, by some authors, polarization, and, by others, stratification or ghettoization of the schools (Taylor & Gorard, 2001). Others defend that parents possess different capacities for exploiting the opportunities

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<sup>7</sup> The *1988 Education Reform Act* replaced mechanisms by which the Local Education Authorities (LEAs) used to allocate students to the nearest secondary schools through a system in which families acquired greater freedom to choose schools for their children (Taylor & Gorard, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> The British quasi-market for education, for example, relied on the publication of the “School Performance Tables” informing the performance of schools in standardized tests. These were clear signs for identification of school quality. (Bradley, Crouchley & Millington, 2000).

presented by mechanisms that allow greater school choice (Bell, 2004, 2005; Holme, 2002).

On the other hand, Gorard & Taylor (2001) argue that the modifications introduced by the 1998 School Standards and Framework Act increased the capacity of education authorities to use the criterion of home-school distance to distribute students among the schools and thereby reduce the role of school choice and of the market mechanisms introduced by the 1988 reform. The authors' research observed that, if the 1988 Education Reform Act was followed by a decline of segregation in schools due to poverty, race and ethnicity, the determinations of the 1998 Act, along with changes in the pattern of residential segregation, led to an inverse trend. Finally, Gorard and Taylor (2001) draw attention to the importance of separating the impacts of education policies from other barriers to social mobility, and conclude: "... the segregation in the school system could be largely a result of wider residential segregation, and where you live therefore becomes a key determinant of your life chances" (Taylor and Gorard, 2001, p. 1830).

## Residential segregation and hidden quasi-market for schools in the city of Rio de Janeiro

Considering the issues that guided the studies mentioned above, the context of large Brazilian cities, mainly the city of Rio de Janeiro, seems to be fertile fields for the study of the effect of education policies and residential segregation on school segmentation.

Various studies about the neighborhood effect favor socio-territorial configurations that denote a territorial segregation on a macroscale. Such studies perform analyses based on the presupposition that the presence of contiguous areas of a low socioeconomic level, forming large enclaves, produce a more marked impact on social disorganization and social isolation, and, consequently, on educational opportunities and school stratification.

However, the analyses that favor residential segregation only at the macro level do not seem capable of taking account of the more complex urban contexts that go beyond a model of the center-periphery type. This is the case of the Rio segregation model, characterized by physical proximity and social distance (Ribeiro, 2005; Ribeiro and Koslinski, 2010; Ribeiro and Lago, 2001). In this specific context, one can observe the presence of *favelas* throughout the territory of the Rio de Janeiro municipality and a

heavy concentration of these in the prime or wealthier areas of the city. However, as one can see, this physical proximity does not imply social interaction founded on horizontal symbolic cultural exchanges. Such exchanges could engender positive effects of the mechanisms of the neighborhood effects mentioned previously, but they are scarce, due to blockages arising from the hierarchy between the polar social segments in the social structure.

The reading of the maps below makes evident the principles of social organization of the city's territory. In Map 1, a vast periphery is observed forming a continuous territory concentrating a low index of social development – red areas – as opposed to spaces (green) that concentrate areas with a high social development index (SDI). This index<sup>9</sup> is composed of the following dimensions: a) access to basic sanitation; b) housing quality; c) degree of schooling; and d) household income. At the same time, Map 2 indicates the location of the *favela* areas of the city (in fact, in the nomenclature, subnormal agglomerations) scattered all over the city, but with a strong concentration in precisely the same territories that aggregate people living in households with high schooling levels and also concentrate urban public goods of higher quality<sup>10</sup>.

What are the *favelas* as a place in the social space of the city of Rio de Janeiro? Some recent studies about *favela* have fed a debate about the sociological pertinence of the *favela* vs. district distinction in the understanding of the model of social organization of the space in the city. In effect, analyzing the evident improvements in the urban living conditions in the *favelas* – especially those related to housing – some authors have pointed out the growing process of diversification of these spaces and their social approximation to low class districts on the periphery (Preteceille & Valladares, 2000). However, the results of various works, in particular those


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
<sup>9</sup> The SDI was created by the Instituto Perreira Passos (IPP) of the Rio de Janeiro City Hall and was constructed based on data from the Censo Demográfico of IBGE of 2000 [Demographic Census]. The specificity of the SDI is that its level of spatial disaggregation refers to the census sector, a geographical unit usually constituted of some hundreds of residences. For further detail about the construction of the SDI, see Cavallieri and Lopes (2008).

<sup>10</sup> Attention is drawn to the fact that around 25% of the population living in the more elite areas lived in *favelas*, a fact that becomes of great relevance on the microscale of the phenomenon of residential segregation in the city of Rio de Janeiro.



Maps 1 and 2 – Residential Segregation and Location of the Shantytowns





developed in the Observatório das Metrópoles<sup>11</sup>, demonstrate the pertinence of this distinction, as it is associated with distinct patterns of social interaction between the *favela* residents and the institutions of the society, and even with other social groups. Such studies show the relation between socio-territorial segmentation and work opportunities, or this segmentation with the school performance and trajectory of individuals, there being control of the individual socio-demographic characteristics (Ribeiro & Lago, 2001; Pero, Cardoso & Elias, 2005; Andrade, 2004; Alves, Franco & Ribeiro, 2008; Ribeiro & Koslinski, 2011). The *favela* is the morphological, social and cultural result of a mode of relation between its occupants and those who are in the district and with the institutions of the city (the police, for example), characterized by a hierarchical distinction. This hierarchy mixes elements pertaining to a competitive order, and, therefore, modern, and those of the market, with other characteristics of a strict traditional order, and, therefore, ascriptive elements.

Thus, in this work, it is assumed that, despite the clear tendencies towards *inter-* and *intra-favela* differentiation, and the expansion of access of their populations to some urban services, the *favela-district* dichotomy remains a distinctive feature of Rio's urban order. Between the *favelas* and the district, a regime of strongly hierarchized social interaction that is organized based on the perceptions of the existence of separate and distant social worlds is maintained.

Regarding the impact of this socio-spatial configuration on school stratification, one can expect an unequal distribution of students among hierarchized schools, which is related to the more macro center-periphery dimension, as well as to the *favela-district* distinction, especially in areas in which *favelas* and more affluent districts coexist side by side. As a hypothesis, one can propose that, in these areas, the children and adolescents living in *favelas* are more easily identified and stigmatized by the educational bureaucracy, which does not recognize in them the attributes that they desire for the students.

This leads to the second dimension focused on understanding school stratification: social mechanisms of hierarchization and segmentation, beyond the formalized public policies, more specifically, the quasi-school markets.

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<sup>11</sup> Research laboratory situated at the Instituto de Planejamento Urbano e Regional, UFRJ, whose researchers are from diverse Brazilian universities and postgraduate programs. The authors of this work are members of the Observatório.

In the Brazilian context, with regard to education policies, one can observe that, until very recently, there was an almost absence of policies aimed at avoiding school segmentation. While, in some municipalities, parents and guardians can enroll their children in any school of the public fundamental school system, in others, one can find restrictions that do not permit the enrollment of children in public schools located in regions different from their places of residence.

Besides this, until very recently, there were no more significant initiatives of policies of accountability (rewards, interventions and controls), of competition among the schools for finance (voucher system and charter schools), or of stimulation or choice of school establishment. Anyway, the absence of this type of policy does not seem to prevent action, as much on the side of demand as on the supply of schools, to approximate the Brazilian educational systems to the quasi-markets established in the British system or those that constitute what Costa and Koslinski (2009, 2011) call “hidden quasi-market”.

On the one hand, the population has signs at its disposal of hierarchical classification of the schools – public and private – and it uses them in the search for schools for their children. However, these signs are not so clear as in regulated quasi-markets<sup>12</sup>. In turn, the schools, or, more precisely, the school bureaucracies and those of the intermediate level of educational administration, are not just reagents to the demand, contrary to what the more orthodox prescriptions of the quasi-market educational policies advocate. They participate actively in the process, modeling the supply and limiting the possibilities of choice. As a result, one can expect a highly hierarchized system, based on fluid criteria, clearly associated with selection mechanisms by social origin and contact networks.

Regarding the supply side, in a previous study conducted in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Costa and Koslinski (2009, 2011) observed that, in the absence of formal rules for student selection, or geographical restrictions on enrollment, various obscure mechanisms come into play in the selection in which students will have access to more prestigious schools.

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<sup>12</sup> Also, Yair (1996) records and analyzes equivalent mechanisms in an Israeli city, in the absence of school choice policies. This researcher makes an important contribution to this discussion in proposing the need for a “market ecology” as a basic concept to understand the transit of students among schools.

In the first place, it is important to highlight that the majority of schools concentrate their students in a segment of fundamental<sup>13</sup> or pre-school education. In Rio de Janeiro, few schools cover the range from pre-school education to the second segment of the fundamental level. Therefore, there occurs intense movement of students among schools, concentrated in some transitional school grades<sup>14</sup>. This movement was, at the moment this study was being conducted, partially, regulated in the registration poles – subdivisions in groups of approximately 8 - 10 municipal schools, with geographical proximity and suppliers of diverse segments of education.

Until 2009<sup>15</sup>, there were, basically, four phases in the attribution of student registration. The first (1) was the so-called relocation. In the second academic semester<sup>16</sup>, school directors asked parents and guardians of students approaching conclusion of the segment to fill in an ordered list with three choices of schools for relocation of their children, provided they were registered in the same registration pole. On the basis of these choices, the schools used to agree with those requests, and the places at the receiving schools were distributed among those sending students.

The second step (2) consisted of the direct public offer of the remaining unfilled places on predefined dates. Each registration pole, with all its schools, used to meet at a common place, and the candidates for the unfilled places were handled via a computerized registration system. Students coming from outside the public municipal system could also enter.

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<sup>13</sup> What is denominated “Fundamental Education”, in Brazil, is the nine compulsory initial grades attended as of the age of six.

<sup>14</sup> Typically, the changes of school occur more frequently in the transitions between pre-school education and fundamental education, or between the 5th and 6th years of fundamental school.

<sup>15</sup> The system was slightly altered from 2009 to 2010, with the introduction of a first phase of computerized, centralized registration, to which parents and guardians fill an ordinal list of five preferences for allocation of their dependents. This procedure, however, is only valid for students entering the municipal school system. The others continue basically subject to the same process as before. It is supposed that the centralized, random distribution of the first place is going to have some impact on aspects of the school’s justification in the municipal system. A specific study about the theme is in progress, with the very recent access to data referring to the quintuple school list of choice of parents and subsequent allocation of students resulting from this. It is intended to conduct a longitudinal study with a focus on the school trajectories, after this alteration, which constitutes a natural experiment.


<sup>16</sup> In Brazil, the academic year is divided into two semesters.

A third step (3) occurred directly in the schools, provided that these still had places, after the previous phases. In this phase, the school principals were directly responsible for the enrollment procedures. Finally, the existence of the fourth phase (4) can be considered, which takes place throughout the school year, also directly in the schools.

As it can be observed, it is not exactly a deregulated process. Rules and formal procedures are established<sup>17</sup>. The result, however, easily perceptible by means of simple visits to schools, suggests absence of randomness. The schools tend towards a certain socioeconomic homogeneity. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, this flagrant outcome cannot be overshadowed by the regional distribution of social inequality, considering the peculiarities of the Rio model of residential segregation.

However, one could identify certain gaps in each of these steps of the student transfer process that allow discretion on the part of the school directors and school bureaucracies in relation to the “selection of students”. Such disguised selection practices were observed, especially in the high prestige schools, most sought by parents and include the range from virtuous and vicious circles that begin in pre-school institutions, as well as the transfer of students to schools of a similar reputation, to the susceptibility of the school bureaucracies to neo-patrimonialist and clientelist influences<sup>18</sup>.

This study focuses on some evidence that shows the access pattern to the first segment of fundamental education and the patterns of student transfer during this segment:



<sup>17</sup> There is an established rule that siblings of enrolled students have an assured place in the same school. The perception is that this rule tends to strengthen a certain transmission of advantages, even though it is quite rational from the operational point of view for families.

<sup>18</sup> Qualitative studies (Brito & Costa, 2010; Lannes, 2011) have found strong results in this direction. The pre-test with 30 families, in Rio de Janeiro, the household survey about the subject, equally impose the consideration of concepts in the understanding of the phenomenon of school place distribution. With regard to the definition of neo-patrimonialism and clientelism, see Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002).

The study of such patterns can offer some clues about the effect of residential segregation and mechanisms related to the functioning of a hidden quasi-market for the distribution of students among public schools with different performances.

## Evidence in the Rio de Janeiro municipal public system

### *Data, variables and analytical approach*

For the development of this study, use was made of the data regarding the city's municipal education system, that is, the "Estudo Longitudinal da Geração Escolar 2005" - GERES, 2005 [Longitudinal Study of School Generation]. GERES, for a period of four years, beginning in 2005, tested the same sample of students in municipal, state, federal and private schools in Reading and Mathematics, also accompanying their socio-demographic data and collecting systematic information about their schools (Franco, Brooke and Alves, 2008).

The analytical approach involves estimation of multivariate models of logistical regression, considering two educational outcomes related to the dynamic of the quasi-market for schools. The first analyzes the access of students from the municipal system to schools with high values in the Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica - IDEB<sup>19</sup> [Basic Education Development Index], created by the federal government in 2005. For this purpose, a dependent variable was constructed that indicates whether the student had access, in the second year of Fundamental School, to a school in the city of Rio de Janeiro with good performance (upper tertile of the IDEB) or not. It is worth stressing that the study involved 30 municipal schools, participants in the GERES in Rio de Janeiro.

On the other hand, the second outcome was related to the flow of students among the municipal schools of Rio de Janeiro. In the second step, the analyses were subdivided into schools with high performance according to the national indicator of quality and those with low performance, and it was constructed a variable indicating whether the students remained or not in the schools during the whole first segment of fundamental education. It is to be stressed that the interpretation of this variable may be complex,

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<sup>19</sup> Basic Education Development Index, measured by national, external assessment, combined with school progression indicators.

depending on the type of school in which the student was studying. For example, if the student attended a high-performance school, and, at some moment of the first segment of fundamental education, left it, this leaving can be interpreted as a selection mechanism on the part of the school. However, if the student attended a low performance school, his leaving may indicate family mobilization in search of higher quality schools. Therefore, the analyses did not discard the fact that the flow of students among schools, as much those of high prestige as those of low prestige, may be the consequence of other factors unrelated to family mobilization, such as, change of residence or, in rare cases, truancy.

On the basis of this approach, estimation was made of the effects of the family characteristics and household context on the increase or decrease in chances of being in one of the educational outcomes considered herein. Chart 1 and Table 1 present, respectively, the definition and descriptive statistic of the variables used in the analyses.

**Chart 1: Variables Used in the Investigation**

	Variables	Type	Description
Dependent Variables			
	Access to the school	Dummy	Indicates whether the student obtained a place in a municipal school in the city of Rio de Janeiro with good performance in the second year of fundamental education (1=yes/0=no)
	Left a school with high performance	Dummy	Indicates whether the student left a municipal school in the city of Rio de Janeiro with high performance during the first segment of fundamental education (1=yes/0=no)
	Left a school with low performance	Dummy	Indicates whether the student left a municipal school in the city of Rio de Janeiro with low performance during the first segment of fundamental education (1=yes/0=no)



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Explicative Variables

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Characteristics of the student and family	Failure	Dummy	Indicates whether the student has been failed (1=yes/0=no)
	White	Dummy	Indicates the student is White (1=yes/0=no)
	Pre-school	Dummy	Indicates whether the student attended a pre-school (1=yes/0=no)
	Mother's educational level	Ordinal	Measurements related to the mother's schooling level
	Presence of <i>favelas</i> within 100 m radius	Dummy	Indicates whether, in a 100 m radius of the students home, there is a favela. (1=yes/0=no)
Characteristics of the household context	Index of Social Development	Continuous	Measurement related to the social and economic conditions in the vicinity of the students home within a radius of 100m. Positive values indicate better social and economic conditions in the surroundings.

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**Table 1: Descriptive statistic of the variables used**

	N	Min	Max	Mean/%	DP
Failure	2,740	-	-	31%	-
White	2,740	-	-	30%	-
Pre-School	2,740	-	-	70%	-
Mother's educational level	2,536	1	5	2.56	0.93
Presence of <i>favelas</i> within a 100 m radius	2,740	-	-	26%	-
Index of Social Development	2,466	-2.75	6.00	0	1

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## Results: access to the school

This section presents the results of the estimation of the logistical regression for the variable indicating whether the student had access, in the second year of fundamental education, to a school with good performance in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Table 2 presents the odds ratios (O.R.) estimated for the variables included in the estimated model.

**Table 2: Estimated model for the “access, in the 2nd year of fundamental education, to a school with good performance in the city of Rio de Janeiro” variable**

	O.R.	p-value
White	1.23	0.089
Pre-School	1.40	0.015
Mother’s educational level	1.33	0.000
Presence of a <i>favela</i> within a 100 m radius	0.78	0.099
Index of Social Development	1.50	0.000

As observed, the results indicate that white students have 23% more chance of having access to a good performance school at the beginning of fundamental education in comparison to non-white students. With regard to the mother’s schooling, the higher the level of education, the better the chance of her children having access to a good performance school. In the same way, having attended a pre-school increases the chances of having access to a good performance school by 40%. On the other hand, the variables related to the characteristics of the household context present quite interesting results. They show that the greater the social development in the vicinity of the household, the greater the chance the student will have of access to a good performance school: the increase in standard deviation in the measurement of the ISD indicates an increase in chance of 50%. Different results are found for families living in *favelas*: the chance of access to a quality municipal school is 28% greater for families living in regular districts.

In summary, the center-periphery effect may be indicated by the ISD of the students' area of residence. However, an effect of residence in or near *favelas*, albeit weakly significant, is proven and remains significant. Previous access to a place in education prior to obligatory schooling (still not universalized) may suggest integration to more affluent social systems, while the mother's educational level presents the expected effect, and being white signifies worrying effects of ascriptive segregation, given the controls, cultural and economic elements.

### *Results: flow of students*

This work aims at identifying factors related to the flows of students entering and leaving schools, even though the small database and the initial school years on which it reports did not encourage the undertaking, given that it was not expected to observe an intense flow that would allow the finding of explicative patterns of the phenomenon in such a precocious schooling phase. However, the result was surprising. Table 3 presents the odds ratios – OR – estimated for the variables included in the models, considering the different dependent variables in the models below.

The model consisted of the estimation of the relative chances of permanence, after an initial enrollment, in a school of the upper tertile or the two lower tertiles of the distribution of the sample of schools analyzed. Once again, it deals with a flow of children in the initial phase of schooling. Supposedly, rather random factors should operate, such as change of residence, reflecting irregularly on schools of high or low performance/prestige, and reducing the chance of finding significance in the factors chosen.

The differences between the two models are significant and must be interpreted considering the different mechanisms of active quasi-markets for schools. In both models, the effect of the variable that informs “Whether the student was failed” is relevant, in the sense of increasing the chance of the student leaving the school: for the low-performance schools, the chance is 323%, and for high-prestige ones, 762%. White students have greater chance of leaving a low-performance school than non-white ones, whereas, for high-performance schools, this variable is not significant. The same occurs for the variable, “Mother's schooling level”: more schooling increases the chance of students leaving low-performance schools, but the

mother’s education has no effect on leaving high-performance ones. Not having attended a pre-school increases the chance of students leaving a good performance school by 69% in comparison to the students who did attend one. In the case of low-performance schools, the effect is not significant. For the context variables, the fact of students living near or in a *favela* exerts a significant impact on their permanence in low-performance schools: the chance of students who live in a district leaving these schools is 54% greater than that of those who are *favela* dwellers.

**Table 3: Estimated models for the “Left a high-performance school” and “Left a low-performance school” variables**

		RC	p-value
Schools with low performance	Failure	4.23	0.000
	White	1.49	0.003
	Attended a pre-school	0.89	0.421
	Mother’s educational level	1.23	0.002
	Presence of a <i>favela</i> within a 100 m radius	0.65	0.001
	Index of social development	1.18	0.005
Schools with good performance	Failure	8.62	0.000
	White	1.40	0.202
	Attended the pre-school	0.59	0.075
	Mother’s educational level	1.11	0.438
	Presence of a <i>favela</i> within a 100 m radius	0.96	0.901
	Index of social development	1.35	0.015

## Conclusion

The enunciated problem sought to relate elements of segmentation manifested in the territorial distribution of inequalities, along with what was denominated a “hidden quasi-market for schools”, in the conditioning of the phenomenon of school hierarchization and inequality of opportunities. It is understood that there are iniquitous mechanisms determining access and flows of students to schools in the same system, but presenting contrasting hierarchical positions. Traditionally, the effects of school choice are observed in the ambit of the family, and these are not discarded in the study. There is, however, as it has been sought to demonstrate, a dimension of the choice of students/families on the part of the schools. It would be necessary to approach the problem not only from the angle of demand, but also from that of supply. Structural constraints, actors and choices are not present in the understanding of the picture only from the side of the family. All the signs indicate that educational bureaucracies will form a strong role, shaping opportunities and actively selecting the beneficiaries. As suggested in this study, the direction of this complex amalgam of forces leads to the maintenance of inequalities, through deregulation of the process. The structure of territorial inequalities seems to intensify the general trend.

Once again, it is pointed out that this modest study is dedicated to dealing with a phenomenon little recognized in the context of Brazilian education, which has issues strongly conditioned by dichotomic models that contrast public vs. private, taking the latter sphere as a bearer of virtues threatened by their antagonistic correspondent. Although conflicts of this order are not disdained, it seems imperative to more decisively explore the unequal structure of opportunities rigidly established in education under direct State control. When conflicts arise around the world about initiatives that reduce the autonomy of the educational bureaucracy at school level, by means of a set of control measures, accountability and regulation, results, like those obtained, provide an alert regarding the potential harm of the absence of careful regulation of the supply of goods as scarce as free education of a good standard.

This study was the first attempt to map this phenomenon with a sample of schools from the GERES (2005) study. Future studies will benefit from large scale databases, far more comprehensive in terms of geographical and social space, which will allow deepening of the scope of the approach presented herein.

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PART II  
**MEGA-EVENTS**



## Mega Sporting Events in Brazil: transformation and commodification of the cities<sup>1</sup>

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

*Orlando Alves dos Santos Junior*

### Introduction

Brazil is currently experiencing a crucial moment of transition that raises the need to update the urban question and its translation into planning and management models for its cities. Urban Surplus absorption through urban transformation is being reconfigured with alterations to the classical pattern of conservative-modernisation that had always dominated the inclusion of the country in the expansion of the world economy and the holding of mega sporting events – the World Cup in 2012 and the Olympics in 2014 – has been performing a crucial role in this process. The Brazilian cities are, in effect, being included in the world circuits that seek alternative temporal-spaces for the permanent crisis of the overaccumulation of financial capitalism. And Brazil is conspicuous by containing attractive frontiers due to the cycle of prosperity and stability it is enjoying, combined with the existence of urban assets that can be exploited and integrated into the internationalised circuits of financial valorisation. For this reason, in our cities, one can observe a new cycle of mercantilization that combines the known urban accumulation based on the action of local mercantile capital with the new internationalised capital circuits that have been transforming the cities into commodities. A new coalition emerges from mercantile interests that transform and recycle the

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urban power that has been running the Brazilian cities as a field and object of the conservative-modernising alliance, threatening the advances of the urban reform project which began in the second half of the 1980s.

This article seeks to reflect on the economic and political changes in progress in the Brazilian cities and how they are deepening their mercantilization, creating new conditions for the circulation and reproduction of capital by the transformation of the prices and market institutions as a nucleus of the dynamic of organisation and urban territory appropriation. For such, it becomes necessary to introduce a new model of urban policies and a form of government of the cities that make this transition viable. In other words, it is exploiting the city as an object and field of businesses, capable, instead of administering it as social wealth whose equitable access must be promoted by the public policies. It is enabling the establishment and full development of mercantile relations in the use and appropriation of the city, instead of regulating the market forces to make them compatible with the promotion of the right to the city. At the centre of such changes are the mega sporting events and their transformation by the media into a political resource for legitimisation of the urban conservative-moderniser power, rendering continuity of the march of our passive revolution viable<sup>2</sup>.

## The emergence of entrepreneurial governance in the context of the core countries

The emergence of a new pattern of urban governance toward mercantilization of the city is not an eminently Brazilian phenomenon. Harvey (2005) sustains that we are witnessing a “reorientation of the postures of urban governance adopted in the last two decades in the advanced capitalist countries”, where “the ‘administrative’ approach, so characteristic of the 1960s”, is being “replaced by forms of initiating and ‘entrepreneurial’ action in the 70s and 80s.” (HARVEY, 2005, p. 167)

Entrepreneurial governance, according to Harvey (op. cit), is characterised by the following central elements:

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<sup>2</sup>The understanding of the particular paths and direction followed by Brazilian modernisation through the Gramscian concept of passive revolution, as well as its political consequences, have been proposed by Luis Werneck Vianna in various texts and books. See, for example, VIANNA (2004).

(i) The coalition of interests that sustain the entrepreneurial governance is founded on the “notion of ‘public-private partnership’, in which the traditional local initiative [the private initiative] is integrated with the uses of the local government powers, seeking and attracting external sources of finance, and new direct investments or new sources of employment”. (p. 172)

(ii) The entrepreneurial activities promoted by the public-private partnership, like all the other capitalist activities, are speculative, subordinated to the market, and, therefore, “subject to all the obstacles and risks associated to speculative developments, unlike rationally planned and co-ordinated development”. (p. 173)

(iii) The entrepreneurship would focus the intervention more in some specific areas of the city than in the whole territory. Here, the reference to “territory” encompasses the entire city, that is, economic projects involving housing, education, etc. of the set of parts of the city considered, whereas the reference to “place” concerns the improvement of the conditions of some specific places capable of attracting investments and leveraging economic development, such as the intervention in a convention centre, the construction of an industrial park, etc.

Following Harvey’s analysis (*op. cit*), there are various strategies for economic development activated by urban entrepreneurial governance. In view of the fact the focus of this article is centred on mega events, it is worth stressing a specific point linked to what Harvey denominated a strategy in relation to the “spatial division of consumption” (*op. cit.* p. 175), even though the different strategies do not exclude each other, and the unequal development of various cities and metropolitan regions depends “on the nature of the coalitions formed, the combination and pace of entrepreneurial strategies, specific resources (natural, human, locational) with which the metropolitan region is capable of working, and on the power of the competition” (*op. cit.* p. 178).

In the strategy linked to the spatial division of consumption, the investments focus on the quality of life of the city and involve the valorisation of degraded urban areas, cultural innovation, the physical improvement of the urban environment (including change to post-modernist styles of architecture and urban design), attractions for consumption (sports stadiums, convention centres, shopping centres, marinas, exotic

food courts) and entertainment (the organisation of urban spectacles on a temporary or permanent basis)...” Above all, the city has to appear to be an innovative place, stimulating, creative and safe to live in or visit, to have fun and consume. (HARVEY, 2005, p. 176)

It is evident that tourism and the promotion of mega events occupy a fundamental role here, exactly due to their capacity to attract people and merchandise, especially when there are unique events and innovative, stimulating activities.

The question, as Harvey points out, is that urban entrepreneurship also involves a certain type of interurban competition, in which each city seeks to gain and retain benefits in relation to others. It is understandable that, in this context, the dispute and competition among cities and countries to hold the mega sporting and cultural events of an international character, is ever fiercer.

From the point of view of the urban dynamic, Harvey sustains that there are various implications arising from the increasingly intense interurban competition and spread of entrepreneurship. Among these, the following are outstanding:

In the first place, “the emphasis on the creation of a favourable environment for business accentuated the importance of the location as a place of regulation concerning the supply of infrastructure, labour relations, environmental control, and even the taxation policy regarding international capital” (HARVEY, *op. cit.*, p. 180). One of the effects of this process was the increase in the spatial flexibility of companies and capital, promoted by the new urban entrepreneurship. But, paradoxically, this process had a homogenising effect on the cities, bearing in mind that the cities tend to adopt innovative strategies aimed at making themselves more attractive as centres of culture and consumption, which are rapidly imitated in other places, often making the competitive advantages achieved ephemeral.

Secondly, there has been a proliferation of management practices aimed at the promotion of speculative projects, with the objective of attracting capital. And here, specifically, one can verify emphasis on tourism, the production and consumption of cultural spectacles, and the promotion of sporting events.

Finally, in third place, the governance of the city seems to resemble more and more that of private companies, that is, of an entrepreneurial nature. From this perspective, what is in focus is not the city as a whole,

but the places, its areas capable of offering better economic returns, which are not rare and in detriment to other spaces, very often in a process of decadence or abandonment.

There are many contradictions in this process that opens up new possibilities for political action. Without going deeply into these contradictions and opportunities here, it is worth highlighting an important political effect indicated by Harvey. For the author, the attempt to create a positive image of the city, required by the interurban competition, could entail the construction of local identity and engagement of the different social groups in the discussions that involve the urban interventions, opening up possibilities of politicization processes arising from the city project.

But this transformation process of urban governance from the perspective of entrepreneurial governance also seems to affect Brazilian cities, which, like all other cities, also have their specificities.

## The urban entrepreneurial governments in the passive Brazilian revolution

A hypothesis can be made for reflection on the reconstruction of the conservative coalition that had been commanding the expansion of Brazilian capitalism since the 1950s, supported by the tripod, international capital, State capital and national capital, now under the hegemony of financial capital (international and national) and its logic, with the reinforcement and internationalisation of major national economic groups. This is the most relevant fact in understanding the paradox of the period experienced by Brazil, in which the State strongly intervenes in the economy, but in a pattern that could be identified as neo-liberal Keynesianism. In other words, the highly favourable international conditions have permitted this traditional alliance to be reconstituted, catering for the interests of governability and reproduction in the power of a new political group, at the same time in which the State, by means of its intervention, actively promotes the internal conditions to overcome the crisis of overaccumulation in evidence until then with the ending of the “developmentalist era”. In the national ambit, the neo-Keynesian policies reconstruct the conditions of capital and labour force circulation, at the same time, in which they subordinate the decisions regarding the use of public funds to the logic of the market and interests of major businessmen; at the same time the policies of effective demand



activation, via the creation and expansion of consumer credit, income transfer, the real minimum salary increase, etc., express redistributive policies that affect on the social reproduction conditions. The local ambit is where the neo-liberal policies seem to emerge at full strength, resulting in the pattern identified herein as neo-liberal Keynesianism.

In this context, what is the role of the urban process in this new expansion cycle of capitalism in Brazil? Brazilian urban capitalism had been performing a frontier role (TAVARES; FIORI, 1998) in the management of social type of conflict and support for the sacred conservative political alliance (LESSA; DAIN, 1982), which, historically, has been commanding the expansion of capitalist relations. The frontier role implied on the use of the occupation of the urban territory as a damper for the social conflict of a capitalism that promoted massive migration to the city of the rural population, forming a gigantic industrial reserve army, which was only possible due to the use of the city as a frontier open to occupation by the worker. The result was the constitution of cities as extensive population settlements, where, for a long time, precarious services and infrastructure, illegality and irregularity of land ownership predominated. On the other hand, as support for the sacred alliance, the city allowed the constitution of a vigorous circuit of urban accumulation, protected and guaranteed by the State, in which companies engaged in public works construction, housing construction, service concessions, etc. embodied local mercantile interests displaced from the tripod by the presence of major international industrial firms.

In this new cycle of capitalist development, the urban process continues to have the role of support for the alliance of classes, but the presence of new international financial interests in this coalition creates the need for a new management pattern for the city, in which private property, and, consequently, the self-regulated market must be the sole mechanisms of access to urban land. For this reason, it becomes necessary for the city to be the object of a new management pattern, whose principal feature is the uprooting of the mercantile relations for land use and occupation, housing production and provision of services, social conventions (private property with jurisdiction and their own institutions not linked to non-mercantile values), political conventions (clientelism or universalism of procedures) and cultural conventions (ideological cognitive models of social representation of the urban question and urban policy, such as the

transformation of a shantytown as a right in business) that limit the full functioning of the self-regulated market.

In terms of Harvey's ideas, we can say that, since the long period 1980-2010, there is a dispute in progress for a new regulatory framework of the cities, especially the large ones, towards their full mercantilization, as the basis for constitution of a new structured coherence<sup>3</sup> (HARVEY, 2005) or *of the growth machine* (LOGAN; MOLOTCH, 1996; MOLOTCH, 1976) or of an urban regime (PRATCHETT; WILSON, 1996; STOKER, 1995; STONE, 1989), distinct concepts with which we can characterise urban policies towards their transformation into a spatial and institutional base for the new conditions of full capital circulation. For the understanding of the fundamentals of this hypothesis, these ideas deserve two theoretical observations based on the works of Polanyi (2000), D. Harvey (2005a, 2012), and Theodore, Peck and Brenner (2009).

Deep remercantilization of the spheres of the reproduction of life is what characterises and expresses the concept of neo-liberalisation. Contrary to common sense, its accomplishment demands not the elimination of public regulation of capital reproduction, as there is no stabilised space for capital reproduction, unless, annexed to the market, there are institutions to regulate the mercantile relations. But the regulatory institutions must be designed and function based and oriented by market logic. The best illustration of this regulatory characteristic of the new institutions created by neo-liberalisation is the substitution of the preservationist conception in the environmental debate by the conception based on the polluter-payer principle.

But the remercantilization, in turn, obeys a process of struggle or transformation that does not evolve in a coherent manner. For this reason, neo-liberalization occurs in a differentiated, heterogeneous, and even contradictory, manner on the planes of the instances, scales and places (THEODORE; PECK; BRENNER, 2009). Also, it is a process that occurs under the effects of the dependence on trajectory, that is, it not only

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<sup>3</sup> Harvey refers to the structured coherence "in relation to the production and consumption in a particular space. Em relação à produção e ao consumo em um determinado espaço. This structured coherence [...] mitigates the forms and technologies of production (patterns of use of resources by the interindustrial connections, forms of organisation, size of companies), the technologies, the quantities and qualities of consumption (pattern and life style, as much of the workers as of the bourgeoisie), the patterns of demand and supply of labour (hierarchies of the skills of the Labour and social processes of reproduction, to guarantee the supply of these) and the physical and social infrastructures." (HARVEY, 2005:146).

depends on the starting point (degree of regulation and social protection reached in the previous phase), but also on the concrete processes and results obtained in the neo-liberalization and resistance processes. In this sense, the ideological and historical roots reached previously count a lot. In societies that instructed broad, deep-rooted welfare regimes may have created a non-mercantile, or even an anti-mercantile, culture about aspects and spheres of social reproduction that can be constituted in resistance to the remercantilization process. One can think for example, of certain aspects of the city. The conquest of urban transport as a social right to be guaranteed by the public authority may hinder its transformation into private services organised exclusively by mercantile logic. Moreover, one can think in this direction, in a slightly less generic manner, about how much the neo-liberalization trajectory of one city may be different from that of another due to the fact that the existing urban legislation in one hand, over time, absorbed ideas of Hygienism, of protection of the urban environment (built or natural), of preservation of cultural values, etc., in case these ideas have been rooted in the society as collective references, whereas in another, either the legislation was not drawn up according to such principles or these were not rooted socially.

For Harvey (2005a), neo-liberalization is a “long march”, on which strategies based on force (e.g. in Chile under Pinochet) are combined with others founded on the construction of consent. But the world is being submitted to the process of neo-liberalization more by the latter path, that is, by the diffusion and affirmation of the neo-liberal conception of the world, whose pillars are, on the one hand, the predominance of the values related to the individual’s right to freedom, especially in relation to the defence of private property. Thus, an inversion is in progress in the hierarchy of values that founded the construction of the social institutions for social regulation and protection that constituted the Welfare State that, especially in the post-Second World War period, expressed another consent on the part of society in which individuals accept to concede part of their full individual liberty associated to the market in favour of engagement in the system of obligations and responsibilities that would ensure the cohesion of the society.

Considering the importance of the strategy of consent in the affirmation of the neo-liberal vision of the world, reflecting on the eventual role of the city as a laboratory for experimentation of neo-liberal policies gains much

importance. In the historical process of the construction of the regulatory and protective conception of the Welfare State, the city, in the first years of the XX century, had already served as a laboratory for experimentation that legitimised and diffused conceptions and representations of the social question that later (in the post-Second World War period) would constitute the ideological, political and cognitive bases of social protection and market regulation. The construction and diffusion of the collective perception of the causes of the Hygienist crisis and the social crisis arising from pauperism as a social fact instead of a moral one had significant importance.

Therefore, it is possible that Brazil is experiencing combined processes of “Keynesianism” on the national plane and neo-liberalization on the plane of the metropolises. Also, one can watch different processes among the country’s metropolises. In the same metropolis, one can have simultaneously differentiated processes, with municipalities experiencing more advanced processes of neo-liberalization and others living other moments. Finally, in the same municipality, it is possible to find differentiated processes of neo-liberalization according to the instances that shape the local urban reality.

## The Conservative-Modernizer Urban Power and its multiple political grammars

For these considerations, it may be interesting to incorporate the idea of transitions to take account of this process of change that occurs in a heterogeneous, differentiated and contradictory manner. This plural conception is important theoretically and methodologically due to the existence in Brazil of an alternative project that represents a counter-hegemony in the current urban policy, linked to the ideal of the right to the city (Harvey, 2012), whose major expression is the Fórum Nacional de Reforma Urbana [National Forum for Urban Reform], a coalition that covers movements, non-governmental organisations, professional associations, intellectuals and scholars.

The hypothesis defended in this article is that the hegemony of the urban policy is disputed by multiple political grammars present in the urban policies: clientelism, patrimonialism, corporativism, and entrepreneurship. These political grammars fragment the public machine into various decision centres that act according to the interests of those who command each one of them.

The urban entrepreneurship constitutes the emerging logic driven by the emergence of the complex international circuit of accumulation and economic and political agents organized around the transformation of the cities into speculative projects founded on public-private partnerships, as described by David Harvey. This circuit is formed of a myriad of interests, protagonized by consulting firms (dealing with projects, research and architecture), companies of production and consumption of tourism services, banks and finance companies specialised in mortgages, companies that promote events, among others. Such interests have as local correspondence the new local elites, bearers of liberal ideologies that seek resources and bases for legitimacy for the project of urban competition. The new elites seek political representation through the use of urban marketing techniques, translated into exemplary works of the “new city”, which is facilitated by the fragility of the political parties. The urban policy begins to become centralised on the attraction of medium and mega events, and in the making of investments for renewal of degraded urban areas, priorities that allow the legitimisation of such elites and construct the alliances with the interests of the international entrepreneurial complex. In the majority of the cases, this orientation is materialised in the constitution of pockets of technical management, directly linked to the executive heads and composed of persons recruited from outside the public sector. Therefore, the logic of urban entrepreneurship, which is intended to be more efficient, implies abandonment and even devaluation of the bureaucratic organisation understood as the technical body linked to the universalism of procedure and subordinate to the democratic decision process.

This logic leads and hegemonizes the new urban coalition, also formed of portions of the other logics, the clientelism, the patrimonialism and the corporativism, resulting in a quite peculiar urban governance pattern, where the planning, regulation and routine of the actions are substituted by a pattern of intervention by exception, with the public administrative bodies and institutional channels of increasingly fragile participation.

In Brazil, as was well pointed out by RIBEIRO and SANTOS JUNIOR (2011, p. 4), the urban accumulation is undergoing a process of reconfiguration through the introduction of the cities “into the world circuits that seek new frontiers of expansion of the accumulation, in view of the permanent financial crisis of capitalism”. Brazil displays attractive urban frontiers, as much due to the cycle of prosperity and economic stability as

the existence of urban assets susceptible to being exploited, that is, bought at devalued prices, and integrated to the internationalised circuits of financial valorisation. The Brazilian urban context is characterised by “a new cycle of mercantilization that combines the known practices of urban accumulation based on the action of local mercantile capital with the new practices employed by a new coalition of urban interests towards its transformation into a commodity.” (RIBEIRO; SANTOS JUNIOR, *op. cit.*, p. 4)

But, although the insertion of the urban accumulation in the globalised financial circuits demands new management patterns for the territory, the analysis of what has been occurring in many Brazilian cities indicates, however, partial maintenance of the management patterns linked to the conservative-modernisation that characterised the national urban development, resulting in an entrepreneurial governance with very particular features in relation to other countries that have been experiencing similar processes. In effect, one can observe in Brazilian cities the emergence of an entrepreneurial governance that maintains the old patrimonialist practices of urban accumulation and representation based on clientelism, and, at times, incorporates part of the universalist discourse regarding citizenship, at the same time as it promotes new practices oriented by the transformation of the cities into commodities. Such a combination results in a peculiar entrepreneurial pattern of governance, founded on urban entrepreneurship, where the planning and regulation are substituted by a pattern of intervention by exception (OLIVEIRA, 2003), with the public administrative bodies and increasingly fragile institutional channels of democratic participation.

In synthesis, there is an emergence of a new coalition of social forces in the metropolises, expressing a block of interests with respect to an entrepreneurial governance, in alliance with old dominant coalitions (characterised by localism, parochialism and clientelism), also involving, as a minority, sectors of the popular progressive segments. This new coalition of forces is sustained by fractions of the property capital in alliance with fractions of financial capital, political party leaders and part of the State’s techno-bureaucracy, and would be strongly linked to some forms of urban intervention, especially those linked to the restructuring of the central areas, the promotion of the mega events, the major infrastructure works (in particular, highways and basic sanitation works), urbanisation and ordination of the shantytowns, and infrastructure linked to property tourism.

A good case to reflect about the emergence and acting of this new entrepreneurial coalition in the present context refers exactly to the environment for preparation of the Brazilian cities to receive the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.

In the preparation process for the mega events, the public administration has had a central role in the creation of an environment propitious for the investments, mainly those linked to the property capital sectors, the public works contractors, the construction companies, the hotel sector, transport, entertainments and communications. Thus, one perceives the strategic character of the infrastructure investments scheduled for the 2014 World Cup, with over 50% of the funds allocated to urban infrastructure, especially transport (urban roadways, bus expressways, underground train system), 25% scheduled for the renovation of ports and airports, and only 25% allocated to the construction and renovation of sports facilities.

Such investments are fundamental to make possible the new conditions of urban accumulation in Brazilian cities. In other words, the urban restructuring of the World Cup host cities must contribute to the creation of new conditions of production, circulation and consumption, centred on some important traditional economic sectors, cutting-edge sectors and the tertiary sector: for example, the property market, the credit finance system, the petroleum complex, the production chain of cultural events, the tourism sector, and the automobile sector – the latter boosted by the new conditions of accumulation arising from the investments in mass transport.

Besides this, the start of the preparatory works for holding the aforementioned mega events have raised various questions regarding the impacts of the urban interventions on the cities, with a special focus on the processes of violation of the human right to housing, involving various eviction processes.

Because of all these, it appears evident that the interventions linked to the World Cup and Olympics involve more profound transformations in the urban dynamic of the cities, making it necessary to deepen the analysis of the impacts of these mega sporting events, based on the hypothesis presented here of the emergence of the urban entrepreneurial governance pattern and the new round of mercantilization of the city.

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## The Right to Housing, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics: reflections on the case of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil<sup>1</sup>

*Orlando Alves dos Santos Junior*  
*Mauro Rego Monteiro dos Santos*

Since the moment it was announced Brazil had been chosen as the host country for the 2014 World Cup and Rio de Janeiro as the host city for the 2016 Olympics, the major press, politicians and various analysts have stressed the opportunities for expanding investments in the 12 cities selected to receive these events, mainly highlighting the possibility of dealing with their problems, such as urban mobility, recuperation of degraded spaces for housing, and developing commerce and tourism, as in the case of the central area of Rio de Janeiro<sup>2</sup>.

However, the start of the preparatory works for the holding of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics has raised various questions regarding the impacts of the urban interventions on these cities, particularly the risks of violating the human right to housing, involving various removal processes. In fact, various studies have associated the holding of the mega events to direct or indirect expulsion of low income people from valorised areas or those recently incorporated into the circuit of valorisation of the property capital through the above investments<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> This article was published in English in the Journal *Territorio*, number 64, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> A version of this article was published in SANTOS JUNIOR; SANTOS, 2012.

<sup>3</sup> Here we highlight two comprehensive studies about the impacts of the mega events on housing, conducted using systematization of the experiences of various countries with mega events are: COHRE, 2007 and the Relatório da Relatora Especial do Direito Humano à Moradia da ONU, Raquel Rolnik em ROLNIK, 2009.

But, beyond the removals, it seems there are more profound transformations in progress in the urban dynamic of the cities, involving, on the one hand, new processes of mercantilization of the city, and on the other, new patterns of relation between the State and the economic and social agents.

In this context, the aim of this article is to discuss the impacts of the mega events using the hypothesis of the emergence of a new pattern of urban governance and formation of a new politico- social coalition – expressing an alliance of specific classes – that sustains this governance, in which the large projects and the mega events have central importance.

The approach of this work, taking as reference the reflections of David Harvey (2004, 2005 and 2012) and his theory of the unequal geographical developments, discusses some of the questions regarding the urban policies employed by the public authority and the removals justified on the basis of preparation of the city to receive the World Cup and Olympics.

## The Mega Sporting Events and the Right to Housing in Rio de Janeiro

In the preparation process for the mega events, the public administration has had a central role in the creation of a propitious environment for investments, mainly those linked to the sectors of property capital, public works contractors, construction companies, hotels, transport, entertainment and communications.

From this perspective, the public authority has adopted various measures linked to investments in these sectors, such as: exemption from taxes and finance with reduced interest rates; transfer of property, above all through public-private partnerships - PPPs and consortiums for urban operations; and removal of low income communities from areas to be revitalised. In fact, the existence of the lower classes in areas of interest to these economic agents becomes an obstacle to the process of appropriation of these spaces to the circuits of valorisation capital linked to the production and management of the city. Such an obstacle has effectively been faced by the public authority through removal processes, involving resettlement of the families to peripheral areas, compensation or simply evictions. In practice, the tendency is for this process to constitute a veritable transfer of property in the possession of the lower classes to some capital sectors.

Thus, it can be said that these removals are processes of urban despoilment that express what Harvey (2004) denominated accumulation by dispossession, where land used at value of use by its occupiers is despoiled and appropriated at value of exchange and integrated into the circuit of property valorisation by capital, by means of the acquisition of these assets at a low price and their transformation into valorised assets, whether by public investments in urbanisation or by the effects of expulsion of the poor people from these areas.

The case of Rio de Janeiro is quite illustrative of this process, not only due to the number of families evicted, but because of the mechanisms of dispossession and deprivation adopted, as well as due to the places reserved for the low income families in the city. Most of the time, the removal processes have made it impossible for families to remain in the same locality or even in the same neighbourhood, whether due to the distance of the majority of the housing developments offered for resettlement of the communities affected, or due to the amounts offered as compensation or assisted purchase, which are based on the value of the improvements and not that of the market.

Next, some cases of removal, or threat of it, in the Rio de Janeiro municipality are identified, ones which occurred during 2011, derived from the preparation of the city to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics<sup>4</sup>, as well as characterised by violations of the human right to the city and to housing. The systematisation of the cases reported here are based on the document issued by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to the City (Projeto Relatores da Plataforma dos Direitos Humanos Econômicos, Sociais, Culturais e Ambientais)<sup>5</sup> after visiting the

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<sup>4</sup> It is to be stressed that the community is threatened with removal are not restricted to areas scheduled for construction and renovation of infrastructure and equipment for the sporting events various communities situated in the valorised areas of the city have also been threatened with removal on the arguments they are the areas of environmental risk, as examples of which, we may cite the communities of Estradinha (Botafogo – South Zone) and Morro dos Prazeres (Santa Tereza – near the City Centre).

<sup>5</sup> The mission of the Special Rapporteur (Investigative Committee) of the Right to the City was undertaken between 18th and 20th May, and its central aim was to investigate eventual situations of violation of the right to housing arising from the preparation works for the aforementioned mega sporting events. The mission was conducted in partnership with the Comitê Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro, Conselho Popular do Rio de Janeiro, Fórum Nacional de Reforma Urbana and other organisations. The Relatório da Missão [Report of the Mission] can be accessed via <http://www.dhescbrasil.org.br/>

Rio de Janeiro municipality (due to denunciations made by The Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics and the news published by the press) and cases accompanied by the Public Defender's Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The communities were grouped according to the criterion, the type of justification used for removal, which, in the case of Rio de Janeiro, are concentrated along four axes: i) the works for urban mobility with the construction of the Transcarioca and Transoeste BRTs (Express Bus Systems); ii) the works for installation or renovation of sports facilities and equipment; iii) the works aimed at promoting tourism; and iv) areas of environmental risk.

### Communities removed, or threatened with removal, due to the construction of the Transcarioca and Transoeste bus expressways (BRTs)<sup>6</sup>

Most of the removals are linked to the works for the transport corridors. But, it is noteworthy that, due to the lack of transparency on the part of the City Hall, there is no access to the total number of families and communities that are at risk of removal. Various works related to the building of the BRTs had still not commenced when this article was concluded.

Communities removed or threatened with removal: Comunidade do Campinho; Comunidade da Rua Domingos Lopes (Madureira); Comunidade da Rua Quáxima (Madureira); Comunidade Vila das Torres (Madureira); Comunidade Arroio Pavuna (Jacarepaguá); Comunidade Restinga; Comunidade Vila Harmonia; Comunidade Vila Recreio II; Vila Autódromo; Comunidade Asa Branca (Curicica); Comunidade Vila Azaleia (Curicica); Taboinha (Vargem Grande). Total families removed or threatened with removal: 7185.

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<sup>6</sup> The Transcarioca BRT – Express Bus System connects the neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca to International Airport and the Transoeste BRT connects the neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca to the western part of the city.

## Communities removed or threatened with removal due to works for installation or renovation of sporting facilities and equipment

Such communities of those situated in areas where sports facilities and equipment are being constructed and/or renovated for the forthcoming mega sporting events, such as the renovation of Maracanã Stadium.

## Removals due to works aimed at the promotion of tourism

The port region, in the city's central area, was abandoned by the Municipal City Hall for decades. It includes various public buildings belonging to the Federal, State and Municipal Governments, which are empty, thus not fulfilling any social function. Several of these buildings have been occupied by homeless people, who, today, are under threat due to the mega project for urban restructuring currently being executed in the region, namely Porto Maravilha. The port zone will store some equipment for the 2016 Olympics, so as to facilitate the implementation of the project. At the end of 2009, the Operação Urbana Consorciada da Região do Porto was created, by means of which public resources and public lands would be allocated to a large property development, in detriment to the residents, in fact, excluded since the beginning of the ambitious, luxurious plan to develop the area.

## Removals from areas deemed to present environmental risk

Despite the City Hall's allegations that its reasons are not linked directly to the holding of the World Cup and the Olympics, the situation of these communities is an illustrative case of the threat processes linked to the beautification of the city, in which the pressure of removal on various communities is intensified, in general justified by the argument of living in risk areas. The residents of these areas denounce that, behind the removals, there are major property interests.

Despite some specificities in the format and procedures adopted by the Municipal City Hall in the removal processes, it can be said that there exists a pattern of action on the part of the municipal public authority towards low income families resident in informal settlements.

## The action of the Rio de Janeiro City Hall in the Removal Processes

In all the cases identified, one can perceive the existence of procedures that can be characterised as clear disrespect of the right to the city, especially the right to housing, and also other social and individual human rights, such as the rights to education, security, protection of the children and youths, assistance for the destitutes, health, sanitation and environmental concerns.

Attention is drawn to the manner in which the evictions occur. In general, they are by means of court orders without fulfilling the principle of due legal process, without there being a full right to defence and appeal by these people. Furthermore, the existing contradictions and conflicts, in the carrying out of these orders, between the Municipal Attorney's Office, in general, the active protagonist in the removal actions, and the Municipal Housing Secretariat, usually more open to negotiations involving the transfer of residents to other housing units of a social nature.

It is perceived that it is a scenario of urban interventions of great intensity, linked to the preparation of the city to host the mega sporting events, which have been causing, or have the potential to cause, intense processes of property valorisation. In general, these interventions do not cover the whole city – the selective interventions in some areas, especially those of the centre and the axis from Barra da Tijuca (area strongly elitist) to the western part of the city. These interventions affect various areas, in general, consolidated, occupied by low income people, who presented as a characteristic fact of having been relatively devalued and neglected by the property sector throughout the last few years, which has been reinforced by the very fact of being occupied by low-income populations. Such areas become of interest to the property sector precisely because of the urban interventions scheduled or in progress.

From recorded accounts, it is possible to affirm that, in these areas, the compensation offered was incapable of guaranteeing access to another property situated in the neighbourhood next door, bearing in mind that the City Hall did not compensate the value of the property based on the market, which was justified by the irregular land tenure situation of these properties, in fact aggravated by the valorisation arising from the investments in progress or scheduled. This situation was not reversed even

with the instrument of assisted purchase, allowing an increase in the value paid as compensation by around 40%, which was still insufficient for the acquisition of property in the same locality. The option that remained was to transfer to a distant property, in the housing complexes that were being constructed, in general, in the western part of the city, in the ambit of the federal program to build affordable housing, called Minha Casa Minha Vida (Map 1). This situation allows characterisation of the removal processes in progress as urban despoilment – in which the property is in the possession of the lower classes are required by other social and economic agents at cut prices, and through processes of revitalisation or re-urbanisation, transformed into new assets in the circuits of economic valorisation, allowing high capital gains, in the form of added land value and/or the new economic activities that are going to replace them. In other words, it is necessary to identify in these processes the new agents that appropriate these revitalised and/or re-urbanised areas.

At the same time, some contradictions ought to be mentioned. These removal processes had been occurring in a context of affirmation of the right to housing, whether in the form of housing units offered to the low income population resettled in the complexes constructed in the ambit of the program, Minha Casa Minha Vida, or with the orientating principle of the housing policy of a social nature that was being developed by the Municipal Housing Secretariat. However, such principles do not seem to delineate the action of the Rio de Janeiro Municipal City Hall as a whole, especially the action of the Municipal Attorney's Office and the local authorities, as the principal promoters of removal actions. Thus, in a general sense, urban despoilment processes and violation of the right to housing can be identified, linked to the interventions for the mega sporting events, which affect various lower class groups, and seem to delineate a certain pattern of action on the part of the Rio de Janeiro City Hall. Such a pattern could be characterised by the following aspects:

(i) Complete absence, or precariousness, of information on the part of the communities, accompanied by pressure and coercive procedures, forcing the residents to accept the offers made by the Rio City Hall. It is to be stressed that the communities visited, without exception, do not have any access to the urbanisation projects involving their areas of residence.



(ii) Complete absence, or precariousness, of involvement of the communities in discussion of the projects for re-urbanisation promoted by the City Hall, as well as possible alternatives for the cases where removals are indicated.

(iii) Delegitimisation of the community organisations and negotiation processes always individualised family by family, clearly seeking to weaken their capacity to negotiate with the public authority. From this same perspective, it is to be noted that the negotiations are often arbitrary and without clear negotiating criteria, including with regard to compensation amounts.

(iv) The use of justice as an instrument against the citizen. Employing as its principal instrument the legal actions promoted by the Municipal Attorney's Office, the Municipal Public Authority had been acting as an irresponsible eviction machine, without any commitment to the health and welfare of the people. The practice of the Municipal Attorney's Office seemed to be to penalise all citizens who resorted to justice to protect their rights, bearing in mind that all the injunctions defeated in the courts were accompanied by immediate removal, determined by the Attorney's Office, systematically executed in situations of terror and violation of human rights. The human being – men, women, the aged and children – were being gravely disrespected through practices such as removal within 24 hours – even before receiving compensation - or subjection of the families to degrading living conditions, obliging them to live among the rubbles of their demolished homes.

(v) Disrespect of citizenship. The pattern of relationship of the public agents was disrespectful with the low income population, treated as second class citizens, as if the residents had no rights, reminiscent of the end of the XIX century in Brazil, when property was the basis for all other rights, that is, as they were residents without ownership, they had no rights.

## Final Considerations: reflections on the character of the urban policies in the context of entrepreneurial governance.

The case of Rio de Janeiro allows one to raise some points for reflection on the pattern of public authority intervention in Brazilian cities in the ambit of the preparation of cities to receive the aforementioned mega sporting events.

In the first place, perhaps unlike the experience of other countries, the public urban policies linked to these mega sporting events, above all those linked to federal programs, seem to be marked by a redistributive profile, or, at least, by redistributive components, that is, they seem to be associated to investments in urban policies, equipment and services – housing, sanitation, health and education – aimed at the lower classes.

At this point it is necessary to consider that the degree to which such policies are developed is variable in each locality and seems to be strongly linked to the nature of the entrepreneurial coalition that emerges in each Brazilian city.

Concerning the major social inequalities that mark the country, one can put forward as a hypothesis the need for investment in urban policies for the lower classes as a requisite for the legitimisation of the State and the coalition that sustains this new urban entrepreneurial governance. In other words, taking Rio de Janeiro as an example, the revitalisation of the port zone (Projeto Porto Maravilha) and investments in Barra da Tijuca (area occupied mostly by the elite) are more easily made viable if accompanied by investments in housing of a social nature in the western part of the city (area occupied mostly by the popular classes).

However, whatever the redistributive character of investments, the city project that is underway seems to deepen the pattern of excluding urbanisation that characterises the Brazilian urban order (with specificities in relation to the pattern of Fordist segregation), marked by isolation (self-segregation of the elite, by the denying urban order of alterity) and by a new round of mercantilization (valorisation) of large areas of the cities.

For this reason, it can be suggested that the neo-liberal character of the contemporary urban interventions, in the Brazilian case, are not “pure” or classic, as verified in other countries. Here, this character is verified by the prevalence of the mercantile logic in the management of public policies, affirmation of individualism, speculative projects, public-private partnerships and dependence on private resources to finance the urban administration.

Secondly, even if it were possible to find urban interventions aimed at broadening the access of the lower classes to the urban services and equipment, there are clear indications that this is a new round of mercantilization of the city, characterised by the transformation of devalued spaces, equipment and urban services – and, therefore, partially or totally

desmercantized – into merchandise, that is, into assets injected into the circuits of the valorisation of capital. This process occurs, whether by the forced transfer of assets under the control of the lower classes to property capital sectors or urban services, or by the creation of new urban services and equipment that are managed by private enterprise (for example, in the area of transport, sport and leisure). In other words, it constitutes a process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004), linked to a new round of mercantilization and elitization of the city, where certain areas begin to constitute merchandise aimed at the middle and upper classes who have the purchasing power to pay for the housing and services that will be offered.

Thirdly, the interventions in progress reveal the incapacity of the State in observing by universalist criteria, centred on the objective of social inclusion of the different social groups in the city and the growing adoption of a pattern of intervention centred on the exception, focused on certain areas of the city with capacity to attract investments, subordinating the policies, implemented in a discretionary manner, to the interests of large economic and financial groups that command the new entrepreneurial coalition. The projects determine what can or cannot be done (World Cup and Olympics here, a port or a cable car there), the communities that can remain and those that need to be removed, legitimised, in the first place, by the discourse of development, and in subsidiary form, by the discourse of order, ownership illegality or environmental risk. If there are collective social rights established in the Statute of the City, relative to housing and participation in the urban projects, these will be applied in a differentiated manner according to the social group involved in a particular conflict. According to Oliveira (2003, p. 11), the abandonment of the universalist pattern of intervention in the city is an effect of “financial bias in the economies and mainly of the public budgets”, which removes the “autonomy of the State” while producing “prevalent autonomy of the market”.

In the case of the World Cup and Olympics, this pattern of intervention by exception becomes very much in evidence in the subordination of the actions of the public authority to the requirements of the international organs that co-ordinate these in the sports, FIFA (Federation of International Football Associations) and the IOC (International Olympic Committee).

Finally, it is opportune to raise some issues regarding the contemporary conflict between the mercantilization and desmercantilization processes of the city. It would be naive to think that the diffusion of entrepreneurial

governance is achieved only via oppression, or by the explicit affirmation of inequality and social exclusion. On the contrary, it can be perceived that the processes of mercantilization occur, in general, using some modality of discourse about the defence of individual rights.

For example, the Rio de Janeiro City Hall states, on its Internet website<sup>7</sup>, that the urban project linked to the Olympics is aimed at “putting an end to the divided city, integrating and imparting dignity to the population”, declaring that “the Carioca will have a new city, more human, considerate of the worker who commutes every day from the suburbs to work in the city centre, or lives in the western part of the city and wants to go, with security, to the airport. The shantytowns, the centenary ill of Rio, are part of the city and so must be dealt with, transformed into districts, with public services and incentives for their development.” In fact, with regard to the housing question, the Morar Carioca project, developed by the City Hall, has planned to urbanise all the shantytowns by 2020. The issue is that such an urban project is not the result of collective discussion, involving the various segments of the population, about the city project intended. At the same time, the concentration of investments in Barra da Tijuca – fundamentally in the transport system, in the revitalisation of the Rio de Janeiro city centre and hotel infrastructure, raised many indications of subordination of the investments to the commercial interests of some economic agents. And, beyond the discourse, such a project has been implemented while denying fundamental social rights, as much with regard to the right to housing, as with respect to the rights to participate in the decisions.

In other words, the promotion of the mercantilization of the city generally occurs, using some modality of defence of individual rights, in this case, fundamentally, the right to property and freedom, at the same time as representing an attack on the processes of desmercantilization and collective social rights of significant portions of the population, which have denied their rights to remain in the areas they inhabit, now of interest to large economic agents, as well as that to participate in discussions regarding the urban projects that are being executed.

Considering the social configurations of the different communities affected by the urban interventions, one can find removals, that is, processes of transfer of assets under the control of lower classes, in which a portion

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<sup>7</sup>Cf. <http://www.cidadeolimpica.com/hoje-amanha-e-sempre/> consulted on 23rd October 2011.

of the population (for example, in a situation of social vulnerability and living in housing with a high degree of precariousness) could be benefiting from the acquisition of regularised property in good condition, even in a distant area; while another portion of the same community (with its social inclusion more or less stabilised due to all links established with social and formal or informal labour networks) could be rendered vulnerable by its exclusion from the area in which it organises its social reproduction. Expressed in another way, the right to housing can at the same time be denied and promoted, provided that it allows and does not threaten the process of mercantilization of the city.

On this plane, it is necessary to take into consideration that the evictions and removals occur with the legitimacy conferred by the courts (which determine and permit the removals) and public order which operate in the conflict between, on the one hand, the discourse about individual rights, freedom and the mercantilization of the city – embodied by the public authority and by the coalition forces that sustain the new entrepreneurial governance, using the discourse of public interest in economic and social development – and, on the other, the discourse regarding collective social rights and the processes of desmercantilization of the city, embodied by the social movements organised in the name of the urban reform and the right to the city. But both discourses expressed in public policies and institutional apparatus within the State apparatus, despite the mercantile logic being dominant and hegemonic<sup>8</sup>. From this results the difficulty in confronting this project.

From the elements raised in this article, and inspired by Lefebvre (1999), it can be said that the confrontation of this new context of deepening the mercantilization of the contemporary city requires a double strategy of inseparable articulated action: the knowledge strategy and the socio-political strategy. In the ambit of knowledge, this strategy implies conceptual deepening of the urban transformations that are occurring, as well as the study of the characteristics of entrepreneurial governance that control them, and radical criticism of the models of urban planning founded on the mercantilization of the city and its subordination to the

<sup>8</sup> In the case of the Rio de Janeiro City Hall, the conflict between these two discourses and orientations is evident in the actions of the Municipal Attorney's Office, local authorities and Empresa Olímpica Municipal, on the one hand, and the Municipal Housing Secretariat on the other.

logic of capital, from the perspective of consolidating a field of knowledge about the contemporary urban phenomenon.

On the socio-political plane, this strategy is centred, on the one hand, on the challenge of updating the set of ideas regarding the right to the city as part of a new dialectic utopia under construction, emancipatory and post-capitalist, materialising in new projects for cities and organisation of social life; and, on the other, on the translation of the set of ideas regarding the rights to the city in a new agenda of urban reform aimed at the action of the agents, as much in the politico-institutional sphere as in the social sphere, in the form of creative rebelliousness capable of shaping a new contra-hegemonic coalition that sustains this agenda and responds to the challenges arising from the contemporary urban, social and economic transformations. From this perspective, the urban reform movement, as the principal social agent that embodies this proposal, faces the challenge of providing form to this creative rebelliousness, “seeking to promote social universes in which there may arise and develop educative practices, public policies and new cultural languages generating the desmercantilization of the city and promotion of the right to the city, thereby breaking the hegemony of the entrepreneurial neo-liberalism” (RIBEIRO and SANTOS JUNIOR, 2011, p.5).


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**Map 1 - Removal Movement of Families Arising Interventions Related to World Cup and the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, 2011**



<b>Removed</b>	<b>Treatened with removal</b>	<b>Favelas</b>
1 - Restinga	Rua do Livramento	Public Areas
2 - Sambodromo	Ocupação Flor do Asfalto	Neighbourhoods
Recreio II	Ocupação Boa vista	Resettlements
3 - Largo do Campinho		
Vila Harmonia		
Vila Taboinha		
4 - Comunidade Estação da Mangueira	6 - Ladeira dos Tabajaras	9 - Belém-Belém
	7 - Pavão-Pavãozinho	10 - Barreira do Vasco
	8 - Canal do Arroio Pavuna	
	Vila Autodromo	
	Asa Branca	
	Vila Azaléia	

Source:  
Observatório das Metrópoles - IPPUR/UFRJ





## **Urban mobility in the “Olympic City”: a transportation revolution in Rio de Janeiro?<sup>1</sup>**

*Juciano Martins Rodrigues*

### Introduction

In recent years, the question of urban mobility in metropolises has begun to occupy more and more space in the public debate in Brazil. Communication mediums in general, social media and other internet networks, such as blogs, official government websites, in addition to academic publications, are full of a practically infinite quantity of content on this topic.

The way that we, as common citizens, deal with the question of mobility in Brazil can be explained briefly through a trivial comparison with one of our national passions, soccer. Here, as it must be in other countries, everyone has an opinion, for example, about the decisions made by the coach of the national team. When the team plays badly, everyone comes up with their own magical solution to the problem. Obviously, this solution – better than those of our peers – is always heavily influenced by the very irrational individual vision of the fan.

As the inhabitants of the metropolises, we fight everyday so that the problems of urban life related to the manner in which we commute within cities can also be solved, as if it were possible with a touch of magic, in the same manner in which we cheer for the success of our national soccer team. Additionally, we have our own solutions. The problem is that our

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<sup>1</sup> This article was published in English in the Journal *Territorio*, number 64, 2013.

solutions, as in more trite cases, like soccer, are also influenced by our opinions and, more so, by our individual daily experiences as pedestrians, cyclists, users of public transportation, and drivers.

Most of what we find in the public debate on the issue of urban mobility in Brazil is especially true, however, the actual conditions of commutes in Brazilian metropolises require more systematized reflexions of the academy and a effort to consider all the complexity of this subject.

In our view, this is based on two principal motives. The first, which we will examine in more detail further in this article, is caused by the growing precariousness of commuting conditions in large Brazilian cities, which allows us to refer to an “urban mobility crisis.” Second, Brazil will receive (or is slated to receive), in the context of the mega-events, the largest amount of investment in urban mobility projects in the history of the country, allowing the supposition that the perspective of overcoming this crisis exists.

It is necessary to add, still, that in spite of the broad picture of academic production on the subject, the attention given to urban mobility in Brazil is still concentrated in the areas of engineering and the technical part of urbanism, with a focus on transportation. In this manner, social effects are minimized (FLORENTINO, 2011) and the scale of metropolitan organization of urban space is not taken into account (RODRIGUES, 2011). The perception of the aforementioned mobility crisis by the urban citizen as just a transportation problem disguises very significant differences in the dimensions and meanings of this crisis. (ROLNIK and KLINTOWITZ, 2010).

In this context, the objective of this paper is to present the question of urban mobility in Brazil, more specifically the actual situation in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, where slated investments for the coming years will likely provoke profound impacts on the urban dynamic and in aspects of the socio-spatial configuration of the city, which will be in the next few years, beyond being one of the sites of the World Cup, the site of the 2016 Olympic Games.

## **Rio de Janeiro, metropolitan city: from a shrinking economy to the euphoria of mega-events.**

The metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro is the second most important one in the urban Brazilian system, in terms of demographic size and economic activity. Today, there are more than 11 million inhabitants,

distributed throughout 20 municipalities. In the last 20 years, this metropolitan area has demonstrated moderate population growth, around 1% per year. This number, which confirms certain population stability, hides, on the other side, the high growth rates registered in the most peripheral areas since the 1950s (Image 1).


This growth in the periphery of the city is one of the principal factors that have influenced the consolidation of Rio de Janeiro as a metropolitan city, or in other words, a large urban area of unspecific internal borders, which developed from the central city. Here, the formation of social relations in the area corresponds to a continuous urban area defined, at first, by the conurbation and, later, by a discontinuity, but defined by accessibility and the circulation of people and economic goods.

In this complex urban space, it is necessary to emphasize, that the borders of the local (municipal) authorities do not coincide with the functional and economic structure of the metropolitan area, and the urban area surpasses these borders. The political fragmentation, where every local (municipal) manager defends their own interests, is the central point of the Brazilian metropolitan issue. Therefore, it is necessary to plan and finance infrastructure in the metropolitan area when there are different local governments each in charge of their own infrastructure.

The metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, starting in the 1980s, experienced economic stagnation, which was reflected in the fixed population growth previously mentioned, in the job market dynamic, and in social conditions. The principal economic consequence of this situation was the loss of importance in the dynamic territory constituted by the southeast of the country, where, during the 1990s and 2000s, positive indicators of productive restructuring were accumulated, impelled by a trajectory of the insertion of Brazil in liberal globalization (DINIZ, 1993). In social terms, conditions worsened in terms of income access, adequate housing, and essential urban services (LAGO, 2010).

Despite this setting, with the migration of the financial sector to São Paulo and a diminished flow of tourism, at the end of the 1990s, the economy of the city and the state of Rio de Janeiro was already showing signs of recuperation. The reversal of the pattern of economic loss in the state of Rio de Janeiro was largely impelled by the strong performance of petroleum extraction, which was concentrated outside of the metropolis. Only in the last few years has the metropolis showed these signs of

**Image 1: Population and Annual Population Growth of the Central and Periphery Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro – 1950/2010**



Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, various population censuses.

recuperation. From 2008 to 2009 the metropolis experienced growth in its part of the state GDP. This part reached 78.6% in 1999, fell to 65.3% in 2008, and, now, beginning the economic recuperation in the metropolis, reaches 72% (Image 2)


In recent years, also, the state of Rio de Janeiro as much as the city has become the target of numerous investments in the areas of steel production, ports, naval industry and petrochemistry. According to Osório (no date), the expectations, in terms of the carrying out of these investments and the reason for them, after decades of qualitative evolutions different from those in other Brazilian regions, are that Rio de Janeiro began to approach the level of national growth.

These signals of recuperation are simultaneous, initially, to the announcement, and secondly, to the preparations of the city of Rio de Janeiro as the site of the World Cup of Soccer and the Olympic Games of 2016. For more optimistic authors, the hosting of these events is Rio de Janeiro's opportunity to definitively reverse the tendency of a shrinking economy. For Urani (2009) the organization of large international events, included in the tourist industry, along with the steel industry, petrochemistry, and the naval industry, would complete the return to the original economic performance of Rio de Janeiro.

In fact, tourist activity has gained importance and economic weight over the course of the last decades, especially in developing countries, which, according to Omena (2011), resort to this activity in search of social and economic improvements. In this way, "the attraction of events of international bearing, especially sporting mega-events, has been hailed by businesspeople, planners, and governing powers as a way to dynamize the local economy in large cities and as a way to attempt to resolve serious problems related to social inequality and the effects of physical burden on infrastructure felt in diverse global metropolises" (OMENA, 2011).

In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the candidature and election of the city as the site of the Olympic Games is also the result of a long trajectory which includes a new concept of city and urban planning, and of new local political articulations (VAINER, 2009). This means that the desire that is now a reality is not by chance, as Vainer calls to our attention (2009), even less is it the result of a virtuous economic dynamic or of a wave of global optimism. In the end, the phase of Rio de Janeiro as "Olympic City" – exactly when the local economy gives signs of recuperating –

Image 2: Participation of the central nucleus, periphery, and other municipalities and the state GDP – 1999 to 2009.



also coincides with the global financial crisis. It is necessary to consider that Brazilian cities are being included in the global circuit, which seeks new borders to expand accumulation, in the face of the permanent capital finance crisis (RIBEIRO and SANTOS, 2010).

This insertion is characterized by interurban competition, city marketing, favors and benefits to global capitals, public-private partnerships, business management, and urban business (VAINER, 2009). Add to this sporting mega-events and large urban projects involved in their fulfillment. In this context, it is necessary to consider that “in spite of developed marketing and the campaign to form political consensus, the reception of these two mega-events in Brazil between 2014 and 2016 was not widely debated, raising many doubts in terms of the real benefits and the resulting costs in the hosting of these events in a network of metropolises marked by high levels of inequality.” (OMENA, 2011).


In the case of urban mobility, it is questionable that large projects marked for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 will be definitive solutions for the serious problems which are faced everyday by the more than 11 million inhabitants of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro. In the face of the discussion of modernization, of amplification and of all of the propaganda which now reigns around the future of transport in the city, it is worth questioning whether or not Rio de Janeiro will in fact lend itself to a revolution in urban mobility systems, which would alter forever the history of the city and the life of its inhabitants. At the same time, it is necessary to question whether or not the projects and action in the area of urban mobility take into consideration the metropolitan dimension of the urban space of Rio de Janeiro.

## Urban Mobility Crisis in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro

Recent research has shown that in the principal Brazilian metropolises, there has been an increase in the number of people who spend more time in their daily commutes between their homes and work places in the last years. Using the database from National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) is it possible to confirm that there are more and more people spending more than an hour on their daily commute in these metropolises. Despite the complexity of the issue, this information can be used as an important proxy of the urban mobility conditions in Brazil.



## Metropolis of Rio de Janeiro: Municipal borders and principal highways



Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles

This indicator has pointed out a worsening of daily commuting conditions in the principal Brazilian metropolises leading to an “urban mobility crisis”. It is a crisis which results mostly from the choice of individual mode of transport in detriment to collective forms of transport, with the abandonment of mass transport investments over the last 50 years. In the face of the complex Brazilian urban system, it is also necessary to consider that we are not facing only a problem of transportation or isolated traffic in the modern metropolis, but that the “mobility issue” also involves problems of spatial organization of human activity, of adaptation of investments, of the necessities and aspirations of the population in relation to their homes and places of work (DICKMAN, 1972, p. 147), in other words, there is a narrow relation with the model of urban development. These problems are derived not only from the size of the modern cities, but also from the improper organization of only one type of land use, of the diverse activities that demand greater mobility, of the lack of conciliation of public services with the private rights to access and movement, and of the preference of its citizens in relation to mode of travel, itinerary, comfort, and costs (DICKMAN, 1972).

In the context of metropolitan Brazil, the concern and attention given to the urban mobility crisis is primarily due to a disorganization of the urban mobility system, which includes a lack of planning and investment in modes of mass transport. Secondly, the abandonment of this mobility system is within the context of profound spatial transformations experienced in these territories, where it is distinguished, on one hand, a larger and more accelerated growth in the peripheral areas,<sup>2</sup> and on the other, the concentration of jobs and of wealthy social groups in the central areas. In other words, urban mobility problems are accentuated when Brazil is considered a metropolitan country.<sup>3</sup> There is also an increase in

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<sup>2</sup> The peripheries of large Brazilian metropolises have grown more than their central areas, although pressure on central areas still exists, a tendency which points to the composition of an urban space increasingly scattered, implying growing costs and logistical problems for the provision of public infrastructure services essential to city life. In the case of Brazil, an important characteristic of this process is that a large majority of people who migrated from the center to the periphery in the second half of the 1990s worked in the center in 2000, suggesting a movement that increases the resident population in the periphery but doesn't weaken the pressure for a job market that affects the central areas (SILVA; RODRIGUES, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Currently, Brazil has 15 urban agglomerations that can be considered metropolitan in function and complexity, because of their economic and political functions. In Brazil, 36.1% of the population is concentrated in these areas.

distances and, consequently, in times and types of daily commutes in a setting of profound socio-spatial inequalities.

The historical trajectory of growth of the metropolises and of the consolidation of Brazil as a metropolitan country are also related, in other aspects, to the Brazilian economic development model. This is implied in the option for a fixed mobility system.

The 1970s represented a period of consolidation of the reorganization of the mobility system of large Brazilian cities, which had been occurring since the second quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the substitution, primarily, of transport in trams for that in buses and, after, in what we can call a third phase of reorganization, the consolidation of the individual car. According to Rolnik and Klintovitz (2011, p. 95), this reorganization “was the result of the confluence of economic, political, and urban processes which made feasible a large-scale modal transference, inundating city roads with hundreds of thousands of new individual cars.” If in previous decades car ownership catered to an economic-ideological aspect, represented by the highway system model, and at the same time, appeased the increase in commuting speed of the middle class, because commuting was much faster by car than bus, this model is currently breaking down (ROLNIK; KLINTOVITZ, 2011, p. 95).

In the last decade, Brazil experienced a meaningful increase in the number of cars, especially in large cities. The speed of growth of cars is larger than that of the population in the 15 Brazilian metropolises, where the population grew around 10.7% and the number of cars increased by 66% between 2001 and 2010, resulting in an increase of about 920,000 cars each year.

As in other metropolises, in Rio de Janeiro there was an enormous growth of the fleet of cars over the last decade. Parallely, there was also an increase in the number of motorcycles, which because of their price and advantage in daily traffic became the alternative for many people.<sup>4</sup> Paradoxically, despite

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<sup>4</sup> It cannot be ignored that the increase in the number of cars is due to a favorable economic conjuncture, with the decreasing costs of imported goods, an economic recuperation in the country, a larger income distribution, and, more than anything, a series of fiscal incentives on behalf of the Brazilian government to the auto industry, which considerably reduced the final price of cars. The amount of cars in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro has increased by 62% between 2001 and 2011. In the same period, the number of motorcycles has tripled, from just over 98 thousand to 430 thousand. More details on the

the growing amount of individual transportation, there have been significant increases in congestion and with this the number of people who spend more time in travelling between their homes and places of work also increased, which leads us to suppose, obviously, that the car is not in fact a solution for metropolitan mobility problems. At the same time, there was a growth in the number of traffic accidents, mainly those involving motorcycles, including fatalities, and in increase in pollution.

To this increase in individual transportation, add a systematic worsening of commuting conditions offered by the systems of public transport. The individual costs are also increasingly higher, even in the presence of poor quality services, and a lack of investment in infrastructure.

In this way, in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, while the governing powers promise a “transportation revolution” to the population, the service of collective public transport offered is currently expensive, precarious, and insufficient to meet the actual demand. For one part of the population, the solution was to buy a car or a motorcycle, even if this meant the family going further into debt or the sacrifice of another economic good. But for the majority, inefficient public transport continues to be the only commuting option in an urban space where the job market is organized more and more in the metropolitan scale, demanding long commutes over long distances, often crossing municipal limits: car ownership is still concentrated in areas of higher socioeconomic status; in other words, in areas that are well served by the public transport system. In much of the metropolitan periphery the possession of at least one car per household does not reach 35%. In other areas (in the southern zone of the city) the percentage of households that own at least one car is over 75%.


Part of the population has the option only of public transport. The high fare prices and lack of intermodal integration is still a major obstacle in the case of organized job markets on the metropolitan scale, that require more distant commutes, connections, and intermunicipal commuting.

In the last few years, fare prices for collective transport in Rio de Janeiro have not only suffered readjustments, or tariff corrections as the governing powers would like us to believe. In the case of services of public transport offered in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, what have actually

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increase in the number of automobiles and motorcycles in the Brazilian metropolis: [http://observatoriodasmetropoles.net/download/relatorio\\_automotos.pdf](http://observatoriodasmetropoles.net/download/relatorio_automotos.pdf)

**Metropolis of Rio de Janeiro: percentage of households with at least one car.**



Source: IBGE and Observatório das Metrôpoles

happened are abusive increases beyond any inflation index.<sup>5</sup> Metro fares, which suffered an increase of 12%, became the most expensive in Brazil.<sup>6</sup>

On February 2nd, 2012, as in the case of other modes, there was an increase in train fares. The passenger who previously paid R\$ 2.80 now paid R\$ 2.90 per trip. Though it seems little, R\$ 0.10 is a fortune in the face of the terrible service offered. There are daily problems with trains operated by the company Supervia Trens Urbanos, which also operates the transporting of passengers by cable car in the Favela do Alemão. On the day of the increase, coincidentally or not, passengers had to walk on the train tracks for hundreds of meters after the train on the Central do Brasil-Campo Grande route broke down. Beyond this, passengers complain of delays, overcrowding, and inhuman heat – complaints of a non-functioning air conditioning system are constant, even on the hottest days of summer, which generated a campaign in social networks<sup>7</sup>.

Transport expenses for families in Brazil have gradually been increasing in the past decades. In the 1970s, according to IBGE, 11.2% of family expenses were in transportation. At the beginning of the 2000s, 18.4% of the family budget was destined for transportation. At the end of the decade, this percentage reached 19.6%, practically the amount spent on food, which was 19.8%.

Another characteristic that should be considered surrounding the inefficiency of the urban mobility system in Rio de Janeiro is the poor intermodal integration. This applies particularly to the subway. The city has been placed as the city of the bicycle by the public powers, for example. But, of the 35 subway stations, only 11 have places for bicycles. Beyond this, the number of spaces (only 206 in 11 stations) seems insufficient in the presence of the potential use of bicycles as a mode of transport in the city.

The breakdowns are not only exclusive to the trains and boats that connect Rio and Niterói, they are also constant in the subway and are a part of the routine of millions of users. Add to this the precariousness of this

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<sup>5</sup> The IPCA – Index of Broad Consumer Prices, measured by IBGE, ended 2011 at approximately 6.5%. The IGP-M – General Index of Market Prices, calculated by GVF, in the 12 months of 2011, ended at 5.09%. This last indicator is generally used to limit the increases in rent prices and public services fares, including transportation.

<sup>6</sup> <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/02/preco-do-metro-pode-variatarifa.html>

<sup>7</sup> <http://trensurbanosrj.blogspot.com>

**Note: passengers walk on train tracks after a problem with a train in Rio de Janeiro/RJ.**



service, the overcrowding, the excessive heat and the wait times, which in these days of breakdowns can reach 40 minutes.<sup>8</sup>

### Transport revolution in the “Olympic City of Rio de Janeiro?”

With the arrival of the mega-events, Rio de Janeiro is experiencing a wave of optimism, not only economically, but also regarding new perspectives of urban mobility, which would become more “efficient, safe,

<sup>8</sup> <http://extra.globo.com/noticias/rio/internautas-relatam-problemas-enfrentados-nos-trens-estacoes-do-metro-rio-91391.html>

comfortable, and sustainable,” according to official discourse. As in other Brazilian cities, the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro is about to receive the largest amount of resources in its history to invest in mobility policies.

The foreseen resources for urban mobility in the 12 host cities represent 50.37% of the total foreseen investments for the World Cup. For this reason, these investments express the impact of the investments linked to this mega-event on the urban structure and urban dynamic in these places. The use of U\$S 6 billion is foreseen in the implantation of the projects and actions in the area of mobility. These investments could provoke profound impacts on the urban dynamic, in aspects of social-spatial configuration of the cities, and in issues that involve the right to adequate housing – dwelling.<sup>9</sup>

In Rio de Janeiro, the public power denominates as “transport revolution” the actions and interventions in the field of urban mobility. In the city are foreseen the construction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems, the lengthening of subway line 1, the implantation of the BRT, and the construction of a Light Rail Vehicle (VLT) in the port. Some of these are already operating, such as the “Transoeste” line, a BRT system that will connect Barra da Tijuca to other neighborhoods in the western zone.


When we look only at the volume of monetary resources committed to the action and projects in the field of urban mobility, we find a strong argument for betting on the success of the foreseen interventions in the context of athletic mega-events. On the other hand, facing exaggeratedly positive visions in terms of the benefits of hosting the mega-events (URANI, 2009, OSÓRIO, no date) the stage designed for the future cannot be considered quite that positively, principally in what is said in respect to expectations of overcoming socio-spatial inequalities present in the metropolitan space. It is necessary to remember that these inequalities derive from a large concentration of power in investments in the central municipality (Ribeiro, 2000). As in the case of many metropolises in South America,

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<sup>9</sup> Of the 12 host cities, 10 are projected to carry out expropriations and removals in the course of the construction for implantation of the BRTs (it is not made explicit whether or not the other interventions will demand removals). At the website [www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014](http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014), the federal government has made data solicited from the states and municipalities available, referring to the forecasted expenses in expropriations for the implantation of the BRTs. Almost R\$ 1.5 billion is the amount intended for expropriations of residential and commercial real estate for the completions of constructions aimed at the improvement of urban mobility through BRTs and express lanes for buses.



## BRT Lines



Source: [www.cidadcolimpica.com](http://www.cidadcolimpica.com)

as opposed to North American metropolises, central areas have an important symbolic value mainly because it is in these areas that management functions and dominant class residence were historically concentrated. With this, these central areas tend to acquire even higher monetary and symbolic values (ABREU, 2010). “For this reason they contribute to the inexistence of a good transportation system, with a restricted offer of public services, which is created by the fact that the wealthy population resides in densely populated areas (such as the case of Rio) and not in rustic suburbs,” as occurs in other countries (ABREU, 2010).

The territorial distribution of the investments in mobility, foreseen and carried out until now, in the context of mega-events, seem to reproduce this same logic of spatial organization. With the current publicized information, there are no elements that allow us to gauge whether or not the enormous investments in mobility will produce a better distribution of people and jobs in the metropolitan territory. On the contrary, in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, the investments in transportation for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games are mostly spatially concentrated. Let us use the example of the implantation of the BRTs. Primarily there is a strong concentration in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, remembering that the metropolitan region has 20 municipalities. Secondly, there is an inequality in the distribution of these investments in the interior of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, with a massive concentration in the southern zone and Barra da Tijuca.

At the same time, it is necessary to consider that solutions for problems in large cities cannot be solved in the area of the municipal spheres, because they are questions of metropolitan nature, including in the case of mega-events.

The so-called “transport revolution” publicized by the public authorities in the context of the mega-events does not seem to be a solution for the mobility crisis. All of the problems deriving from enormous difficulties of daily commuting to enter into a job market more and more organized in the metropolitan scale are not considered. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the mobility crisis will not be overcome with investments that are spatially concentrated, such as the case of the projects and action in the area of mobility for the mega-events. Lastly, it is necessary to emphasize that in the context of interventions in the mobility system for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, there is not even an integrated

plan that considers Rio de Janeiro a “metropolitan city.” The last Urban Transportation Director Plan for the metropolitan region is from 2003, and it is not being used to plan the current interventions. In this way, the opportunity to overcome the challenge of planning and financing infrastructure on the metropolitan scale is possibly being wasted for reasons of territorial concentration of the interventions and insistence on the highway system model, reproducing concentrated and non-distributary political practices, which tend to accentuate inter-metropolitan disparities (ABREU, 2010). The desire for an “Olympic City” can produce a more and more unequal metropolis.

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## From Culture to Spectacle, the new logics of Brazilian football<sup>1</sup>

*Christopher Gaffney*

### Introduction

There are currently twelve major stadium projects underway for the 2014 World Cup, with a collective price tag of R\$6,904,000,000, 97% of which comes from public sector financing (Anon.). This cost does not include the 32 training sites that will be needed for each of the World Cup teams. In the western Brazilian city of Cuiaba alone, there are three professional training facilities under construction. Each one has a spectator capacity greater than the average attendance at the city's principal stadium. Cuiaba is not an anomaly as cities around Brazil are building world-class facilities on speculation as they try to woo top teams. The 2014 World Cup has stimulated public investment in professional-grade sporting infrastructure at a cost, scope, pace and scale never before experienced in Brazil.

Infrastructure development for the world's biggest football tournament is occurring at a propitious moment for the Brazilian economy. The massive public outlays for stadia, airports, transportation, security and business subsidies are being born by a population that has, by and large, benefitted from the expansion of the Brazilian economy in recent years. Yet the cost being paid by the Brazilian taxpayer cannot be limited to money spent on infrastructure but must be considered in relation to the use value of these projects once the World Cup has passed. We know, for instance, that most Brazilian schools

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<sup>1</sup> This article was published in English in the Journal *Territorio*, number 64, 2013.

lack recreation areas and that investment in sporting facilities for public use is negligible. In Rio de Janeiro, which is receiving more government investment than any other city because of the 2016 Olympics, there are only nine public sport centers, the majority of these in very poor repair(Anon. 2009)<sup>2</sup>”event-place”.”Rio de Janeiro”,”URL”.”http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/rio2016/mat/2009/10/10/na-cidade-sede-dos-jogos-olimpicos-45-das-escolas-publicas-nao-tem-sequer-uma-quadra-de-esportes-768006155.asp”,”issued”:{“year”:2009,”month”:10,”day”:10}}}],”schema”.”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”). Rio has no municipally sponsored recreation leagues and active participation in sport is concentrated in the city’s wealthiest neighborhoods. The official discourse suggests that the World Cup will benefit society as a whole, bringing lasting benefits to cities and stimulating sporting culture<sup>2</sup>. However, as of August 2012, there were no sporting or cultural projects associated with the World Cup meaning that 100% of public investment is being directed towards the development of professional grade sporting infrastructure.

This chapter will examine the development of stadium and sport related infrastructure projects associated with the 2014 World Cup. We begin our analysis with a brief history of football in Brazil, noting that the radical changes to the Brazilian sporting landscape have been conditioned by shifts in the political economy of sport that have in turn shaped modes and cultures of spectatorship.

We suggest that the construction of 12 new stadia for the 2014 World Cup is the culmination of a decades-long project aimed at changing the social and economic profile of Brazilian football. These changes, we suggest, are inconsistent with the cultural milieu of Brazilian spectatorship and as such will not adequately serve the needs of cities and populations after the month long tournament.

## The historical trajectory of Brazilian football

There is no question that association football, or *futebol*, is the most popular sport in Brazil. The sport emerged out of the cultural milieu of European expatriates in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and was quickly adopted by Brazil’s wealthy urbanites (Melo 2000). As the idle sons of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo’s upper classes kicked about, they eventually formalized

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.copa2014.gov.br/pt-br/sobre-a-copa/grandes-numeros>

their meetings and established clubs dedicated to football or brought organized football into already existing associations. The game gained in popularity as it was introduced to factories, played by dockhands and covered by the press. Stadiums emerged on the grounds of privately owned clubs and by the 1910s; football was firmly entrenched as a spectator sport in rapidly growing Brazilian cities. Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, as the political and economic centers of the country, saw the game spread among suburban and lower income populations, but the game also established itself in all of Brazil's coastal cities (Mascarenhas de Jesus 2002). Football was a central part of Brazil's centennial celebrations in 1922, and with the advent of radio transmissions and improvements in transportation the game spread to Brazil's vast interior (Caldas 1990).

As Brazil entered more completely into industrial modernity in the 1920s and 1930s, its cities grew as workers flowed in from the countryside and new transportation lines stimulated migratory patterns from the impoverished northeast to the wealthy south. Because of its plasticity, football can be played on nearly any surface, with a huge variety of numbers, and under a wide range of physical constraints. This made the adaptation of football in both inner cities and worker's suburbs extremely easy. The spectacular success of football as a popular form of leisure was matched by its increasing commercial success (Mascarenhas de Jesus 2000). Brazilian stadiums were getting larger, a specific press developed to cover the sport, and Brazilians were soon considered to be among the best players in the world. The centrality of football to Brazilian national identity was confirmed when the national team won a 3<sup>rd</sup> place medal at the 1938 World Cup and tens of thousands gathered to welcome the team on the docks of Rio de Janeiro (M. J. Rodrigues 1964).

As a testament to this surging popularity, Brazil was chosen to host the 1950 World Cup. The tournament was well received in Brazil and attendances were high, though uneven. Notably, the Brazilian team played before crowds averaging 125,000<sup>3</sup>. There were only two construction projects undertaken for the 1950 World Cup: the Independence Stadium in Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro's Municipal Stadium (later, Jornalista Mario Filho, aka Maracanã). The Brazilian team lost to Uruguay in the final game of the tournament in front of an estimated 200,000 fans. Known as the Maracanazo, or the failure in the Maracanã, this is a defining event in Brazilian history (C. T. Gaffney 2008).

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.rsssf.com/tables/50full.html>



In the post-war period and throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Brazilian football grew in size, stature and popularity. Politicians clearly understood the use of football and stadiums as political tools (Helal, Soares, e Louisivolo 2001). Stadia such as Rio's Maracana, Sao Paulo's Morumbi, Belo Horizonte's Minerao, and Fotraleza's Castelão had huge spectator capacities and significant standing-only sections that offered cheap access fo the working classes. These stadiums were well serviced by public transportation and the low cost of tickets facilitated the popularity of football. Stadiums were little more than containers for the performance of teams and their fans and reflected an architectural style that was consistent with the simplicity of the sport itself. It was within these spaces, however, that a complex culture with rich traditions consolidated into something that was uniquely and identifiably Brazilian(HOLLANDA 2009).

In 1970, Brazil won its third World Cup and by 1975, Brazil had more stadia with capacities over 100,000 than any other nation. In general, we can assert that futebol and the places in which it was played followed a fairly consistent trajectory. Once consolidated as "the people's game" new social formations such as the *torcida organizada* (organized fan groups) entered the scene. This new element built upon the carnivalesque nature of Rio de Janeiro's public spaces and its traditions of public festival (Murad 1996; Matta 2006). Rio's fans had long used costumes, music and decorations as means of creating spectacle but the torcidas organizadas took this production to the next level. The tight relationship between the game on the field and the play in the stands made for a participatory and creative moment, a spatial and social conjuncture, the building blocks of culture and meaning. The openness of Brazilian stadia allowed for a fluidity of movement and appropriation of space that made for a unique and participatory spectacle.

The very size and character of the Brazilian stadia built in this "popular" (if not "populist") era reflected the zeitgeist. Between 1950 and 1980 Brazilian stadia were large bowls of concrete and steel, commissioned by military leaders, regional strong men and other political leaders. Used as political tools, Mascharenas (2002) has suggested that these public spaces had a hermeneutic effect. The spaces of the stadia were so large that a single voice could never be heard, reducing an individual's sense of agency. It was only the union of five or ten or a hundred voices that could be heard from across the stadium, encouraging collective and coordinated action.

State or federal governments financed the construction of the majority of stadia built in this era and they remained under public administration.

The development of cable and satellite television services in the 1980s opened new revenue streams for sport (Aidar, Leoncini, e Oliveira 2000). The growth of World Cup and Olympic television revenues brought record profits to FIFA and the IOC. In European domestic leagues and in the United States, improvements and expansion of broadcast services simulated the sporting economy on a global scale. European teams were leading the way in football, accelerating the trend of buying Brazilian stars to play in Europe, much as had happened in earlier decades with the exodus of players to Colombia, Spain and Italy. In the 1980s, this did not have an immediate impact on attendances or passion for football in the local context, but it did eventually lead to a dilution of the talent pool and a weakening of the domestic game. The president of FIFA was a Brazilian, a conditioned that put Brazilian football in a powerful position internationally, but with a national football economy that was maintained in a state of dependency (Yallop 1998).

The transition from dictatorship to democracy between the mid 1980s and the early 1990s occurred at the same moment that the global economy was entering a period of accelerated integration. Improvements in communications (internet, cable, cell phones) and transportation (containers, expansion of jet travel) technology opened pathways for flows of capital and cultural exchange in unprecedented volume. Brazil was physically unprepared for the demands of the “global” economy (Harvey 2001). At all levels, the Brazilian state had been unable to invest in basic urban infrastructures for more than a decade. The 1980s in all of Latin America are referred to as “lost” and Brazil was characterized by financial and political instability, low growth and emigration to Europe and the United States. During this period football retained much of its “classic” characteristics but at the same time it became increasingly violent as the *torcidas organizadas* became mechanisms through which Brazil’s marginalized youth could perform their frustration (Hollanda 2009).

The growing social disturbances in football were partly a reflexive response to the deterioration of urban life in general. In the 1980s a series of collective and violent actions against trains in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro demonstrated the level of frustration that the “popular” classes experienced in their daily lives. These same people, “*o povo*,” composed the

majority of football fans, principally because ticket prices were reasonably affordable and the large urban stadiums had significant catch basins for fans. In the biggest cities, intense local rivalries frequently resulted in running street battles. The rising perception of urban insecurity that had created new architectures of fear (closed condominiums, private security) was exacerbated by the media's portrayal of all football fans as violent and aggressive (Caldeira 2000; Alabarces 2003). While always limited to a minority of offenders and exacerbated by a police force that had retained characteristics inherited from the military dictatorship, there were real problems of insecurity and violence in and around football stadiums.

When cable and satellite television arrived in Brazil in the 1990s, attendances began to decline. The perception of violent, uncomfortable stadiums kept many fans at home. And while there were real problems with violence in and around the stadiums, the institutional responses were often just as violent, assuming criminal intent on the part of ordinary fans. These factors combined with a crisis of institutional governance (for instance, the Brazilian league had thirty different formats in its first 30 years) and a lack of basic maintenance of aging stadia further reduced attendances. This, in turn, increased the influence of the *torcidas organizadas* both within the clubs and on the streets surrounding stadiums on game day. In order to combat or control these well organized, rowdy and angry young men, the police further militarized stadium space, diminishing the appeal of live spectatorship even further. To make matters worse, the contracts signed between the Brazilian Football Confederation and the Globo media outlets ensured that many games would only start after the tele-novelas, 10pm on a weekday. The lack of interest on the part of public authorities in providing transportation to and from stadia made it difficult for all but the most dedicated fans to attend matches.

The institutional crisis of football was aggravated by the indifference of the football clubs (Helal, Soares, e Louisolo 2001). These remained opaque institutions governed by *cartolas*, or top hats, local or regional strongmen that negotiated club business behind closed doors, in many cases using their institutional authority to augment their own power, wealth and influence. The clubs remained impassive and impenetrable to the demands of ordinary fans, and profited tremendously from the sale of players to European clubs. They also courted the favor of the *torcidas organizadas*, giving out political and economic favors in exchange for support on the terraces.

This incredible situation was aided and abetted by the institutional opacity of the CBF and FIFA, which actively pursued a policy of back room negotiations, especially with the Globo television network. The Brazilian Joao Havelange was president of FIFA from 1974-1998 and his then son-in-law Ricardo Teixeira was head of the CBF from 1989 – 2012. This kind of familial relationship allowed for a never-ending series of scandals and sleights of hand in the management of contracts, the management of the Brazilian national team, and the governance of football at all levels. As Brazil won its fourth World Cup in 1994 and finished second in 1998, the controversies surrounding these institutional arrangements stimulated some government investigations, but the culture of indifference, private profit, impunity remained defining characteristics of Brazilian football. Despite all of this, Brazil continued to produce the best footballers in the world, winning their fifth World Cup in 2002.

## Fin de siècle, again

The Brazilian public has never had a close relationship with the individuals and institutions responsible for the development, propagation and care of football (Alvito e Gaffney 2010). As we noted, the game emerged out of elite circles in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, ensuring that already well-established economic and political actors would always maintain control of the game. Although many of the directors of Brazil's football clubs come from the world of business, there has never been significant professionalization of club management and there are no sport management courses in Brazilian universities. In the history of Brazilian football, there has never been an organization that represented fans at a meaningful institutional level and it was not until 1999 that a federal level law was passed to regulate the football industry.

The Lei Pele<sup>4</sup>, or Pele's Law, was passed under the Cardoso government in 1999. The law was directed under the influence of Pele, who was given the position of Extraordinary Minister of Sport in 1997 in order to establish a more rigorous institutional framework to deal with the crisis of governance in Brazilian football. The details of the law are of interest in that they establish rules of conduct in a number of related fields but provide no regulatory mechanism. Thus, the fundamental elements of the Lei Pele were difficult to enforce and business was allowed to carry on as usual.

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/leis/19615consol.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/19615consol.htm)

The next major federal level intervention was the Parliamentary Inquisition Committee (CPI) CBF/Nike. The book length report investigated the contractual relationship between the Brazilian Football Confederation and Nike, a major sponsor of the CBF. The inquisition resulted from the strange events that surrounded Brazil's 3-0 defeat to France in the 1998 World Cup final. The clear influence of Nike in the internal politics and decision making of the CBF was clearly demonstrated yet no punitive or corrective action was taken. The public outrage soon dissipated and Ricardo Teixeira was able to maintain his position as president of the CBF. Joao Havelange left his position as president of FIFA in the months after Brazil's loss, but for reasons not associated with the CPI. For many Brazilians, the scandals associated with the 1998 World Cup are a turning point in their relationship with the national team as there was a general feeling that a sacred trust had been violated for the personal economic gain of the CBF directors.

The crisis of Brazilian football did not improve with Pele's Law or with the CPI CBF/Nike. With the ascension of Lula to the presidency in 2003, it appeared that the Brazilian government was going to take, for the first time, the issue of fans' rights seriously. The first law passed by the Lula administration was the Estatuto do Torcedor, or Fan's Statute.<sup>5</sup> This statute elaborates the expectations of fan behavior as well as the rights that fans have to access to information, security, transparency in the management of sport. Upon signing the law, president Lula said, "fans would never again be treated like a herd of animals." The passing of the law unleashed a series of polemics within the CBF and the major football clubs that claimed they did not have the capacity to deal with the demands of the new law<sup>6</sup>. As ever, there was no group that represented fans' interests.

Over the past decade the enforcement of the Estatuto do Torcedor has been uneven while its provisions have proven inadequate and controversial.<sup>7</sup> One of intended effects of the law was to reduce violent incidents at football matches by making fan behavior more transparent. Special punitive measures for football fans were introduced yet no equivalent punishments were conditioned for the game's administrators or for the security forces

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<sup>5</sup> [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/leis/2003/l10.671.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/l10.671.htm)

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/artigos/fd270520031.htm>

<sup>7</sup> <http://blogdojuca.uol.com.br/2010/01/lula-o-cartola/>

that enforced elements of the new law. The Estatuto do Torcedor did bring some fundamental guarantees to football fans and it has had significant effect in some sectors such as ticketing, yet the institutional framework of football was not significantly altered and their continues to be no “popular” representation in any of football’s governing bodies.

The lack of transparent, federal institutional frameworks is repeated at state and national levels, where participatory public or governmental oversight mechanisms do not hold accountable the private institutions responsible for the organization of professional and amateur leagues. This lack of oversight has led to innumerable instances corruption and influence peddling within Brazilian football (Coutinho 2010; Kfoury 2010; Rebelo e Torres 2001). There is wide acknowledgement that the amateur nature of football officials has contributed to a culture of corruption and impunity. Thus, the public has traditionally been unable to influence the workings of football, leaving ownership in the hands of opaque and self-referential institutions.

At the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century it was clear that Brazil was not prepared to host large-scale international sporting events. In most cases, public sporting facilities had suffered from lack of investment and mis-management while new facilities such as the stadium of Atletico Paranaense in Curitiba were privately funded and pursued North American style naming-rights agreements. Successive failures of Olympic bids underscored the gravity of problems in transportation, security and sporting infrastructure in Brazil’s largest cities.

It is perhaps not accidental that the first stadium in Brazil to take a corporate name occurred in Curitiba, a city credited with adopting the tactics and techniques of city marketing (SANCHEZ 2010). The aggressive pursuit of mega-events by some of Brazil’s urban administrations (Rio de Janeiro in particular) was closely tied to new forms of urban governance directed by principles of city marketing. The selling of a city’s image to international audiences in an attempt to attract highly mobile finance capital had “successfully” transformed places like New York City, Barcelona, Buenos Aires and Curitiba, which had become the Brazilian model for “efficient urban planning.”

In order to host the 2000 World Club championship, the state government of Rio de Janeiro reduced the 179,000 capacity Maracanã to 129,000 and installed more than one hundred skyboxes around the upper rim of the stadium. While seemingly insignificant, this was the first time

that a Brazilian stadium had undergone significant reform in order to host a major international event. The reduction of capacity eliminated the prideful claim that the stadium was “O Maior do Mundo” (world’s largest) and by creating air conditioned, sealed containers for VIPs while reducing traditional standing sections, the stadium’s character was altered. Perhaps as a signal of things to come, construction of a glass-encased FIFA Hall of Fame began but was never completed (Gaffney 2008).

## Brazil gets its Games

As its most iconic and photogenic city, Rio de Janeiro led Brazil’s 21<sup>st</sup> century attempt to capture sports mega-events as a way of selling the city and country as a “place” for business and tourism. Failed attempts to secure the 2004 and 2012 Olympic Games forced mega event boosters to turn to smaller, regional events. In 2003 the city won the right to host the 2007 Pan American Games (Mascarenhas, Bienenstein, e Sánchez 2011). This ushered in an era of sport-related infrastructure projects that has put Rio de Janeiro and Brazil at the epicenter of global mega event production.<sup>8</sup>

Soon after the conclusion of the 2007 Pan American Games, FIFA awarded Brazil the 2014 World Cup. Strangely, Brazil was the only candidate as FIFA had, under president Blatter, instituted (albeit briefly) a continental rotation for the tournament. Following Asia, Europe and Africa, 2014 was to be South America’s turn and Brazil was the only country put forth by the regional football confederation, CONMEBOL. While the FIFA technical report cited the need for a maximum of 8 to 10 host cities, 18 Brazilian cities put forth candidature projects and the Brazilian government chose 12 of them in May of 2009. Once the cities were chosen, the wheels were set in motion to attend to the technical team’s finding that “none of the stadiums in Brazil would be suitable to stage 2014 FIFA World Cup™ matches in their current state.”<sup>9</sup>

The processes through which the 2014 host cities were selected and the processes of projecting and contracting the myriad developments for each host city merits book length treatment. The above sketch of the historical trajectory of Brazilian football and sporting culture has provided some of the

<sup>8</sup> The hosting of the Pan American Games was hugely problematic. For a more complete account of the event see (C. Gaffney and Melo 2010; C. Gaffney 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Inspection Report for the 2014 World Cup, FIFA, Zurich. 2007, p.25.

background information necessary to make sense of the urban, institutional and social contexts in which the infrastructure projects for the 2014 are taking shape. While far from complete, this analysis has shown that the dramatic changes to Brazil’s sporting landscape are conditioned by processes not visible on the surface. In the following section we examine data regarding football spectatorship, undertake a brief analysis of select architectural projects and imagine the trajectory of Brazilian football in the post-Cup era.

## Realities and prospects

As we mentioned at the outset, the massive public outlays for spending on World Cup and Olympic infrastructure are happening as the Brazilian economy has experienced consistent economic growth and an increase in purchasing power for all social segments. As the World Cup was announced to the Brazilian public in 2007, the government made guarantees that no public money would be spent. This was evidently false as there were no corporate partners supporting the 2014 bid and few potential host cities prepared financial viability statements.<sup>10</sup> As the World Cup has taken physical shape, public investment has been 98.5% of the total expenditure<sup>11</sup>. Eager to justify the inevitable cost overruns the Minister of Sport, Aldo Rebelo, quipped in November of 2011 that the government “was not paying for the World Cup, but investing in Brazilian cities.”<sup>12</sup>

**Table 1: Largest crowds in Brazilian history by decade<sup>13</sup>**

1950 – 1959	25
1960 – 1969	44
1970 – 1979	103
1980 – 1989	55
1990 – 1999	0
2000 – 2009	0

<sup>10</sup> See Inspection Report for the 2014 World Cup, FIFA, Zurich. 2007, p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Dossie, Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas Rio de Janeiro, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Aldo Rebelo, hosted by ACIE November 16, 2011, Rio de Janeiro.

<sup>13</sup> Adapted from <[http://www.flamengo.com.br/flapedia/Maiores\\_p%C3%ABablicos\\_do\\_futebol\\_brasileiro](http://www.flamengo.com.br/flapedia/Maiores_p%C3%ABablicos_do_futebol_brasileiro)>.



The extensive and monumental physical interventions currently underway for the 2014 FIFA World Cup stadiums are but the most visible manifestation of a process referred to as “elitizacao”, or elitization. Elitization implies a change in the social profile of stadium-going fans from lower and middle to upper-middle and upper class. With this, there is a perceived change in social comportment at football matches, moving from active to passive spectatorship. There are two distinct schools of thought regarding this process, but both agree on the character of the changes taking place.

The tables below show two interrelated phenomenon. The first table shows the average revenue streams for major Brazilian football clubs. The major sources of revenue are player sales and television contracts. The dominance of these sectors indicates that large media outlets have an important say in the programming and management of football and that the Brazilian leagues continue to export their best players. While a more rigorous comparison with other leagues would reveal comparative values, these data are not yet available.

Of particular interest to our discussion is the percentage of revenue derived from ticket sales, 11%. This implies that clubs are not dependent on having paying fans in stadiums. For instance, if from one year to the next, Brazilian attendances were cut in half, there would only be a 5.5% decrease in club revenues. This could easily be compensated for by the sale of extra players, a new sponsorship, or a more lucrative television contract. The general political and institutional conditions that we previously identified have both created and re-enforced the economic dynamics of clubs.

**Table 2 – Club revenue streams - 2010**

<b>Source of income</b>	<b>(%)</b>
Ticket sales	11
Sponsors and advertising	12
Other receipts (i.e. replica sales)	12
Member dues and amateur sports	13
Television	24
Sale / transfer of players	28

Source: Cadernos FGV Projetos, Junho 2010, Ano 5, numero 13, issn 1984-4883

Again, comparative data for the past ten years would reveal changing trends, but there are not yet data available. We can assume that as the Brazilian economy has grown the value of television contracts has increased. The expansion of Brazil’s internal consumer market has likely increased the value of advertising and sponsorship contracts over time.

The decline in fan attendance at first division matches has been more than matched by an increase in the average ticket price. The table below shows very clearly that while there are fewer fans in the stadiums per match, profits have soared. This means that average ticket prices have increased dramatically. We read in this table that ticket prices have increased by at least 70% in five years. Ticket prices vary widely from city to city and from game to game. Our research in Rio de Janeiro has shown that a R\$30 - R\$40 ticket is beyond the reach of most working class fans. While the average ticket price remains relatively low compared to leagues in Europe, Brazilian football statistics are skewed by the influence of what is known as the “half-ticket”, or half-price tickets for students, elderly and state workers. Tickets are also sold in volume and at a discount to the *torcidas organizadas* who sell them on to fans. To complicate the situation further, our research has shown that tickets given to the football federations, clubs, and sponsors can account for up to 15% of spectators at any give match. Hence, the data below cannot be considered absolutely accurate, but rather an indication of trends. If anything, the situation is even more alarming: as recently as 2005, standing tickets at Rio’s Maracanã stadium were R\$5.

**Table – Average attendance at football matches  
– Campeonato Brasileiro, Serie A, 2007-2011**

year	total paying public	average paying public	gate receipts (R\$)	average ticket (R\$)
2007	6.582.976	17461	80040848	12.2
2008	6.439.854	16992	101241490	15.7
2009	6.766.471	17807	125764391	18.6
2010	5.638.806	14839	112873893	20.0
2011	5.660.987	14976	117665714	20.8
% Change	-14	-14	46	71

Source: <http://www.cbf.com.br/competicoes/campeonato-brasileiro/>

This new political economy of Brazilian football is being consolidated with the arrival of the World Cup. In 2012, Ricardo Trade of the 2014 Local Organizing Committee said the following regarding the new stadiums under construction:

“The stadiums sometimes attract people through their modern design, they become places for family outings and fans take stadium tours, they can visit the trophy room, see photos, arrive early for the game and consume club products.”<sup>14</sup>

We can also observe that fewer people are able to attend matches because of the increased ticket prices that this “consumptive football” has brought with it. The distancing of Brazil’s lower classes from their most popular form of leisure is bringing about significant changes to and challenges for “traditional” Brazilian terrace cultures.

While it can be argued that the elevation of ticket prices is a “natural” outcome of an expanding economy and inflationary processes, the same logic would suggest that greater purchasing power would cause attendances to remain constant or even increase. However, as we have argued, there has been what appears to be a deliberate attempt to reduce the presence of the working class in Brazilian stadiums with the goal of transforming “traditional fans” into “families of consumers.” This trend is entirely consistent with stadium and sport management practices in North America and Europe. As the new stadiums in Brazil are being paid for with public money, the government is actively subsidizing professional sport. This intention was made clear as early as the FIFA Technical Evaluation of Stadiums in 2007:

“The Brazilian model for the 2014 FIFA World Cup™ is to give priority to private finance in the construction and remodelling of the stadiums through long term concessions and eventually public private partnerships (PPPs).”

This statement is misleading, in that the “priority to private finance” should have been reflected in the appearance of private financing for the construction of stadia. In fact, one of the pillars of the government’s argument for hosting the World Cup was that it would be 100% financed by private enterprise. Just the opposite has happened. A literal reading of the above sentence makes clear the government’s *real* intent to privilege private interests through publicly financing of projects that will then be handed to the private sector to profit from.

<sup>14</sup> <<http://www.copa2014.gov.br/pt-br/noticia/diretor-do-col-avalia-que-selecao-brasileira-pode-aumentar-sustentabilidade-de-arenas>>.

In addition to importing models of stadium development and sports management practices from abroad, the models for the stadiums under construction are heavily influenced by “international best practice” in design. This partially results from the contracts signed between host cities and FIFA in which World Cup stadiums must attend to the guidelines established in the “Technical Requirements for Stadia” manual.

The 125-page manual, treats ten primary areas ranging from pre-construction decisions to match-day security requirements. Stadium designers and event managers are thus slightly limited in their choices about which architectural elements to include and if they are to “qualify” as a World Cup host, their stadium and game management plan must conform to FIFA’s exigencies. Failure to comply with these exigencies within two years of the event could signal a breach of contract and the potential loss of the event.

There has developed an international stadium building knowledge network that is comprised of multinational sports management firms such as Los Angeles-based IMG, and by multinational stadium design firms. Similar to other mega events, with the production of the World Cup a country enters into an international knowledge-sharing network. Teams of specialist technicians move around the globe, producing and reproducing sports mega events. The architecture, design, engineering and management contracts for World Cup stadia are open to global bidding, though it is usually national level civil construction firms that direct the projects. The “internationalization” of Brazilian football is bringing dramatic changes to stadium architecture, design and access, as well as consolidating a process of “elitization” which will have enduring effects on Brazilian football culture.

## Conclusion

The 2014 World Cup will be a historical marker in Brazil. Much as in 1950, the country will use the tournament to project itself to an international audience through the construction of monumental stadia. In the immediate post-war era, Brazil was anxious to demonstrate its engineering and architectural capacity, as well as the budding “racial democracy” of the Brazilian people. The stadiums designed in that era reflected this ideal. Sixty-four years later, much in Brazil has changed and the projects underway are a reflection of the goals and desires of Brazil’s political and economic elite. As we have shown, there has been a change in

the economics of Brazilian football in recent years, which has resulted in the diminishing of crowds, an increase in ticket prices and the emergence of a commercially oriented model of fandom (Durão 2010).

These changes did not happen because of the World Cup, but they cannot be separated from them. The progressive territorialization of Brazilian stadiums and urban space will reach its apogee between June 13 and July 23, 2014. As Gaffney (2008, 2010) has shown, and the FIFA documents bear out, nearly every square meter of modern stadiums are controllable, regulated and conditioned. For instance, in the FIFA stadium requirements, VIP hospitality areas require 4.6 square meters per person, while VVIP (Very Very Important People) are allotted 5.2 square meters. This kind of hyper-rationalization and differentiation of space extends to the stadium as a whole.

In truth, the boundaries of stadium space are highly flexible, as FIFA requires that a two-kilometer radius from the center of the stadium be given over to their exclusive control for marketing purposes for the length of the tournament. Again, we can identify a large public subsidy for the generation of private profit. The militarization of public space that accompanies global mega-events has been well documented and in a society that has not yet fully made the institutional transition from military dictatorship to representative democracy there are major concerns regarding the management of and access to public space during the 2014 World Cup. This is similar to processes observed in recent World Cups (Alegi 2008; Maennig e du PLESSIS 2007; Pithouse 2008; C. Rodrigues 2010).

It can be argued that the World Cup will bring something unique to Brazilians, namely, the ability to see a World Cup match. While FIFA has made promises that 300,000 category 4 tickets will be made reserved for lower income Brazilians, the remainder of the tickets will remain well out of reach for the most. We can see in the following table a progressive increase in the price of World Cup tickets. Those who wish to be close to the action for this “once in a lifetime” opportunity will not only have to have an Internet connection and a credit card, but will pay significantly more than South Africans or Germans. The company MATCH, owned by the nephew of the FIFA president won a no-bid contract for selling 2014 World Cup tickets.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> <[http://www.transparencyinsport.org/No\\_tendering\\_for\\_World\\_Cup\\_tix\\_contract/no\\_tender\\_for\\_world\\_cup\\_tickets.html](http://www.transparencyinsport.org/No_tendering_for_World_Cup_tix_contract/no_tender_for_world_cup_tickets.html)>.

**Table 3: Ticket Price comparisons for recent FIFA World Cups**

	category 1	category 2	category 3	category 4
Germany 2006	\$ 126	\$ 75	\$ 57	\$ 45
South Africa 2010	\$ 160	\$ 120	\$ 80	\$ 20
Brazil 2014	\$ 203	\$ 192	\$ 112	\$ 25

The month long World Cup will live in the memories of Brazilians, but what about after the event has passed? Many cities will have to maintain expensive stadiums that have no permanent tenants and cannot be counted on to generate sufficient revenue though hosting football matches, concerts, or religious gatherings. Given the trends in ticket prices, we can assume that Brazilian clubs will continue to try to extract more money out of fewer fans by “capturing” them within stadiums that have facades similar to shopping malls and office buildings. The commercial offerings of teams within the stadiums will likely increase as the stadium demographics increasingly shift from the young working classes to the middle and upper middle professional classes. The gradual and forceful displacement of traditional fans will be felt in the stadiums as a certain dulling of the experience as a formerly participatory environment turns to one of passive and comfortable consumption.

These trends can be observed in the architecture of the new stadia and the documentation that has accompanied the selling of these projects to local, national and international audiences. We see in the destruction of many of Brazil’s traditional stadiums the loss of architectural and cultural traditions. Of the twelve stadium projects underway, six were existing stadia demolished to be reconstructed in the same physical space, two are reforms of privately owned facilities, and four are being built from the ground up. While many of the projects are visually attractive, there is a sense that they are little more than stages upon which the performative ritual of football is to be carried out. There will be little to distinguish, for example, the new stadium in Cuiabá from stadiums in Portugal, Austria, Poland or South Africa. Similar to shopping malls, no new stadium allows for a visual connection or physical articulation with the urban environment. Financed with public money and controlled by private interests, World Cup stadiums will be worlds of consumption isolated from their urban and cultural contexts.

The accepted business wisdom of football suggests that this is the only way forward for Brazilian football. The private sector has undertaken no risk in developing the World Cup and the public sector has over-achieved in their desire to put forth a “positive image” of Brazil to the world. The wonton destruction of historic stadiums has been accompanied by a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of tournament organizers. Football’s institutions have not recognized the very real threats to traditional football culture in Brazil. To the contrary, these very institutions have worked closely with private interests to change the form and function of Brazilian stadiums as well as the “kind” of people that go there. These processes, as we have outlined, have the potential to permanently alter an essential element of Brazilian cultural identity. Ironically, it is the cultural weight of football, as created and sustained by “o povo”, that has made possible its rentability in the global marketplace.

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## Changes and continuities on Brazilian urban governance: the impacts of the Sporting megaevents<sup>1</sup>

*Erick S. Omena de Melo*

### Introduction

The promulgation of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 represented a fundamental step toward the creation of a judicial sign that supported the demands for increased democratization of public management. Related to certain social policies, for example, article number 204 attempts to guarantee “the participation by the population through representative organizations in the formulation of policies and the control of actions at all levels.” In a similar manner, article 227 allows the participation of NGOs in the elaboration and evaluation of certain sectional policies.

These indications can be considered true innovations in the area of Brazilian institutional framework, a preliminary performance in the construction of the history of the new republic. In the meantime, it is important to emphasize, that these advances were not granted as simple benevolences on the part of the state and its legislators. On the contrary, they represent the fruit of mobilizations by diverse social segments, which sought redemocratization of the country over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, in the context of a centralized and vertical public administration. Certainly, the environment of repression and strong dictatorial control

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<sup>1</sup> This article was published in English in the Journal *Territorio*, number 64, 2013.

contributed to the emergence of social movements which prioritized democratic revindications.

As a consequence of this, there was a proliferation of new institutional arrangements aimed at the decentralization of public administration and the amplification of participation and social control in the 1990s and 2000s. Experiences such as those of the Managing Council of Public Policy, articulated in the three branches of power and which cover a range of performance sectors such as health, education, housing, the environment, transportation, culture, tourism, cities, among others, became references of democratic institutionalization. This process was accompanied by the incorporation into these new structures of certain social movements and entities of the third sector, despite diverse analyses having pointed out problems of their elitism, their control by government representatives, and their mere formality (SANTOS JUNIOR, AZEVEDO, RIBEIRO, 2004).

Parallely, it was during this same historical period that a particular form of management of cities called urban entrepreneurship - based on the adoption of business techniques, on the competition between cities, and on the attraction of new capital and consumers through spectatorship of the territory (HARVEY, 1996) – that a hegemony in national affairs was established. In particular, the current promotion of mega-events as privileged tools of its actions and objectives is notable. It is exactly this tool which contributes to the consolidation ideology in the face of public opinion. After a few unsuccessful experiences, local and national governments, supported by businesses and constituents of multinational organizations, were able to bring first class sporting events to the country, in this case, the Pan-American games of 2007, the World Cup of 2014, and the Olympics of 2016.

Although these programmed events are commonly legitimated by the generated anticipation surrounding their capacity to promote socioeconomic changes, there are various records of violations of human rights in the preparations by host countries for the events (COHRE, 2007). In particular, the intensification of authority practices lacking transparency during anticipatory periods for these sporting events is notable.

In this sense, the principal objective of the present article is to contribute to the analysis regarding the contradictions and conflicts involved in the convergence of two tendencies of the Brazilian urban government, verified over the course of the last decades: the increase of

institutionalized participation in the construction of public policy by civil society, and the hegemonic growth of urban entrepreneurship, more than anything, through the adoption of sporting mega-events, whose principal characteristic has been repeated anti-democratic practices. Specifically, it is designed to analyze the impacts of the preparations for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 on the amplification of institutional spaces of sociopolitical participation and the organizational process of social movements.

Therefore, the particularities of the mega-events will be considered in the current context of globalization as well as using surveys conducted by the network of Observatório das Metrópoles on the new institutional arrangements created to contain or influence the decision-making processes involving the large urban projects surrounding the international sporting events of 2014 and 2016, as much as in the context of the articulations of social movements in the national sphere surrounding the mega-events and their consequences. Primarily, a panorama of the increasing importance of these events in the urban restructuring of the host cities will be drawn, and of the popular participation in the planning of projects, considering the principal impacts broached by specialized literature. Next, primary sources will be used which include legal documents, official projects, meeting minutes, interviews and institutional websites related to the new institutional federal government structure, and the mobilization of social movements in the same sphere.

Using this database, it will be investigated by which method 1) these new institutional arrangements have sought to create channels of dialogue and effective participation by civil society organized in the decision-making process, and 2) to what point the social movements have sought new forms of articulation related to the changes brought by mega-events.

## The reality of sporting mega-events

The trajectory of sporting mega-events in the 20th century reveals an enormous growth in their importance from a socioeconomic point of view as much as from a political, geographic and symbolic angle, especially over the course of the last decades. This is due to the fact of their projection on a global level, proportioned by the intrinsic transformations related to what is called the global process, like the arrival of cable TV and satellite

transmission, the expansion of borders of capital accumulation, and the consolidation of what is called business government entrepreneurialism. By virtue of this, these programmed events have become characterized as increasingly lucrative and interesting for their organizing entities and for national and multinational corporations (SHORT, 2004; ROCHE, 2009).

On the other hand, the budget increases of the games have been implied in the growth of public investment directed toward the visibility of the infrastructure and other demands of international organizations, such as the IOC and FIFA and other partner companies (IPEA, 2008). Not unusually, this can occur in a traumatic manner, which was demonstrated in the cases of Montreal and Athens. In the first case, the debt assumed by the state for the Olympics of 1976 was paid off a full 25 years after the fact (RUBIO, 2005). In the second example, the Greek government is still bearing the expenses as a consequence of hosting one of the most expensive mega-events in history, a fact made worse by the unfavourable European and global macroeconomy of the past years. In the meantime, the same large burdens have frequently been justified by the economic dynamism that such investments bring to host countries and cities, most of all when considering the creation of jobs and income for the resident population, and the urban infrastructure that is implemented for these occasions. Even though there is no consensus in terms of the advantages or disadvantages related to the costs and benefits of these experiences in the specialized literature, different lines of study tend to agree that the costs for the public coffer are higher and higher.

Accompanying the economic evolution of these events there has been a simultaneous intensification of social costs for the host countries. Generally, sporting mega-events are associated with urban structure interventions in the mobility sectors, housing, and other urban apparatuses, whose most immediate impacts have translated themselves into the forced and violent displacement of thousands, or even millions of people. There are still adverse social consequences indirectly related to these interventions, such as gentrification, which is the expulsion of the vulnerable population due to the occurrence of increased costs of living. Such impacts are exacerbated by the criminalization of sex workers, the homeless and street vendors. All of these problems are usually accompanied by repression or, at least, disconsideration of the affected populations, beyond changing various laws and a lack of transparency in public actions (COHRE, 2007).

Some cases grab our attention in particular, such as the Beijing Olympics, where more than a million people were forcibly displaced and were violently repressed in their attempts to demonstrate. It is worth highlighting that, in cases generally evaluated in a positive way in terms of public opinion and on behalf of specialized literature, there are recorded cases of violations of human rights. The experience of Barcelona is an example in this sense, knowing that, even though there were a large volume of direct removals, a large part of the most vulnerable population in the areas of intervention was expelled to the peripheries as a function of the rapid real estate valorization and the consequent increase of cost of living in the city.

It is clear, in the meantime, that even though there is an enormous involvement of the population of many countries in the audience of the Olympic Games and increased financial gains for corporations at a global and national scale, there is still much to advance in what plays into the guaranteed rights of the inhabitants of host cities. The amplification of popular participation and transparency in the planning of actions surrounding the preparation for mega-events is identified in ample specialized literature, as a central point to counterbalance the enormous power inequalities between international corporations and a large part of the host city inhabitants, as a way of avoiding, or at least minimizing, the recurrent negative effects, especially violations of human rights.

In this sense, the current reporter for the right to adequate housing for the United Nations, Raquel Rolnik, in the conclusions of her most recent report on the subject submitted to the human rights council of the same institution, recommended that local and national authorities “give chances of participation in the planning process, from the bidding stage, to everyone who will be affected by the preparations for the event, and to actually take into account their opinions.” The urbanist confirms that “participation should also be open to civil society organizations, in particular those that are dedicated to promoting the right to adequate housing.” In the same manner, she suggests that the IOC and FIFA should demand that “candidates (to host the games) proceed in an open and transparent way in planning and bidding, with the participation of civil society, in particular those organizations that represent the housing sector and affected populations” (UN, 2010, p. 19 & 21).

## The World Cup and Olympics in Brazil

Economic factors in sight, the mega-events in Brazil seem to follow a confirmed tendency of previous editions. In the case of the event organized by FIFA, the total anticipated in the responsibilities matrix, a document containing projects and their respective costs, is almost R\$ 24 billion. Of this total, 75% comes from the federal government, in the form of loans or direct investments, and another 23% comes from other spheres of public power. The private sector has only contributed 2% of the budget. In terms of sectoral division, it is noticeable that practically half the investments are destined towards urban mobility, while one quarter is marked for the construction or remodeling of stadiums<sup>2</sup>.

In the case of the preparations for the competitions organized by the IOC, the slated cost is more than R\$ 31 billion, according to the candidature dossier. Of this, more than R\$14 billion (45%) will be used only for “roads, railways, and urban inheritances,” while around R\$ 4.5 billion (15%) will be spent on the construction of sporting instalations, the Olympic Village, and the media.

Analyzing the figures described above, primarily, the massive contribution of public money in the face of practically residual participation of the private sector is distinguished, even though this information has only been divulged for the World Cup. Moreso, the sum of investments directed toward the implementation of new urban infrastructure is notable. Because of this, the tendency for public works to be inflated seems to be confirmed, following the analysis of previous events, mainly made up of the grand potential for urban restructuring, that is, for large projects of mobility and collective works.

In terms of what plays into the social costs related to such investments and projects, the callibrated data also includes the tendency of repetition of other records of the last decades. Some estimates suggest that close to 170,000 people in the country will be removed from their homes before 2016. There are still diverse testimonies of inhabitants facing the threat of removal, bemoaning more transparency in acts of public power (SANTOS JUNIOR, 2011). In the twelve host cities, there is a perception of repetition of behavior patterns by the state involving the repression of families who

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<sup>2</sup> <<http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014/>>.

try to resist the violation of their right to housing, which is generally associated with the valorization and speculation of local real estate.

Human rights organizations have also articulated claims about the impacts suffered by other vulnerable groups. Informal workers are being systematically excluded from future areas of commercial limits surrounding the stadiums, through local and national legislative innovations. The same is applied in the case of fan rights, whose representative associations have complained of elitist processes of limitation of freedom of expression in the realm of the stadiums, foreseeing even more intensity during the international competitions of the coming years.

In the meantime, the repetition of planning practices for sporting mega-events in Brazil based on inflated public budgets, large urban projects, and various violations of human rights reinforce the pressing and already announced necessity for the new institutional arrangements responsible for this planning process, channels of ample popular participation in their decision-making processes, more than anything of the most vulnerable groups.

## New institutional arrangements and mega-events in Brazil

Generally, the agencies, organizations and parallel structures created as functions of preparation for the sporting mega-events are of two types: those of a decision-making/executive nature and those of an advisory nature. While the first are the instances legally responsible for deciding and implementing guidelines and actions related to the projects for the mega-event in question, they are the last ones to contribute information, opinions, studies and representations of interest of specific groups which subsidize the decision-making of the groups that are effectively responsible. Beyond this, these groups can be divided into governmental and non-governmental.

Accordingly, it can be seen in the table and diagram below, dozens of which were created for the projects of the World Cup and the Olympics, the grand majority is represented by those of a consultive and governmental character. The effective decision-making power is concentrated in a very reduced number of deliberative state and non-state organizations, directly connected to multinational organizations, who debate and discuss amongst themselves according to their respective stipulated responsibilities in agreements and contracts signed between the federal and municipal government, FIFA or the IOC, and local committees.



## New Institutional Arrangements for the 2014 World Cup – National Scale

Organ	Function	Composition	Created on	Format
<p><b>World Cup 2014 Organizing Committee CGCOPA</b></p>	<p>Establish the guidelines for the Brazilian government's strategic plan of action for the hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, as well as supervise the work of GECOPA</p>	<p>I – Ministry of Sport (coordinator); II – Attorney General; III – Staff of the President of the Republic; IV – Office of the Comptroller General; V – Institutional Security Cabinet of the President of the Republic; VI – Ministry of Cities; VII – Ministry of Science and Technology; VIII – Ministry of Communication; IX – Ministry of Culture; X – Ministry of Defense; XI – Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; XII – Ministry of Finance; XIII – Ministry of Justice; XIV – Ministry of the Environment; XV – Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management; XVI – Ministry of Foreign Relations; XVII – Ministry of Health; XVIII – Ministry of Work and Employment; XIX – Ministry of Transportation; XX – Ministry of Tourism; XXI – Human Rights Secretary of the President of the Republic; XXII – Promotion of Racial Equality Policies of the President of the Republic; XXIII – Port Secretary of the President of the Republic; XXIV – Civil Aviation Secretary of the President of the Republic; and XXV – Social Communication Secretary for the President of the Republic</p>	<p>1/14/2010</p>	<p>Deliberative</p>
<p><b>World Cup 2014 Executive Committee – GECOP</b></p>	<p>I – establish the Brazilian government's strategic plan of action for the hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup; II – establish goals and monitor the results of the implementation and execution of the plan in item I; III – itemize the actions of the General Union Budget related to the government activities related to the 2014 World Cup; IV – coordinate and approve governmental activities related to the 2014 World Cup developed by direct or indirect organs and entities of the federal administration with union resources, including through sponsorship, fiscal initiatives, subsidies, grants, and credit operations.</p>	<p>I – Ministry of Sport, which will coordinate; II – Staff of the President of the Republic; III – Ministry of Cities; IV – Ministry of Finance; V – Ministry of Justice; VI – Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management; VII – Ministry of Tourism; and VIII – Civil Aviation Secretary of the President of the Republic</p>	<p>1/14/2010</p>	<p>Deliberative</p>

<b>Local Organizing Committee</b>	Brazilian entity responsible to FIFA for the organization and preparation of competitions in the country.	Ricardo Teixeira and CBF	4/14/2008	Deliberative
<b>FIFA LOC Board</b>	Make decisions on operational aspects of the preparation for the tournaments and other events related to the competitions.	Representatives of the senior directors of FIFA and LOC (coordinators Ricardo Teixeira and Jérôme Valcke)	No information	Deliberative
<b>Responsibilities Committee</b>	Make sure demands, deadlines, and goals are met for the preparation of the event, especially the viability of the athletic infrastructure in the different host cities.	Ministry of Sport, governors and mayors of host cities	1/2/2010	Deliberative
<b>2014 World Cup Consortium</b>	Lend support services to the administration for the organization and carrying out of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Responsible for the initial feasibility studies.	Brazilian company of engineering and infrastructure, Ltd. (EBEI); Galo Publicity, Production, and Marketing, Ltd.; Value Partners Brazil, Ltd.; Value Partners Management Consulting, Ltd.; Enerconsult S.A.	7/30/2009	Advisory
<b>Board of Stadiums</b>	Discuss operation and management plans in the areas and their vicinity for the Confederation Cup 2013 and the World Cup 2014	No information	6/2/2010	Advisory
<b>Board of Transparency</b>	Discuss, formulate and put into practice – in the governmental sphere – the policies and instruments of transparency in the preparation and carrying out of the World Cup 2014, including the participation of the host cities and states.	Ministry of Sport, the Attorney General, Office of the Comptroller General, and the Ethos Institute	8/18/2011	Advisory

<b>Board of Security</b>	Discuss the model of operation and security for large events and the alignment between diverse security organs, creating synergies between the different police and security forces.	Ministry of Sport, Ministry of Justice, Federal Police, LOC/FIFA	5/10/2010	Advisory
<b>Board of Health</b>	Promote the national coordination of preparation of health proceedings for the event through the definition of guidelines, support in the preparation of projects, and accompaniment in the carrying out of proceedings.	Ministry of Health, National Agency of Sanitary Vigilance (Anvisa), National Agency of Supplementary Health (ANS), and cities and states that will host the games.	10/05/2011	Advisory
<b>Board of Tourism</b>	Improve the quality of Brazilian tourism not only during the World Cup, but for the future, as well as promote debates focused on the preparation of the World Cup site.	Ministry of Sport, National Council of Tourism (4), Ministry of Tourism (4), EMBRATUR, the Attorney General, Office of the Comptroller General, Ministry of Cities, and GVE.	5/29/2010	Advisory
<b>Board of Infrastructure</b>	Select and define, along with all of the federal entities and the private sector, the essential infrastructure projects for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, as well as discuss the operation plans that will be executed over the course of the event.	Ministry of Sport, Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management	No information	Advisory
<b>Board of Promotion of Commerce and Technology</b>	Present the available tools, such as financial initiatives, to stimulate the participation of host cities in the strategy for the promotion of the country and ensure the economic impact of the World Cup, calculated as RS 47 billion, if reached.	Ministry of Sport, Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade, Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exportation and Investments (Apex), institutions dedicated to the promotion of products and services of the 12 host cities.	10/14/2010	Advisory

<p><b>Secretary of Human Rights Work Group (right to dignified housing World Cup/Olympics)</b></p>	<p>Receive denunciations, monitor and propose guidelines seeking to ensure the human right to adequate housing and prevent forceful removals, as a consequence of activities for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.</p>	<p>I – Board of Defense of Human Rights; II – Representative of the General Secretary of the President of the Republic; III – Ombudsman of the Secretary for Human Rights of the President of the Republic; IV – Representative of the Public Federal Ministry; V – Representative of the Federal Public Register; VI – Representative of the Ministry of Cities; VII – Representative of the Ministry of Sport; VIII – Representative of the Ministry of Transport; IX – Representative of the Ministry of National Integration; X – Representative of the Ministry of Tourism; XI – Representative of the Ministry of the Environment; XII – Representative of the Ministry of Health; XIII – Representative of the National Confederation of the Residents Association (CONAM); XIV – Representative of National Movement of Struggle for Housing (MNLAM); XV – Representative of the Popular National Union for Residents; XVI – Representative of the Central Office of Popular Movements (CMP); XVII – Representative of the National Movement of the Street Population; XVIII – Representative of the Forum of National Entities of Human Rights (FENDH); and XXIX – Representative of the National Forum of Urban Reform.</p>	<p>10/6/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>Ministry of Culture Work Group</b></p>	<p>Propose guidelines and actions for cultural promotion and diffusion to be developed during the preparations and carrying out of the World Cup.</p>	<p>I – Special Advisory Council to the Cabinet of the State Ministry of Culture (president of work group and work reports); II – Secretary of Cultural Policies; III – Secretary of Institutional Articulation; IV – Secretary of Cultural Citizenship; V – Secretary of Cultural Identity and Diversity; VI – Secretary of the Audiovisual; VII – Secretary of Cultural Advancement and Incentive; VIII – National Library Foundation; IX – National Arts Foundation; X – Brazilian Institute of Museums; XI – National Institute of Historical and Artistic Patrimony; XII – Palmares Cultural Foundation; and XIII – Casa de Rui Barbosa Foundation</p>	<p>6/16/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>Ministry of Culture Work Group – Communication in large events</b></p>	<p>Prepare the national communications for the hosting of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, mainly in the area of telecommunications.</p>	<p>Executive Secretary; Secretary of Telecommunications; Secretary of Electronic Communications Services; Secretary of Digital Inclusion; Sub secretary of Postal Services and Management of Related Companies</p>	<p>8/5/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>

<p><b>Public Federal Ministry Work Group</b></p>	<p>Accompany the application of federal budgets for the carrying out of the 2014 World Cup.</p>	<p>Procurators of the Republic who practice in the states that will host the World Cup</p>	<p>8/1/2009</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>Ministry of Health Work Group</b></p>	<p>I – establish the general guidelines, actions, strategies, and goals for the preparation for health proceedings for the 2014 World Cup; II – accompany the implementation of actions for the preparation for health proceedings for the 2014 World Cup; III – provide technical material to represent the Ministry of Health in the Health Council for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil.</p>	<p>I – One representative of the Executive Secretary (SE/MS); II – One representative of the Secretary of Health (SAS/MS); III – One representative of the Secretary of Health Vigilance (SVS/MS); IV – One representative of the Secretary of Strategic and Participatory Management; V – One representative of the National Agency of Sanitary Vigilance (ANVISA); VI – One representative of the National Agency of Supplementary Health (ANS); VII – One representative of the National Board of Health Secretaries (CONASS); and VIII – One representative of the National Board of Municipal Secretaries of Health (CONASEMS).</p>	<p>5/10/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>Ministry of Tourism; Center of Tourist Information</b></p>	<p>Research, collect, store, and distribute information about the preparation of the country for the 2014 World Cup, mainly around the professional qualification of tourism workers and knowledge of English and Spanish – The Olá Turista Program.</p>	<p>I – Cabinet of the Ministry; II – National Secretary of Politics and Tourism – SNPTur; III – National Secretary of Tourism Development Programs – SNDTur.</p>	<p>7/26/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>Ministry of Justice -Extraordinary Secretary for Large Events</b></p>	<p>Coordinate and plan the security actions for the events Brazil will receive in the coming years.</p>	<p>1. Director of Operations; 2. Director of Intelligence; 3. Director of Logistics; and 4. Director of Special Projects</p>	<p>8/2/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>External Commission of the House of Representatives, World Cup and Olympics</b></p>	<p>Analyze and discuss the legacy to be left by the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games and their region, and examine the execution of construction works.</p>	<p>Representatives Alessandro Molon (PT-RJ), Aroldo de Oliveira (DEM-RJ), Lílilam Sá (PR-RJ), Filipe Pereira (PSC-RJ), Vitor Paulo (PRB-RJ), Marcelo Matos (PDT-RJ), and Glauber Braga (PSB-RJ)</p>	<p>4/13/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>

<p><b>Temporary Subcommission of the Federal Senate, World Cup and Olympics</b></p>	<p>Accompany, evaluate, and examine all of the entrepreneurial actions for the hosting of the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Olympics and Paralympics.</p>	<p>PRESIDENT: Senator Lídice da Mata - PSB - BA; VICE-PRESIDENT: Senator Zeze Ferrela - PDT -MG; José Pimentel(PT); Vital do Rêgo (PMDB); Eduardo Amorim(PSC); Eunício Oliveira(PMDB); Cícero Lucena(PSDB)</p>	<p>7/5/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>
<p><b>House of Representatives -Special Commission for the General Law of the World Cup</b></p>	<p>Analyze and propose possible necessary alterations to the General Law of the World Cup proposed by the executive.</p>	<p><b>PT</b>:Titulars: José Guimarães (CE), Vicente Cândido – reporter - (SP), Waldenor Pereira (BA) and (representative of the PMN occupies a space) <b>PMDB</b>:Titulars: Alceu Moreira (RR), Edio Lopes (RR), Renan Filho – president -(AL) and Solange Almeida (RJ) <b>PSDB</b>: Titulars: Carlaile Pedrosa (MG), Otavio Leite (RJ), Rui Palmeira (AL) <b>DEM</b>:Titulars: Fábio Souto (BA), Rodrigo Maia (RJ) <b>PP</b>:Titulars: Simão Sessim (RJ), Afonso Hamm (RS) <b>PR</b>:Titulars: José Rocha (BA), Maurício Quintella Lessa (AL) <b>PSB</b>:Titulars: Jonas Donizette (SP), Romário (RJ) <b>PDT</b>:Titulars: André Figueiredo (CE) <b>Bloco PV</b>, <b>PPS</b>:Titulars: Rubens Bueno (PPS-PR) <b>PTB</b>:Titulars: Amaldo Faria de Sá (SP) <b>PSC</b>:Titulars: Deley (RJ) <b>PCdoB</b>:Titulars: Jô Moraes (MG) <b>PRB</b>:Titulars: Acelino Popó (BA) <b>PMN</b>:Titular: Fábio Faria (PMN)</p>	<p>10/11/2011</p>	<p>Advisory</p>

Sources: Institutional and organ press sites, Tabulation: Observatório das Metrópoles

Generally, the absence of civil society representatives and, even moreso, popular strata is distinct. It is notable that the proceedings, advice, and participatory instances that are integrated into the Brazilian institutional-legal apparatus, consolidated over the course of the previous decades are void of any role in the new agencies created to take into account the urban projects connected to the World Cup and the Olympics.

In the few registered participatory institutional channels registered in the structure of the government, unequal opportunities are offered to actors from the corporate sector and the popular field, in detriment to this. In the more than two dozen organizational structures created for the World Cup in the federal sphere, only one of them, the Work Group created by the Federal Secretary for Human Rights, has a representative presence in the social movements, marked by limitations because it is only advisory.

On the other hand, the massive presence of representatives from the most varied federal organizations is identified. In this setting, the Ministry of Sport is the key player, coordinator of the principal deliberative and consultive organizations. A type of “decentralized centralization” can be perceived, in which the federal government calls on the most varied components to participate in decisions, without, meanwhile, promoting an effective decentralization through the opening of institutions for civil society. The same occurs in what is associated with the preparations for the Olympics, where it is the Public Olympic Authority that assumes the role of governmental decentralization unaccompanied by participation.

Rare openings are limited to the participation of insitutions associated with private companies in themed boards, like the Ethos Institute and the Consortium “Brazil 2014,” which assisted the Ministry of Sport in the elaboration of preliminary studies and guidelines. In the few moments when civil society was called to participate in the decision-making process, it was restrited to only the corporate face and business-like NGOs were privileged.

In this sense, the case of the Legacy Board for the Olympics is emblematic in that is possesses in its composition five representatives of the city of Rio de Janeiro, one representative of the state government, representatives of organizing committees of the World Cup and the Olympics, five representatives from the private sector and four representatives from civil society (Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian Institute of Architects, Association of Directors of Real Estate Companies, NGO Rio Como Vamos). The Advisory Board of CDURP, a public company formed

to oversee the process of service concession to private companies in the port area of Rio de Janeiro, follows the same path. With a function restricted to approving trimestral reports, the board is made up of a representative of CDURP, three representatives of the city, and three representatives of civil society, who are the vice-president of IAB-RJ, the general superintendent of the Association of Directors of Real Estate Agencies, and a member of the Security Board of Bairro da Gamboa.

In this way, the ad hoc instances nationally created to manage the preparations for the mega-events in the country until now have three fundamental characteristics. First, they are relatively decentralized from the point of view of responsibility sharing between governmental spheres and organs. Second, they are extremely closed off to popular participation, a fact that is reinforced by the total exclusion of participatory mechanisms consolidated ahead of time in the federal judicial-institutional framework. The only entities represented by the state as participatory seem to only be a part of a simple simulation, which constitutes the third peculiarity of this exceptional governmental structure.

Particularly in terms of the last point, it is worth pointing out that the behavior of the advisory councils and themed boards destined to deal with issues associated with the World Cup and the Olympics, beyond being very limited from the point of view of influence on relevant decision-making processes, present enormous representative disparities between groups of civil society. Mere formality is a characteristic of these few participatory instances, consigned to the lowest place on the “participatory ladder” created by Arnstein (1969) to evaluate the openness of the state to civil society.

## Social Movements and Mega-events in the country

The impacts of mega-events on Brazilian cities inevitably create room for problems, and will be confronted by active social movements in Brazil. The processes associated with urban restructuring, in the direction of considerable sums of public resources for large projects and the violation of human rights in this area, influence their fields of struggle and mobilization.

Departing from this presupposition, the network of Observatório das Metrôpoles initiated the creation of surveys about different social movements with actions of national scale directly surrounding the



consequences of sporting mega-events. The result, despite being preliminary, is expressed in the table below and through some relevant information for the comprehension of the possible alterations in the dynamic of the articulation of these movements in function of the World Cup and the Olympics.

In the general picture, on one hand, an expressive fragmentation of organizations is certified, which is still considered only a specific field of struggle, like the defense of labor, housing, and transparency rights. This is, actually, an inheritance of the behaviour dynamic of the social movements that were previously consolidated. As a counterpart, the emergence of articulation networks destined to add a large part to these organizations around common revindications is emphasized, in a way that makes strategies more effective through joint action.

There were 42 different institutions acting nationally with demands directly related to Sporting mega-events and originating from various sectors. Of this total, only four (10%) were created in association with the announcement of the mega-events in Brazil, two of which are made up of articulated networks of various entities surrounding demands related to the World Cup and the Olympics. The other two are made up of movements representing rights of fans, denoting a more specific aspect, since they are not only new organizations, but overall giving way to a new area, which has not yet been explored.

In this way, we can affirm that the principal identified phenomenon is the emergence of large articulation networks to realize the new demands, that is, the National Articulation of the Popular Committee of the World Cup (ANCOP) and Project Fair Play. While the first joins 13 of the 40 identified organizations, the latter involves 17 entities. Their respective capacities of aggregation are particularly notable, since the two contain  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the total movements and organizations nationally mobilized around the mega-events, in addition to both having local representation in all 12 site cities.

Despite these similarities, their differences are also well marked. ANCOP is especially based in popular movements and university groups that fight for the right to the city and in the recently created organizations in defense of fan rights. Project Fair Play presents itself as an articulation much associated to social responsibility initiatives of companies, surrounding the combat of corruption and the amplification of transparency, headed by the Ethos Institute and financed by Siemens.

## Social Movements and Mega-events in Brazil

Organization	Created for mega-events	Sector	Key demands
ABRACCI	No	Combating corruption	The same as Project Fair Play
Amaribo Brasil	No	Combating corruption	The same as Project Fair Play
National Articulation of the People's Committee for the World Cup <i>ANCOP (Articulação Nacional dos Comitês Populares da Copa do Mundo)</i>	Yes	Intersectoral Articulation	1) Include popular participation in decisions surrounding the projects, 2) total transparency of public documents, 3) "zero eviction" in the carrying out of the events, 4) respect for current legislation, 5) maintenance of social policy, independent of the demands of the mega-events, among other.
People's Assembly <i>(Assembleia Popular)</i>	No	Intersectoral Articulation	Call attention to budgetary problems and to violations of rights (disputing the legacy proposed by the government and businesses in function of the mega-events).
Brazilian Association of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transvestites, and Transsexuals	No	Sexual orientation rights	Creation of a campaign against homophobia at the World Cup, in the same form as previous campaigns against racism at other World Cups.
National Fan Association ( <i>ANT</i> )	Yes	Fan rights	1) Maintenance of common spaces in stadiums marked as "principal protagonists of Brazilian football culture," that is, their fans, 2) democratization of decisions surrounding Brazilian football with fan participation, 3) respect for rights of workers' communities threatened by the removal being carried out in the name of the World Cup and the Olympics.
Athletes for citizenship	No	Social inclusion for sport	1) Increase athletic participation in schools and 2) incentivize the general population to participate in sports
Center for Popular Movements ( <i>CMP</i> )	No	Intersectoral Articulation	The same as ANCOP

Workers' Center ( <i>Central Única dos Trabalhadores</i> )	No	Worker Rights	1) Include in the general law of the World Cup authorization for registered street workers in the prefecture to work near the stadiums, 2) include in the general law of the World Cup a guarantee of mapping the supply chain for FIFA and CBF products, service providers, and commercial partners to identify and punish cases of slave, child, and/or degrading labor, 3) prohibit voluntary work in the case of regulated professionals or in activities that could put public security at risk, 4) include the expression "decent work" in the social issue of the World Cup, and 5) impede the approval of the legal project 728, from 2011.
CIDES	No	Intersectoral Articulation	Guarantee of the right to the city and housing in the preparation for the World Cup.
CONAM	No	Rights to the city	Respect for the social function of the city, for the right to housing, and to the city planning on the part of the mega-events.
Syndicated Confederation of the Americas	No	Sectoral articulation – workers' rights	Unified minimum salary, basic food basket of R\$ 300; participation in the earnings and results of two minimum salaries; health insurance extended to family members; overtime of 80% from Monday to Friday; 100% on Saturdays and 150% on Sundays and holidays; guarantee of organization by work place; extra evening pay of 50%; 5 days off for every 60 days worked; implementation of better health and work conditions in service fronts; and test period of 30 days.
Confélegis	No	Regulation and representation of professional categories	The same as Project Fair Play
Federal Council of Engineering and Agronomy ( <i>CONFEA</i> )	No	Regulation and representation of professional categories	Amplification of transparency in the projects and combating corruption through: government guarantees with presentation of account installment payments of all enterprises for the World Cup, through GDF; participation of CREAs in the LOC; public balance every three months, monitoring and improving the process, aiming to make necessary adjustments and corrections in the global organization, centralized and unified; the non-approval of the RDC.
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNDOC)	No	Combating drugs and crime	The same as Project Fair Play
Global Compact of the United Nations	No	Social Responsibility	The same as Project Fair Play

ETERN	No	Right to the city	The same as ANCOF
National Human Rights Organizations Forum (FENDH)	No	Intersectoral Articulation	No information.
FNRU	No	Intersectoral Articulation - Right to the city	Respect the right to the city in the context of the mega-events. World Cup without removals.
National Front of Fans	Yes	Rights of football fans	1) Maintenance of common spaces in stadiums marked as “principal protagonists of Brazilian football culture,” that is, their fans, in detriment to the “modernization of football” also brought by the mega-events 2) democratization of decisions surrounding Brazilian football with fan participation.
Urban Resistance Front	No	Sectoral Articulation - Right to the city	Creation of a popular plebiscite on subject of the World Cup so that everyone can share their opinion surrounding decisions.
AVINA Foundation	No	Sustainable development	Monitor and influence the investments in the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics looking at sustainability, transparency, and social legacy.
INESC	No	Intersectoral Articulation	No information.
IBASE	No		No information
Brazilian Institute of Consumer Defense (IDEC)	No	Consumer Rights	<b>Changes in the general law of the World Cup:</b> - alteration of article 11 of the bill to limit FIFA's commercial monopoly in official competition sites and avoid the privatization of public spaces; - inclusion of an article on FIFA's obligations and responsibilities; - insertion of payment for moral and patrimonial damages to aggrieved fans, in proposition I of article 27; - exclusion of proposition II of article 27, which permits bonus buys, prohibited by article 39, I of the CDC; - exclusion of proposition III of article 27, which established a penal clause (fines to consumers) who desisted entrance, as well as those who bought tickets online, which goes against article 49 of the CDC. – Inclusion of the Code of Consumer Defense as a subsidiary legislation.
ETHOS Institute	No	Social responsibility and combating corruption	The same as Project Fair Play

Social Observatory Institute	No	Right to work	The same as Project Fair Play
PACS	No	Intersectoral Articulation	The same as ANCOP
ICM	No	Sectoral Articulation – Right to work	Strengthening consulting and popular participation practices in planning processes and in the evaluation of construction and removals. An end to housing and workers' rights violations.
Global Justice	No	Intersectoral Articulation	The same as ANCOP
Movement to fight for neighborhoods, boroughs, and favelas - <i>MLB</i>	No	Sectoral Articulation – Right to the city	No information.
National Movement of the Homeless Population	No	Rights of the homeless	1) Organized participation in all decisions regarding the homeless population, 2) liberation of resources for the implementation of housing and job policy, and 3) federal government endeavors, to mediate an end to rights violations
MNLM	No	Right to the city	No information.
MTST	No	Right to the city	Creation of a popular plebiscite on the subject of the World Cup so that everyone can share their opinion surrounding decisions.
National Observatory for Homeless and Non-homeless Children	No	Sectoral Articulation – Rights of homeless children	Against the compulsive interment of children and adolescents, in virtue of athletic mega-events.
Metropolitan Observatory ( <i>Observatório das Metrópoles</i> )	No	Rights to the city	The same as ANCOP
Project Fair Play	Yes	Intersectoral Articulation	Clear identification of all investments related to the fulfillment of the 2014 World Cup in the Annual Budget Law for 2012. Explanation of the relation with the FIFA World Cup in all forms of divulgation of project investments for the World Cup, such as the contract announcements and informative signs at the construction sites.

Brazilian Southern Jubilee Network ( <i>Rede Jubileu Sul Brasil</i> )	No	Intersectoral Articulation	Its first demand, in conjunction with the National Articulation of People's Committees for the World Cup (ANCOP), is directly related to the issue of finance and public debt, as well as the 10 points in the ANCOP document.
Brazilian Social Network for Just and Sustainable Cities	No	Sectoral Articulation – the right to participation and transparency	No information.
StreetNet – international network of street vendors	No	Right to work	1) Meetings between the representative organizations of informal vendors and the government to discuss the impacts of proposed infrastructure constructions and revitalization programs and urban zoning planned for the World Cup; 2) relocation plans for shops affected by projects related to the World Cup, which will be carried out with the consultation of groups of informal vendors, and 3) resist the plans to create exclusion zones surrounding fan parks during the World Cup.
Land of Rights ( <i>Terra de Direitos</i> )	No	Intersectoral Articulation	The same as ANCOP
National Union for Popular Housing ( <i>UNMP</i> )	No	Right to the city	Immediate reclaim of transfers for the cooperative housing associations, considering that the suspension of these transfers is unacceptable, unexplainable, and arbitrary, for the social production of housing, once the criteria of selection, contracting, and developments for the projects are sufficiently transparent and obey the process of governmental and judicial system's logic and rite, with the effect of social control (Carta 1.12).

(\*) Source: Institutional websites and interviews. (\*\*) Tabulation: Observatório das Metrôpoles

## Conclusion

The spatial transformations that accompany the preparation of the site cities for mega-events possess similarities with the known process of tourist urbanization. This means that their central characteristics lie in the accommodation of territory and the ascension to local power coalitions of certain fractions of capital, represented mostly in the sectors of tourism, real estate, civil construction, finance, and specialized services in detriment to other economic sectors.

Nevertheless, more than a unique opportunity to aggregate interests between different fractions of capital at the local level, the mega-events provide the concrete possibility of increasing construction of a broad coalition of corporate agents. This process involves the aligning of enterprises, builders, real estate speculators, and local tourism conglomerates with transnational mega corporations in the areas of marketing, banking, diverse industrial products, and local governments. The organizing multinational organizations of these events, that is the IOC and FIFA, not only make up a part of this coalition, but also have a central role in its construction.

To respond to the demands of territory acquisition to the coalition projects, there have been abrupt transformations in the Brazilian judicial-institutional system. Concretely, this has been constituted by the creation of exceptional structures of government that ally the intra-governmental decentralization with the deflation of civil society participation in the decision-making process. In the meantime, there is a regression in the verified tendency over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, of proliferation of new institutional arrangements open to the participation of civil society, such as the councils created in different spheres after the promulgation of the federal constitution in 1988.

This change in the trajectories aligned with the violation of various human rights (those of public information, dignified housing, work, leisure and sport, etc.) recorded in the preparation of the Brazilian metropolises for mega-events, appears to be stimulating the emergence of a new organizational cycle and behavior of urban social movements. Particularly, the construction of two large networks of articulation surrounding the impacts of the World Cup and the Olympics, with the intuition to add the claims of quite diverse groups, indicates a counter positioning attempt by civil society to this new scene of intensification of social exclusion promoted by a broad interscale

coalition of corporate agents. The fact that ANCOP as much as Project Fair Play have in common the emphasis on the demands for more transparency and participation in the decision-making processes reinforces the verification of the democratic retrocession in the Brazilian institutionalism.

Finally, it is worth remembering that the tendency of the aggregation of social movements had already been noted by Maria Gohn (2010), before the beginning of the cycle of mega-events in Brazil. Another important precursor was the creation of the Plenary of Social Movements in Rio de Janeiro and the Pan Social Committee in relation to the Pan American Games of 2007 (MELO & GAFFNEY, 2010). Therefore, the current process of mobilization strategies surrounding the World Cup and the Olympics appears to indicate more the intensification of a previous movement than the appropriation for the creation of a new dynamic.

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## From discourse to reality: impacts of Rio's "*transportation revolution*" on socio-spatial justice<sup>1</sup>

*Jean Legroux*

### Introduction

The 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games represent the very top outcome of a Rio de Janeiro's urban strategy based on mega-event hosting. The period preceding the hosting of the two biggest mega-events of the world creates a positive context for Rio de Janeiro's city, regarding investments in transportation facilities, and an opportunity to accelerate transport planning policies. In a context in which the city is receiving the best transportation investments ever, the urban marketing strategy adopted by local authorities spreads a discourse which emphasizes the advantageous impacts of what they have named "*transportation revolution*". The so-called revolution is described, officially, as a collective, integrated and efficient transport network, able to solve the Cariocan's mobility crisis by connecting four "natural urban centralities", for Rio de Janeiro's future.

If current transportation projects in Rio de Janeiro should be, in some way, interpreted as a "*revolution*", this one is also a discursive argument of the global urban marketing strategy adopted by local power. Thereby, to legitimate the restructuring of urban landscape and facility choices, the official discourse tends to minimize the major traffic problem of the last decades

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<sup>1</sup> This article was presented at Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, 2013, Los Angeles, California. Session: "Social Justice and the Marvellous City".

increasing number of cars and motorcycles – and to overestimate social and equity positive impacts of mobility projects. As a matter of fact, there is a contradiction between Rio’s urban marketing short-term investments for the events’ needs and long-term Rio’s urban planning challenges.

By analyzing and comparing discourses and opinions collected through interviews and field research, this article attempts at evaluating the impacts of Rio’s main transportation projects. Then, this paper does not aim to determine if this “*transportation revolution*” is a reality or a discourse, rather it aims to show several (sometimes contradictory) realities behind discourses. In fact, conclusions depend on the geographical scale of analysis and on the different projects, but it also depends on the point of view or discourses adopted by people and institutions according to their position within the transformation of the Cariocan mobility system. Based on socio-spatial justice theories and a multi-scale approach, this research conclusion shows unequal social and territorial distribution of the “*transport revolution*” benefits. In terms of mobility and housing, negative effects are perceived concerning several vulnerable populations investigated. The analysis of transport projects investments reinforces segregation aspects: on the one hand, investments are prioritized on the “*natural centralities*”; apart from that, the road model persists, even in the collective system conception.

## 1) The “*transportation revolution*” challenges and contradictions in the context of Rio de Janeiro’s preparation of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.

### 1.1) The transportation projects aim to guarantee the logistics needs of both events and to solve the Cariocan’s mobility crises.

Through the last decade, mega-events’ literature confirmed that countries and cities have accepted mega-events strategy as a way to reinforce the economic growth, to broadcast a favorable image abroad and to transform urban space (Andranovich G, Burbank M, 2001; Horne J, Manzenreiter W, 2006; Eisinger P, 2000; Antier G, 2005; Shoval N, 2002; Gotham K.-F, 2010; Broudehoux, A.-M, 2007; Short J.-R, 2008; Hall C.M, 2006). In this way, 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games represent the very top outcome of Rio de Janeiro’s “*city-image making*”

and “*city boosterism*” strategy (Short J.-R, 2008, p. 328) based on mega-event hosting. This is why Rio de Janeiro was candidate for the 2004 Olympic Games bid in 1996, hosted the Pan-American Games in 2007 and the military Games in 2011. According to the *International Congress and Convention Association* (ICCA), Rio featured at the 26<sup>th</sup> position in the 2009 ranking of cities which hosted most mega-events (Borius O, 2010). With the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games and other events such as the RIO+20 conference or the 2013 JMJ, we can reasonably think that Rio de Janeiro will get a better ranking. In this context, Rio de Janeiro transportation has to be deeply reformed to respond to both events’ specific demands and to resolve the structural problem of collective transport called the “*Cariocan mobility crisis*”.

a) The importance of transportation in both 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games preparation

Rio’s strategy of hosting mega-events for urban changes implies new and/or reformed transportation facilities which must connect the main events places and touristic clusters to guarantee a great mobility and logistics during the event and to give a positive image of the city abroad. Furthermore, the city had to promise a huge restructuration of its transportation supply to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in order to win the right to host the Games (Beyer A, 2011). The proposal made by the municipal government to the IOC includes renovation of railway systems but, in the FETRANSPOR (Federação das Empresas de Transportes de Passageiros do Estado do Rio de Janeiro) director’s words, the BRT system is a structuring network able to transform the mobility of the city: “*The (municipal) government made a proposal to the IOC with the subway expansion and renovation of trains, but a new fact is the existence of an integrated BRT network with 160 kilometers of lines. And where these 160 km would be transversal and radials, and most importantly, they will transport 2 million inhabitants, who are going to switch from an old bus transportation system with independent lines, to an integrated system*”<sup>2</sup> (Interview with Lelis Teixeira, director of FETRANSPOR & Rio Ônibus, 2012).

In any case, we can notice a kind of standardization and propagation of “best practices” in the Olympic Games transportation policy, since IOC began

<sup>2</sup> Translated by the author. From now on, each interview quoted will be translated by the author.

to encourage legacy planning in 2001 (Kassens-Noor, 2012). Even knowing that recommendations might vary depending on cities, Kassens-Noor (2012) proposed six common characteristics (among five host cities between 1992 and 2012) from all those that are being from all those that are being implemented in Rio de Janeiro: “*New or improved airport city center connection*”, “*airport improvement*”, “*New and revitalized parks*”, “*New-high Capacity Transport modes*”, “*Additional Road Capacity*”, “*advanced Intelligent Transport System*” (Kassens-Noor E, 2012, p. 2). Concerning the “*New-high capacity Transport modes*” field, in the words of the FETRANSPOR director – even recognizing the great transformation of rail transportation systems - BRT systems is a mass transit system: “*Subway and train are receiving investments which will duplicate from 500,000 to 1 million or 1.1 million, approximately [...] and our system is making BRTs for 2 million people, with a high quality model, and mainly by transforming our bus system into a high capacity transport system, a mass transit system*” (Interview with Lelis Teixeira, director of FETRANSPOR & Rio Ônibus, 2012). Before wondering if the 160 Km lines of the BRT network constitute a high capacity system able to structure urban mobility once the events are over and taking into account mobility challenge with a metropolitan scope, we should describe the “*mobility crisis*” in Rio de Janeiro and its response named “*Transportation revolution*” by local authorities.

b) The priority of collective transportation to solve the Cariocan mobility crises

First of all, the Cariocan mobility crisis is mainly a crisis of collective modes which has a weak physical integration and unequal distribution in the city. As a matter of fact, the rate of collective transport use fell 29% from 1999 to 2005, while the subway and train only represent, respectively 1.78 % and 1.52 % of the daily travels in the RMRJ - metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro (PDTU-RMRJ, 2003). The structural well-below capacity of railway systems triggers off a growing bus system (Beyer, 2011) intensifying a road-transportation model which has shown its limits. In addition, the car fleet growth, which switched from 1,6 to 2,5 million vehicles in-between 2000 and 2011, emphasizes traffic congestion, increases travels’ average time, and declines transportation conditions.

If not all current transportation facilities depend officially on mega-events, it is important to bear in mind that the hosting preparation creates a

very favorable context to make investments that would not have been possible in a “normal” situation and to catch up for the lack of investments during the three last decades. In some way, the several frustrated attempts of the municipal political agenda to reform the public transport system during the three last decades<sup>3</sup> (Beyer, 2011) are now within reach. This window of opportunity is particularly efficient regarding the three governments’ levels (Federal government, government of Rio de Janeiro State and municipal government) alignment for financing transportation infrastructure. That is why transportation in Rio de Janeiro represents 51 %<sup>4</sup> of the total World Cup investments and 57 %<sup>5</sup> of the total investments for the Olympic Games. Also, out of a total of R\$ 29 billion for the Brazilian World Cup, Rio de Janeiro ranks as the 2<sup>nd</sup> city receiving investments with 14.4 %, just behind São Paulo (22 %).

The main collective transport infrastructures are presented in the chart below (Figure 1). Concerning the railway systems, we assist to the modernization and extension of both trains and subway. On the one hand, the suburban train system, operated by SUPERVIA Company, hopes to transport 1 million passengers in 2016 against today’s 460,000. On the other hand, apart from the modernization of the two existing lines (line 1 and line 2), the controversial line 4 which will connect the south area with the area of *Barra da Tijuca* will permit, in the words of the *Casa Civil Secretary*, to transport 300,000 passengers (p/day) and to take 2,000 cars in rush-hour traffic<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> The author quoted several failed reform attempts of the transportation system: project of dedicated lanes in the beginning of the 1970’s, the revitalization plan of downtown in 1985, the “*Projeto Novo Rio Ano 2000*” in 1986, the project of reintroduction of modern tramway in the hyper-center in 1990, and the mass transportation plan in 1994 (Beyer, 2011, p. 8).

<sup>4</sup> Mobility field represents R\$ 2,155,700,000 out of a total of R\$ 4,185,318,205. If we add the airport investments, following Kassens-Noor’s (2012) typology of common transport legacies, and seaport investments, then mobility represents R\$ 3,282,970,000, i.e 78 % of total investments for the World Cup. Those calculations are based on official information available at: <<http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014/cidades/home.seam?cidadeSede=10>> (Accessed on 01/17/2013).

<sup>5</sup> We chose not to include the airport investments because this cost already appears in World Cup investments. We based our calculations on official information available at: <<http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/rio2016/matriz/projetos-area.asp?descricaoArea=Transportes>> (Accessed on 01/17/2013).

<sup>6</sup> “*Linha 4 é fundamental. Ela vai transportar 300 mil passageiros/ dia e vai permitir a retirada de 2 mil veículos/hora durante os horários de pico do trânsito*”, Secretary of the *Casa Civil*, Régis Fichtner, quoted by Alba Valéria Mendonça in “*Obra da Linha 4 do metro tem 92 % de aprovação, diz governo do RJ*”, G1.globo.com, 11/08/2012. Available at: <<http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2012/11/obra-da-linha-4-do-metro-tem-92->

**Figure 1- Main collective Transportation current projects in Rio de Janeiro**

Main collective transportation current projects in Rio de Janeiro		
Projects	Description	Costs (in R\$ millions)
Trains	Renovation of stations, signalization system of railway, extension of some lines, acquisition of new trains	2,400
Subway	Modernization of Line 1	438
	Modernization of Line 2	384
	Line 4 construction (South area – Barra da Tijuca)	7,000
BRT	Transbrasil	1,130
	Transcarioca	1,884,6
	Transoeste	900
	Transolímpica	2,300
LRV	LRV (Light Rail Vehicle)	1,100
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>17,536</b>

Sources: <http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/rio2016>;  
<http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/copa2014/cidades/previsao.seam?empreedimento=204>

The LRT is part of the seaport revitalization named “*Porto maravilha*” and it would play the same role of reducing car use by creating a smart area of integration with boat, trains, subway and BRT (Bus Rapid Transit). Generally speaking, railways systems cannot be considered as able to solve both Olympic mobility and the long-term mobility policy of Rio de Janeiro. In other words, even with great investments in train, subway and LRV, it would not have been possible to guess such investments supply the lack of investments in massive transport during the last decades. In fact, BRT systems “*emerged as the dominant solution for Rio de Janeiro to meet the transportation demands of the Olympic Games*” (Kassens-Noor A, Gaffney Ch, 2013), but BRTs represent also in discourses the great massive solution for Cariocan mobility, and the less expensive as FETRANSPOR director explains that with almost the same cost BRT system is going to transport ten

[de-aprovacao-diz-governo-do-rj.html](#) (Accessed on 03/15/2013).

times more passengers than the new line 4 of the subway: “*The investments for the subway to Barra (da Tijuca), is going to spend the same R\$ 6 billion and will transport 200,000 (p/day) passengers to Barra*” (Interview with Lelis Teixeira, director of FETRANSPOR & Rio Ônibus, 2012).

Rio de Janeiro local authorities’ discourses are proud to nearly have the most important BRT system of the world and will transport, according to official figures, about 900,000 passengers p/day with the *Transbrasil* which will connect *Santos Dumond* Airport with *Deodoro* area. Then, the *Transcarioca* connecting Barra da Tijuca to the international airport will have a capacity of 500,000 while 400,000 passengers are expected p/day in the *Transolímpica* (Barra da Tijuca – Deodoro). Finally, the *Transoeste*, inaugurated on June 6th, 2012,<sup>7</sup> will transport 220,000 passengers p/day in its full capacity and connect Barra da Tijuca with two lower-income inhabitant areas named *Santa Cruz* and *Campo Grande*. Thus, such a prospect as transporting 2 million people with BRT system we understand better the FETRANSPOR director’s conclusions about mega-event legacy: “*If you ask me what is the principal legacy of the World Cup and Olympic Games, – it is this BRT network, plus investments in the subway with the Barra line and with the purchase of new trains and the modernization. The new system will go from 18% [of daily dislocations] to 64% by mass transit system. This is the big legacy that will remain.*” (Interview with Lelis Teixeira, director of FETRANSPOR & Rio Ônibus, 2012). Will the new mass transport system be able to solve the Cariocan mobility crisis and will it benefit all social groups of the city? Exploring mega-events contradictions, through transport analysis and with a justice theoretical mark, permits to identify differentiated impacts of transportation projects.

1.2) Reveal mega-event contradictions through the analysis of transportation (perceptions’) impacts: the geographical theories of justice applied to mega-events

a) Literature review

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<sup>7</sup> Cirilo Junior, “*Com a presença de Lula, Rio inaugura 1º corredor de BRT*”, June 6, 2012. Available at: <<http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/cidades/com-a-presenca-de-lula-rio-inaugura-1-corredor-de-brt,074ae7948c1da310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.htm>> (Accessed on 02/10/2013).



## Growing doubts about great economical and financial positive impacts: a way to focus on social impacts of mega-events

Always used as strong arguments to justify the organization of mega-events, economic and financial benefits are more and more contested by the literature (Horne J, Manzenreiter W, 2004, 2006; Humphreys B, Prokopowics S, 2007; Owen J, 2005; Lenskyj H.-J, 2000; Pillay U, Bass O, 2008) opening a path to the analysis of social effects. After the financial disaster of the 1976 Olympic Games of Montreal, the number of bidding cities to the event significantly decreased. A turning point happened with the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games which made a great *ex-ante* study of macro-economic impacts of the Games. From that time, *ex-ante* impacts' studies have become systematic and necessary to persuade populations about the positive impacts of mega-events. The urban marketing actors often need to display very optimistic figures and *ex-ante* previsions showing the growth of the main economic indicators. Especially in the last decades, the growing skepticism toward significant economic impacts of mega-events have stemmed first from an exaggerated difference among impacts' studies. Consultancy studies used to foresee very high economic benefit while academic studies tended to adjust downwards such interpretations. Besides, in the scientific community, contrasted results are obtained because of different theoretical fundamentals - Keynesian approach, and input-output model, for instance (Barget E, Gouguet J.-J, 2010a, p. 381). Each economic model of calculation shows the same methodological failings: not to take into account the leaks of the economic cycles such as the leaks outside the territory and eviction effect (Barget E, Gouguet J.-J, 2010a). Likewise, there exist several difficulties in taking into account what Horne J and Manzenreiter (2006) called the "*known unknowns*" such as the calculation of the number of tourists and locals who are going to leave the city because of the event. In addition to the serious errors of calculation responsible for rough conclusions of impact studies (Barget E, Gouguet, J.-J, 2010a, p. 380) there exists a trend to under-evaluate investment costs and post-Games maintenance of infrastructures expenditure, not ever well taken into account, and, when they are, often inferior to the final costs (Zimbalist A, 2010; Horne J, Manzenreiter W, 2004; Short J.-R, 2008; Barget E, Gouguet J.-J, 2010a; PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2004). As the following table shows

(Figure 2) the three last Olympic Games (Athens in 2004, Beijing in 2008 and London in 2012) have finally cost around 3 times more the initial previsions. The 2016 Olympic Games will cost US\$ 15 billion according to official figures. If the city of Rio de Janeiro follows the same trend, they will likely be the most expensive Olympic Games in history.

**Figure 2 - Comparison between initial estimations and actual expenditures of Olympic Games (1976-2012)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Initial estimations (US\$)</b>	<b>Actual expenditures (US\$)</b>
1976	Montreal	\$74 million	\$1,1 billion
1980	Moscow	n/a	\$ 3 billion
1984	Los Angeles	\$333 million	\$ 97 million
1988	Seoul	\$ 2,33 billion	\$2,7 billion
1992	Barcelona	n/a	\$2,1 billion
1996	Atlanta	\$ 400 million	\$503 million
2000	Sydney	\$ 895 million	\$1,1 billion
2004	Athens	\$5,5 billion	\$16 billion
2008	Beijing	\$14,2 billion	\$40 billion
2012	London	\$5,3 billion	\$14 billion
2016	Rio de Janeiro	\$15 billion	?

Notes: n/a - not available.

Source: Bergen, 2007, in Short J.-R, 2008, p. 335.

The deficit of ex-post event studies prevents from verifying the ex-ante previsions (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004, p. 20) and the growing cost of hosting such an event triggers off a growing calling into question of economic significant benefits and impacts. In some way, ex-ante studies producers and local mega-event promoters formed a coalition of special interest groups (Barget E, Gouguet J.-J, 2010s) because local power needs ex-ante studies that permit to justify politically the host of the event (Crompton J.-L, MacKay S.-L, 1994; Crompton, 2006; Gravari Barbas M, Jacquot S, 2007).

At the same time, Gusmão de Oliveira (2012) shows that the existence of a specialized expertise opens a powerful possibility of capital movements with the creation of a new market into the mega-event field<sup>8</sup>. Indeed: “*The politicians seek from the scientists the reasons of their action, the scientists try to respond to the politicians’ orders; roles strengthen one another by a reciprocal legitimization*” (Offner J.-M, 1993, p. 8).

The emergency situation and the need for flexibility before the event allow some coalitions of special interest groups to impose their project and their vision of the city (Borius O, 2010; Gusmão de Oliveira N, 2011, Gaffney Ch, 2010; Sanchez F, 2010; Grzybowski C, 2009; Broudehoux A.-M, 2007). For Gotham K.-F (2010), mega-events reveal stronger social inequalities and emphasize social tensions. In fact, we assist to increasing conflicts in Rio de Janeiro. In this way, urban marketing operations led by municipal government<sup>10</sup> are social and political apparatus of legitimization of the huge public investments (Vanneste D, 2007). According to Anne-Marie Broudehoux (2007), the Beijing games (2008) have encouraged the concentration of economic and political powers headed by a coalition of governmental leaders and private investors. But, this legitimization should also legitimize the exclusion of some social groups (Atkinson D, Laurier E, 1998) which introduce directly questions of redistribution and equity of mega-events impacts.

The relevance to approach the socio-spatial justice of mega-events by the study of transport

*“While many studies highlight the positive benefits of the Games (largely funded by organizations and groups seeking to justify the Games) fewer studies examine the costs of the Games and the redistributive consequences.”* (Short J.R, 2008, p. 331). As explained above, transportation expenditures are the most important in both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games and both events are almost entirely financed by public funds<sup>11</sup>. It turns legitimate

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<sup>8</sup> Nelma Gusmão de Oliveria analyzes mega-events with the Bourdieu’s field concept which is also a social space, a multidimensional space, constructed with principles of differentiation or of distribution.

<sup>9</sup> Translated from French to English by the author.

<sup>10</sup> As we have seen before, there is a coalition between the three levels of government.

<sup>11</sup> After the L. A. Games, which received a great participation of private investments, the hosting cities did not manage to get such private support, several billion dollars were spent

for civil society and populations to question how public funds and massive investments are distributed between different spatial areas and social groups. Recently, studies about 2008 Beijing Games (Broudehoux A.-M, 2007) and the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Pillay U, Bass O, 2008; Charles P, 2010) or about other events as the “*Bristol’s 1996 International festival of the Sea*” (Atkinson D, Laurier E, 1998) reveal that mega-events do not let a pertinent legacy for the cities (under-utilization of sport facilities, public debt for several years) and are likely to reinforce social inequities. Transport and mobility are directly connected to the question of social inequities. Some authors remind us that the literature had recognized the strong link and articulation of social mobility and physical displacements. In this way, the access to mobility is not well distributed between social groups and should trigger off exclusion (Flonneau M, Guigueno V, 2009, p. 13). One consequence of the Cariocan “mobility crisis” described above is that: “*the public crisis transport leads to a growing physical fragmentation (by saturation) and social (by the unequal distribution of accessibility)*” (Beyer A, 2011, p. 8).

The notions of mega-events’ “*social profitability*” (Barget E, Gouguet J.-J, 2010a) and “*social utility*” (Barget E, Gouguet J.-J, 2010b) incite to study mega-events impacts for local populations with a socio-spatial justice paradigm. The first hypothesis is that decisional processes are headed by local elites that impose their projects, in accordance with “visitor class” interests and often to the detriment of local low-income populations (Whitson D, Horne J, 2006). The second hypothesis is that transportation projects are non-neutral (Vasconcellos E.-A, 2001) and we have to question the equity in transport policies. Mobility is a fundamental variable of spatial justice and of the “right to the city” and transport is a key basic service and primordial instrument to fight against poverty and inequities. Alexandre de Avila Gomide insists in the fact that, in Brazil, inequalities are not only of income and opportunities and that lower income inhabitants of Brazilian metropolis<sup>12</sup> are deprived of collective transport access that is an essential public service according to the 1988 federal constitution (Gomide Avila A, 2006, p. 242).

To what extent are socio-spatial justice theories relevant to study mega-event impacts, and even more transportation impacts? The expression “socio-spatial” refers to the coincidence between spatial differentiation and

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by public funds in Seoul (1998), Barcelona (1992), Nagana (1998), Sydney (2000), Athens (2004) and Beijing (Zimbalist A, 2010, p. 10).

<sup>12</sup> Based on studies on São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Recife and Rio de Janeiro.

social inequalities (Leibler L, Musser A, 2010; Orfeuill, 2004; Flonneau M, Guigueno V, 2009). The equity (or justice) concept is often used in place of the equality one and vice versa. The basic idea of equity is that there should exist fair inequalities (that we do not remove) and unfair inequalities (that we must correct). Inequalities of mobility are not only measurable by the distance travelled or the income percentage of transport expenditure and must be placed in a larger analysis because:

*“A low mobility should be as much the expression of a constrict way of life by low aptitudes of mobility, linked for example to the lack of financial means, as the expression of a non-limited way of life, characterized by the centrality of employment and residential places and organized around proximity relations” (Paulo C, 2006, p. 13).*

The equity principle is often criticized to legitimate what should stay unequal and what we should correct by redistribution. But, this conflict between equality and equity should be apprehended in terms of complementarity. For Fitoussi and Rosanvallon<sup>13</sup> (1996), equity triggers off the research of a better defined equality criteria. Equity is a multidimensional concept (Souche S, 2003, p. 127) that is linked to conceptions that could change over time and depends on people. But, philosophical social justice theories give a theoretical basis to the equity notion that inserted in the 1970's a “*new geography of welfare*” that introduced the question of redistribution and evaluation of the social welfare because: “*a generalized prosperity should hide unfair spatial inequalities*” (Brennetot A, 2011, p. 122). The work of John Rawls (1982) had influenced the whole geography with three fundamental principles<sup>14</sup>. The last principle called “maximin” is the most influent because its objective is to maximize what a person in a minimal position should earn.

Pluralist theories admitted that justice criteria depend on the studied field (Paulo C, 2006) and on local configurations (Souche S, 2003). Stéphanie Souche (2001, 2003), who studied the equity of urban trolls, concluded that it was necessary to adopt an analysis in which different

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<sup>13</sup> Cited by Christelle Paulo, 2006, p. 25-26.

<sup>14</sup> The principle of equal liberty (guaranty of basic liberties for all), the principle of equal opportunities (fair equality of opportunities) and the principle of difference (maintains only the inequalities that beneficiate the most underprivileged).

sorts of equities are assembled. She suggests the use of an analytic mark to study the acceptability of urban trolls based on the confrontation of: a) economic efficiency (to orient efficiently the demand); b) territorial equity (corresponds to the “liberty principle”: the society must guarantee everywhere the accessibility of work, goods and services); c) horizontal equity (corresponds to the principle of equal opportunities); d) vertical equity (corresponds to the principle of difference that takes into account explicitly social inequalities and their consequences). Since social and spatial segregations are often interrelated, the application of the vertical equity means improving the situation of the poorest people (income criteria) or of areas under-served by public transport. This analytic mark seems to be well-adapted to this research to seek the differentiated impacts of transportation projects with a multi-scale approach. For instance, BRT lines should appear economically efficient and relevant regarding mobility in a metropolitan scope. But, the same line should be considered as unfair if we focus on a smaller scale where the lower-income communities are the most affected by these projects.

## b) Methodology

This investigation uses several qualitative research methods. On the one hand, the author conducted a large work of semi-directive interviews with transportation experts (in both public and private entities, but also in the “civil society”) in order to compare opinions about current transformation (and their impacts on mobility) and construct a wide vision about it. For instance, the actors of the following entities have been interviewed: the Municipal Secretary of Transport (SMTR - Secretaria Municipal de Transportes), the metropolitan agency of urban transport (AMTU – Agência Metropolitana de Transporte Urbano), the BRT’s Center of Control and Operation (CCO- Centro de Controle e de Operação), the Federation of Passenger Transportation Companies of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FETRANSPOR- Federação das Empresas de Transportes de Passageiros do Estado do Rio de Janeiro), the RioÔnibus Company (Empresa de Transporte de Ônibus da cidade do Rio de Janeiro), the National Association of Public Transport (ANTP – Associação Nacional de Transportes Públicos), the Economic Regional Council (CORECON – Conselho Regional de Economia), the National Association of Research and Education in Transports (ANPET –

Associação Nacional de Pesquisa e Ensino em Transportes), the subway concessionaire called MetrôRio, the Brazilian Urban Trains' Company (CBTU – Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos).

On the other hand, semi-directive interviews have been conducted with inhabitants in several areas affected by transportation projects. In order to investigate the BRT Transoeste impacts on lower-income populations, various inhabitants were interviewed in the (ex) communities of *Restinga*, *Recreio 2* and *Vila Harmonia*. In addition, to verify and generalize our conclusions about impacts of transportation projects on socio-spatial and on urban processes in the *Barra da Tijuca* area, the interviews have been completed by interviews in two communities threatened by mega-event transformations: *Vila Autodromo* (linked with *Transolímpica* BRT line) and *Arroio Pavuna* (linked with *Transcarioca* BRT line). Both are located near the *Jacarepaguá* lagoon and very near the future Olympic village and in an area similar to Barra da Tijuca regarding real-estate speculation, and urban processes. We must underline that this research is part of a PhD research which is going to study more deeply the growing effects of the other BRT lines to be implemented along 2013 and 2014.

Furthermore, the author has participated in many field researches and on-site interviews: a three-day visit to communities affected by BRT lines or mega-events infrastructures in May 2011 with the delegation of the Rapporteur of the Right to the City (Relatoria do Direito à Cidade – Plataforma Dhesca). It has enabled us to investigate the situation of housing rights violation in the communities of: Comunidade do Metro (near to Maracana stadium), Favela Campinho (which disappear with Transcarioca BRT implementation), Morro da Providência (in *Porto Maravilha* area, several houses are already threatened of expropriation for a cable-car, road-projects and some other touristic projects). *Comunidade da Restinga*, *Recreio 1*, *Vila Autodromo* and *Vila Harmonia* were also known for the first time in this occasion. Apart from the analysis of these two groups studied (transportation researchers, experts, actors and inhabitants directly impacted by transportation projects), we also did participant observation of social movements such as the “*Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas*” which discusses the social impacts (in a deeper way) of the two events. On top of that, repeated travels in Rio de Janeiro have permitted us a good comprehension of the Cariocan territory allowing us to share information with other researchers, to follow the local press, and to live the Cariocan mobility daily.

## 2) The impacts of Rio's "transportation revolution" on socio-spatial justice: The case of the BRT *Transoeste* implantation

### 2.1) Questioning the "transportation revolution" by analyzing urban marketing

As pointed out above, there is a real "*transportation revolution*" regarding investments amounts and the transformation of transport infrastructures in several modes. However, some researches underline that BRTs projects are not adequate for the long-term development of Rio de Janeiro (Kassens-Noor E, Gaffney Ch, 2013). They are very often not considered as high capacity system: "*BRT is an excellent system for a stated capacity level*" (Interview with Henrique Futuro, AMTU, 2012). Others think that BRTs are improving mobility but cannot be presented as a massive transit system:

*"I don't see BRTs as a massive transport. I see them as a transportation system with a capacity a little bit better than buses [...] but I don't see them as a system which is going to meet big demands and passengers mobility wills. The BRT already implemented (Transoeste) recently had a period of excessive demand and had accident problems on the line"* (Interview with Marcio Dagosto, PET-COPPE/ UFRJ; ANPET, 2012).

As a matter of fact, several actors questioned the official discourses about this "*transportation revolution*" mainly based on this BRT system: "*The point is if you are selling that as 'The' solution, and it isn't, it's a substitute, you are trying to recover lost ground. It will be better? Yes. Will it be the public transport that Rio de Janeiro needs? No*" (Interview with Jan Krugger, 2012). BRTs have their importance and should play a role only if they are integrated with a massive transit system (Interview with Marcio Dagosto, PET-COPPE/UFRJ; ANPET, 2012). On the other hand, traditional high-capacity systems such as railways infrastructures do not seem to be able to operate this revolution even with great investments. For instance, the subway line 4 will certainly compensate for the connection between the South area and Barra da Tijuca. But, as this line is considered as a simple extension of line 1 (which is already saturated), there exist uncertainties and criticisms about the capacity of this line to afford the



benefits announced officially (car-user transfer and reduction of the congestion of the South area-Barra da Tijuca axis, transport time and quality increase). This line, which does not always create a true network subway, is very much criticized by various actors, specialists and inhabitants, and the sharp controversy about the current line 4 project has been illustrated by a broad opponent movement to the governmental choice (Figure 3).

The discursive framework of “*legacy*” justifies infrastructure choices (Gaffney Ch, Sanchez F, 2012) and plays a central role in the urban marketing strategy adopted by the city of Rio de Janeiro. Hence, the “*transportation revolution*” forms part of the “*metropolitan marketing*”<sup>15</sup> which had to construct and address its discourse to both international and local levels. As well, Muriel Rosemberg (2000) distinguished urban marketing (discourse that does not come from “the city”) from the marketing of the city (discourse that comes from urban decision makers), admitting that both types of marketing should form a single one thanks to the relationships between media, economical powers, communication experts, public powers: “*Marketing of the city and urban marketing are distinct but interrelated because they form part of the same communication of the city*”<sup>16</sup> (Rosemberg M, 2000, p. 63). The expression “*Metropolitan marketing*” should be used in a mega-event hosting context in which the city must conform to the requirements of a global economic context of generalized world competition between cities, but also to legitimate projects and urban transformation from local inhabitants. At any rate, internal marketing and external marketing are very dependent on each other. There exists an ambivalent play between local and global objectives of mega-event marketing (even more in a city under metropolization process and challenges) which had to refocus the territory (by masking urban discrepancies and reinforcing the cohesion) and, at the same time, to decentralize it (discover the proper competitive advantage of the city as

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<sup>15</sup> The expression used by Gilles Antier (2005) seems to be appropriate to our subject since metropolitan marketing suggests that the cities need to be known and recognized by local inhabitants and on both national and international levels.

<sup>16</sup> Consequently, when we use here the expression “*metropolitan marketing*” we consider both definitions together: discourses which do not come from the city but from where they are submitted and, then, the adoption and practice of these marketing techniques.

Figure 3- Comparison of the municipal government lane choice and civil society and original project for this line.



Source: <http://www.metroqueorioprecisa.com.br/entenda-a-questao/>

seen by people from abroad). Our hypothesis is that each type of marketing corresponds to two different groups: the “*visitor class*” (tourists, foreigners, investors and local institutions, companies or political powers which have the same interest of this group) and the “*inhabitants-users-citizens*”<sup>17</sup>.

As suggests an article entitled: “*The glocal politics of sports mega-events: underestimated costs and overestimated benefits*” (Whitson D, Horne J, 2006) mega-event marketing is accused of hiding negative impacts and trying to convince that investments will benefit everyone, through progress, growth and development for each social category (Horne J, 2007; Horne J, Manzenreiter W, 2006). The metropolitan marketing aim is to construct a societal consensus on the chosen infrastructures. In this way, the marketing made for the BRT system intends to eliminate other possibilities: “*Who produces space, whom for, what for: these questions are evacuated by the magic of consensus*” (Rosemberg M, 2000, p. 33). In the light of this, it appears essential to question the marketing made on “*transportation revolution*” to grasp the differentiated impacts of current projects being implemented in Rio de Janeiro.

## 2.2) Differentiated impacts of the BRT transoeste implantation

Improving the mobility of the west area low-income populations and reinforcement of socio-spatial segregation in the *Barra da Tijuca* and *Jacarepaguá* Areas.

During the International Car free Day on September 22, 2012, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes, made a marketing operation in the BRT *Transoeste* and a journalist asked him if he would take the BRT in rush hour and not only on a Sunday morning. The mayor answered: “*BRT has been made for humble population who lives in the west area. It is not my case. I’m mayor and I travel by car. I don’t need BRT. I didn’t made it just thinking in myself*”<sup>18</sup>. In fact, *Santa Cruz* and *Campo Grande* inhabitants

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<sup>17</sup> This expression came from Michel Bassand (1997).

<sup>18</sup> Translated by the author from: “*O BRT foi construído para o povo humilde que mora na Zona Oeste. Não é o meu caso. Sou prefeito e ando de carro. Não preciso do BRT. Não fiz ele pensando apenas em mim*”. Quoted by Caio Barbosa, “*Prefeito do Rio pede voto no ônibus*” in *O Dia Online*, 09/22/2012. Available at: <http://odia.ig.com.br/porta/brasil/eleicoes2012/prefeito-do-rio-pede-voto-no-%C3%B4nibus-1.493122> (Accessed on 01/16/2013).

should now travel to Alvorada terminal station (Barra da Tijuca) in one hour instead of two hours without BRT. That means an improvement of the quality of life in these low-income populations that need collective transport. Notwithstanding, we observe the increase of segregation processes in the *Barra da Tijuca* and *Jacarepaguá* areas and along the BRT lines. Some observations and interviews demonstrate that BRTs implantation is used to justify – sometimes with dubious reasons – the expropriation of low-income communities along the *Transoeste* and *Transolímpica* and the *Transcarioca*<sup>19</sup> lines (see for instance the five communities on the map above, Figure 4).

Remembering the choice to use different criteria of equity, it is possible to identify in some discourses that the expropriation of a few people should be justified for the overall well-being of 220,000 people p/day regarding official previsions about the BRT *Transoeste*. Through this way of apprehending justice we find the utilitarian theories<sup>20</sup> that consider equity as the maximization of the collective well-being. Pareto, with the economy of well-being, then introduced the principle of “the less sacrifice for the lowest people”. Asking the director of the BRT-CCO (Center of Control and Operation) if there have been expropriations along the line, he answered: “*Very few, very few. I don't have the figure here but it was almost nothing. It was nearest to Santa Cruz and at the beginning of the Grota Funda tunnel also. There, they had to expropriate some parcels*” (Interview with Alexandre Castro, BRT-CCO director, 2012).


In reality, expropriations of low-income communities are not as few as it seems and represent a clear reinforcement of the socio-spatial segregation along the BRT lines, especially in areas which are under real-estate speculation processes. For instance, the enlargement of the *Avenida das Américas* for the *transoeste* in the area of *Recreio* (see communities C, D and E on the map) triggered off the expropriation of 150 families (and 40 businesses) of Restinga favela, 120 families in the community Vila Harmonia and of 235 families of the favela named *Recreio 2*. Very near the future Olympic park, on the shore of Jacarepaguá Lagoon, the BRT *transolímpica* threatened to expropriate the 500 families of the community

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<sup>19</sup> BRT *Transbrasil* implementation is today the less advanced. That why it has been less studied for the time being.

<sup>20</sup> Bentham, 1789; Sidwick, 1907.

Figure 4 – Rio de Janeiro’s BRT system and 5 communities’ case-studies.



Vila Autódromo<sup>21</sup>. The BRT transcarioca is also a threat to the last 28 families of the community of Arroio Pavuna<sup>22</sup>. All those expropriations happened with violence, without notice or dialogue while the financial compensations have been quite always back-below the right real-estate value of the houses demolished. The persons who accepted to be relocated by the federal Program “*minha casa minha vida*” were relocated in distant areas, such as *Campo Grande* and *Santa Cruz*. Ironically, they should now return where they lived quickly with the BRT. The worst cases had not been compensated at all as testifies Michel, an ex-habitant of the (ex-) community of *Restinga*: “(the municipality) had compensated neither for the business nor for the house, some (families) received compensations, others not” (Interview with Michel, ex-inhabitant of Restinga, 2012). The hypothesis of a transportation project excluding low-income populations living far-away should be verified when examining how those lots were used. In the place of a part of the ex-community *Vila Harmonia* the public power constructed a road-approach. With the remainder space, it is planned to construct a closed condominium.

An ex-inhabitant of the community of *Recreio 2*, named Jorge, tells us that only a few meters of the whole community extension area have been used to enlarge the road: “*Today, I prove to you that the rubble it’s still there, next to the lane*”. Expropriated people who stay in the area are very few: “*Nobody has gone to less than 40, 50 kilometers away (...) neither from Vila Harmonia and Restinga from Recreio 2 (...) Well, I’m personally less than a kilometer away. I respect the law in my own way*” (Interview with Jorge, ex-inhabitant of Recreio 2, 2012). Jorge is living currently in a house he rents and has not yet been financially compensated. Those socio-spatial segregation processes should be economically efficient and even considered as taking into account some “territorial equity” if we admit that the BRT lines guarantee a better access to the city. On the contrary, this tendency to expel lower-income inhabitants from some areas is totally

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<sup>21</sup> Vila Autódromo had to resist to the expropriation threatening for three decades and designed an innovative popular plan with the help of universities and social movements to respond to the municipal solution based on the expropriation of the whole community. To see the plan: <http://comitepopulario.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/planopopularvilaautodromo.pdf> (Accessed on 03/11/2013).

<sup>22</sup> Sixty-eight families had already been removed to make room for the construction of a roundabout that permits a greater access to closed condominiums for high-income populations, and for the duplication of a traffic lane.

opposed to the horizontal equity because it does not respect the principle of equal opportunities by expelling low-income populations in most remote areas with less access to work services and culture. In some way, the poorest people do not benefit from landscape valorization. Finally, expropriation process does not attend vertical equity whose principle (of difference) is to give as much as possible to the people who have the less, often translated by the principle of reparation in public policies.

### Collective transportation prioritization: the illusion of the calling into question of the road model transportation system

Urban marketing official discourses focus on the prioritization of collective transportation presenting investments as a “*revolution*” of collective transport system. However, Rio de Janeiro had a historical process of intensification of the road-model, with a progressive switch away from railway systems which represent currently less than 5 % of the total of diary travels in the RMRJ. As already explained, the constitution of an integrated transport network is largely based on BRT system, which is still being a transport by road. Moreover, all BRT implantations had triggered off an extension of the number of lanes for “normal” traffic. For instance, concerning the *Transoeste* BRT line, especially in a great part of the *Avenida das Américas* there exist today 12 lanes in total (one line of traffic for BRT in each direction and five in each direction for the normal traffic). In addition to the two BRT lanes, the number of lanes to car traffic in each direction has been duplicated from two or three to five, depending on the sections. So, the space reserved to collective transportation is quite marginal (3 meters for every BRT lane) compared with the space available for car use.

In such corridors, we also notice the total inexistence of bicycle paths even if bicycle parking spaces have been set up, able to receive 10 bicycles per station. Those bicycle parkings seem to have been implanted more for a preoccupation of city-image or marketing than to respond to the real pent-up demand of bicycle paths existing in this area<sup>23</sup>. The urban development model of Barra da Tijuca which is called “*the Brazilian Miami*” by Eduardo Vasconcellos (Interview, 2012) is based on the intensification

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<sup>23</sup> On September 9, 2012, during a field research on the BRT *Transoeste*, as the 10 places of the Salvador Allende station were all occupied, we crossed the five car lanes in front of the station and counted more than 80 bicycles attached where it was possible.

of the social and territorial fragmentation. Then, the inhabitants who are living in highly valued areas are deeply dependent on cars. Referring to the possibility of taking car lanes to have, in the future, two BRT lanes in order to increase the capacity of the system, the BRT-CCO director explained that it would be easier to take the median strip green area than to rubble some space to car users because: “(event if) *it were possible, this is a very loud political and polemical decision, principally because the public of this area is a high-income one and intensely car-users*” (Interview with Alexandre Castro, 2012). Since all BRT projects trigger off a growing space for cars, BRT projects (even given the improvement of some inhabitants’ mobility) should be considered as a collective transportation argument to give more space to the individual transportation model. In this way, there is no incentive for car-users to switch to a collective transportation but, on the contrary, to maintain the road-model transportation, at least for high-income population.

The BRT-CCO director gives some support to our observation of differentiated impacts of the BRT Transoeste. We can observe an exclusion of poor people justified by transportation projects which at the same time offer a better transport to these people who should work in an area where they cannot now live in: “*the great future of the economical center of Rio de Janeiro, is here, in Barra da Tijuca. So, in reality, these regions of Deodoro, Santa Cruz, are workforce providers’ that come here, hence the need to create this mobility*” (Director of BRT-CCO, 2012). Through this prism, it becomes more difficult to talk about a real transformation of the collective transportation system. Last but not least, BRT lanes do not seem to have been well planned regarding its quality just six months after its inauguration, creating a very fast degradation of the service.

## Conclusion

Today in Brazil, the dynamics of segregation processes and of social and territorial fragmentation is often analyzed through the identification of the stronger and stronger relationships between the State and the real-estate in the production of urban space. Then, we can conclude that mega-events emphasize the production of urban highly-valued areas contrasting with new areas of low-income populations, often increasingly distant from the previous one. (Gomes de Mendonça J, Soares de Moura Costa H, 2011).



**Figure 5 - Picture of Transoeste BRT lane degradations**



Sources: *O Globo* newspaper (01/06/2013).

Available at: <http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/inaugurado-ha-6-meses-corredor-transoeste-sofre-com-buracos-7207730#ixzz2HIofDWcv> (Accessed on 03/13/2013).

Observing the example of the *Avenidas das Américas*, where the number of lanes switched from two or three to five, the justification of the need for space to collective transportation to expropriate some communities is no more valid. As these lanes were not necessary to the BRT system, expropriated people are in some way removed to let space for car users. Almost all inhabitants who had to leave their houses feel excluded from the benefits of mega-events and facilities investments. Their discourses form part of justice theories with a preference for the reparation principle, while governments and transportation politics actors are often closer to an utilitarian vision of justice: there should exist some victims for a best common good. That is why it seems to be appropriate to use different principles of equity when studying mega-events through transportation projects.

What we have called the “differentiated impacts” of transportation projects mean adopting socio-spatial justice theories and principles to reach

a wider vision of the impacts of transportation. From there are emerging several realities. The confrontation of discourses and the deconstruction of urban marketing by analyzing what is hidden behind their consensual discourses enable a better understanding of urban conflicts and processes.

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PART III  
**POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT**



## Political culture, citizenship and the representation of the *urbs* without *civitas*: the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1 2</sup>

*Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro*

*Filipe Souza Corrêa*

### Introduction

This article chimes with several investigations, conducted across various fields and with distinct perspectives, that have attempted to understand Brazilian political behavior and its relationship with the construction of citizenship. Articles and books recently published in the fields of political sociology and political science have converged around an analytical focus on the relationship between citizens and institutions, on understanding the values that justify citizens' attitudes and civic dispositions towards particular political behaviors. Such analyses have also converged in identifying individuals distrust in democratic institutions as a striking feature of these values and attitudes, and thus seeing this as a foundation in the constitution of an *ethos* similar to *amoral familism* (REIS, 1995) and of a behavior characterized by a *social hobbesianism* (SANTOS, 1993). Those authors identify, in Brazil's social and cultural environment and in the operation

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<sup>2</sup> This text resume and unfolds some questions that were presented in the chapter "Cultura Política na Metrópole Fluminense: cidadania na metrópole desigual" from the book *Cultura Política, Cidadania e Voto nas Metrôpoles: desafios e impasses*, Rio de Janeiro, *Carta Capital*, forthcoming, organized by Azevedo, Ribeiro and Santos Junior. The authors would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments, which contributed a great deal to the clarity of this text, while assuming full responsibility for the content hereby presented.



of our political institutions, the foundations of the rationality of a political behavior guided by selfishness, individualism and a rejection of collective actions that take place outside each individual's close personal relations.

Rennó Jr. (1999, p.107) states that an approach called adaptive cultural rationality enables one to consider the way in which citizens' political culture interferes with their immediate rational judgments for political behavior. According to this perspective, the *logic of distrust*<sup>3</sup> appears in the Brazilian scenario as an adaptive rational response to the constraints and incentives created by social and institutional contexts characterized by: (i) the existence of high levels of violence in the relationships among groups of individuals and even in the relationship between individuals and the institutions that should provide public security; (ii) strong distrust from the population about the State's real capacity to administer Justice; (iii) ineffectiveness of public policies to meet even the most basic demands of the population; and (iv) persistent social disparities within society, both objective and subjective, feeding the collective perception of distant and hierarchical separate worlds. All these elements converge to create and diffuse a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty. This, in turn, generates a cultural environment dominated by distrust, both in interpersonal relationships and in the relationships between individuals and institutions, which considerably raises the costs of sociopolitical participation. Therefore, structural, cultural and institutional causes are identified by these authors as foundations in the constitution of a logic of distrust, something that not only guides the political behavior of Brazilians, but also blocks the development of an active citizenship and, hence, an obstacle to the consolidation of full democracy in Brazil.

## City, citizenship and Political Culture in Brazil

The main objective of this article is to contribute to a deepening of the debate over the relationship between citizenship and political culture, by exploring the urban dimension of the mechanisms that purport to explain

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<sup>3</sup> "The citizen does not find, either culturally or institutionally, selective incentives to seek solutions to his or her daily conflicts in the urban sphere. Daily surroundings discourage both the search for state organisms to solve problems and involvement in associations with common aims, because a generalized feeling of distrust towards neighbors, laws and public organizations prevails. The essence of the logic of distrust is the unpredictability of the behavior of others." (RENNÓ Jr., 2000).

the political disparities between metropolitan citizens. Our starting point is the empirical evidence of a low degree of political and interpersonal trust across the metropolitan population of Rio de Janeiro. This can be clearly seen in survey data on political culture and citizenship that made use of the indicators of the *International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)* (<http://www.issp.org>). The study was conducted by the Observatório das Metrópoles in partnership with the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ) and the Instituto de Ciências Sociais (ICS) of Lisbon, Portugal. The main goal was to identify the perceptions, values and practices linked to the exercise of citizenship and to identify democratic dynamics in the metropolises of Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon. In the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro we were able to submit the questionnaire to a large sample. This allowed us not only to explore the indicators for the whole of the region, but also to disaggregate the data into a number of large areas, and thus uncover any differences in the political and civic culture across Rio, a metropolis known for its social and geographical diversity. For this study, 1.010 people were interviewed in the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro. They were divided according to a systematic probabilistic sorting of census tracts, weighted according to the total number of households for each selected tract. The sample was structured through quotas relating to sex, age and schooling, with a margin of error of five percent. This produced a final sample in which 52,7% were women and 47,3% were men. All over 18 years old, with 31,1% aged between 18 and 29 years old; 32% between 30 and 44 years old; 21,7% between 45 and 59 years old; 12,7% between 60 and 74 years old; and 1,7% were over 75 years old. Generally, the schooling level of interviewees was low, with a prevalence of people that hadn't finished high school (68,5% of the sample). The theoretical model of civic culture was taken as a reference, but the researchers weren't able to identify the expected correlation between trust (either interpersonal or political), civic culture and political mobilization of the metropolitan citizens. The result has encouraged us to reflect upon the urban foundations of this truncated connection of the political culture in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro.

Reflecting on the establishment of the Republic in Brazil, José Murilo de Carvalho (1987) stresses out that this historical transformation has resulted in a separation that in Rio de Janeiro between political society on one side and urban society on the other. The result has been an impoverished

cultural politics in terms of civic virtues, characterized by distrust in interpersonal relations and in institutions; by administrators' detachment from the people they are supposed to serve; and by the fragmentation of the associative formations. For Carvalho this historical genesis has produced today's social reality, as it is responsible for the development of a political culture and for the creation of political institutions that reproduce such dissociation based on a "city scarcity", a metaphor coined by Maria Alice de Carvalho (1995).

Before moving further it is important that we highlight the relevance of the city for the consolidation of the very bases of citizenship, as opposed to social submission. According to Weber (2009, p. 427), the Western city was always characterized by the substitution of the hierarchical solidarity based on the bonds of belonging to groups of clans for a horizontal solidarity operating through on territorially based contractual associations.

This loss of statutory privileges generated a relative social leveling. As a result, according to Weber, the Western city has constituted a collective experience centered on the valorization of individuals who are free and equal and in the existence of political and social institutions that provide feelings of autonomy and integration into a city community. During the social and political history that began with the blossoming of the urban phenomenon during the Middle Ages, the city, in its very essence, has produced the most significant forms of civil society (ANSAY, P.; SHOONBRODT, R. 1989).

By contrast, the findings of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1975) and Richard Morse (1975) suggested that the processes of urbanization that took place in Latin America have not accomplished the social changes described by Weber. This means that the urban experience, even though it produced a cultural medium that was favorable to the spreading of values such as freedom and moral equity, wasn't able to create social and political institutions that were based in a sense of civic community. It was based in such an interpretation that Cardoso coined the expression "city without citizenship" (CARDOSO, 1975, p. 162).

Thus, the "scarce city" is the spatial manifestation of social and political conditions that reproduce an ethics which both orients and legitimates social behavior based on a privatist attitude and on the search for the materialization of private interests at any cost. This is the case whether it is in the interaction between social groups, in the interactions between individuals and such groups, and even in the interactions between

social groups and the government. The marginalization of a fair share of the population from *city rights* or *citizenship<sup>4</sup> rights* (from the Latin word, *civitas*), maintain the strong social disparities with regard to *the right to the city*. Therefore, we can conclude that what primarily constitute the disparities between individuals in the city are the inequalities in access to all those elements that compose urban welfare (such as transportation, sanitation, housing, etc.); and to opportunities to improve quality of life (such as education and employment)

The hypothesis that we will attempt to construct in this study is that the obstacles to access of resources can be attributed to the insertion of a large part of the metropolitan population in various networks of personal subordination existing in Rio de Janeiro society, which also favor the maintenance over time of political institutions that reproduce the dissociation (from “clientelistic party machines” to welfare entities kept by members of parliament).

This political culture is at the root of both the behavior of the controlling agents of circuits of crime and contravention, and of the permanent personal subordination of those individuals that are devoid of power. They operate through mechanisms and conditions that reproduce relationships of hierarchy and patronage, in an attempt to integrate in a subordinate and selective fashion those that are at the margin of this “scarce city”. Such relationships become necessary, as the city’s marginalized – who nonetheless hold formal political rights – are called in to validate a representative system that is incapable of universalizing private interests.

In other words, through hierarchy and patronage, the marginalized population come to be part of this “scarce city”, but this insertion happens at the expense of a subordination to the ‘owners of the power’, and through fragmenting dynamics of social cohesion, since the city’s scarcity provides uneven chances for individuals to have their interests and demands satisfied. Therein, the circuit closes: those at the margins of the city must also establish among themselves a power differential in order to ensure a portion of the accumulation of the scarce urban resources (like transportation, sanitation, paving, housing, education etc.).

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<sup>4</sup> Citizenship understood here as the full fruition of civil rights, that guarantee life in society, political rights, that guarantee participation in the government of the society, and of social rights, that guarantee participation in the wealth that is collectively produced (CARVALHO, 2001, p. 9-10).

In the very composition and in the reproduction of the scarce city, three elements play an important role and act mutually reinforcing ways. The first relates to the historical-geographical formation of the city. The hilly terrain over which the city extends, combined with its social history, has produced distinct and distant social worlds, visible in the geographical separation of elite and popular strata that accelerated after the demographic explosion of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. The second element relates to the social geography of the city and the way it has, over many years, fed the intense social disparities that are expressed most clearly in urban inequalities. This social geography has developed through a ‘total tolerance’ policy approach to the illegality of land ownership, with the tacit acceptance, by various governments, of processes of ‘favelization’ and construction of illegal and clandestine subdivisions around the outskirts of the city. The precarious urban conditions to which a large portion of the Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan population has been subjected is a token of the failure to universalize basic rights of citizenship that are necessary to protect and empower individuals in their dealings with powerful groups. The effects of this social geography on the reproduction of power have been catastrophic. Drawing on the work of Reinhard Bendix (1996), we can state that the legitimacy of the public authority in the city of Rio de Janeiro is not based on the consent of subordination to the State in exchange for the protection of the citizens’ public rights – in this case, the urban rights – that would place the individuals (and groups) sheltered under the relations of power. The importance of the maintenance of the illegality and even of the irregularity of land ownership in the fragile civic culture of the Brazilian cities has not, yet, been properly reflected upon by the field of political sociology<sup>5</sup>. By ‘fragile civic culture’, we mean the low level of consciousness of civic duty (and rights) regarding the general interests of society, embodied in the State. On the contrary, the State had to search for other forms of legitimacy based on the binomial

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5 In part, the lack of attention sociologists have given to this theme is due to the abusive association between private property rights and the ideology of the “possessive individualism”. In a recent text, Robert Castel has reflected upon contemporary social insecurity (CASTEL, 2003). Through an attentive reading of classics in political sociology (such as Locke) he has provided interesting and provocative arguments about the necessity of disseminating the concept of the right to private property as a protection of individuals against later decisions to institute in society a notion of social property that is the basis of the social contract of the Welfare State.

*submission-favor* dynamic between the popular classes and government agents. Finally, the third element is violence as a form of sociability that, according to author Maria Alice Rezende de Carvalho (1995), derives from the fragile legitimacy of the State. The following excerpt synthesizes this author's ideas very thoroughly:

Based, thus, on this frame of reference, I will highlight a political dimension of the question of violence, paying less attention to the conjunctural risks that such a phenomenon might introduce in the democratic functioning of any given government, and more to the problem of the ever growing empowerment of the social organization regarding the political and institutional background. I mean that the violence in big Brazilian cities is related to the low legitimacy of the political authority of the State, whose "congenital privatism" has excessively narrowed the dimension of the polis, condemning basically the entire society to the condition of barbarians. The term "scarce city" refers to this, i.e. the residual dimension of citizenship and, therefore, to its lack of competence to articulate the social appetites of an organized political life – which, in the realm of political ideas, characterizes the "liberal-democratic city". (CARVALHO, 1995, p. 4)

To summarize, in the context of the "scarce city", the State isn't guided to use its consented authority to bring about the generalization of a stable and universal social pact. On the contrary, social experience is organized based in an intense fragmenting of different judgments. In this way, Rio de Janeiro's political evolution and the pattern of social ethics that derives from it might be presented as a plot with a varied array of meanings between individuals and selected groups of the state sphere that, although recently providing a small degree of social integration, it has not inscribed representative politics as the most appropriate arena for the resolution of the marginalized population's demands. As advocated by Carvalho (1995, p. 4), the result of this process can be translated currently by two easily identified practices, the first being society's "apathy" towards acting in the public sphere. The second is that the needs of the poor, assumed to be captured within webs of urban clientelism, are now enacted not only by the traditional agents, but also by segments of state bureaucracy, churches and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The action of these groups in the context of great need tends to confirm strategies of a perverse rationality,

since these are guided towards the persistence of such clientele bonds. It is based on this frame of reference that we turn to reflect upon some relative statistical data relating to disparities in the pre-conditions for the exercise of citizenship and for the varied intensity with which modalities of citizenship are exercised inside the carioca metropolis.

## Scarce Political Culture in the Fragmented Metropolis

One of the explicative dimensions of the hypothesis of “city scarcity” as put forth by Maria Alice de Carvalho is the rise of a political orientation tilted much more towards individualistic resolution of conflicts than towards the shared resolution of said conflicts. In the present case this predatory political orientation is based in the very socio-spatial organization of Rio de Janeiro. Based on this perspective we consider that more thorough analysis of the several possible internal variations of political culture in this metropolis might aid us to reflect upon the effects of this fragmented socio-spatial organization on the production of patterns of behavior, belief, values and attitudes to politics. The hypothesis we put forward is that segregated areas of the metropolis are more prone to the emergence of a *culture of distrust*, whether it is in the various social interactions between individuals or in the interactions of those individuals with political institutions; or in the maintenance of political practices that are guided less to formal political representation and more to the negotiated resolution of needs relating to infrastructure and/or urban welfare.

In order to do this, we’ll analyze how this socio-spatial organization is configured in the carioca metropolis in terms of: income levels, according to the mean distribution of the average family income per capita in the internal areas of the metropolis; schooling levels, according to the mean distribution of the average school years per adult in the households of the area; and the distribution of the needs of a network of public services and facilities (CORRÊA, 2011, p, 101).


Firstly, the average of the different levels of family income per capita by margin weighted areas of the IBGE’s (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) 2000 Demographic Census (*Censo Demográfico de 2000, IBGE*) was calculated. Then, in order to more easily visualize

the distribution of family income *per capita* in the metropolitan space we divided this distribution into quartiles. This allowed us to classify four areas, according to income levels (“low”, “medium-low”, “medium-high”, and “high”). The spatialization of income quartiles of family income *per capita* by weighted areas of the *RMRJ* (Rio de Janeiro Metro Area) indicates that, in spite of the growing economic dynamism of the cities of the *Baixada Fluminense* region (composed of twelve municipalities that display high incidence of poverty and violence), such as Nova Iguaçu and Duque de Caxias, the spatial distribution of income still presents a marked core-periphery pattern of organization. That is to say, despite some income increases in the most central areas of the cities of the metropolitan periphery, the majority of these areas present an income level that is medium-low or low (Figure 1).

Next, we present the metropolitan areas’ breakdown according to household adults’ (individuals of 25 years of age or more) average years of study. This variable is known as household educational environment. Recent studies on residential segregation and social disparities have highlighted this variable’s capacity to synthesize territorial social disparities since it presents significant results for children and adolescents’ school performance and young people’s chances of gaining access to high-quality and well-paid jobs (RIBEIRO & KOSLINSKI, 2010; RIBEIRO, RODRIGUES & CORRÊA, 2010; ZUCCARELLI & CID, 2010). The spatialization of the household educational atmosphere quartiles indicates the asymmetry of the distribution of this variable in the different areas of the metropolitan space since the average of the educational environment in the lowest quartile (5.05 years of study) is practically half of the average of the educational atmosphere in the highest quartile (10.17 years of study). (Figure 2).




**Figure 1 – Weighted Areas of the MRRJ according to family income *per capita***



Source: CORRÊA, 2011.

**Figure 2 – Weighted Areas of the MRRJ according to levels of average household educational environment**



In order to identify the spatial distribution of need for infrastructure services and facilities a composite index was created. This index aims at distinguishing the percentage of people in the weighted areas living in households with shortage of at least one of the following infrastructure services: water supply, sanitary sewage, and garbage collection<sup>6</sup>. Based on this index (Figure 3) it was found that, in the year 2000, 25% of the weighted areas of the Rio de Janeiro Metro Area display an level of shortage that varied between 24.02% and 79.35% of people residing in households with any of the aforementioned shortage situations. Once again, the most needy areas in terms of infrastructure are located mostly in the peripheral cities of the Rio de Janeiro Metro Area. In some cities all the tracts have a percentage of 24.02% or more people residing in households with some type of shortage of infrastructure services.

From this characterization of the metropolitan space of Rio de Janeiro based on socioeconomic variables such as income, school years and the level of shortage of infrastructure services it is possible to perceive that this socio-spatial organization is characterized by a marked social fragmentation. This mirrors the analysis of Preteceille and Ribeiro (1999), Ribeiro (2000), Ribeiro and Lago (2001) on metropolitan social structure based on socio-occupational categories, showing that the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area is strongly organized according to a system of social distances and oppositions that fragments the different portions of society across the physical space of the metropolis. According to those authors, the upper classes of the carioca metropolis – i.e., the groups of individuals who share large amounts of social, cultural and economic capital – are located almost exclusively in the area of the “South Zone” of the city of Rio de Janeiro, while the popular masses are located predominantly in the peripheral spaces of the metro area, and in part of the “West Zone” of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Both are distant, in one or another way, from the middle segments of the social structure that are located chiefly in the suburban spaces in which the social configuration is less well-defined. In other words: there is a clear projection of the dividing lines of the society of Rio de Janeiro in its physical space, in such a way that to live in one

<sup>6</sup> The construction of such index is important for two reasons: first, because it allows the identification of the areas of the MRRJ that present the most critical situations in terms of access to minimal conditions of infrastructure; Second, because it reveals juxtapositions of different shortages in a single area, in cases where areas suffer more from one type of shortage than another.



or another part of the metropolis demonstrates one's position in the city's social structure. It is this dynamic of constant spatial separation of different social groups on the one hand, and aggregation of social groups that are alike on the other hand, that the above mentioned authors call residential segregation (or *socio-spatial segregation*). According to those authors, such processes of auto-segregation or compulsory segregation of social groups in space are typical traits of the urbanization model of large cities. However, it produces even more perverse consequences in Brazil's case since, according to Ribeiro (2004, p.34), the outcomes of this model of socio-spatial segregation reflect the country's hybrid social order. This consists of a social logic that distributes resources of power according to a scale of honor and social prestige, alongside an economic logic which is competitive and individualistic and which distributes resources of power according to the individual's autonomy and capacity. Therefore, this spatial order reflects the outcomes of a social order that, at its root, is highly hierarchical and uneven and entrenches the this logic in the functioning of government in the various spheres and organs in which it acts upon socio-spatial planning. The outcome of this is the reproduction of the power inequalities through the reproduction of social disparities, a hypothesis that will be detailed further on. Before that, though, a return to an approach of the political culture is needed, now studied in an intra-metropolitan perspective.

Disaggregating the indicators of political culture is the first step in the quest for evidence concerning the relationship between a fragmented socio-spatial organization and the patterning of the differentiated patterns of behaviors, beliefs, values and attitudes regarding politics. In order to do this, the data collected in the aforementioned survey were divided into three areas according to the following criteria: (a) the social structure of such areas; (b) prevailing forms of occupation, land use and housing production; (c) concentration or shortage of urban social welfare; and (d) the connections with the metropolis' central areas. This division resulted in the identification of the following areas: (1) *Core*: Made up by the neighborhoods of the South Zone of the City of Rio de Janeiro, and also Barra da Tijuca, the Greater Tijuca and Niterói, it is where the major part of the upper layers of the metropolitan social structure can be found, which confers to this area a strong social power, exercised via the ability to connect with the political power through mechanisms such as a presence in the media and activation of social networks; the (2) *Suburb*: Where most of the denizens can be

classified as middle-class or blue-collar, mingled with favela areas; and the (3) *Periphery*: which includes the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro and the Baixada Fluminense. These peripheral regions contain the largest share of the poor population in the metropolis, and are characterized by the presence of local power dynamics, such as the hegemony of familistic structures that exercise local power in the Baixada Fluminense.

When the interpersonal trust indicators were disaggregated, the feeling of distrust appeared much more strongly in the Periphery than in the Core and the Suburb<sup>7</sup>. In the Periphery, more than half of the population believes that people will almost always try and take advantage in any situation. Whilst a more abstract dimension of trust presents more moderate differences between areas, we can nonetheless see that more than half of the population of the periphery also believes that almost always one can never be too cautious with people in general. This means that, if distrust in social interactions is something prevalent in the metropolis, it is more intense in the most peripheral areas, which corresponds to one of the main pieces of evidence in support of the “scarce city” hypothesis. (Table 1)

When the assessment asked about trust towards politicians, the results indicate that there is a generalized feeling of distrust about the ethics and efficiency of rulers among the three areas of the MRRJ, especially when the more specific question, of whether rulers will pursue personal advantage, is asked. A closer analysis of the data indicates that the denizens of the MRRJ’s Core tend to be more demanding of efficient behavior by politicians in general than their counterparts in the Suburbs and in the Periphery; however, an analysis of the answers’ mean has not presented significant differences. (Table 2)

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<sup>7</sup> It is important to highlight that the frequencies of the indicators of political culture presented in this section serve just to illustrate the variation in responses that compose the indicators when the internal divisions of the MRRJ are considered. For a greater statistical control of these comparisons the average of the indicators (and respective tests of Variance Analysis) were used, so as to identify the significant variations between the data that were found for different areas (*See Appendices*).

**Table 1 – Interpersonal trust in the areas of the MRRJ**

	People will try and take advantage*			People are trustworthy**			
	Core	Suburb	Periphery	Core	Suburb	Periphery	
Almost always	38.6	37.4	53.2	Almost always	7.0	2.4	4.5
Sometimes	34.6	32.3	22.7	Sometimes	20.0	10.6	17.1
Sometimes fair	16.7	23.2	16.6	Sometimes one can't be too cautious	30.4	40.8	25.5
Almost always fair	10.1	7.1	7.6	Almost always one can't be too cautious	42.6	46.3	52.9
Total	100	100	100	Total	100	100	100

(\*) Do you think people will try and take advantage whenever possible or do you think they'll try and act fairly?

(\*\*) Do you think people can be trusted, or, on the contrary, one can never be too cautious?

**Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Study, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.**

**Table 2 – Trust in politicians in the MRRJ pre-defined areas**

	People from the government will do what is right*			Most politicians seek to obtain personal advantages**		
	Core	Suburb	Periphery	Core	Suburb	Periphery
Totally agree	7.1	11.2	8.7	65.8	63.3	67.6
Partially agree	16.4	6.2	6.3	17.5	20.1	9.9
Neither agree nor disagree	13.7	8.9	15.4	9.6	4.6	13.4
Partially disagree	19.5	29.3	33.1	4.8	7.3	5.9
Totally disagree	43.4	44.4	36.6	2.2	4.6	3.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

(\*) Usually, one can trust that people from the government will do what is right,

(\*\*) Most politicians got into politics in order to obtain personal advantages

**Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Study, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.**

In spite of the existence of evidence to support the logic of distrust in the attitudes of the inhabitants of the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, paradoxically this group has a high, although internalized, degree of that which authors call “civic virtues”, i.e., they use as reference those values that are expected of those who feel integrated to a political community. The positioning of the metropolitan citizens regarding behaviors considered civic is much more indicative of a group concerned with the general welfare of needy people (of Brazil and of the World) than that of a group which has a political positioning consistent with labor unions, associations or political powers (or even environmentally and ethically conscious consumption). Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe, in this case, that there is a higher portion of civic importance for such behaviors in the Periphery than in the Core of the MRRJ, which is something that relativizes the polarization between the two areas, in terms of civic culture. In a certain way, this result indicates the trend to a lesser appreciation of civic behaviors in the Core of the MRRJ, something that is consistent with the perspective of “social hobbesianism”, since it largely indicates much more individualistic behavior. (Table 3)

According to the classic hypothesis of civic *communitarianism* (PUTNAM, 1996), the feeling of belonging to a civic community is contradictory, as it coexists with a higher degree of interpersonal and political distrust. Based on this paradox, it is possible to test two explanations: the first is that such a paradox confirms the existence of a dissociation between civil society and political society, as mentioned by J. M. de Carvalho (1987). The second explanation is that there is an identification of a “civic cynicism” as a pattern of the predominant behavior among the metropolitan citizens of Rio de Janeiro. The basis of this behavior is the appreciation of a behavior that is both consistent with democratic ideals and highly distrustful of politicians – a direct result of the precarious functioning of institutions and of the “fight of all against all” for scarce goods, according to the social hobbesianism idea that was put forth by Santos (1993). Similarly the high level of distrust in interpersonal relationships supports the thesis of amoral familism - a diffusion of overly individualistic and even predatory social behavior that values the family dimension to the detriment of the public sphere - as adapted to the Brazilian reality by Reis (1995).



**Table 3 – Civic virtues in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Importance Scale*											
	Core				Suburb				Periphery			
	Less Important.	Important	Very Important		Less Important.	Important	Very Important		Less Important.	Important	Very Important	
Help people in Brazil that live in a worse condition than yourself	5.7	17.0	77.3		3.1	14.7	82.2		4.9	10.1	85.0	
Help people in the World that live in a worse condition than yourself	8.3	21.4	70.3		5.8	17.8	76.4		3.2	11.8	85.0	
Obeys laws and rules	10.0	20.5	69.4		8.1	20.9	70.9		6.3	17.5	76.2	
Try to understand the opinion of people with ideas that are different from yours	8.8	18.5	72.7		11.3	27.2	61.5		7.6	18.2	74.1	
Keep updated with governments' activities	17.1	16.7	66.2		10.1	31.9	58.0		9.6	17.7	72.7	

Never evade taxes	11.0	18.4	70.6	15.9	21.3	62.8	9.0	19.5	71.5
Be willing to perform military service if drafted	24.1	25.9	50.0	23.4	21.9	54.7	15.4	16.4	68.1
Always vote in political elections	18.3	20.4	61.3	13.1	25.0	61.9	16.8	20.2	63.0
Choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	21.2	34.1	44.7	32.9	34.5	32.5	14.8	32.5	52.7
Participate in associations, unions and political parties	23.3	30.8	45.8	25.1	42.7	32.2	18.3	34.1	47.7

(\* ) There are many diverging opinions over what should be done in order to be a good citizen, in a scale from 1 to 7, in which 1 means less important and 7 very important, what importance do you attach personally to each of the following aspects?

Source: Observatório das Metrópoles's Study, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.

A method to test this first hypothesis is to verify the existence of a relationship between manifestations of civic virtues and citizen engagement in acts of socio-political participation. According to what was predicted by the specialized literature, it must be expected that the more intense the feelings of political duties and obligations with a community, the bigger its activism in social (associativism) and political (political mobilization) spheres.

An analysis of Table 4 indicates, though, the low insertion of the metropolis' citizens in those classic civic associations that provide the formation of a social capital constituted by the insertion in social networks founded on strong bonds (GRANOVETTER, 1973). Only religious participation - a mode with high doses of communitarianism but one that fails to translate this social integration into political behavior that is consistent with a broader democratic perspective - presented considerable levels. However, there is a higher incidence of a feeling of belonging to the associative forms of greater political potential (political parties, unions and syndicates, guilds and professional associations) in the Core of the MRRJ, whereas membership of religious organizations increases in the Periphery. This suggests the existence of a marked intrametropolitan segregation of associative forms of political participation. (Table 4)

The data that refer to political mobilization also indicate a low level of mobilization for political purposes by the residents of the MRRJ. The modes with the highest participation rate were "plea or petition signature" and "participation in rallies or political meetings", both of which, according to Azevedo et al. (2009, p. 710) are characterized by a low engagement cost. A signature is seen as a transient event, while so-called *showmícios* (concert-rallies), which are largely responsible for the high percentages of both modes, are seen as embodying a trivialization of politics and loss of political meaning. However, it is interesting to note that the three last modes of political mobilization ("Give money or try to fundraise for a public cause", "Contact or appear in the media to express its own opinions" and "Participate in an internet forum or discussion list") have presented participation rates that were significantly higher in the Core of the Metro Area of Rio de Janeiro than in the other two areas, as did "boycotting products" and "participating in demonstrations". Hence, it is also possible to state that there is strong evidence to support the existence of a segmentation in modes of political mobilization, chiefly those that demand a higher socio-political engagement. (Table 5)

**Table 4 – Associativism in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Association affiliation and belonging*								
	Core			Suburb			Periphery		
	Yes	Ever	Never	Yes	Ever	Never	Yes	Ever	Never
Political Party	5.4	11.2	83.5	3.8	9.2	86.9	3.3	5.3	91.4
Union or syndicate, guild, professional association	11.0	20.2	68.9	8.4	16.5	75.1	9.0	10.4	80.6
Church or another religious organization	30.1	21.0	48.9	29.9	27.6	42.5	40.4	20.9	38.8
Sports, cultural or recreational group	14.8	19.1	66.1	6.5	18.8	74.6	8.8	7.6	83.6
Other voluntary association	10.8	9.9	79.3	4.9	12.2	82.9	4.6	4.6	90.8

(\*) Often people participate in groups and/or associations. For each of the following groups, (a) political party, (b) union or syndicate, guild, professional association, (c) church or another religious organization, (d) recreational, cultural or sports group and (e) have another voluntary association, respond if you (i) actively participate; (ii) belongs to, but do not participate; (iii) have ever participated; or (iv) never participated.

Obs.: The percentage that refer to responses (i) and (ii) were grouped together in the “Yes” category, whereas the percentage that refers to response (iii) corresponds to the category “Ever”, and the percentage that refers to response (iv) corresponds to the category “Never”.

**Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles’s Study, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.**

Therefore, it remains to be seen how these trends and contradictions in the emergence of a civic culture in the MRRJ are related to the predisposition for individuals’ political mobilization in the different areas of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area. In Chart 1 displayed below, the effects of the results of some of the conditioning variables of the level of individuals’ political mobilization are presented. The objective, though, is not to exhaust the explanatory possibilities of political mobilization, something that would escape the goals of this article, but to collect empirical evidences of the importance of considering the socio-spatial diversity of the MRRJ. In other words, according to what was verified in the descriptive analysis presented above, not only do the indicators of political culture vary between individuals, but so, it was hypothesized, are those variables articulated differently according to the spatial origin of such individuals.

**Table 5 – Political Mobilization in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Participation in political mobilizations in the last years*					
	Core		Suburb		Periphery	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Sign a petition or a plea	38.9	61.1	36.9	63.1	35.3	64.7
Boycott or buy given products because of political, ethical or environmental reasons	20.9	79.1	15.0	85.0	14.4	85.6
Take part in a manifestation	26.3	73.7	19.5	80.5	14.9	85.1
Participate in a rally or political meeting	24.6	75.4	20.8	79.2	22.0	78.0
Contact, or try to contact a politician or government employee to express your opinions	10.9	89.1	7.8	92.2	8.3	91.7
Give money or fundraise for a public cause	11.4	88.6	3.8	96.2	5.5	94.5
Contact, or appear in , the media to express your opinions	8.3	91.7	2.7	97.3	2.2	97.8
Participate in an internet forum or discussion list	9.2	90.8	6.1	93.9	2.2	97.8

(\*) Listed below are some modes of political and social action that people might engage in. Please indicate, for each of the following: “a) Sign a petition or a plea; b) Boycott or buy given products because of political, ethical or environmental reasons; c) Take part in a manifestation; d) Participate in a rally or political meeting; e) Contact, or try to contact a politician or government employee to express your opinions; f) Give money or fundraise for a public cause; g) Contact, or appear in, the media to express your opinions; h) Participate in an internet forum or discussion list;” having, as response options: (i) performed over the last year; (ii) performed in previous years; (iii) never performed but could perform it; and (iv) would never do it.

Obs: The percentage that refer to responses (i) and (ii) were grouped together under the “Yes” category and the ones that refer to responses (iii) and (iv) were grouped together under the “No” category.

Source: **Observatório das Metrôpoles’s Study, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.**

Hence, Chart 1 shows that political trust is invariably not significant in its effect upon political mobilization, mostly because this feeling of distrust towards politicians permeates the entire society in fairly high levels. On the other hand, the interpersonal trust in the Suburb and Periphery presents an inverse and significant correlation towards political mobilization. On a different note, in the Core of the MRRJ schooling and associative experience have greater weight in explaining the degree of individual mobilization, while in the Periphery indicators that address primary socialization and interest in politics present greater explanatory power than level of schooling. To summarize, the data indicate that if distrust is indeed a demotivating element, other political culture variables nonetheless exist that can compensate for such an effect. It follows from this that if these variables such as schooling, associativism and level of interest in politics are also distributed in an uneven fashion in the territory then it should be considered that the aforementioned demotivating effect of the distrust culture will be mediated, to some extent, by the individual's place of origin, i.e., by the different levels of civic culture that this relation with the territory provides. (Chart 1)

Besides this fragmentation of interpersonal trust and civic trust that are taken by the literature as a basis for a more active political behavior, recent evidence points to something that can be considered one of the most direct outcomes of this differential for the constitution of the metropolis' political culture. Next, empirical evidences will be provided to help illustrate the impacts of this differentiated configuration of political culture across the metropolitan population upon their political behavior, in this case, the vote. The hypothesis considered is that the voting choice in proportional elections takes into consideration the political culture of individuals as mediated by their experience in the territory, which would provide different ways to relate with the representative forms of power.

**Chart 1 - Constraints<sup>8</sup> of political mobilization in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Core	Suburb	Periphery	
1 <sup>st</sup> block:	0.201***	0.138*	0.102**	
Schooling	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	
2 <sup>nd</sup> block:	0,141*	<i>n/k</i> .	0.215***	
Primary socialization	(0,042)	(0,036)	(0,024)	
3 <sup>rd</sup> block:	<i>n/k</i>	0.210**	<i>n/k</i>	
Scondary socialization	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.032)	
4 <sup>th</sup> block:	0.129*	<i>n/k</i>	0.161***	
Interest in politics	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.024)	
5 <sup>th</sup> block:	0.140*	<i>n/k</i>	0.150***	
Civic virtue	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.017)	
6 <sup>th</sup> block:	<i>n/k</i>	-0.155**	-0.099*	
Interpersonal trust	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.029)	
7 <sup>th</sup> block:	<i>n/k</i>	<i>n/k</i>	<i>n/k</i>	
Political trust	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.021)	
8 <sup>th</sup> block:	0.291***	0.307***	0.272***	
Associativism	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.045)	
<b><i>R<sup>2</sup> Adjusted</i></b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>29%</b>	
<b>Amount of Cases</b>	<b>1.010</b>	<b>1.010</b>	<b>1.010</b>	
<b>Accrual in <i>R<sup>2</sup> Adjusted</i></b>	1 <sup>st</sup> block	12%	9%	5%
	2 <sup>nd</sup> block	11%	7%	10%
	3 <sup>rd</sup> block	2%	7%	2%
	4 <sup>th</sup> block	1%	0%	2%
	5 <sup>th</sup> block	4%	0%	3%
	6 <sup>th</sup> block	1%	4%	1%
	7 <sup>th</sup> block	1%	0%	1%
	8 <sup>th</sup> block	7%	8%	7%

Note: Values are standardized regression patterns (betas) statistically significant: \*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ ;  $n/k = p > 0.05$ .

Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Study, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Besides the previously presented variables, the following political mobilization requirements were added: the (1) *schooling* was gained from the respondent's declared educational level, according to the following bands: (i) no schooling, (ii) low schooling level, (iii) above low schooling level, (iv) secondary school level, (v) above secondary school

By way of example, a more in depth analysis of the electoral results for the state Congress across the metropolis points to a significant difference in the number of competitors for the vote among the different areas of the metropolis. From data on the territorial distribution of the degree of competitiveness for votes<sup>9</sup> in the polling stations of the MRRJ, Corrêa (2011, p. 99) has conducted a classification of the intra-urban areas.<sup>10</sup> This classification resulted in four types of area with an intra-group variance of 38% and an inter-group variance of 62%, a satisfactory result in terms of groups' classification, in the sense that they are sufficiently coherent internally and sufficiently different from one another.

From the spatialized result of the level of competitiveness in the electoral race for state Congressman in 2006 (Figure 4), it is possible to infer that there is a disparity in the distribution of such competition for votes among the areas of the MRRJ. What draws attention in this result is that those areas that are classified as highly concentrated electoral markets correspond, to a great extent, to the Periphery of the MRRJ, while the areas classified as highly dispersed are circumscribed only to the main city of the Rio de Janeiro Metro Area.

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level, (iv) holder of higher education diploma; the (2) *primary socialization*, composed by the answers' mean to the following questions: "When you were 14/15 years old, how frequently did you hear about politics in your house?" and "And in school/college/university, how frequent do you, or did you, talk about politics?", given the following responses' options: (i) frequently, (ii) sometimes, (iii) rarely, (iv) never; the (3) *secondary socialization* composed by the answers' mean to the following questions: "Nowadays, excluding the media (television, radio and newspapers), how often do you hear people talking about politics in the following situations: a) in the workplace, b) in meeting with friends, c) at your house or in a relative's house, d) in associations' meetings, e) talking to neighbors", given the following responses' options: (i) frequently, (ii) sometimes, (iii) rarely, (iv) never; and (4) an *interest in politics* composed by the answers' mean to the following questions: "Would you say that you have an interest in politics?" given the following responses' options: (i) very interested; (ii) interested; (iii) not really interested; and (iv) not interested at all.

<sup>9</sup> From the polling stations that were geocoded in the MRRJ, the *effective number of candidates index* ( $N_i^{cand}$ ) was set up for each area. The objective was to produce an estimate of the average number of candidates acquiring a meaningful number of votes, so as to make them competitive in the area of that particular polling station. This allows the identification of the level of competitiveness per vote for each area. Such an index is calculated according to the following formula:  $N_i^{cand} = 1 / \sum_{j=1}^n p_{ij}^2$ , in which  $p_{ij}$  is the proportion of votes that a candidate  $j$  received in the polling station  $i$ ; and  $n$  is the number of candidates that have received at least 1 vote in the polling station  $i$ .

<sup>10</sup> Weighted Areas of the IBGE's 2000 Demographic Census.





Multivariate analysis of the data collected by the 2000 Demographic Census (CORRÊA, 2011, p. 114) indicates a strong link between these differences in the competitiveness level and the distribution of socio-economic characteristics across the population of the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. To summarize, the results indicate that there is a significant and considerable relation between the hierarchization of the intra-urban areas — identified by the uneven distribution of individuals in the metropolitan space with a high concentration of resources, such as income and schooling, and by the unequal distribution of public infrastructure services<sup>11</sup> — and electoral competitiveness.

According to the theoretical perspective of the geography of vote (AMES, 2003; CARVALHO, 2003), as a candidate's votes gets more territorially concentrated, the bigger are the incentives for it to assume a parliamentary behavior guided by parochial interests and, inversely, the more dispersed it gets, the bigger are the incentives for it to assume a parliamentary behavior guided by universal interests. According to Corrêa's classification (2011), when only those who obtained more than 50% of their votes in the interior of the metropolitan area were considered, 31 out of 50 metropolitan members of congress present a voting profile identified with an incentive to that which Nelson de Carvalho (2009) has called "metropolitan parochialism", i.e., the maintenance of electoral strongholds in the interior of the metropolis.

The strength of concentrated voting in the interior of the city of Rio de Janeiro was previously featured in a study by Kuschnir (2000). According to this author, based on a survey conducted since the 1980s, at least a third of the City Council of Rio de Janeiro was elected based on geographically concentrated votes. However, what has been highlighted in Kuschnir's study is the existing connection between geographical concentration of Rio de Janeiro's councilors and members of congress and the existence of assistance centers to the population that members of congress maintain:

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<sup>11</sup>The *concentration of resources* is measured from the percentage per area of individuals whose per capita family income is more than five times the minimum wage and whose average schooling time of the household's adults is above 11 years. The *infrastructure shortage* is measured from the percentage of people in each area living either: in households with no access to safe drinking water through the public system or through boreholes or wells; with no access to the public sewage system or to cesspools; or in which there is no collection of garbage through the public garbage collection service. (CORRÊA, 2011, p. 114).

the so-called “social centers” (KUSCHNIR, 2008). In such places various “public services” that are relevant to the general population are offered, as put forth by Kuschnir:


It is vital that we point out that these Social Centers often have an intimate relationship with the ruling power, and receive the label of “public utility” by indication of the legislative houses and with the Mayor’s or Governor’s sanctioning. This assures these centers tax exemption, and eventually joint contracts with both municipal and state governments, providing services such as daycare centers, medical services and professional training centers. There are denouncements that state that several of these Centers work as disreputable entities that raise public financing through overpricing in the purchase of equipment, medications and other service (CAMPOS, 2004). Although some end up suffering sanctions during the electoral period, it is noteworthy that they operate freely in the remaining times of the year. (KUSCHNIR, 2008, p. 7)

In this situation, it is clear that the process of enshrining social centers as “public utilities” – the foremost mechanism of legitimizing such entities - interferes with members of congress performing their duties of actually maintaining such social centers. On the other hand, it is paramount to point out the existing link between congress members’ vote and the presence of their respective social centers, as can be seen in the example provided by Kuschnir (2008, p. 5) of the correspondence between areas with prevalence of votes and geographical distribution of users of social centers’. (Figura 5)

## Conclusion

In conclusion, based on the empirical evidence listed in the previous section, we can affirm the plausibility of the hypothesis that the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro is organized in such a manner that it reproduces pronounced urban disparities, and that the social differences observed in this area are the basis for the development of distinct socio-political conditions across the metropolitan population. In this regard, the different ways in which individuals experience the territory in their daily lives and the different levels of attention from government to the immediate needs of the different areas of the city, promote different forms of configuring the political culture of

Figure 5 – Spatial distribution of a Congressman's votes and of users of a social center that was kept by this Congressman



Source: KUSCHNIR, 2008.

individuals. This will, later on, impact upon their political behavior, chiefly their level of political engagement, and in the various ways through which this behavior manifests itself. Rather than offering an explanation for the maintenance of the logic of distrust in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, this article intended to evidence the importance of considering the dimension of urban inequalities in the understanding the political disparities among metropolitan citizens. In other words it is possible to consider that the maintenance, within the metropolitan space, of severe disparities regarding the access to urban welfare - something that is confirmed in the distribution of levels of shortage of infrastructure services, in access to opportunities for improving of quality of life and in the distribution of household income per capita - marginalizes a considerable part of the metropolitan population from the *right to the city*. This means that the direct result of this segregating and exclusionary logic of metropolitan organization, is the marginalization of a large part of the metropolitan population regarding their rights as metropolitan citizens (an efficient public transportation network; access to basic sanitation services and safe, potable water; public sewage and garbage collection; access to reasonable and dignified housing; access to an adequate system of health services; education; leisure and culture, etc.). This, in turn, strengthens and legitimates the disparity of conditions for the exercise of citizenship (*civitas*), a relationship that is well translated by the metaphors of the “scarce city” or “city scarcity” put forth by M. A. de Carvalho. Finally, when these unequal conditions of urban welfare are connected with the functioning of the Brazilian political and representative democratic system, what we see is that the use of political representation as a means of bargaining the personal subordination the urban poor through political and clientelistic mechanisms and the functioning of entities of assistencialism kept by members of congress. The example of the office of State Congressman Natalino, elected in the 2006 poll with votes concentrated in Rio de Janeiro’s West Zone because of its involvement with a militia in the region, raises serious questions about the perverse results that this double shortage of rights (of both *the right to the city* and of *city rights*) on the quality of the democracy that is practiced in large metropolises displaying a similar socio-spatial organization.

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## APPENDICES

### Averages of the indicators of political culture according to the areas of the MRRJ

**Chart 1 – Average of interpersonal trust in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Core	Suburb	Periphery	ANOVA
People will always try to take advantage * N	1.98 <sup>a</sup> 228	2.00 <sup>a</sup> 254	1.79 <sup>b</sup> 489	$F(2, 968) = 5.52; p = 0.004$
People are trustworthy** N	1.91 <sup>b</sup> 230	1.69 <sup>a</sup> 255	1.73 <sup>a</sup> 510	$F(2, 992) = 4.58; p = 0.01$
Index N	1.95 <sup>b</sup> 230	1.84 <sup>ab</sup> 257	1.75 <sup>a</sup> 511	$F(2, 995) = 6.67; p = 0.001$

(\*) Do you think that people will always try and take advantage whenever possible, or do you think they will be try and be just?

(\*\*) Do you think you can trust people, or that, on the contrary, one can never be too cautious?

Scale: 1 – minimal to 4 - maximal

Note: Different letters represent statistically different groups– Duncan a  $p < .05$ .

Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Research, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.

**Chart 2 – Average of political trust in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Core	Suburb	Periphery	ANOVA
Government people will do what is right * N	2.24 226	2.10 259	2.17 495	$F(2, 977) = 0,71; N/K$
Most politicians seek to obtain personal advantages** N	1.60 228	1.70 259	1.67 494	$F(2, 983) = 0,07; N/K$
Index N	1.93 228	1.90 260	1.93 498	$F(2, 978) = 0,53; N/K$

(\*) Usually, one can trust that people from the government will do what is right,

(\*\*) Most politicians get into politics in order to obtain personal advantages

Scale: 1 – minimal to 5 - maximal

Note: Different letters represent statistically different groups– Duncan a  $p < .05$ .

Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Research, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.

**Chart 3 – Average of indicators of civic virtues\* in the areas of the MRRJ**

	<i>Core</i>	<i>Suburb</i>	<i>Periphery</i>	<i>ANOVA</i>
<i>Always vote in political elections</i> N	5.31 230	5.44 252	5.41 505	$F(2. 984) = 0.27; N/K$
<i>Never evade taxes</i> N	5.79 b 228	5.38 a 258	5.88 b 502	$F(2. 985) = 6.15; p = 0.002$
<i>Obeys laws and rules</i> N	5.78 a 229	5.87 a b 258	6.08 b 508	$F(2. 992) = 2.93; p = 0.05$
<i>Keep updated with governments' activities</i> N	5.54 a 228	5.42 a 257	5.88 b 502	$F(2. 984) = 5.83; p = 0.003$
<i>Participate in associations, unions and political parties</i> N	4.75 b 227	4.23 a 255	4.96 b 493	$F(2. 972) = 9.89; p = 0.001$
<i>Try to understand the opinion of people with ideas that are different from yours</i> N	5.93 b 227	5.57 a 257	6.01 b 499	$F(2. 980) = 5.72; p = 0.003$
<i>Use environmentally correct products, even if expensive</i> N	4.75 b 226	4.17 a 252	5.19 c 480	$F(2. 955) = 18.92; p = 0.001$
<i>Help people in Brazil that live in a condition that is worse than yours</i> N	6.17 229	6.36 258	6.39 507	$F(2. 991) = 1.95; N/K$
<i>Help people in the World that live in a condition that is worse than yours</i> N	5.86 a 229	6.13 b 258	6.44 c 507	$F(2.991) = 12.74; p = 0.001$
<i>Be willing to perform military service if drafted</i> N	4.82 a 228	4.93 a 256	5.57 b 499	$F(2. 980) = 11.98; p = 0.001$
<i>Index</i> N	5.48 a 230	5.36 a 259	5.79 b 512	$F(2. 988) = 13.59; p = 0.000$

(\*). There are many diverging opinions over what should be done in order to be a good citizen, in a scale from 1 to 7, in which 1 means less important and 7 very important, which importance do you attach personally to each of the following aspects?

Scale: 1- not important to 7 – very important

Note: Different letters represent statistically different groups– Duncan a  $p < .05$ .

Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Research, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.

**Chart 4 – Average of indicators of Associativism\* in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Core	Suburb	Periphery	ANOVA
Political Party N	0.25 <sup>b</sup> 224	0.18 <sup>a b</sup> 260	0.13 <sup>a</sup> 510	$F(2. 991) = 4.17; p = 0.01$
Union or syndicate, guild, professional association N	0.49 <sup>b</sup> 228	0.36 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.30 <sup>a</sup> 509	$F(2. 995) = 5.08; p = 0.006$
Church or another religious organization N	1.00 <sup>a</sup> 229	1.07 <sup>a</sup> 261	1.28 <sup>b</sup> 513	$F(2. 1000) = 5.72; p = 0.003$
Sports, cultural or recreational group N	0.56 <sup>b</sup> 230	0.36 <sup>a</sup> 260	0.29 <sup>a</sup> 512	$F(2. 999) = 10.00; p = 0.000$
Other voluntary association N	0.38 <sup>b</sup> 222	0.24 <sup>a</sup> 246	0.16 <sup>a</sup> 500	$F(2. 965) = 8.83; p = 0.000$
Index N	0.55 <sup>b</sup> 230	0.44 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.44 <sup>a</sup> 514	$F(2. 1002) = 4.00; p = 0.02$

(\*). Oftentimes people participate in groups and/or associations. For each of the following groups, (a) political party, (b) union or syndicate, guild, professional association, (c) church or another religious organization, (d) recreational, cultural or sports group and (e) have another voluntary association, respond if you (i) actively participate; (ii) belong to, but do not participate; (iii) have ever participated; or (iv) never participated.

Scale: 0 – never took part to 3 – participate actively

Note: Different letters represent statistically different groups– Duncan a  $p < .05$ .

Source: Observatório das Metrôpoles's Research, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.

**Chart 5 – Average of the indicators of Mobilization\* in the areas of the MRRJ**

	Core	Suburb	Periphery	ANOVA
Sign a petition or a plea N	1.24 229	1.12 260	1.06 510	<i>N/K</i>
Boycott or buy given products because of political, ethical or environmental reasons N	0.83 <sup>b</sup> 225	0.56 <sup>a</sup> 254	0.59 <sup>a</sup> 500	$F(2. 976) = 8.64; p = 0.000$
Take part in a manifestation N	0.95 <sup>b</sup> 228	0.72 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.72 <sup>a</sup> 510	$F(2. 996) = 7.60; p = 0.001$
Participate in a rally or political meeting N	0.89 228	0.74 260	0.80 509	<i>N/K</i>
Contact, or try to contact a politician or government employee to express your opinions N	0.67 <sup>b</sup> 229	0.44 <sup>a</sup> 257	0.60 <sup>b</sup> 509	$F(2. 992) = 6.96; p = 0.001$
Give money or fundraise for a public cause N	0.62 <sup>b</sup> 229	0.36 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.56 <sup>b</sup> 505	$F(2. 992) = 11.35; p = 0.000$
Contact, or appear in , the media to express your opinions N	0.63 <sup>b</sup> 230	0.46 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.46 <sup>a</sup> 510	$F(2. 998) = 7.42; p = 0.001$
Participate in an internet forum or discussion list N	0.69 <sup>b</sup> 229	0.44 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.47 <sup>a</sup> 507	$F(2. 994) = 10.80; p = 0.000$
Index N	0.81 <sup>b</sup> 230	0.60 <sup>a</sup> 261	0.66 <sup>a</sup> 513	$F(2. 1001) = 10.74; p = 0.000$

(\*) Listed below are some modes of political and social action that people might perform. Please indicate, for each of the following: “a) Sign a petition or a plea; b) Boycott or buy given products because of political, ethical or environmental reasons; c) Take part in a manifestation; d) Participate in a rally or political meeting; e) Contact, or try to contact a politician or government employee to express your opinions; f) Give money or fundraise for a public cause; g) Contact, or appear in, the media to express your opinions; h) Participate in an internet forum or discussion list;” having, as response options: (i) performed over the last year; (ii) performed in previous years; (iii) never performed but could perform it; and (iv) would never perform it.

Scale: 0 – Would never perform it to 3 – have performed in the last year

Note: Different letters represent statistically different groups– Duncan a  $p < .05$ .

Source: Observatório das Metrópoles’s Research, IUPERJ, ICS-UL, ISRP, 2008.



## Local democracy and metropolitan governance: the case of Rio de Janeiro<sup>1</sup>

*Luiz Queiroz Ribeiro Cesar*

*Ana Lucia Britto*

**B**razil is now an urban country: over 80% of its population lives in cities. It is also a country of large urban agglomerations. Its urban network has 13 cities with over one million people in a global scenario where only China, India and Indonesia have over 10 cities of this size. In addition, in Brazil, over 12 large urban agglomerations have metropolitan functions and regroup nearly 70 million people, that is, 36% of the national population. These features are a result of an urbanization process that occurred simultaneously to the metropolisation of the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and to the rural exodus of nearly 36 million inhabitants between the 1950s and 1980s.

These metropolitan territories constitute major economic actors since they concentrate over 64% of the national technological capacity, forming a hierarchy of the Brazilian urban network nodes that structure national economy. At the same time, these cities embody the challenges of consolidating Brazil's development, particularly those relating to the precariousness of urban and environmental conditions. Hence, the construction of metropolitan governance must simultaneously consider the imperatives of economic competitiveness and bring a solution to huge traps. For example, according to data provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*)

<sup>1</sup>This article was published in French in the book titled *De la ville à la métropole, les défis de la gouvernance*; edited by Christian Lefèvre ...[et al.], published by L'Oeil d'Or in Paris in 2013.

/ IBGE in 2010, of 6329 «non-standard agglomerates» (*aglomerados subnormais*), i.e., sets having over 50 units of adjacent dwellings marked by precariousness of housing and infrastructure, 88.2% are located in metropolitan areas with over one million inhabitants. These areas are also characterized by the precariousness of the wastewater treatment system resulting either from a lack of adequate forms of effluents collection or lack of collected residuals treatment. They are also areas marked by recurrent floods that are consequences of the irregular occupation of areas at risk characterizing the growth of metropolises, and sources of serious social and economic damage.

Despite their economic and social importance, Brazilian metropolises are territories marked by a certain political atrophy. Note, however, that this phenomenon does not seem to constitute a Brazilian historical feature. Many works that assessed experiences of governance in metropolises in the Americas (WILSON, SPINK and WARD, 2011; ROJAS, CUADRADO-ROURA and FERNÁNDEZ GÜELL, 2005) and Europe (LEFEVRE, 2009; SEIXAS and ALBET, 2010) agree on the existence of obstacles to the construction of effective institutions capable of promoting policies in a scale adapted to these territories. In the metropolises, policies are mostly on a global or local scale since the metropolitan territory as a whole lacks the necessary conditions for a coordinated action of private actors, civil society and the public sphere, that is, a coordinated action designed by a logic of cooperation or conflict. This implies a genuine paradox: metropolises are the contemporary scale of the spatial fix (HARVEY, 1985) and are, at the same time, politically atrophied territories. How can we understand this paradox?

The first prerequisite needed to overcome the political atrophy of the metropolis is the existence of institutions capable of involving the economic, political and social actors in legitimate collective actions addressed to the development of these major cities and their contemporary issues. This legitimacy comprises three dimensions: functional, social and political (LEFEVRE, 2005). The first refers to the division of functions of the metropolitan government between the different government spheres and levels existing in the major cities and the institution created to perform them. According to Lefrève (2005), the overall models of metropolitan governance experienced to date have a deficit of functional legitimacy evidenced in the adoption of solutions that do not clearly define the responsibilities of the metropolitan institutions established, which leads

to the ambiguity of their functions. Besides, in cases where such definition exists, the functions of the metropolitan government do not benefit from the delegation of authority and corresponding resources. Social legitimacy is essential to make the metropolitan institutions build roots in society. This legitimacy would be achieved by registering such institutions into systems of collective action and by the existence of a social identity as reference for the metropolitan territory. In this regard, we also observe a certain deficit of legitimacy in metropolitan institutions tested in many countries and resulting from the most diverse models. This presupposes that metropolitan institutions work as relevant instances and arenas of expression and resolution of conflicts. The deficit of political legitimacy seems to be the major obstacle to the construction of institutions addressed to the governability of metropolises since this implies the delegation of important portions of the power formed by the countries' political system. It is as much the power to represent the general interest, related to the organization and functioning of the metropolis as a social and economic space, as the power to regulate individual and collective actions on behalf of this same general interest.

Thus, it is the debate on the conditions and obstacles for the construction of a sovereign public authority in the metropolises what is at the core of the discussion. In this sense, the reflections of R. Bendix (1996) on the establishment of the Nation State seem useful. Large cities are governed by the non-coordinated action between the three levels of government<sup>2</sup> and by the free play of private interests (material and ideological) that are fragmented and in competition, resulting from the lack of a social order based on the encounter of diverse interests and a system of solidarity capable of ensuring social cohesion. Such a social order presupposes the existence of a consensus between public and private actors as regards the general interests that must be preserved by the government of these territories. Instead of a social order that would result in institutions of governance, priority is given, in the management of cities, to cooperative actions based on the model of what M. Weber (2003) identified as «unions of interest», characterized by the fragmentation and the transitional aspect of the cooperation between actors.

Analyzed from this perspective, the major challenge in fighting the political atrophy of the metropolis is the adaptation of the political regimes

<sup>2</sup> In Brazil, the three levels of government are: federal, federated States, and municipal.



and political geography of the Nation States to the new territoriality shaped by the rising economic importance of these spaces on national and global levels<sup>3</sup>. The legal and political strength of municipalities, present in varying degrees in different countries, tends to be identified as a major obstacle to the construction of the governability of the metropolises. Actually, In most cases, municipalities are instances of government with a strong social and political legitimacy found in regimes that are unitarily organized. This obstacle achieves greater importance in the contemporary period, insofar as decentralization processes carried out in various countries participated to improve, at the local level, institutions and mechanisms of participatory democracy (JOUVE, 2005).

Having as basis the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, this chapter is designed to contribute to the debate around this issue. It stands as the second economic metropolis of the country and comprises nineteen municipalities on a territory of 5318.9 km<sup>2</sup> for a population of nearly 11.5 million people. Located in the geoeconomic space of the Brazilian Southeast which concentrates the most dynamic urban agglomerations of the country's economy, it faces competition from two other major metropolitan poles – São Paulo and Belo Horizonte – when it comes to secure public and private investments. There is no current institution in this territory capable to assume its governance. On the contrary, institutional fragmentation predominates in the metropolis where cooperative actions between different levels of government, which could eventually organize themselves in the form of the 'union of interests' mentioned earlier, contain the seed of serious consequences for both the present and the future of this territory and its population. We will attempt to determine to what extent this fragmentation results from the combination of factors induced by the model of local government in force in Brazil with factors from historical, sociological and geoeconomic specifications that characterize the Metropolis of Rio de Janeiro.

This chapter is organized into four parts. The first presents Brazilian federalism and pays particular attention to the institutional aspects unfavorable to cooperative action between the different governmental bodies and spheres. The second presents the way local democracy is developed in Brazil within the framework of a compartmentalized federalism model. The third shows how the lack of governability of the

<sup>3</sup> For a more elaborate treatment of this issue, see Brenner (2004).

metropolis led to a serious environmental problem in its consolidated urban periphery, known as Baixada Fluminense. This periphery is a densely populated territory which has over three million people, or over 30% of the population of the State of Rio de Janeiro, divided between eight municipalities. On account of historical, geographic and environmental reasons, this part of the metropolitan periphery is subject to significant and frequent floods that bring dramatic consequences for its population. However, such events could be solved – or at least minimized – if there were a metropolitan institution with legitimacy and ability to articulate the municipal urban land policies and the wastewater sanitation policy within the State jurisdiction. As we will point out in the third part of this chapter, the lack of this institution is due to the aforementioned fragmentation that prevents the urban periphery from being transformed into a political space with sufficient elements for the construction of a public authority endowed with functional, social and political legitimacy. Finally, the last part will address the presentation of some considerations on the political rationality that underlies this situation, similar to that known in literature under the term ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, in which metropolitan actors are subject to various incentives to act selfishly on the basis of their own interests in order to meet their individual needs.

## Metropolises in Brazilian federalism

In Brazil, the issue of the governability of metropolises emerged almost concurrently with the phenomenon of metropolisation. Indeed, it is at the end of the second half of the 1970s in the context of accelerated industrialisation and population explosion of large cities, including Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, that nine metropolitan areas were created by the federal Government which was under the military *coup*<sup>4</sup> at that period. They function not only as planning and management units that comprise different public bodies subordinated to their respective States, but also as representatives from municipal governments forming their deliberative councils. These bodies should promote cooperation between different

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<sup>4</sup> The Federal Complementary Laws No. 14, June 8, 1973 and No. 27, November 3, 1975 and the Complementary Law of the Federated State No. 94, of May 29, 1974 established the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Recife, Fortaleza, Goiânia and Belém.

levels of government for the provision of services considered of general interest: wastewater sanitation, transport and road network, exploration of water resources, etc. However, the Federal law that created these institutions subordinated the rules governing the occupancy of urban land, under municipal jurisdiction, to their compatibility with the provision planning of these services, besides conditioning the municipalities' access to federal resources, including loans, to this planning.

At that time, the initiative of the federal government expressed its technical design of public planning and its power to make institutional changes. The technical elites that have dominated the bureaucracy of the federal government since 1964 intended to conduct the reform of the Brazilian State to increase rationality, so that it could assume its role of planner of the national development with the greatest efficiency. As part of this reform, the military created a new model of intergovernmental relations based on the principles of a hierarchial cooperative federalism through a system of division of competences and resources whose implementation entailed the accession of the municipal governments and the federated States to the guidelines and priorities of planning and management set vertically<sup>5</sup>.

Brazilian bodies of metropolitan planning and managing ran into crisis from 1979 as they were deprived of their technical capabilities and their bases of political legitimacy after receiving strong criticism of their technocratic character, and especially of their association with the authoritarian regime. The erosion of these institutions of metropolitan governance took place in a historical context dominated by the effects of the developmentalist model crisis initiated by the oil shocks, which resulted in the reduction of the Brazilian State capacity to resort to international loans to finance the accelerated pace of industrial growth. During the 1980s, Brazilian society experienced a long process of re-democratization during which an important role would be played by the older municipal ideologies present in Brazilian political culture. These ideologies had been renewed by a certain ideal of local democracy based on the direct participation of citizens in public management.

The institutional fragility of the bodies created in 1979, such as the instances of metropolitan governance, reached its peak in 1988, the year when the constitutional reform hierarchically replaced the cooperative federalism

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<sup>5</sup> The best example of this project is the creation of the Participation Funding of the Federated States and Municipalities created in 1963 and included in the Constitution reform of 1967.

by the “compartmentalized federalism” (ABRÚCIO, SANO and SYDOW, 2010). The latter dedicates the virtues of a participatory local democracy as a strategy for the State democratization, as well as the promotion of the universalization of urban services and territorial distributive justice in the distribution of costs and benefits of public intervention. As we shall see, this constitutional reform has been accompanied by the creation of a series of legal and planning instruments that strengthen the municipality as a self-governing instance of formulation of urban policies, thus starting the era of “autarchical municipalism” (DANIEL, 2001). This federalism led to the creation of a political environment of competition between the municipalities characterized by few incentives to the establishment of lasting and systematic cooperative relationships between different levels of government – Union, Federated States and Municipalities.

This type of relationship is expressed acutely in metropolitan areas through a fragmented management not only of public policies but also of the administration systems of urban services. Nonetheless, these obstacles do not result directly from the federal model adopted in 1988, but from the articulation of these characteristics compartmentalized with the localistic dynamics present in the Brazilian political system in which the federated States still play a central role. The control of municipalities over the construction and reproduction of political representation is a strategic element for them. Similarly, for the municipalities, political alliances with the federated States – at the expense of inter-municipal alliances – are all strategies for short-term political gains. Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination decisions, horizontal and vertical, run counter both to the satisfaction of various interests and to a short-term political calculation. These two phenomena are reinforced by the existence of significant asymmetries in the metropolitan structure that, in most of the country, are monocentric and polarized by a powerful municipality centre around which peripheral municipalities revolve.

## Local democracy in compartmentalized federalism

The new Constitution of Brazil has privileged the decentralization of public action at the municipal level. It has also put into action various participation mechanisms of civil society in the definition, monitoring and control of public policies. The participatory process is, indeed, the

cornerstone of the government system of the country which establishes that power may be exercised either by the elected representatives, through universal suffrage by direct and secret ballot, or by direct participation, through plebiscite, referendum and popular initiative laws (SANTOS JUNIOR, RIBEIRO and AZEVEDO, 2004). As regards the permanent institutional channels of direct participation, the Constitution of 1988 highlights the role of the Public Policies Sector Councils attending the three levels of the country's administrative structure: federal, federate States, and municipal level (GOHN, 2004). Created in the 1990s, the said councils are mostly thematic and are associated with specific social policies. Their personnel are members of the government and representatives of civil society organizations, have unpaid volunteer mandates, and may be replaced at any time by the social organisations they represent.

The Federal Constitution of 1988, promulgated in a context of social rights assertion, also sought to guarantee the principle of the cities' social function, urban equity, and of a better distribution of offices and benefits of the urbanisation process. Aiming to reach this objective, the text affirmed the role of municipalities in urban management and created the Urban Development Master Plan – mandatorily developed by cities comprising over 20 thousand people – as the essential instrument of urban policy. Thirteen years later, in 2001, with the creation of the City Statute – the Federal law that regulates the articles of the Constitution dealing with urban policy –, the Urban Development Master Plan will enhance its role as a basic instrument for urban development and expansion policy, insofar as the City Statute extends its mandatory nature to all cities in metropolitan areas and urban agglomerations.

The main objective of the Urban Development Master Plan is to define the social function of the city and urban property in order to (i) ensure access to urban and regularized land to the overall segments of society, (ii) guarantee the right to housing and urban services to all citizens, and (iii) to implement a democratic and participative management. Municipalities have designed their Master Plans as laws regulating the use and occupation of the soil in accordance with the basic principles of the City Statute. However, despite the technical quality and good political intentions present in many Master Plans, municipalities have faced many difficulties to implement them, that is, to enforce what has been approved as law. The reasons for this failure are many: prevalence of the interests of large

economic groups, especially those related to real estate production and building, in addition to the weak administrative and institutional capacity of the municipalities to effectively control the process of occupancy and development of their urban territory.

As regards inter-municipal relations, crucial to give coherence to the urban development of the metropolitan territory, it is noted that in most cases the Master Plans adopted by the municipalities in the metropolitan regions are unable to seize the theme in depth. The issue of the relations between metropolitan municipalities seems treated secondarily, and there are few references to agreements and instruments of inter-municipal cooperation.

Thus, the lack of metropolitan management and the low degree of cooperation between the municipalities located in metropolitan areas impact negatively on sector policies whose territorial scope exceeds municipal administrative boundaries, as is the case of management policies of most urban infrastructures (public transportation, sanitation), including those regarding urban waters management, especially rain and floods waters. Water management works on the principle of «watershed», a territorial scale which generally exceeds the municipality boundaries. Therefore, it implies a strong articulation and integration of actions between the different institutional levels present in the basin territory. This integration concerns the systems and activities directly related to the use of water in the basin, especially the access to drinking water, the treatment of waste water, the fight against floods, the distribution of water for industries, water to produce energy, as well as the systems that have an indirect impact on water such as waste collection. It also concerns the integration between instances that share responsibility for territory development (municipalities and federated States), which includes planning instruments for the process of urban development put into action by these different instances so as to avoid the emergence of problems such as the degradation of water resources or flooding.

## Fragmented Governance: territory management VS water management

The Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro was not established by the Federal Law No. 14 of 1973, but by an Act of the federal government of 1974 which decreed the merger of the States of Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara. It was a geopolitical strategy of the military government to

strengthen the former national capital and reduce the federal imbalance caused by the industrial concentration in São Paulo. The institutionalization of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro has been accompanied by the creation of FUNDREM (Foundation for the Development of the Metropolitan Region) which was responsible for the planning and coordination of the actions carried out by the municipal governments and the federated States in the management of land occupation and provision of general interest services. However, FUNDREM did not distinguish itself as an institution of metropolitan governance. Its low functional legitimacy and the fragility of its political legitimacy prevented it from working as an arena for cooperation between the government of the federated State and municipal governments. It was abolished in 1989 by an Act of the governor and no political player stood up in its defense. Since then, public policy management is inscribed into a framework of fragmented actions, marked by non-cooperation and conflict between the different levels of government.

At the same time, the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro is affected by an emancipation process of many districts that are transformed into municipalities, in addition to the establishment of municipal governments that are poorly qualified, technically and politically, to implement an effective urban management. On the other hand, it is historically characterized by important polarization around its main municipality. Indeed, the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro predominates in terms of population, budgetary resources, concentration of economic activities, infrastructure and services network, and is also one of the most expressive cities of the country on both the cultural and political levels. This polarization around this main municipality will continue, despite the fact that from the 1990s other municipalities such as Niterói and Duque de Caxias began to play an increasingly important role in the economic development of the State of Rio de Janeiro and the Metropolitan Region. As regards the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, it has never acted as initiator or protagonist of any integration or cooperation between the metropolitan municipalities. On the contrary, throughout the last few decades it kept a position of constant competition with the other municipalities of the Metropolitan Area. This situation was caused mainly on account of the discrepancies between the political parties in power in various municipalities, as well as between the representatives of the Federal and federated State governments.

Such configuration has failed, so far, to encourage inter-municipal cooperation. Indeed, on one hand, the federated State is not involved either in the definition of a metropolitan planning or in the deepening of the relationship between the municipalities integrating this territory and, on the other, these same municipalities have failed to create the instances needed to their cooperation or consultation. Most of them confront their problems in isolation whether in negotiations with the federal government or with the federated State.

The Metropolitan Area overlaps the territory of the Iguaçu/Sarapuí basin, an area of 727 km<sup>2</sup> in which are completely contained the municipalities of Belford Roxo and Mesquita, certain parts of the municipalities of Nilópolis, São João de Meriti, Nova Iguaçu, and Duque de Caxias, all located in the region of Baixada Fluminense, and a part of the West Zone of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro. This watershed is characterized by the recurrence of flood and overflowing phenomena, sources of material losses and exposure of the population to diseases, which can, in some cases, cause death in families living on the banks. It is estimated that about 180 thousand people live in the flood-prone areas of the basin<sup>6</sup>. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accurately estimate the number of the affected individuals and the damage caused by these floods. For example, it is important to include in this evaluation the citizens' impossibility to reach their work places, as well as the interruption of the traffic and trade along the flooded tracks<sup>7</sup>.

The exposure of Baixada Fluminense to flooding results in part from the basin topography of the Iguaçu-Sarapuí rivers which consists of two landform units: Serra do Mar<sup>8</sup> and Baixada Fluminense. There is a significant difference in altitude (1600 metres) between the highest point of the mountain area, the peak of Tinguá, and the valley. The climate is hot and humid, and during the rain season, in summer, heavy rainfalls – in the order of 1700 mm / year – turn rivers into torrents that flow into the valley with a strong power of erosion. Upon reaching the plain, they lose their speed and leave their beds causing extensive flooding.

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<sup>6</sup> See Carneiro (2008).

<sup>7</sup> See “Laboratório de Hidrologia e Estudo do Meio Ambiente da COPPE / UFRJ – PNUD” (1996).

<sup>8</sup> The term *Serra do Mar* literally means “mountainous area of the sea”.



However, these natural factors could be controlled if there were a planning for land occupation at an appropriate level, using the watershed as a territorial unit of reference for flood management. The origins of the problems aforementioned are traced back to the fragmentation of the regulation of soil occupation, which is inscribed in a logic of electoral localism and satisfaction of clientelist interests that impairs the capacity of the municipalities' influence on urban reality and subordinates it to the political co-option interests at local level. In this context, even if those municipalities have Urban Development Master Plans they are unable to guide the urbanization process to minimize the problem, either because control instruments are not enforced or because territorial planning instruments are poorly designed. Similarly, there is no articulation between the various Urban Development Master Plans, as they are designed in a logic based on the recognition of municipal administrative boundaries.

The consequences of this fragmentation on the occupation and use of the basin soil are numerous: deficit of urban infrastructures and of services for treating wastewater and collection of solid waste, disorderly and illegal occupation of the banks and floodplains, and proliferation of illegal or built subdivisions on the sidelines of urban and environmental legislation.

The instruments of planning and regulation of the use and occupation of the soil developed at the local level suffer a certain fragility and a lack of articulation. Note that there is not, at the level of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro, instruments of territory planning or mechanisms for inter-municipal coordination and cooperation able to avoid the aggravation of flooding problems caused by the disorderly expansion of the urban fabric and the occupation of the soil in the watershed of the Iguaçu/Sarapuí rivers. The government policy of the federated State goes precisely in the opposite direction, insofar as it is based on projects that do not interact between them and that establish, therefore, competing goals regarding the needs of the basin territory. This is the case, for example, of the drainage projects of the Iguaçu basin and the construction of a beltway known as «Metropolitan Arch», with strong impact on the territory of Baixada Fluminense.

The first case is the Project of Flood Management, Urbanization and Environmental Recovery of the Basins of the Iguaçu, Botas and Sarapuí Rivers that remained unheeded for nearly 10 years, created with funding from the federal government in the context of its Program of Growth Acceleration (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento) (PAC) initiated in

2007. This project is based on an integrated vision of the basin but it had to be reduced due to limited resources and emergency actions relating to the sustainable urban drainage. With a budget of over 200 million of reais<sup>9</sup>, it covers the overall six municipalities of the watershed listed previously which are also part of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro. Its main achievements are the desilting of watercourses, recovery of degraded shorelines, planting of green areas, construction of cycle tracks and coastal parks, channel development, meso-level drainage works and relocation of riverside populations.

The construction of the Metropolitan Arch, benefiting from the same federal government program, aims to consolidate a new road axis through the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro from East to West at the intersection of a railway station and five federal bus stations and connect many large-scale industrial poles which are settled in the region. At a cost of around one billion of reais, this new road axis aims the introduction of new vectors of urban expansion to unserved municipalities, as those of the Iguaçú/Sarapuá basin. However, the announced urban expansion towards the watershed unoccupied areas may lead to the intensification of environmental degradation and soil sealing, which will result in the acceleration of the already high rate of flooding and in the waste of resources that remained tied up for a long time on account of a project of flood contention in the region. Thus, it seems clear that, despite its position as leader of a project addressed to a greater metropolitan articulation, the government of the federated State does not contribute, indeed, towards such articulation, as seen at the level of municipal governments.

In addition, a project of drainage or flood management in an area such as a watershed must imperatively create articulations with policies of environmental sanitation like the establishment of networks of collection and treatment of wastewater, or effective programmes of collection of household waste that are under the responsibility of the various municipalities concerned. Obviously, the latter must create articulations between themselves and with other federal entities and other instances involving civil society and private actors, as is the case of Sector Councils. This lack of articulation not only prevents the solution of existing problems, but also it aggravates conditions that are already critical and which characterize Baixada Fluminense.

<sup>9</sup> *Real* is the actual Brazilian currency.

In the opposite direction to the situation described, we argue in this chapter that the strategy used both to deal with the problem of flooding and with the promotion of a long-lasting urban development of the area consists of a revival of mechanisms of metropolitan governance, which could be based on the following aspects: 1) articulation of the three spheres of government to create mechanisms of metropolitan governance; (2) regulation and control of the use of the soil at the regional level; (3) review and adequacy of municipal master plans in accordance with the requirements of urban control and expansion, aiming to ensure public safety and environment protection; (4) implementation of compensatory measures for a long-lasting drainage to control the flow of water in the upper part of the basin by establishing physical boundaries to the expansion of the urban perimeters of the metropolitan municipalities.

To do this, it is fundamental that the municipalities, in joint action with the federated State, provide a legal regulation appropriate to these areas by applying the urban and fiscal measures to address the first cause of this expansion, namely the housing deficit. Only this set of articulated strategies will be able to ensure the maintenance of non-urbanized areas in the basin, so that to prevent the issue of flooding in consolidated urban areas.

## Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, we would like to propose some reflections of a general nature regarding the substantive issue around which our analysis of the *fluminense*<sup>10</sup> metropolis is organized. As we have seen, the latter is characterized by the complete lack of practices of metropolitan governance, including sector policies, as illustrated by the case of the policy of environmental sanitation. It is an extreme manifestation of the paradox mentioned in the Introduction: considering that the city is the second metropolis of the country in terms of economic weight, the lack of mobilization of political forces around a project of metropolitan governance does surprise us. Indeed, it is true that, in general, Brazilian metropolises are characterized by the fragility of their institutions of governance. In many cases there were experiments of construction of mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between municipal governments and those of the federated States. This is particularly the case of the cities of São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Recife,

<sup>10</sup> *Fluminense* is the adjective related to Rio de Janeiro.

where the governments of their federated States have sought to develop plans of metropolitan development in partnership with municipalities, civil society and private actors. Although these experiments have not led to the creation of a public authority with the necessary legitimacy to act on behalf of the general interest of the metropolises, they attest to the mobilization of political forces to meet the challenges of metropolitan governance. It is also likely that these initiatives correspond to the resumption, since 2005, of urban investments – regarding sanitation, transportation, housing, etc. – on the part of the federal government, as part of a national development strategy. As these investments were made through public programs managed through intergovernmental partnerships, it is likely that they are selective incentives for public actors develop relationships of cooperation and collaboration.

This being said, in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro the situation of institutional fragmentation still remains. How this paradox can be explained? To what extent is it linked to the specific effects of the national political model, between compartmentalized federalism and local democracy? The difficulties of transcending the institutional fragmentation of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro can be explained by the combination of sociological and geoeconomic factors resulting from a fragmented political dynamics that leads to the fragmentation of interests.

The first factor is strongly linked to the effects of dependency that have marked the social and political formation of the metropolis, created from the merger of the former State of Guanabara and the State of Rio de Janeiro in the context of a geopolitical reform carried out by the military in 1974 and endorsed by the Complementary Law N° 20. The creation of the State of Guanabara date of the transfer of the national capital to Brasília with the transformation of the former Federal District of Rio de Janeiro. More than two states merging, it was the juxtaposition of two cultures and two distinct political grounds. The State of Guanabara is dissolved in the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, and some municipalities that belonged to the former State of Rio de Janeiro integrated its periphery. Many of them were established in recent times, following the emancipation of former districts developed to cope with the intense migration generated by the industrialization after World War II. The municipalities on the periphery have seen the reproduction and routing of municipal governments based on a model of private appropriation of power control. Hence, this shows that an urban society can be very quickly built without forming a political society.

It is this historical context that allowed the formation of a privatist political order in the metropolitan periphery, controlled by personal networks that transform municipalities into electoral machines based on the selective distribution of resources<sup>11</sup>. In this political order, the management of urban land has a fundamental importance, insofar as the legalization of irregular and even illegal land divisions has turned into a powerful bargaining chip. The municipal elites of the periphery have therefore no interest to delegate their management power in that territory or to contain the growth of urban occupation. Conversely, the political elites of the former Federal District have never sought the articulation with the municipalities of the metropolitan periphery. This situation is explained by the aforementioned historical reasons and the fact that the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro has an electorate sufficient to elect representatives to the Legislative Assembly and the House of Representatives. Moreover, the elites of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro have always sought their conditions of reproduction in the privileged relations with instances and bodies of the federal government, which resulted from their close proximity to national elites, a factor derived from the history of the former Capital of the Republic.

The second factor highlights the geoeconomic segmentation of the metropolis in the political dynamics. The municipalities of the periphery have some electoral weight, but as they concentrate significant contingents of destitute population they are unable to turn it into an actual political power. In their great majority, they do not have a sufficient tax base to exercise the autonomy recognized in the Constitution of 1988, which makes them highly dependent on decisions of resource allocation made by the government of the federated State. Thus, a relationship of mutual support is established between the municipal elites and the federated State elites through the bias of coalitions of interests not much favorable to metropolitan interests. In the present case, related to environmental sanitation problems, the elites at the head of the government of the federated State have no interest in a project of water management that will reduce the power of control over the use and occupation of the urban soil owned by the municipal elites. The latter, dependent on resources that cross the government of the federated State, adopt practices of inter-municipal competition not much favourable to the establishment of a water management plan.

<sup>11</sup> See on this argument the work of Siqueira Barreto (2004).

Finally, it is important to mention the fragility of the associative dynamics prevailing in the municipalities of the periphery and its consequences on the ability to dominate local elites. The spaces and instruments used by the population for participating in municipal management – established by the Constitution of 1988 – are controlled by the social elites that comprise segments that are most privileged in terms of education and income<sup>12</sup>, that is, segments which are far from representing the majority of the population of Baixada Fluminense.

In this context, Sector Councils operating in these municipalities seem to have been extinguished when we consider either the action of the groups that compose them or their deliberative capacity, even though this capacity is defined legally. In practice, the activity of these councils is limited to the application of the federal recommendation that created them, and have no impact *de facto* on the policies that are ruled by them. They operate as legitimators of a certain rationality related to local democracy as it was proclaimed in our last Constitution in force, fulfilling the elites' aspirations, as it has always been. Hence, what is shown in this scenario is the fact that spaces and instruments for participation are better consolidated at the federal level than in the municipalities, and that the State of Rio de Janeiro has no City Council in which it would be possible to develop to some degree a democratic management that will favor the metropolis.

Consequently, the institution of spaces and instruments of metropolitan governance constitute a pressing challenge in the case of Rio de Janeiro in the same way as the fulfillment of the ideal of local democracy, mainly in the municipalities of Baixada Fluminense. These are two major challenges which must be dealt with jointly, otherwise the existing problems will reach greater proportions, which already reverberate so tragically on the living conditions of the local population, as is the case of floods.

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<sup>12</sup> See Ribeiro and Santos Junior (1996) and Santos Junior, Ribeiro and Azevedo (2004).

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## About the Authors

### **Editor:**

#### **Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro**

Full Professor of the Institute of Urban and Regional Planning (Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano e Regional/IPPUR) of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro/UFRJ (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro). He is the Coordinator of the INCT/Observatório das Metrôpoles and responsible for a networking comprising comparative studies on 15 Brazilian metropolises. He holds a Doctoral degree in Architecture and Urbanism from the University of São Paulo/USP (Universidade de São Paulo). He has an extensive bibliographical production developed over 30 years of academic studies which records his investigations on the Brazilian urban reality. Currently, he is the editor of the *Cadernos Metrôpoles* and *e-metrópolis* Journals.

### **Collaborators:**

#### **Adauto Lúcio Cardoso**

He holds a Bachelor's degree in Architecture and Urbanism from UFRJ (1974), a Master's degree in Urban and Regional Planning from UFRJ (1988) and a Doctorate degree in Architecture and Urbanism from USP (1997). He is currently an Associate Professor of IPPUR/UFRJ and a Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles. He has an extensive experience in the field of Urban Planning, and has been working mainly on the following themes: Housing Policy and Regulatory Instruments for the Use of Urban Land.

#### **Ana Lucia Nogueira de Paiva Britto**

She holds a Bachelor's degree in Geography from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro/PUC-Rio (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro), a Master's degree in

Urban and Regional Planning from UFRJ and a Doctorate degree in Urban Planning from the Institute of Urbanism in Paris – University of Paris XII (Institut D’Urbanisme de Paris/Université de Paris XII/Paris-Val-de-Marne). She is currently an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism at PROURB/UFRJ (Post-graduate Programme in Urbanism at UFRJ) and a Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles.

### **Christopher Thomas Gaffney**

Visiting Professor at the Post-graduation Programme of Architecture and Urbanism at the Federal Fluminense University/PPGAU/UFF (Universidade Federal Fluminense) and Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles. He holds a Master’s degree in Geography from the University of Massachusetts in Amherst and a Doctorate degree in Geography from the University of Texas in Austin. He is the author of the book *Temples of the Earthbound Gods* (University of Texas Press, 2008) and of various academic articles focusing on the urban and social changes resulting from large sports events in Brazil. He is responsible for the site Hunting White Elephants ([www.geostadia.com](http://www.geostadia.com)).

### **Erick Omena de Melo**

He holds a Master’s degree in Urban Planning from IPPUR/UFRJ and he is a Doctoral student in Urban Planning at the Oxford Brookes University (a CAPES scholarship recipient – Full Doctorate). He is an affiliated Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles and he has been developing investigation on the urban re-structuring related to large sports events.

### **Fátima Alves**

She has conducted research on the Brazilian educational system focusing on education policy, school choice, teacher policies, school accountability and educational evaluations. She is currently an Assistant Professor at the Department of Education at PUC-Rio. She has written books, articles and reports comparing various aspects of education cross-nationally for both Brazilian and international audiences. She holds a Doctorate degree in Education from PUC-Rio.

### **Filipe Souza Corrêa**

He holds a Master's degree in Urban and Regional Planning from IPPUR/UFRJ and he is a Doctoral student in Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais/ UFMG (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais). He is an affiliated Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles and with the Centre for Legislative Studies/UFMG (Centro de Estudos Legislativos).

### **Flávia de Sousa Araújo**

Architect and Urbanist from the Federal University of Pará/UFPA (Universidade Federal do Pará), she is a Doctoral student at IPPUR/UFRJ and she is presently enrolled in a Post-graduate Specialization Programme in Anthropology at the Federal University of Alagoas/UFAL (Universidade Federal de Alagoas). She holds a Master's degree in Architecture and Urbanism from the Federal University of Bahia/UFBA (Universidade Federal da Bahia) and a Specialization degree in Urban Development and Environment at UFPA. He is currently an Assistant Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles Network.

### **Jean Legroux**

He is a Political Science graduate from the Institute of Political Studies/IEP (Institut d'Études Politiques) and holds a Master's degree in Engineering of the Urban Services in Networks from IEP and from the University of Rennes 1. He is a Doctoral student at the Transport Economics Laboratory/LET (Laboratoire d'Économie des Transports), affiliated to the University of Lyon 2/CNRS/ENTPE; and, also, at IPPUR/UFRJ under joint supervision. He is an affiliated Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles.

### **Juciano M. Rodrigues**

Researcher at the Observatório das Metrôpoles. He holds a Doctorate degree in Urbanism from the Post-graduate Programme in Urbanism (PROURB/UFRJ). He is a Postdoctoral Researcher at IPPUR-UFRJ through the Programa de Pós-Doutorado Nota-10 of Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro/FAPERJ.

### **Luciana Corrêa do Lago**

Architect, she holds a Doctorate degree in Architecture and Urbanism from USP (1998). She is an Associate Professor at IPPUR/UFRJ and a Researcher at the Observatório das Metrópoles networking. She has been developing investigations on the fields of Urban Sociology and Urban Politics, with emphasis on the following topics: work and structuring of the urban territory; urban self-managing; housing cooperativism and production and representation of the city.

### **Márcio da Costa**

He is an Associate Professor of Sociology of Education at UFRJ. He holds a Doctorate degree from Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute/IUPERJ (Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro). His main research focuses on the distribution of educational opportunities and on social inequalities which are the subjects of most of the articles he has published.

### **Marianna Olinger**

PhD(c) in Urban and Regional Planning at IPPUR/UFRJ. She holds a MSc's degree in Social Policy and Planning from the London School of Economics. She is an Associate Researcher at Observatório das Metrópoles and a member of the editorial committee of the *emetropolis* Journal. Politics and policy making related to urban planning, urban violence, public safety and human rights have been object of her investigation interests in recent years.

### **Mariane C. Koslinski**

Associate Professor of the Faculty of Education (Faculdade de Educação) at UFRJ, and Researcher at the Observatório das Metrópoles and Observatório Educação e Cidade. She holds a Doctorate degree in Sociology from the Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences (Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Sociais/IFCS/UFRJ), and completed her postdoctoral studies at IPPUR/UFRJ. She is the author of various articles in Sociology of Education, focusing on topics related to social, urban and education inequalities, civil society and the State, and assessment of educational policies.

### **Matthew Richmond**

A Doctoral student in the Geography Department at the Brazil Institute at King's College London, and an affiliated Researcher at the Observatório das Metrópoles (IPPUR/UFRJ). He holds a Master's degree in Social Sciences from the University of Cambridge. His doctoral research, "Network and *favela* in the urban opportunity system", explores the relationship between the individual, the neighborhood and the urban economic, institutional and social processes in the production of inequalities in contemporary Rio de Janeiro.

### **Mauro Rego Monteiro dos Santos**

Sociologist, he holds a Master's degree from IPPUR/UFRJ (2000). He is currently a recipient of an extension fellowship from CNPq and integrates the National Coordination of the Metropolization and Large Events Project (Axis: Housing) (Projeto Metropolização e Megaeventos [eixo Moradia]) developed by the Observatório das Metrópoles/IPPUR/UFRJ. He has an extensive experience in popular education, training for social and governmental agents in the area of urban planning, housing and environmental sanitation, and in investigations on the democratic management of cities and urban policies monitoring.

### **Orlando Alves dos Santos Júnior**

Professor of IPPUR/UFRJ. He holds a Master's degree and a Doctorate degree in Urban and Regional Planning from IPPUR/UFRJ. He is a Sociologist and Researcher at the Observatório das Metrópoles. He has published many articles focusing on Urban Planning and Urban Sociology.

### **Samuel Thomas Jaenisch**

Sociologist, he holds a Master's degree in Urban and Regional Planning at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul/UFRGS (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul), and currently he is a Doctoral student at the Post-graduation Programme of IPPUR/UFRJ. He is a Researcher at the Observatório das Metrópoles where he is devoted to the study of the impacts of recent housing policies in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro.

